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The Second World War

If we take the entire history of mankind from time immemorial to the present day, then the Second World War is the largest war in the history of mankind. The Second World War had a huge impact on the fate of mankind. It was attended by 62 states (80% of the world's population). Military operations were conducted on the territory of 40 states. 110 million people were mobilized into the armed forces. The total human losses reached 50-55 million people, of which 27 million people were killed on the fronts (although the exact data on losses are still not known and different historians give different figures). The greatest human losses were suffered by the USSR, China, Germany, Japan and Poland.

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In World War II, of all the fronts in Western Europe, Africa, Asia, the most important and decisive, the largest, both in terms of the number of opposing troops and the number of irretrievable losses, was the Soviet-German front, on which three major battles took place. One of them is the Battle of Kursk. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943.

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Battle of Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is also known as the Battle of Kursk and the German offensive Operation Citadel. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

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The battle on the Kursk Bulge became "... an outstanding battle not only of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet period, but of the entire Second World War" - Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces A.Kh. Babadzhanyan. The peak of the battle on the Kursk Bulge fell on the field, later called "tank". "The greatest tank battle of World War II near Prokhorovka essentially decided the outcome of the war. It was the beginning of the end of fascist Germany," Soviet writer Yuri Bondarev later wrote.

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The plans of the enemy

The general plan of the German command was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region. (In the area of ​​​​Orel-Kursk-Belgorod-Kharkov, the front bizarrely curved backwards with the letter S - in the north, a ledge was wedged into the Soviet defense, in the center of which was Orel, and directly below it was exactly the same ledge that was held by Soviet troops and whose center was Kursk ). Despite the fact that the plan for Operation Citadel was kept a strict secret, the Soviet command managed to guess not only the place where Hitler would try to conduct a general offensive, but also the direction of his main attacks. These data, obtained back in March, made it possible to begin preparations for the defense of the Kursk Salient long before the start of Operation Citadel. The Kursk region has become the most powerful fortified area in the world. And although a static defense on a long front is in principle a rather ineffective strategy, on the Kursk Bulge it fully justified itself due to the correctly guessed place and direction of the German strike, as well as the time needed to create a well-prepared, in-depth defense.

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Operation Citadel

The German offensive began on July 5 in the afternoon with ... Soviet shelling. Having data on the location of the German units prepared for the attack, our artillerymen covered them with fire, which led to a delay in the offensive for one and a half to two hours. For several days, until July 11, fierce battles continued on the northern front. The defense of the "Kursk citadel" was a complex system of anti-tank fortifications, minefields, positions of anti-tank artillery. However, these elements of defense were by no means insurmountable in and of themselves. Much more important was the competent location of the reserves of the Soviet command, which threw them into swift counterattacks on the flanks of the advancing enemy. That is why the German attacks choked one after another, and if the Nazis managed to capture a settlement or a height, then the Soviet tankers soon beat it back.

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On the southern front, the German offensive developed a little more successfully. Already on July 6, reserves were brought up, and German troops began to move deep into the Soviet defenses. In the south of the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis launched an offensive in two wide wedges. One of these wedges was directed towards the village of Prokhorovka. This was the most dangerous direction. Fierce fighting in this direction lasted from 10 to 16 July. On July 12, 1943, the famous meeting battle near Prokhorovka took place. According to Soviet data, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated in the battle near Prokhorovka on both sides. Both sides suffered serious losses, but it was this battle that finally stopped the German offensive on the southern face of the arc.

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On the northern face, the German offensive bogged down around the same days. There were no such major battles as near Prokhorovka in the north, but the general intensity of the battle on the main directions of attacks was no less. In particular, at the very beginning of the German offensive, fierce battles took place near the village of Ponyri. However, by July 12, all offensive actions of the Germans had practically ceased - they simply had no strength left. On the same day, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive, hitting the flank of the German grouping from the northeast to the south and simultaneously carrying out strikes from the east and southeast. These counterattacks against the bloodless German troops were almost impossible to contain. By the evening of the next day, units of the Red Army broke through the German defenses to a depth of 25 kilometers. Later, on the northern face, the divisions of the Central Front joined the advancing units of the two fronts. On July 26, the Nazi troops were forced to leave the Orlovsky bridgehead and begin a retreat to positions east of Bryansk. On July 29, Volkhov was liberated, on August 5, Orel, by August 18, Soviet troops approached the defensive lines near Bryansk. On this, the Oryol-Kursk operation formally ended, but the counteroffensive on the Kursk Bulge developed into a general offensive of the Red Army along the entire front.

