The first stage of the Stalingrad battle. The battle of Stalingrad - briefly about the main thing. Paulus' breakthrough to the city

The turning point in the course of the Second World War was the great summary of events is not able to convey the special spirit of solidarity and heroism of the Soviet soldiers who participated in the battle.

Why was Stalingrad so important to Hitler? Historians identify several reasons that the Fuhrer wanted to take Stalingrad at all costs and did not give the order to retreat even when the defeat was obvious.

A large industrial city on the banks of the longest river in Europe - the Volga. Transport junction of important river and land routes that united the center of the country with the southern regions. Hitler, having captured Stalingrad, would not only cut off an important transport artery of the USSR and create serious difficulties in supplying the Red Army, but would also reliably cover the German army advancing in the Caucasus.

Many researchers believe that the presence of Stalin in the name of the city made its capture important for Hitler from an ideological and propaganda point of view.

There is a point of view according to which there was a secret agreement between Germany and Turkey on its entry into the ranks of the allies immediately after the passage for Soviet troops along the Volga was blocked.

Stalingrad battle. Summary of events

The time frame of the battle: 07/17/42 - 02/02/43.
Participated: from Germany - the reinforced 6th Army of Field Marshal Paulus and the Allied troops. On the part of the USSR - the Stalingrad Front, created on 07/12/42, under the command of Marshal Timoshenko first, from 07/23/42 - Lieutenant General Gordov, and from 08/09/42 - Colonel General Eremenko.
Battle periods: defensive - from 17.07 to 11.18.42, offensive - from 11.19.42 to 02.02.43.

In turn, the defensive stage is divided into battles on the distant approaches to the city in the bend of the Don from 17.07 to 10.08.42, battles on the distant approaches in the interfluve of the Volga and Don from 11.08 to 12.09.42, battles in the suburbs and the city itself from 13.09 to 18.11 .42 years.

Losses on both sides were colossal. The Red Army lost almost 1,130,000 soldiers, 12,000 guns, and 2,000 aircraft.

Germany and the Allied countries lost almost 1.5 million soldiers.

defensive stage

July 17th- the first serious clash between our troops and enemy forces on the banks
August 23- enemy tanks came close to the city. German aviation began to regularly bomb Stalingrad.
September 13- assault on the city. The glory of the workers of Stalingrad factories and factories thundered all over the world, who repaired damaged equipment and weapons under fire.
October 14- The Germans launched an offensive military operation off the banks of the Volga in order to capture the Soviet bridgeheads.
November 19- our troops went on the counteroffensive according to the plan of operation "Uranus".

The entire second half of the summer of 1942 was hot. The summary and chronology of the events of the defense indicate that our soldiers, with a shortage of weapons and a significant superiority in manpower from the enemy, did the impossible. They not only defended Stalingrad, but also went on the counteroffensive in difficult conditions of exhaustion, lack of uniforms and the harsh Russian winter.

Offensive and victory

As part of Operation Uranus, Soviet soldiers managed to surround the enemy. Until November 23, our soldiers strengthened the blockade around the Germans.

12 December- the enemy made a desperate attempt to break out of the encirclement. However, the breakthrough attempt was unsuccessful. Soviet troops began to compress the ring.
December 17- The Red Army recaptured the German positions on the Chir River (the right tributary of the Don).
December 24- ours advanced 200 km into the operational depth.
31th of December- Soviet soldiers advanced another 150 km. The front line stabilized at the turn of Tormosin-Zhukovskaya-Komissarovsky.
January 10- our offensive in accordance with the plan "Ring".
January 26- The 6th German Army was divided into 2 groups.
January 31- destroyed the southern part of the former 6th German army.
February 02- liquidated the northern group of fascist troops. Our soldiers, the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad, won. The enemy capitulated. Field Marshal Paulus, 24 generals, 2500 officers and almost 100 thousand exhausted German soldiers were taken prisoner.

The Battle of Stalingrad brought great destruction. Photos of war correspondents captured the ruins of the city.

All the soldiers who took part in the significant battle proved to be courageous and brave sons of the Motherland.

Sniper Zaitsev Vasily, with aimed shots, destroyed 225 opponents.

Nikolai Panikakha - threw himself under an enemy tank with a bottle of combustible mixture. He sleeps forever on Mamayev Kurgan.

Nikolai Serdyukov - closed the embrasure of the enemy pillbox, silencing the firing point.

Matvey Putilov, Vasily Titaev - signalmen who established communication by clamping the ends of the wire with their teeth.

Gulya Koroleva - a nurse, carried dozens of seriously wounded soldiers from the battlefield near Stalingrad. Participated in the attack on the heights. The mortal wound did not stop the brave girl. She continued to shoot until the last minute of her life.

The names of many, many heroes - infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers and pilots - were given to the world by the Battle of Stalingrad. A brief summary of the course of hostilities is not able to perpetuate all the feats. Entire volumes of books have been written about these brave people who gave their lives for the freedom of future generations. Streets, schools, factories are named after them. The heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad must never be forgotten.

Significance of the Battle of Stalingrad

The battle was not only of grandiose proportions, but also of extremely significant political significance. The bloody war continued. The Battle of Stalingrad was its main turning point. It can be said without exaggeration that it was after the victory at Stalingrad that mankind gained hope for victory over fascism.

The battle for Stalingrad in terms of the duration and fierceness of the fighting, in terms of the number of people and military equipment participating, surpassed at that time all the battles of world history.