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The counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction began almost immediately after the Battle of Prokhorov. Already on July 13, the Germans went on the defensive, and on the 16th they began to withdraw their forces. The Soviet troops went over to the pursuit and threw back the Nazi troops to the starting line, from which the Germans attacked the "Kursk citadel" on July 5. Gradually building up strength from the depths, Soviet troops advanced 20 kilometers within two days. On August 5, Belgorod was liberated. In just five days, the troops traveled over 100 kilometers. By the end of August 11, the troops of the Voronezh Front cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The troops of the Steppe Front came close to the outer defensive contour of Kharkov. Having unsuccessfully tried to counterattack, the Germans finally went on the defensive. On August 23, after stubborn fighting, the troops of the Steppe Front completely cleared Kharkov of the enemy. In total, during the counter-offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, Soviet troops advanced 140 kilometers and hung over the entire southern wing of the German front, taking an advantageous position to go on a general offensive in order to liberate Left-Bank Ukraine.

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On August 23, the Battle of Kursk ended. One of the greatest battles of the Second World War lasted for fifty days. Irreparable losses were inflicted on the enemy, all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov regions were thwarted. Conditions were created for the transition of our troops to a general offensive on most of the Soviet-German front. For courage and heroism shown in the Battle of Kursk, more than 100 thousand soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army were awarded orders and medals, 180 especially distinguished soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

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The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper. After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote: “It was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With her failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. According to Guderian, “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment. Results of the Battle of Kursk

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In the history of World War II, there are many events that can be considered the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. Actually, many Russian and Western historians believe that the very attack of Germany on the USSR was the very point after which the countdown of the days of Nazi Germany began. The Battle of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk Bulge - all these glorious victories brought the Red Army closer to Berlin. In October 1941, near Moscow, it became clear that the blitzkrieg had failed; in late 1942 - early 1943, after the Battle of Stalingrad, the whole world learned that the Soviet army was capable of inflicting crushing defeats on the Germans. Finally, in 1943, on the Kursk Bulge, the German army received such a blow from which it could no longer recover. All these dates are equivalent for history - these were steps towards Victory, the steps along which the Soviet soldier rose to the top of his glory. BEGINNING OF THE END

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Presentation on the topic: Battle of Kursk

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Battle of Kursk side of the USSR Germany Commanders Konstantin Rokossovsky, Georgy Zhukov, Erich von Manstein, Günther Hans von Kluge, Nikolai Vatutin Walter people, according to German - about 780 thousand 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, people, 2758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 in 19 100 guns and mortars repair), about 10 thousand guns and 2050 + 7.4 thousand aircraft in reserve 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve

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Losses of the USSR Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70 330 Sanitary - 107 517 Operation "Kutuzov": Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112 529 Sanitary - 317 361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe FrontIrrevocable - 71,611Sanitaries - 183,955Total in the Battle of the Kursk Salient: Irretrievable - 189,652Sanitaries - 406,743In the Battle of Kursk in general ~ 254,470 killed, captured, missing 608,833 wounded, ill

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German losses According to German sources, 103,600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet less than 1696 aircraft

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Preparations for battle During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent Wehrmacht counter-offensive in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.