At certain stages, more than 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, up to 26 thousand guns participated in it on both sides. The fascist German troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as a large number of military equipment, weapons and equipment, killed, wounded, captured.

Defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd)

In accordance with the plan of the summer offensive campaign of 1942, the German command, having concentrated large forces in the southwestern direction, expected to defeat the Soviet troops, go to the big bend of the Don, seize Stalingrad on the move and capture the Caucasus, and then resume the offensive in the Moscow direction.

For the attack on Stalingrad, the 6th Army (commander - Colonel General F. von Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. By July 17, it included 13 divisions, in which there were about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. They were supported by aviation of the 4th air fleet - up to 1200 combat aircraft.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad direction. On July 12, on the basis of the field administration of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. On July 23, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov was appointed commander of the front. The front also included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. At the same time, the 57th, as well as the 38th and 28th armies, on the basis of which the 1st and 4th tank armies were formed, were in reserve. The Volga military flotilla was subordinated to the front commander.

The newly created front began to fulfill the task, having only 12 divisions, in which there were 160 thousand soldiers and commanders, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars and about 400 tanks, the 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft.

In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters were involved. In the initial period of defensive actions near Stalingrad, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops by 1.7 times in personnel, by 1.3 times in artillery and tanks, and by more than 2 times in the number of aircraft.

On July 14, 1942, Stalingrad was declared under martial law. Four defensive bypasses were built on the outskirts of the city: outer, middle, inner and city. The entire population, including children, was mobilized for the construction of defensive structures. The factories of Stalingrad completely switched to the production of military products. Militia units, self-defense work units were created at factories and enterprises. Civilians, equipment of individual enterprises and material values were evacuated to the left bank of the Volga.

Defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. The main efforts of the troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where they occupied the defenses of the 62nd and 64th armies in order to prevent the enemy from forcing the river and breaking through it by the shortest route to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of these armies fought defensive battles for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. This allowed us to gain time to strengthen the defense at the main line. Despite the steadfastness, courage and perseverance shown by the troops, the armies of the Stalingrad Front failed to defeat the enemy groupings that had penetrated, and they had to retreat to the near approaches to the city.

On July 23-29, the 6th German Army made an attempt to encircle them with sweeping attacks on the flanks of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, go to the Kalach region and break through to Stalingrad from the west. As a result of the stubborn defense of the 62nd and 64th armies and the counterattack of the formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy's plan was thwarted.

Defense of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

July 31, the German command turned the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General G. Goth from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad direction. On August 2, its advanced units reached Kotelnikovsky, creating a threat of a breakthrough to the city. Fighting began on the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad.

To facilitate command and control of troops stretched over a 500 km zone, on August 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed a new one from several armies of the Stalingrad Front - the South-Eastern Front, the command of which was entrusted to Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were directed to the fight against the 6th German Army, which was advancing on Stalingrad from the west and northwest, and the South-Eastern Front was directed to the defense of the southwestern direction. On August 9-10, the troops of the South-Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the 4th Panzer Army and forced it to stop.

On August 21, the infantry of the 6th German Army crossed the Don and built bridges, after which the tank divisions moved to Stalingrad. At the same time, Gotha's tanks launched an offensive from the south and southwest. 23 August 4th Air Army von Richthofen subjected the city to a massive bombardment, dropping more than 1000 tons of bombs on the city.

Tank formations of the 6th Army moved towards the city, encountering almost no resistance, however, in the Gumrak area, they had to overcome the positions of anti-aircraft gun crews that had been put forward to fight the tanks until the evening. Nevertheless, on August 23, the 14th Panzer Corps of the 6th Army managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad near the village of Latoshynka. The enemy wanted to break into the city on the move through its northern outskirts, however, along with the army units, people's militia detachments, the Stalingrad police, the 10th division of the NKVD troops, sailors of the Volga military flotilla, cadets of military schools stood up to defend the city.

The enemy's breakthrough to the Volga further complicated and worsened the position of the units defending the city. The Soviet command took measures to destroy the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Volga. Until September 10, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the reserves of the Headquarters transferred to its structure launched continuous counterattacks from the north-west on the left flank of the 6th German Army. It was not possible to push the enemy back from the Volga, but the enemy offensive on the northwestern approaches to Stalingrad was suspended. The 62nd Army was cut off from the rest of the troops of the Stalingrad Front and was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.

Since September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, commanded by General V. I. Chuikov, and troops of the 64th Army General M.S. Shumilov. On the same day, after another bombardment, German troops launched an attack on the city from all directions. In the north, the main target was Mamayev Kurgan, from the height of which the crossing over the Volga was clearly visible, in the center the German infantry made its way to the railway station, in the south, Goth's tanks, with the support of the infantry, gradually moved towards the elevator.

On September 13, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 13th Guards Rifle Division to the city. Having crossed the Volga for two nights, the guards threw back the German troops from the area of the central crossing over the Volga, cleared many streets and quarters of them. On September 16, the troops of the 62nd Army, with the support of aviation, stormed the Mamaev Kurgan. Fierce battles for the southern and central parts of the city continued until the end of the month.

On September 21, on the front from Mamaev Kurgan to the Zatsaritsyno part of the city, the Germans launched a new offensive with the forces of five divisions. A day later, on September 22, the 62nd Army was cut into two parts: the Germans reached the central crossing north of the Tsaritsa River. From here they had the opportunity to view almost the entire rear of the army and conduct an offensive along the coast, cutting off the Soviet units from the river.

By September 26, the Germans managed to come close to the Volga in almost all areas. Nevertheless, Soviet troops continued to hold a narrow strip of the coast, and in some places even separate buildings at some distance from the embankment. Many objects changed hands many times.

The fighting in the city took on a protracted character. The troops of Paulus lacked the strength to finally throw the defenders of the city into the Volga, and the Soviet ones - to dislodge the Germans from their positions.

The struggle was for each building, and sometimes for part of the building, floor or basement. Snipers were active. The use of aviation and artillery, due to the proximity of enemy formations, became almost impossible.

From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were waged on the northern outskirts for the villages of the Krasny Oktyabr and Barrikady factories, and from October 4 - for these factories themselves.

At the same time, the Germans were attacking in the center on Mamaev Kurgan and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. By the evening of September 27, Mamaev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the area of the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, from where the Soviet units, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food and losing control, began to cross over to the left bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks of the newly arriving reserves.

They were rapidly melting, however, the losses of the 6th Army took on catastrophic proportions.

It included almost all the armies of the Stalingrad Front, except for the 62nd. Commander was appointed General K. K. Rokossovsky. From the composition of the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and to the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command General A. I. Eremenko. Each front was directly subordinated to the Stavka.

Commander of the Don Front Konstantin Rokossovsky and General Pavel Batov (right) in a trench near Stalingrad. Photo reproduction. Photo: RIA Novosti

By the end of the first decade of October, enemy attacks began to weaken, but in the middle of the month Paulus launched a new assault. On October 14, the German troops, after a powerful air and artillery preparation, went on the attack again.

Several divisions advanced on a sector of about 5 km. This offensive of the enemy, which lasted almost three weeks, led to the most fierce battle in the city.

On October 15, the Germans managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. After that, they launched an offensive along the banks of the Volga to the south. On October 17, the 138th division arrived in the army to support Chuikov's weakened formations. Fresh forces repelled enemy attacks, and from October 18, Paulus' ram began to noticeably lose its strength.

To alleviate the position of the 62nd Army, on October 19, troops from the Don Front went on the offensive from the area north of the city. The territorial success of the flank counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.

By the end of October, the offensive operations of the 6th Army slowed down, although in the area between the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, no more than 400 m remained to go to the Volga. Nevertheless, the tension of the fighting weakened, and the Germans basically consolidated the captured positions.

November 11 was made the last attempt to capture the city. This time the offensive was carried out by the forces of five infantry and two tank divisions, reinforced by fresh engineer battalions. The Germans managed to capture another section of the coast 500-600 m long in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant, but this was the last success of the 6th Army.

In other sectors, Chuikov's troops held their positions.

The offensive of the German troops in the Stalingrad direction was finally stopped.

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant, and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches.

During the defensive battles for Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost in July - November up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1000 tanks, over 2000 guns and mortars, more than 1400 aircraft. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 aircraft.

Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy grouping operating near Stalingrad, which created favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.

Stalingrad offensive operation

By the autumn of 1942, the technical re-equipment of the Red Army had been basically completed. At the factories located in the deep rear and evacuated, mass production of new military equipment was launched, which not only was not inferior, but often surpassed the equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht. During the past battles, Soviet troops gained combat experience. The moment had come when it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy and begin mass expulsion of him from the borders of the Soviet Union.

With the participation of the military councils of the fronts at Headquarters, a plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed.

The Soviet troops were to launch a decisive counter-offensive on a front of 400 km, encircle and destroy the enemy strike force concentrated in the Stalingrad area. This task was assigned to the troops of three fronts - the South-Western ( Commander General N. F. Vatutin), Donskoy ( Commander General K. K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad ( Commander General A. I. Eremenko).

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, although in tanks, artillery and aviation, Soviet troops already had a slight superiority over the enemy. Under such conditions, in order to successfully carry out the operation, it was necessary to create a significant superiority in forces in the directions of the main attacks, which was achieved with great skill. The success was ensured primarily due to the fact that special attention was paid to operational camouflage. The troops moved to the assigned positions only at night, while the radio stations of the units remained in the same places, continuing to work, so that the enemy had the impression that the units remained in their previous positions. All correspondence was forbidden, and orders were given only orally, and only to direct executors.

The Soviet command concentrated more than a million people on the direction of the main attack in a 60 km sector, supported by 900 T-34 tanks that had just rolled off the assembly line. Such a concentration of military equipment at the front has never happened before.

One of the centers of fighting in Stalingrad is an elevator. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The German command did not show due attention to the position of its Army Group "B", because. was waiting for the offensive of the Soviet troops against the Army Group "Center".

Group B Commander General Weichs did not agree with this opinion. He was worried about the bridgehead prepared by the enemy on the right bank of the Don opposite his formations. According to his urgent demands, by the end of October, several newly formed Luftwaffe field units were transferred to the Don in order to strengthen the defensive positions of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian formations.

Weichs' predictions were confirmed in early November, when aerial reconnaissance photographs showed the presence of several new crossings in the area. Two days later, Hitler ordered the transfer of the 6th Panzer and two infantry divisions from the English Channel to Army Group B as reserve reinforcements for the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies. It took about five weeks for their preparation and transfer to Russia. Hitler, however, did not expect any significant action from the enemy until early December, so he calculated that reinforcements should have arrived in time.

By the second week of November, with the appearance of Soviet tank units on the bridgehead, Weichs no longer doubted that a major offensive was being prepared in the zone of the 3rd Romanian army, which, possibly, would also be directed against the German 4th tank army. Since all of his reserves were at Stalingrad, Weichs decided to form a new grouping as part of the 48th Panzer Corps, which he placed behind the 3rd Romanian Army. He also transferred the 3rd Romanian armored division to this corps and was about to transfer the 29th motorized division of the 4th tank army there, but changed his mind, because he also expected an offensive in the area where the Gota formations were located. However, all the efforts made by Weichs turned out to be clearly insufficient, and the High Command was more interested in building up the power of the 6th Army for the decisive battle for Stalingrad than in strengthening the weak flanks of General Weichs' formations.

On November 19, at 0850, after a powerful, almost one and a half hour artillery preparation, despite the fog and heavy snowfall, the troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts, located northwest of Stalingrad, went on the offensive. The 5th Panzer, 1st Guards and 21st Armies acted against the 3rd Romanian.

Only one 5th tank army in its composition consisted of six rifle divisions, two tank corps, one cavalry corps and several artillery, aviation and anti-aircraft missile regiments. Due to a sharp deterioration in weather conditions, aviation was inactive.

It also turned out that during the artillery preparation, the enemy’s firepower was not completely suppressed, which is why the offensive of the Soviet troops at some point slowed down. After assessing the situation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, decided to bring tank corps into battle, which made it possible to finally crack the Romanian defense and develop the offensive.

On the Don Front, especially fierce battles unfolded in the offensive zone of the right-flank formations of the 65th Army. The first two lines of enemy trenches, passing along the coastal hills, were captured on the move. However, decisive battles unfolded behind the third line, which took place along the chalk heights. They were a powerful defense center. The location of the heights made it possible to fire at all the approaches to them with crossfire. All the hollows and steep slopes of the heights were mined and covered with barbed wire, and the approaches to them crossed deep and winding ravines. The Soviet infantry that reached this line was forced to lie down under heavy fire from the dismounted units of the Romanian cavalry division, reinforced by German units.

The enemy carried out violent counterattacks, trying to push the attackers back to their original position. At that moment it was not possible to get around the heights, and after a powerful artillery raid, the soldiers of the 304th Infantry Division stormed the enemy fortifications. Despite the hurricane of machine-gun and automatic fire, by 4 p.m. the enemy's stubborn resistance had been broken.

As a result of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved the greatest success. They broke through the defenses in two areas: southwest of the city of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. A gap up to 16 km wide was formed in the enemy defenses.

On November 20, south of Stalingrad, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. This came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The offensive of the Stalingrad Front also began in adverse weather conditions.

It was decided to begin artillery preparation in each army as soon as the necessary conditions for this were created. It was necessary to abandon its simultaneous conduct on the scale of the front, however, as well as from aviation training. Due to limited visibility, it was necessary to fire at unobservable targets, with the exception of those guns that were launched for direct fire. Despite this, the enemy's fire system was largely disrupted.

Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

After the artillery preparation, which lasted 40-75 minutes, the formations of the 51st and 57th armies went on the offensive.

Having broken through the defenses of the 4th Romanian army and repelled numerous counterattacks, they began to develop success in the western direction. By the middle of the day, conditions were created for the introduction of army mobile groups into the breakthrough.

The rifle formations of the armies advanced after the mobile groups, consolidating the success achieved.

To close the gap, the command of the 4th Romanian army had to bring into battle its last reserve - two regiments of the 8th cavalry division. But even this could not save the situation. The front collapsed, and the remnants of the Romanian troops fled.

The incoming reports painted a bleak picture: the front was cut, the Romanians were fleeing the battlefield, the counterattack of the 48th Panzer Corps was thwarted.

The Red Army went on the offensive south of Stalingrad, and the 4th Romanian Army, which was defending there, was defeated.

The Luftwaffe command reported that due to bad weather, aviation could not support ground troops. On the operational maps, the prospect of encirclement of the 6th Wehrmacht Army clearly loomed. The red arrows of the blows of the Soviet troops hung dangerously over its flanks and were about to close in the area between the Volga and the Don. In the course of almost continuous meetings at Hitler's headquarters, there was a feverish search for a way out of the situation. It was necessary to urgently make a decision about the fate of the 6th Army. Hitler himself, as well as Keitel and Jodl, considered it necessary to hold positions in the Stalingrad region and confine themselves to a regrouping of forces. The leadership of the OKH and the command of Army Group "B" found the only way to avoid disaster in withdrawing the troops of the 6th Army beyond the Don. However, Hitler's position was categorical. As a result, it was decided to transfer two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to Stalingrad.

The Wehrmacht command still hoped to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops with counterattacks by tank formations. The 6th Army was ordered to stay where it was. Hitler assured her command that he would not allow the encirclement of the army, and if it did happen, he would take all measures to unblock it.

While the German command was looking for ways to prevent the impending catastrophe, the Soviet troops developed the success achieved. A unit of the 26th Panzer Corps, during a daring night operation, managed to capture the only surviving crossing over the Don near the town of Kalach. The capture of this bridge was of great operational importance. The rapid overcoming of this large water barrier by the Soviet troops ensured the successful completion of the operation to encircle the enemy troops near Stalingrad.

By the end of November 22, the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts were separated by only 20-25 km. On the evening of November 22, Stalin ordered the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Yeryomenko, to join tomorrow with the advanced troops of the Southwestern Front, which had reached Kalach, and close the encirclement.

Anticipating such a development of events and in order to prevent the complete encirclement of the 6th field army, the German command urgently transferred the 14th tank corps to the area east of Kalach. Throughout the night of November 23 and the first half of the next day, units of the Soviet 4th mechanized corps held back the onslaught of enemy tank units rushing south and did not let them through.

The commander of the 6th Army already at 18 o'clock on November 22 radioed to the headquarters of Army Group "B" that the army was surrounded, the situation with ammunition was critical, fuel supplies were running out, and food was enough for only 12 days. Since the command of the Wehrmacht on the Don did not have any forces that could release the encircled army, Paulus turned to the Headquarters with a request for an independent breakthrough from the encirclement. However, his request went unanswered.

Red Army soldier with a banner. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Instead, he was ordered to immediately go to the boiler, where to organize an all-round defense and wait for help from outside.

On November 23, the troops of all three fronts continued the offensive. On this day, the operation reached its climax.

Two brigades of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the Don and launched an offensive against Kalach in the morning. A stubborn battle ensued. The enemy fiercely resisted, realizing the importance of holding this city. Nevertheless, by 2 p.m., he was driven out of Kalach, which housed the main supply base for the entire Stalingrad group. All the numerous warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food and other military equipment located there were either destroyed by the Germans themselves or captured by Soviet troops.

At about 4 p.m. on November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the Sovetsky area, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping. Despite the fact that instead of the planned two or three days, the operation took five days, the success was achieved.

An oppressive atmosphere reigned at Hitler's headquarters after the news of the encirclement of the 6th Army was received. Despite the obviously disastrous situation of the 6th Army, Hitler did not even want to hear about the abandonment of Stalingrad, because. in this case, all the successes of the summer offensive in the south would have been nullified, and with them all hopes for conquering the Caucasus would have disappeared. In addition, it was believed that the battle with the superior forces of Soviet troops in the open field, in harsh winter conditions, with limited vehicles, fuel and ammunition, had too little chance of a favorable outcome. Therefore, it is better to gain a foothold in the positions occupied and strive to unblock the grouping. This point of view was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, who assured the Fuhrer that his aviation would provide air supply to the encircled group. On the morning of November 24, the 6th Army was ordered to take up an all-round defense and wait for a deblocking offensive from the outside.

Violent passions also flared up at the headquarters of the 6th Army on November 23. The encirclement ring around the 6th Army had just closed, and a decision had to be made urgently. There was still no response to Paulus's radiogram, in which he requested "freedom of action". But Paulus hesitated to take responsibility for the breakthrough. By his order, the corps commanders gathered for a meeting at the army headquarters in order to work out a plan for further actions.

Commander of the 51st Army Corps General W. Seidlitz-Kurzbach called for an immediate breakthrough. He was supported by the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps General G. Hube.

But most of the corps commanders, led by the chief of staff of the army General A. Schmidt spoke out against. Things got to the point that in the course of a heated dispute, the infuriated commander of the 8th Army Corps General W. Gates threatened to personally shoot Seydlitz if he insisted on disobeying the Fuhrer. In the end, everyone agreed that Hitler should be approached for permission to break through. At 23:45, such a radiogram was sent. The answer came the next morning. In it, the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded in Stalingrad, were called "troops of the fortress of Stalingrad", and the breakthrough was denied. Paulus again gathered the corps commanders and brought them the order of the Fuhrer.

Some of the generals tried to express their counterarguments, but the army commander rejected all objections.

An urgent transfer of troops from Stalingrad began to the western sector of the front. In a short time, the enemy managed to create a grouping of six divisions. In order to pin down his forces in Stalingrad itself, on November 23, the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov went on the offensive. Its troops attacked the Germans on the Mamayev Kurgan and in the area of the Krasny Oktyabr plant, but met with fierce resistance. The depth of their advancement during the day did not exceed 100-200 m.

By November 24, the encirclement was thin, an attempt to break through it could bring success, it was only necessary to remove troops from the Volga front. But Paulus was a too cautious and indecisive person, a general who was used to obeying and accurately weighing his actions. He obeyed the order. Subsequently, he confessed to the officers of his headquarters: “It is possible that the daredevil Reichenau after November 19, he would have made his way to the west with the 6th Army and then told Hitler: "Now you can judge me." But, you know, unfortunately, I'm not Reichenau."

On November 27, the Fuhrer ordered Field Marshal von Manstein prepare the deblockade of the 6th field army. Hitler relied on new heavy tanks - "Tigers", hoping that they would be able to break through the encirclement from the outside. Despite the fact that these machines had not yet been tested in combat and no one knew how they would behave in the conditions of the Russian winter, he believed that even one battalion of "Tigers" could radically change the situation near Stalingrad.

While Manstein received reinforcements from the Caucasus and prepared the operation, Soviet troops expanded the outer ring and fortified it. When on December 12 Panzer Group Gotha made a breakthrough, it was able to break through the positions of the Soviet troops, and its advanced units were separated from Paulus by less than 50 km. But Hitler forbade Friedrich Paulus to expose the Volga Front and, leaving Stalingrad, to make his way towards the “tigers” of Goth, which finally decided the fate of the 6th Army.

By January 1943, the enemy was driven back from the Stalingrad "cauldron" by 170-250 km. The death of the encircled troops became inevitable. Almost the entire territory occupied by them was shot through by Soviet artillery fire. Despite Goering's promise, in practice, the average daily aviation capacity in supplying the 6th Army could not exceed 100 tons instead of the required 500. In addition, the delivery of goods to the encircled groups in Stalingrad and other "boilers" caused huge losses in German aviation.

The ruins of the fountain "Barmaley" - which has become one of the symbols of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

On January 10, 1943, Colonel General Paulus, despite the hopeless situation of his army, refused to capitulate, trying to tie down the Soviet troops surrounding him as much as possible. On the same day, the Red Army launched an operation to destroy the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of January, Soviet troops pushed the remnants of Paulus's army into a small area of the completely destroyed city and dismembered the Wehrmacht units that continued to defend. On January 24, 1943, General Paulus sent one of the last radiograms to Hitler, in which he reported that the group was on the verge of destruction and offered to evacuate valuable specialists. Hitler again forbade the remnants of the 6th Army to break through to his own and refused to take out of the "cauldron" anyone except the wounded.

On the night of January 31, the 38th motorized rifle brigade and the 329th sapper battalion blocked the area of the department store where Paulus' headquarters was located. The last radio message received by the commander of the 6th Army was an order for his promotion to field marshal, which the headquarters regarded as an invitation to suicide. Early in the morning, two Soviet parliamentarians made their way into the basement of a dilapidated building and handed over an ultimatum to the field marshal. In the afternoon, Paulus rose to the surface and went to the headquarters of the Don Front, where Rokossovsky was waiting for him with the text of surrender. However, despite the fact that the field marshal surrendered and signed the capitulation, in the northern part of Stalingrad the German garrison under the command of Colonel General Stecker refused to accept the terms of surrender and was destroyed by concentrated heavy artillery fire. At 16.00 on February 2, 1943, the terms of surrender of the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht came into force.

The Hitlerite government declared mourning in the country.

For three days, the funeral ringing of church bells sounded over German cities and villages.

Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet historical literature has claimed that a 330,000-strong enemy grouping was surrounded in the Stalingrad area, although this figure is not confirmed by any documentary data.

The point of view of the German side on this issue is ambiguous. However, with all the scatter of opinions, the figure of 250-280 thousand people is most often called. This figure is consistent with the total number of evacuees (25,000), captured (91,000), and enemy soldiers killed and buried in the battle area (about 160,000). The vast majority of those who surrendered also died from hypothermia and typhus, and after almost 12 years in Soviet camps, only 6,000 people returned to their homeland.

Kotelnikovsky operation Having completed the encirclement of a large grouping of German troops near Stalingrad, the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front (commander - Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko) in November 1942 came from the north to the approaches to the village of Kotelnikovsky, where they entrenched themselves and went on the defensive.

The German command made every effort to break through the corridor to the 6th Army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this purpose, in early December, in the area of the village. Kotelnikovsky, an attack group was created consisting of 13 divisions (including 3 tank and 1 motorized) and a number of reinforcement units under the command of Colonel-General G. Goth - the Goth army group. The group included a battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, which were first used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In the direction of the main attack, which was delivered along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad railway, the enemy managed to create a temporary advantage over the defending troops of the 51st Army in men and artillery by 2 times, and in terms of the number of tanks - more than 6 times.

They broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and on the second day they reached the area of the village of Verkhnekumsky. In order to divert part of the forces of the shock group, on December 14, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Nizhnechirskaya, the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. She broke through the German defenses and captured the village, but the position of the 51st Army remained difficult. The enemy continued the offensive, while the army and the front no longer had any reserves left. The Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in an effort to prevent the enemy from breaking through and releasing the encircled German troops, allocated the 2nd Guards Army and a mechanized corps from its reserve to reinforce the Stalingrad Front, setting them the task of defeating the enemy strike force.

On December 19, having suffered significant losses, the Goth group reached the Myshkova River. 35-40 km remained to the encircled grouping, however, Paulus's troops were ordered to remain in their positions and not strike back, and Goth could no longer move further.

On December 24, having jointly created approximately double superiority over the enemy, the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 5th Shock Army, went on the offensive. The 2nd Guards Army delivered the main blow towards the Kotelnikov group with fresh forces. The 51st Army was advancing on Kotelnikovsky from the east, while enveloping the Gotha group from the south with tank and mechanized corps. On the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the enemy's battle formations and captured the crossings across the Myshkova River. Mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough, which began to rapidly move towards Kotelnikovsky.

On December 27, the 7th Panzer Corps came out to Kotelnikovsky from the west, and the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Kotelnikovsky from the southeast. At the same time, the tank and mechanized corps of the 51st Army cut off the enemy grouping's escape route to the southwest. Continuous strikes against the retreating enemy troops were carried out by aircraft of the 8th Air Army. On December 29, Kotelnikovsky was released and the threat of an enemy breakthrough was finally eliminated.

As a result of the Soviet counter-offensive, the enemy's attempt to release the 6th Army encircled near Stalingrad was thwarted, and the German troops were thrown back from the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km.

Few people in our country and in the world will be able to challenge the significance of the victory at Stalingrad. The events that took place between July 17, 1942 and February 2, 1943 gave hope to the peoples who were still under occupation. Next, 10 facts from the history of the Battle of Stalingrad will be given, designed to reflect the severity of the conditions in which the hostilities were fought, and, perhaps, to tell something new that makes you take a different look at this event from the history of World War II.

1. To say that the battle for Stalingrad took place in difficult conditions is like saying nothing. The Soviet troops in this area were in dire need of anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft artillery, and there was also not enough ammunition - some formations simply did not have them. The soldiers got what they needed as best they could, mostly taking it from their dead comrades. There were enough dead Soviet soldiers, since most of the divisions thrown to hold the city, named after the main man in the USSR, consisted either of unfired newcomers who arrived from the Stavka reserve, or of soldiers exhausted in previous battles. This situation was aggravated by the open steppe terrain in which the fighting took place. This factor allowed the enemies to regularly inflict heavy damage on Soviet troops in equipment and people. Young officers, who just yesterday left the walls of military schools, went into battle like ordinary soldiers and died one after another.

2. At the mention of the Battle of Stalingrad, images of street fighting, which are so often shown in documentaries and feature films, pop up in the minds of many. However, few people remember that although the Germans approached the city on August 23, they began the assault only on September 14, and far from the best Paulus divisions participated in the assault. If we develop this idea further, we can come to the conclusion that if the defense of Stalingrad had been concentrated only in the city, it would have fallen, and fallen quite quickly. So what saved the city and held back the enemy onslaught? The answer is continuous counterattacks. Only after repulsing the counterattack of the 1st Guards Army on September 3, the Germans were able to begin preparations for the assault. All offensives by Soviet troops were carried out from the northern direction and did not stop even after the start of the assault. So, on September 18, the Red Army, having received reinforcements, was able to launch another counterattack, because of which the enemy even had to transfer part of the forces from Stalingrad. The next blow was inflicted by the Soviet troops on September 24th. Such countermeasures did not allow the Wehrmacht to concentrate all its forces to attack the city and constantly kept the soldiers on their toes.

If you are wondering why this is so rarely mentioned, then everything is simple. The main task of all these counter-offensives was to reach the connection with the defenders of the city, and it was not possible to fulfill it, while colossal losses were incurred. This can be clearly seen in the fate of the 241st and 167th tank brigades. They had 48 and 50 tanks, respectively, which they pinned hopes on as the main striking force in the counteroffensive of the 24th Army. On the morning of September 30, during the offensive, the Soviet forces were covered by enemy fire, as a result of which the infantry lagged behind the tanks, and both tank brigades hid behind a hill, and a few hours later, radio communication with the vehicles that broke deep into the enemy defenses was lost. By the end of the day, out of 98 vehicles, only four remained in service. Later, two more damaged tanks from these brigades were able to be evacuated from the battlefield. The reasons for this failure, like all the previous ones, were the well-built defense of the Germans and the poor training of the Soviet troops, for whom Stalingrad became a place of baptism of fire. The chief of staff of the Don Front, Major General Malinin himself, said that if he had at least one well-trained infantry regiment, he would march all the way to Stalingrad, and that it’s not the enemy’s artillery that does its job well and presses the soldiers to the ground, but in the fact that at this time they do not rise to the attack. It is for these reasons that most writers and historians of the post-war period were silent about such counterattacks. They did not want to darken the picture of the triumph of the Soviet people, or they were simply afraid that such facts would become an occasion for excessive attention to their person by the regime.

3. The soldiers of the Axis who survived the Battle of Stalingrad, later usually noted that it was a real bloody absurdity. They, being by that time already hardened soldiers in many battles, in Stalingrad felt like rookies who did not know what to do. The Wehrmacht command seems to have been subjected to the same sentiments, since during urban battles it sometimes gave orders to storm very insignificant areas, where sometimes up to several thousand soldiers died. Also, the fate of the Nazis locked in the Stalingrad cauldron was not facilitated by the air supply of troops organized by order of Hitler, since such aircraft were often shot down by Soviet forces, and the cargo that nevertheless reached the addressee sometimes did not satisfy the needs of the soldiers at all. So, for example, the Germans, who were in dire need of provisions and ammunition, received a parcel from the sky, consisting entirely of women's mink coats.

Tired and exhausted, the soldiers at that time could only rely on God, especially since the Octave of Christmas was approaching - one of the main Catholic holidays, which is celebrated from December 25 to January 1. There is a version that it was precisely because of the upcoming holiday that Paulus' army did not leave the encirclement of Soviet troops. Based on the analysis of the letters of the Germans and their allies home, they prepared provisions and gifts for friends and waited for these days as a miracle. There is even evidence that the German command turned to the Soviet generals with a request for a ceasefire on Christmas night. However, the USSR had its own plans, so on Christmas the artillery worked at full strength and made the night of December 24-25 the last in their lives for many German soldiers.

4. On August 30, 1942, a Messerschmitt was shot down over Sarepta. Its pilot, Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, managed to land the plane with the landing gear retracted and was taken prisoner. He was a famous Luftwaffe ace from the squadron JG 3 "Udet" and "concurrently" the great-grandson of the "Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismarck. Such news, of course, immediately hit the propaganda leaflets, designed to raise the spirit of the Soviet fighters. Einsiedel himself was sent to an officer camp near Moscow, where he soon met with Paulus. Since Heinrich was never an ardent supporter of Hitler's theory of a superior race and purity of blood, he went to war with the belief that the Great Reich was waging war on the Eastern Front not with the Russian nation, but with Bolshevism. However, the captivity forced him to reconsider his views, and in 1944 he became a member of the anti-fascist committee "Free Germany", and then a member of the editorial board of the newspaper of the same name. Bismarck was not the only historical image that the Soviet propaganda machine exploited to boost the morale of soldiers. So, for example, propagandists started a rumor that in the 51st Army there was a detachment of submachine gunners commanded by Senior Lieutenant Alexander Nevsky - not just the full namesake of the prince who defeated the Germans under Lake Peipsi, but also his direct descendant. He was allegedly presented to the Order of the Red Banner, but such a person does not appear on the lists of holders of the Order.

5. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Soviet commanders successfully used psychological pressure on the sore points of enemy soldiers. So, in rare moments, when hostilities subsided in certain areas, propagandists through speakers installed not far from enemy positions transmitted songs native to the Germans, which were interrupted by reports of breakthroughs by Soviet troops in one or another sector of the front. But the most cruel and therefore the most effective was considered a method called "Timer and Tango" or "Timer Tango". During this attack on the psyche, the Soviet troops transmitted through the loudspeakers the steady beat of a metronome, which, after the seventh stroke, was interrupted by a message in German: "Every seven seconds, one German soldier dies at the front." Then the metronome again counted seven seconds, and the message was repeated. This could go on 10 – 20 times, and then a tango melody sounded over the enemy positions. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of those who were locked in the “boiler”, after several such impacts, fell into hysterics and tried to escape, dooming themselves, and sometimes their colleagues, to certain death.

6. After the completion of the Soviet operation "Ring", 130 thousand enemy soldiers were captured by the Red Army, but only about 5,000 returned home after the war. Most of them died in the first year of their captivity from illness and hypothermia, which the prisoners had developed even before they were captured. But there was another reason: of the total number of prisoners, only 110 thousand turned out to be Germans, all the rest were from among the Khiva. They voluntarily went over to the side of the enemy and, according to the calculations of the Wehrmacht, had to faithfully serve Germany in its liberation struggle against Bolshevism. So, for example, one sixth of the total number of soldiers of the 6th army of Paulus (about 52 thousand people) consisted of such volunteers.

After being captured by the Red Army, such people were already considered not as prisoners of war, but as traitors to the motherland, which, according to the law of wartime, is punishable by death. However, there were cases when captured Germans became a kind of "Khivi" for the Red Army. A vivid example of this is the case that occurred in the platoon of Lieutenant Druz. Several of his fighters, who were sent in search of the "language", returned to the trenches with an exhausted and mortally frightened German. It soon became clear that he did not have any valuable information about the actions of the enemy, so he should have been sent to the rear, but due to heavy shelling, this promised losses. Most often, such prisoners were simply disposed of, but luck smiled at this. The fact is that the prisoner before the war worked as a teacher of the German language, therefore, on the personal order of the battalion commander, they saved his life and even put him on allowance, in exchange for the fact that the Fritz would teach German scouts from the battalion. True, according to Nikolai Viktorovich Druz himself, a month later the German was blown up by a German mine, but during this time he more or less taught the soldiers the language of the enemy at an accelerated pace.

7. On February 2, 1943, the last German soldiers laid down their arms in Stalingrad. Field Marshal Paulus himself surrendered even earlier, on January 31. Officially, the place of surrender of the commander of the 6th Army is his headquarters in the basement of a building that was once a department store. However, some researchers do not agree with this and believe that the documents indicate a different place. According to them, the headquarters of the German field marshal was located in the building of the Stalingrad executive committee. But such a "defilement" of the building of Soviet power, apparently, did not suit the ruling regime, and the story was slightly corrected. True or not, perhaps it will never be established, but the theory itself has the right to life, because absolutely everything could happen.

8. On May 2, 1943, thanks to the joint initiative of the leadership of the NKVD and the city authorities, a football match took place at the Stalingrad Azot stadium, which became known as the “match on the ruins of Stalingrad”. The Dynamo team, which was assembled from local players, met on the field with the leading team of the USSR - Spartak Moscow. The friendly match ended with the score 1:0 in favor of Dynamo. Until today, it is not known whether the result was rigged, or whether the defenders of the city, hardened in battle, were simply used to fighting and winning. Be that as it may, the organizers of the match managed to do the most important thing - to unite the inhabitants of the city and give them hope that all the attributes of peaceful life are returning to Stalingrad.

9. On November 29, 1943, Winston Churchill, at a ceremony in honor of the opening of the Tehran Conference, solemnly presented Joseph Stalin with a sword forged by special decree of King George VI of Great Britain. This blade was given as a token of British admiration for the courage shown by the defenders of Stalingrad. Along the entire blade was an inscription in Russian and English: “To the inhabitants of Stalingrad, whose hearts are strong as steel. A gift from King George VI as a token of the great admiration of the entire British people."

The decoration of the sword was made of gold, silver, leather and crystal. It is rightfully considered a masterpiece of modern blacksmithing. Today, any visitor to the Museum of the Battle of Stalingrad in Volgograd can see it. In addition to the original, three copies were also released. One is in the Museum of Swords in London, the second is in the National Museum of Military History in South Africa, and the third is part of the collection of the head of the diplomatic mission of the United States of America in London.

10. An interesting fact is that after the end of the battle, Stalingrad could completely cease to exist. The fact is that in February 1943, almost immediately after the surrender of the Germans, the Soviet government was faced with the acute question: is it worth restoring the city, because after fierce fighting, Stalingrad lay in ruins? It was cheaper to build a new city. Nevertheless, Joseph Stalin insisted on restoration, and the city was resurrected from the ashes. However, the residents themselves say that after that, for a long time, some streets exuded a putrid smell, and Mamayev Kurgan, due to the large number of bombs dropped on it, did not grow grass for more than two years.