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The plans and forces of the parties The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of Gott: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of Soviet troops. And, based on the losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (From the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th tank army, General Fangor)

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The plans and forces of the parties To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (18 of them tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, totaling, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people. The command of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Tank, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Tank Army, the 24th Tank Corps and Operational Group "Kempf" (commander - General Herman Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets. To carry out the operation in the Kursk region, several elite SS Panzer divisions were advanced:

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The role of intelligence From the beginning of 1943, the intercepts of secret communications from the Nazi High Command and Hitler's secret directives increasingly referred to Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed in general details by Stalin about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 translated from German “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, who would sign it only three days later, was laid down on Stalin’s desk. These data were received scout who worked under the name "Werther". The real name of this man is still unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luci agent operating in Switzerland - Rudolf Rössler.

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Kursk defensive operation The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.

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Kursk defensive operation Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. Operation "Citadel" - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk by counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge, as well as the defeat of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). The main blow from the south was delivered by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Herman Goth, 48th Tank Corps and 2nd SS TD) with the support of the Kempf Army Group (W. Kempf).

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (commander: O. von Knobelsdorf, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the strongest formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 Panzer divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Grossdeutschland", 10 tank brigade and 911 det. division of assault guns, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of the units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkasskoye - Yakovlevo - Oboi on July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. against the operational reserves of the Red Army in the area of ​​​​st. Prokhorovka, and 48 shopping mall was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. To accomplish the assigned task, units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") were required to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. should have reached the city of Oboyan. However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, their courage and stamina, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were “substantially adjusted” - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan at all.

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th Panzer Division on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated in front of the engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, the competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), the rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions 196 Guards Rifle Regiment (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by the divisional and army anti-tank reserves, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd and 11th divisions with the involvement of forces of the 245th detachment (lieutenant colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks M3) and 1440 saps (sub-regiments nickname Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalion. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th tank (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the Great Germany division (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 tank brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) in the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering obstacles (overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassky caused especially great difficulties), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 of the guards artillery point (lieutenant colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of 33 detached troops (colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fire weapons. So, for example, the battle group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time. The result of the resulting congestion on the routes of advance was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. The development of the offensive of the 48th Panzer Division on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: 1. active operations of sapper-assault units, 2. aviation support (more than 830 sorties) 3. overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles.

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July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky. An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap that had taken place by the summer of 1943 in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

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July 5, 1943 The first day. Defense of Cherkassky. Only after overcoming the anti-tank obstacles south of Cherkassky by the bulk of the tanks in the afternoon, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Special Forces to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Special Forces retreated, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Panzer Wehrmacht was the wedging of the 6th Guards into the first line of defense. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

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July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks. By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive section of the 48th tank (near the village of Cherkasskoye) and 12-13 km in the section of the 2nd tank SS (in the Bykovka-Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Special Division (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line defense, occupied by the Guards Special Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.

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July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks. However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - on July 5 did not complete the task of the day, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375th northern division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in battles 5 July. On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd Panzer SS (334 tanks) were determined: for the MD "Dead Head" (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th northern division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Lipovy Donets, for MD "Leibstandarte" (brigadeführer T. Vish, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and "Das Reich" (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village of Yakovlevo and access to the line the bend of the Psyol district is the village of Teterevino. At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and the 55th motorized rifle unit of six-barreled mortars), with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps crossed on the offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th guards special forces. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify and carry out a fire raid on the command and control posts of the regiments of the 51st Guards Special Division, which led to the disorganization of communications and command and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards Special Division repelled enemy attacks without communication with the higher command, since the work of communications officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle. The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced divisions of the divisions, the main the ramming force of which was the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end a few hundred meters from the trenches.

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July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks. By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th guards special forces were knocked down from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; the left flank of the 158th Guards Special Forces, having bent its right flank, as a whole continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units 154 and 156 was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses. The general leadership of the retreating battalions was practically absent, the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Special Forces went to the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the suitable artillery from the 5th Guards Reserve. Stalingrad tank corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M.N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.M. Shchekal) fought hard battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the offensive of the combat groups of md "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the gunners managed to save most of their heavy weapons. A fleeting but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the 464th Guards Artillery Battalion and the 460th Guards Mortar Battalion of the 6th Guards Infantry Brigade of the 5th Guards Rifle Brigade managed to deploy (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

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July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks. At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th anti-tank division began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After that, up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front, in front of the Das Reich battle group, there were actually no units of the 6th Guards Army capable of holding back its offensive: the main forces of the anti-tank artillery of the army were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoe highway and in the offensive zone 48 tank, which, according to the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main attack of the Germans (which was not entirely true - the strikes of both German tank corps were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the strike of MD "Das Reich", the artillery of the 6th Guards simply did not remain at that moment. The offensive of MD Leibstandarte in the Oboyan direction in the morning of July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of Soviet artillery in its offensive area, timely strikes by the 1st armored division (Colonel V. M. Gorelov) and 49 armored (lieutenant colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3 mechanized corps of the 1st tank army of M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in which the main forces of the division, including her tank regiment. Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Division basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards was crushed, and a little later, with the capture of the village of Yakovlevo from the side of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of 48 tank. The advanced units of the 2nd Panzer SS were ready to begin to fulfill one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​​​st. Prokhorovka. However, German Goth (commander of 4 TA) failed to fully fulfill the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th tank, which faced the skillful defense of the Katukov army that entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to surround some regiments of the 67th and 52nd guards special divisions of the 6th guards in the afternoon. And in the interfluve of the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers, however, having stumbled upon the rigid defense of the brigades of the 3rd microdistrict at the second line of defense, the divisions of the corps could not seize bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and reach the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of parts 2 shopping mall SS. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the combat group of the 3rd MD tank regiment (F. Westkhoven), which gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tankers and artillerymen of the 22nd division (Colonel N. G. Vennichev), which was part of the 6th tank division (Major General A D. Hetman) 1 TA.

slide number 24

Description of the slide:

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks. Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th Tank Army managed to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank, inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control over units of the 51st Guards Special Division and the 5th Guards Rifle Division, at the junction of the 1st TA and the 5th Guards Rifle Division, an area not occupied by Soviet troops was formed, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug up the brigades of the 1st Tank Army, using his experience in defensive battles under Eagle in 1941. However, all the successes of the 2nd SS TC, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be embodied in a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of the Kempf AG, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG "Kempf" still could not provide the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Also significant to the further course of events was the loss of the Germans in armored vehicles. So, for example, in the tank regiment of md "Great Germany" 48 mk after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered incapable of combat (the Soviet troops put out of action 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in 10 tank brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, less ambitious tasks were set for the 4th TA corps than on July 6 - expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army's flanks. Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet one, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored attack. Due to the loss of combat capability and the failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, the overall operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of the Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. And I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st Tank Army M. E. Katukov. The main frame of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Panzer Army.

slide number 25

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The Battle of Prokhorovka On July 12, one of the largest oncoming tank battles in history took place near the Prokhorovka station. From the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps participated in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle from the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike was launched, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12. Fight for svh. "October" and the height of 252.2 resembled the surf. Four tank brigades, three batteries, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves against the defense of the SS Grenadier Regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering enormous losses in the process.

slide number 26

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The battle near Prokhorovka During the battle, a lot of tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. A high level of casualties among command personnel in the 32nd brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), commander of a tank platoon (61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). Very high losses were suffered by the command link and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade, many commanders of companies and platoons were killed and seriously injured. His commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, failed (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital). Grigory Penezhko, a participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st brigade, later Hero of the Soviet Union, recalled the condition of a person in those terrible conditions.

slide number 27

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Losses According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd Panzer SS on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division. At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks. According to the memoirs of Major General of the Nazi Army F.V. von Mellenthin, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns - up to 240 vehicles in total , incl. four tigers. It was not supposed to meet a serious enemy, according to the German command, TA Rotmistrova was involved in the battle against the "Dead Head" division (in fact, one corps) and a counter attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks was a complete surprise. However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command "overslept" the enemy and the attack of the Tank Army with other corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but pursued the goal of going into the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its division "Dead Head" was taken. The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire.