FEDERAL AGENCY FOR EDUCATION

History department

Partisan movement during the Patriotic War of 1812

Course work

Scientific adviser:

Introduction……………………………………………………………………3

Chapter I. The Origin of the Partisan Movement

I.1. The entry of Napoleon's army into Russia……………………5

I.2. Partisan detachments at the initial stage of the war………….9

Chapter II. Partisans. Their role in the main stages of the war

II.1. The initial stage of the war…………………………………...…13

II.2. Tarutino…………………………………..........................…15

II.3. The situation after the Tarutinsky march maneuver………….…20

II.4. Army partisan detachments………………………..…25

Conclusion……………………………………………………………...30

Bibliographic list…………………………………......…..…34

Application……………………………………..................................… 37

MANAGEMENT

Relevance: The War of 1812 is one of the most studied and at the same time controversial episodes of Russian history. It would seem that the abundance of sources, both written and archaeological, should make all research on this issue simple and understandable, but that was not the case. Even among contemporaries, views differed on what was happening in this fatal year for the Russian Empire, to say nothing of subsequent generations. Differences begin from the very beginning - from the causes of the war, go through all the battles and personalities, and end only with the departure of the French from Russia. Also, the extreme politicization of the question of the war of 1812 adds to the difficulties for the researcher. The official view of the war was formed back in the time of Alexander the First, and the state in all subsequent stages never left without control what historians would write about this period. One of the most odious questions in this already politicized topic is the question of the partisan movement in World War II. And if there is any clarity with partisan detachments formed from regular army units, then the question of the popular movement is not fully developed and understood to this day.

aim our work is to consider all aspects of the partisan movement during the war of 1812.

Based on the goal, we need to implement the following tasks :

1. Explore the origin of the partisan movement.

2. Consider the role of the partisan movement at the initial stage of the war.

3. Analyze army partisan detachments.

Historiography: Academician E.V. Tarle in his work "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1812". An important place in considering the role of the partisan movement at all stages of the war is occupied by the work of N.A. Troitsky "1812: The Great Year of Russia". When analyzing army partisan detachments, we used the work of Knyazkov S.A. "Partisans and Partisan Warfare in 1812". In this book, the most eminent partisan of the Patriotic War describes the organization of partisan detachments, the rise of peasants to fight the enemy, and reminisces about the operations in which he had to participate.

We have used memoirs and diaries that are not directly related to the partisans, but in one way or another provide us with important information on this issue. These sources include: “Letters from a French officer from Smolensk in 1812”, cited by V.I. Grachev, as well as "Historical Notes" by G.P. Meshetich (officer of the Russian army).

We also used some documents related to that time. These include the Collection of Documents by M. I. Kutuzov and the Collection of Documents "Vladimir People's Militia in the Patriotic War of 1812".

I .1. Entry of Napoleon's army into Russia

From the very first day of entering the Russian land, the Napoleonic army began to plunder and ruin peasant farms, take away food and livestock. The riots, everywhere perpetrated by soldiers and officers, aroused indignation, protest and hatred for the invading Napoleonic army. Once upon a time, the troops of revolutionary France were famous for their discipline. But now, in this predatory and unnecessary campaign for the people of France, the soldiers of the "Big Army" committed violence against civilians. Napoleon understood the danger of the decomposition of the army. He issued an order for the execution of soldiers convicted of robbery and looting, but this did little to help. And Napoleon himself promised to give Moscow for plunder to the soldiers as a reward for all the hardships of the campaign. But it was not only the looting of soldiers. The French authorities did not differ much from their subordinates. It was also a robbery, only "organized".

Therefore, from the very beginning of hostilities, the majority of the peasants of Lithuania and Belarus were in favor of disobedience to the invaders. This became especially dangerous for the French. Civilians turned into brave warriors, agricultural tools became a formidable weapon in their hands; there was nothing that the people were not ready to sacrifice, if only the enemy did not get it. Thus, the struggle of the peasants acquired the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the departure of the population to forests and areas remote from military operations. And although it was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army.

“Burning around the village and the suburbs of the city, streets strewn with the wounded and dead, fields smeared with human blood and littered with many corpses, robbery, rape and murder of disarmed residents” is a sketch from life of one of the witnesses of the entry of Napoleon’s troops into Vitebsk. Many such testimonies can be cited.

Peasant partisan detachments were born spontaneously, during the retreat of the Russian army. But every day the movement developed, taking on more and more active forms and becoming a formidable force. The just and defensive nature of the war caused the active participation of the broad masses of the Russian people.

The Belarusian land, covered with forests and swamps, burned under the feet of the invaders. As we moved deeper into Russia, the resistance of the people grew.

Seeing the active resistance of the peasants, Napoleon began to spread provocative rumors about the upcoming liberation of the peasants from serfdom. But in reality, his war against Russia was exclusively of an aggressive nature, and his army suppressed anti-serf actions.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The provisional Lithuanian “government”, subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landowners, continue to perform all work and duties, and those who evaded were to be severely punished, involving for this if circumstances so require, military force.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In the manifesto, the emperor said: “May the enemy meet in every nobleman of Pozharsky, in every spiritual one - Palitsin, in every citizen - Minin! .. Unite everyone. With a cross in your heart and with a weapon in your hands, no human forces will overcome you.” In reality, things were different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, the inhabitants went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned. The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than the one in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

The readiness of everyone to sacrifice everything for the defense of the Fatherland was so great that the government had to limit donations only to the provinces closest to the theater of war. Despite the fact that in a short time the militia was composed of more than 300 thousand people and collected up to 100 million rubles. The peasants voluntarily brought everything they had to the retreating army: food, oats, hay. And the enemy could not get hay and fodder from them either for money or by force. The violence of the enemy caused "the frenzy of the people."

The French were only the backbone of the "Big Army". Most of the troops consisted of forcibly mobilized contingents of European countries. These soldiers saw Napoleon as the oppressor of their peoples and were therefore morally unreliable. To supply his huge army, Napoleon had to mobilize almost all the resources of Europe. “Never before have I given such extensive preparations,” he wrote to Marshal Davout.

But, despite this, the French troops quickly began to experience an acute shortage of food and fodder. This was not long in affecting the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers starved, looting intensified. Even before Vilna, several thousand horses perished.

The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: "The army could only eat what the marauders, organized in whole detachments, got; Cossacks and peasants daily killed many of our people who dared to go in search of" . Skirmishes took place in the villages, including shootings, between French soldiers sent for food and peasants. Such skirmishes occurred quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance was born - partisan struggle.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind the chief of staff Berthier about the heavy losses in people and strictly ordered that an increasing number of troops be allocated to cover the foragers. Sometimes the French command was forced to leave entire military units to fight the peasants.

The broad masses of the Russian peasantry rose to the partisan struggle, as soon as the Napoleonic troops entered the borders of the Smolensk province. A partisan movement was born in Poresensky, Krasinsky and Smolensky counties, since the population of these counties first of all suffered from the invaders. But as the enemy army advanced deep into Russia, the entire population of the Smolensk province rose to the fight.

I .2. Partisan detachments of the initial stage of the war

Residents of the Roslavl district created several partisan detachments on horseback and on foot, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, and provided significant assistance to the army partisans to Denis Davydov's detachment.

The partisans of the Smolensk province dealt a tangible blow to the enemy, and also helped the Russian army a lot. In particular, the detachment of the merchant of the city of Porechye Nikita Minchenkov helped the army detachment to eliminate the French detachment under the command of General Pino.

The partisan struggle of the peasants acquired its widest scope in August in the Smolensk province. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be held accountable.

The French forced the peasant Semyon Silaev from the Smolensk province to show them the way to the city of Bely. And he assured them that the road was swampy, the bridges were burned and it was impossible to pass. Loaded guns are directed at him - he stands his ground, they offer him gold - it does not help. So the French left with nothing. The city was saved. And it was easy to pass: all the swamps dried up that summer.

The largest Gzhatsk partisan detachment successfully operated. Its organizer was a soldier of the Elizavetgrad Regiment Fyodor Potopov (Samus). Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself behind enemy lines and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2,000 people (according to other sources, 3,000). Its strike force was a cavalry group of 200 men armed and dressed in French cuirassier armor. The Samusya detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system for warning the population about the approach of the enemy by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages were empty, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes told when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, it was necessary to go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture a cannon. The Samusya detachment inflicted significant damage on the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.

In the Gzhatsk district, another partisan detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kiev Dragoon Regiment. He was wounded during a rearguard battle near Tsarevo-Zaimishch and taken prisoner, but three days later he managed to escape. From the peasants of the villages of Basmany and Zadnovo, he organized a partisan detachment, which at first numbered 40 people, but soon increased to 300 people, and then up to 4 thousand people. Over time, Chetvertakov's detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him, and also entered into battle even with large detachments of invaders. The detachment acted on French communications, once a whole French battalion cowardly evaded the battle with the peasants.

Unfortunately, little information remains about Gerasim Kurin, a peasant in one of the villages near Moscow. Undoubtedly, he was an outstanding leader of the partisans. There were 5,300 foot and 500 cavalry soldiers in his detachment. The detachment fought near Gribovaya, Subbotina, Nazarova, Trubitsina and others. Its largest action was near Borogodsk (now Noginsk). "Our invincible hero Gerasim Karin, in all these battles, successfully commanded everywhere himself." It is known that he captured many prisoners, three guns, a convoy with bread.

Among the active organizers of peasant partisan detachments were the names of peasant women. Vasilisa Kozhina became famous among the people - the wife of the headman of one of the villages of the Smolensk province. She went down in history under the name of the elder Vasilisa. There are many legends about her among the people, in which it is often difficult to distinguish truth from fiction. When Vasilisa's husband led a party of prisoners into the city, she put together a detachment of women and teenagers armed with pitchforks, axes and scythes. This detachment guarded the village, escorted the prisoners.

Just as in the Smolensk province, Napoleon was met in other areas. The popular partisan movement assumed an increasingly mass character. Everywhere the peasants rose up to fight the enemy. Heroism has become commonplace.

There are many facts and evidence that the partisan peasant detachments of Gzhatsk and other areas located along the main road to Moscow caused great trouble to the French troops.

Thus, large detachments began to be created, thousands of folk heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle came to the fore.

After many bloody battles with separate detachments of the Russian army, Napoleon saw that the war in Russia was not like the wars that he was accustomed to wage in Western Europe. The dwellings abandoned by the inhabitants of the city and village, the dwellings they voluntarily burned, the devastated fields also clearly testified to him that he had not entered a country that was easy to conquer. Near Smolensk, Napoleon for the first time doubted the success of his enterprise and, through one captured Russian general, decided to talk about peace. He didn't have an answer.

II . Partisans. Their role in the main stages of the war

II .1. The initial stage of the war

The Patriotic War of 1812 can be divided into two periods: the first retreat period, the second offensive. The first began with the crossing of the Neman River by French troops on June 12 (24) and ended on October 5 (17) with an attack by Russian troops on the vanguard of Murat near Tarutino. The second period began on October 5 (17) and ended on November 16 (28), 1812, with the complete defeat of the French troops on the Berezina River.

At the first stage of the war, the emergence and formation of the Partisan movement took place. The partisans of Belarus, Lithuania, Smolensk and Moscow provinces caused enormous damage to Napoleon's troops.

The people also helped the army in major battles. For example. During the defense of Smolensk, a huge number of people stood up for the defense of their city.

Retreating towards Moscow, Kutuzov decided to give Napoleon a defensive battle. The position for this was chosen near the village of Borodino, 110 west of Moscow. This position fully met the requirements of tactics. She is one of the “best, which can only be found on flat places ...”, - Kutuzov reported to Alexander I.

The people's militias also participated in the Battle of Borodino. So, for example, a strong group was created on the left flank, consisting of the corps of N.A. Tuchkova, withdrawn from the reserve, as well as from the troops of the Moscow and Smolensk militias and the Cossack detachment A.A. Karpov.

Remarkably, Kutuzov later spoke to Alexander I about the battle, mentioned the courage of the soldiers of the left flank. They held the line for a long time, honorably defending their native land.

Napoleon sent blows to this part of the Russian army, but the troops fought courageously. It was on this flank that Bagration was wounded. "It is not for nothing that all of Russia remembers the day of Borodin". In the battle, Russia lost many soldiers: out of 135 thousand regular troops and militias, 38.5 thousand were killed and wounded. Napoleon lost 58 thousand out of 135 thousand people killed and wounded.

Further, following the retreating Russian army, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon's army lost 30 thousand people from partisan actions. The command of the French army brutally cracked down on the partisans, trying to frighten the Russian patriots with cruelty.

After the Military Council in Fili, at which the question was raised: whether to fight with available forces near Moscow or leave the city, Field Marshal Kutuzov decides to leave the ancient capital. He was firmly convinced of victory and on September 4 he wrote to Alexander I: “The entry of the enemy into Moscow is not yet the conquest of Russia ...”

And after that Kutuzov makes his brilliant maneuver to destroy the French army. Passing through Moscow, Kutuzov headed first along the Ryazan road, but then, suddenly on September 4, turned west. The famous Tarutinsky march-maneuver was carried out so skillfully that the French lost contact with the Russian army.

Having made this march, Kutuzov took such an advantageous position near the village of Tarutino that he turned his strategic situation in his favor.

While in Tarutino, Kutuzov did a great job of strengthening the army. Including carried out the formation of people's militias. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the militias of the first circle had 133 thousand, the second - 26 thousand and the third - 43 thousand people. In addition, there was the formation of militias in Ukraine and the Baltic states. All the peoples of Russia stood up to defend their homeland.

During the preparation of the counteroffensive, Kutuzov wages the so-called small war. For its implementation, he singled out light and Cossack cavalry and used partisan detachments. A number of militias were also involved in the partisan struggle. The tsarist government was afraid of the development of the peasant partisan movement, as it was afraid that the peasants might start a struggle against the feudal landlords. Therefore, it was decided to create army partisan detachments that would fight the French and at the same time control the actions of the peasants. This was done “in order to be able to take away all the ways from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of food in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food; already near Moscow, the enemy was supposed to eat horse meat.

II .2. Tarutino

Moscow was surrounded by a dense ring of partisan detachments allocated by Kutuzov from the army. Together with them, many peasant partisan detachments acted. Kutuzov found talented commanders in the person of D. Davydov, A.S. Figner, A.N. Seslavin and others, and the Cossacks were the best suited for action in the most unfavorable conditions. Their actions were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Not a day passed that in one place or another the partisans did not raid the enemy's food convoy, or defeated a detachment of the French, or, finally, suddenly raided the French soldiers and officers stationed in the village.

The activity of the partisans forced General Loriston, who arrived in Tarutino, to spread "about the image of a barbarian war", to which Kutuzov answered him that among the people "this war is revered, as well as the invasion of the Tatars, and I am not able to change their upbringing."

Army partisan detachments acted in close contact with the peasant partisans, whose movement grew and expanded. The partisan movement of the peasants of Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces developed especially widely. The forms of movement were very diverse. Often the peasants of a number of villages, hiding in the forests, set up guard posts and, when the enemy appeared, attacked him. The peasants protected their villages from ruin, set up ambushes, captured carts, etc. In addition, they provided the Russian command with valuable information about the enemy, served as guides, and escorted prisoners. On the territory occupied by the enemy, more and more new peasant partisan detachments were organized.

In Zvenigorodsky district, which was almost occupied by the enemy, peasant partisan detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, partisan detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov.

In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant partisan detachments united up to 2 thousand people. They repeatedly attacked large parties of the enemy and defeated them. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants - partisans from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail

Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasiev.

The largest peasant partisan detachment in the Moscow region was the detachment of the Bogorodsk partisans. He numbered about 6 thousand people in his ranks. The talented leader of this detachment was the serf Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other, smaller detachments, led by the serf peasant Gerasim Kurin, the head of Vokhnov Yegor Sutulov, the centurion Ivan Chushkin and the head of the Amerovo volost Emelyan Vasiliev, not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into armed struggle with enemy troops. So, on October 1, a partisan detachment led by Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov, numbering 5 thousand foot and 500 cavalry partisans, captured a large number of enemy soldiers, captured 3 cannons and many other weapons.

In the Volokolamsk district, armed peasants guarded their villages day and night, courageously repulsed the attacks of Napoleonic soldiers. A retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov played an important role in leading the partisan movement in the Volokolamsk region. The leaders of the peasant partisan detachments were also the volost head of the village of Seredy Boris Borisov with his son Vasily, the volost headman of the village of Burtsovo Ivan Ermolaev, the volost clerk Mikhail Fedorov, the peasants of the village of Seredy Akim Fedorov and Philip Mikhailov, the peasants of the village of Podsukhina Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov.

In the Serpukhov district, the peasants launched a merciless struggle against the Napoleonic detachments. The headman of the village of Semenovsky Akim Dementiev, the clerk of the village of Katun Ivan Ilyin, the headman of the village of Gorok Nikita Saveliev, having heard about the movement of enemy troops along the Kashirskaya road, gathered the peasants, armed them with spears, pitchforks, axes and hunting rifles, and ambushed the village of Panushkina. But the French detachment, having learned about the armament of the peasants, turned aside.

The peasants of the Vereisk district also acted together and unitedly. When, at the end of August, detachments of the Napoleonic army attacked the Vyshegorodskaya volost, the peasants gave them a decisive rebuff. The leaders of the rural partisan detachments in the Vereisk district were the patrimonial elders Nikita Fedorov and Gavrila Mironov, the clerks Alexei Kirpishnikov and Nikolai Usakov, who, at the head of the peasant partisan detachments, repulsed the enemy detachments during the entire time that Napoleon’s detachments were in Moscow.

Peasant partisan detachments under the command of burgomasters - peasants from the village of Krutits Ignatius Nikitin and Galaktion Maksimov, who were subsequently awarded the St. George Crosses for active partisan activity, especially distinguished themselves in the county.

Peasant partisan detachments received assistance from the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M. I. Kutuzov. With satisfaction and pride, Kutuzov wrote to St. Petersburg: “The peasants, burning with love for the Motherland, organize militias among themselves ... Every day they come to the Main Apartment, convincingly asking for firearms and cartridges to protect themselves from enemies. The requests of these respectable peasants, true sons of the fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with rifles, pistols and cartridges.

During the preparation of the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militias and partisans fettered the actions of the Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subjected to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the Headquarters of the Russian army.

A good organizer of the partisan detachment was also the private of the Moscow infantry regiment Stepan Eremenko. He organized a detachment of 300 people and began a successful struggle against the invaders. Here, in the Smolensk province, a detachment operated under the command of Ermolai Vasilyevich Chetvershakov.

In the Sychevsky district, a large partisan detachment was organized by retired major Semyon Yemelyanov. There was good order and discipline in his detachment. Successfully acting against the enemy, the detachment inflicted great damage on him.

In addition, other detachments led by A. Ivanov, S. Mironov, M. Vasiliev, A. Stepanov, A. Fedorov and the volost head V. Nikitin acted in the Sychevsky district.

In addition to direct hostilities, it should be noted the participation of militias and peasants in intelligence .

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “Peasants,” wrote Kutuzov, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war, inflict the greatest harm on the enemy ... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and deliver those taken prisoner to the army.” The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6,000 French. During the capture of Vereya, a peasant partisan detachment (up to 1 thousand people), led by priest Ivan Skobeev, distinguished himself.

II .3. The situation after the Tarutinsky march maneuver

Moscow was surrounded by a dense ring of partisan detachments allocated by Kutuzov from the army. Together with them, many peasant partisan detachments acted. These rings gradually narrowed and threatened to gradually turn the strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Thus, Kutuzov ensured the blocking of the enemy army, deprived it of the means of transporting food and fodder, constantly disturbing and destroying small detachments, put out of action up to 30 thousand people. This exhausted the French and introduced demoralization into the ranks of the troops. At the same time, Kutuzov protected himself from the active actions of the enemy and eventually forced the enemy to leave Moscow.

Thus, when Napoleon decided to leave Moscow, the Russian army was already ready to wrest the initiative from the enemy and go on the counteroffensive. Before leaving, Napoleon ordered to blow up the Kremlin and other cultural monuments that had survived the fire. Fortunately, the invaders managed to carry out this atrocity only partially.

The first who turned to Kutuzov with a request to send him behind enemy lines with a small detachment was the lieutenant colonel of the hussar regiment, the poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. Initially, he received 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks from Kutuzov. The detachment is small, but the people are reliable. Partisan life began: for days on end, a detachment on horseback scoured the surrounding roads, raiding enemy foragers, transports with food and weapons, repelling prisoners. Davydov took some of the liberated into his detachment. Many of Davydov's plans were carried out successfully thanks to the help of the peasants. They notified the detachment in time about the appearance of the enemy and its numbers, supplied the detachment with food. Davydov, in turn, passed on his military knowledge and experience to the peasants. He wrote instructions for the peasants on how to act when the French approached, how to contact the military detachments of the Russian army. Denis willingly shared trophy weapons with the peasants.

The commander of the partisan detachment, Alexander Samoilovich Figner, always took on the most dangerous assignments. Knowing French, German and Italian very well, Figner, in the uniform of a French officer, penetrated the location of enemy troops, spoke with soldiers and officers and received important information. Once he changed into a peasant dress and entered Moscow. Figner wanted to kill Napoleon, but he failed to get into the Kremlin. Having learned a lot of valuable things, Figner returned to his detachment. M.I. Kutuzov said about Figner: “This is an extraordinary person, I have never seen such a high soul, he is a fanatic in courage and patriotism, and God knows what he will not do.”

Napoleon led his army towards Kaluga, where large food supplies were concentrated and from where it was possible to move west along roads not devastated by the war.

The commander of the partisan detachment, Seslavin, was the first to inform Kutuzov that Napoleon was leaving Moscow. Seslavin was ordered to collect information about the movement of the enemy. On October 6, having crossed the Puddle River with his detachment, he alone made his way through the forest to the Borovskaya road. Here he saw enemy columns heading towards the city of Borovsk. Among the guards, Seslavin noticed Napoleon himself, surrounded by marshals. Having crept up to the column, Seslavin grabbed a French non-commissioned officer and, before he had time to come to his senses, dragged him into the forest and delivered him to the disposal of the Russian army. The interrogated "language" confirmed that Napoleon had withdrawn the army from Moscow and was moving towards Kaluga.

Kutuzov decided to detain the enemy army on the way to Kaluga, near Maloyaroslavets. The battle began at dawn on 12 October. “Today,” wrote Kutuzov, “is one of the most famous in this bloody war, for the lost battle of Maloyaroslavets would have led to disastrous consequences and would have opened the way for the enemy through our most fertile provinces.” Napoleon threw his troops on Maloyaroslavets eight times, the city changed hands eight times. Finally, what was left of the city was captured by the French. But on the way to the south, a powerful Russian army stands unshakably. And Napoleon for the first time in his life ordered to retreat. His army was forced to move along the Smolensk road, ravaged to the ground. "This day is one of the most famous in this bloody war ...".

Thus, in the first defeat of the great army, which had not known defeat for twenty years, the partisan detachment led by Seslavin played an important role.

And throughout the road to the border of Russia, partisan detachments helped in the fight against the invaders. “With martyr firmness,” Kutuzov reported to the tsar about the peasants of Moscow and Kaluga provinces, “they endured all the blows associated with the invasion of the enemy, hid their families and young children in the forests, and the armed themselves sought defeat in the peaceful dwellings of their appearing predators. Often the women themselves in a cunning way of these villains punished their assassination attempts with death, often armed villagers joined our garrisons, greatly contributed to them in the extermination of the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by the peasants. Kutuzov gave the peasants weapons and ammunition: "The requests of these respectable peasants, the true sons of the Fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with guns, pistols and gunpowder."

Napoleon strove for Smolensk. The Russian army, not lagging behind, pursued the enemy along a parallel road on the left side. This provided her with a connection with the grain-growing provinces, and, in addition, as Kutuzov explained, "the enemy, seeing me walking next to him, will not dare to stop, fearing that I will not bypass him." But Kutuzov did not just move alongside the enemy army.

In order to prevent the enemy from stopping and gathering his forces, stretching for more than 70 miles along the Smolensk tract, the commanders of all partisan detachments were given the task of striking at the head and flank of the retreating columns, destroying all bridges and destroying all food and fodder supplies. Peasant detachments also rose up against the enemy. “All my partisans,” Kutuzov informed Wigtenstein, “warn him on the march, making it difficult for the enemy to retreat in every possible way, while causing him the greatest harm.”

Kutuzov's tactics fully justified themselves. The enemy suffered heavy losses in men and materiel, and by the time of the decisive events was greatly weakened.

The first major stage at this stage of the counteroffensive was launched at Vyazma. Russian troops surrounded the city from three sides and then took it by storm. The French retreated in disarray. Their losses near Vyazma amounted to 6 thousand killed and 2.5 thousand prisoners.

Following this, the Cossacks and partisans near Lyakhov won a major victory. Here they surrounded the Augereau brigade of their Barague de Illie division, which covered the approaches to Smolensk from the southeast, and forced this brigade to surrender in full force.

On October 28, Napoleon's army approached Smolensk, having halved. Napoleon hoped in Smolensk to give the army a rest, to pull up reserves. But there was less food here than the French thought. What was immediately plundered by crowds of soldiers who were the first to enter the city. I had to keep retreating. The Russian army continuously attacked the enemy. Especially glorious for the Russian army were the battles near Krasnoe. In three days the enemy lost here about 26,000 prisoners and lost almost all of his artillery and cavalry. Attacked from all sides by Russian units, the enemy fought not for life, but for death. But his furious counterattacks were repelled by Russian artillery and infantry bayonet strikes.

Skillfully maneuvering, the Russian troops dealt the enemy one blow after another. Peasant detachments of partisans played an important role at this time. They attacked the side guards and the carts of the retreating French troops. The village sextons and elders were skillful drivers of hastily formed detachments, and in the battles between Moscow to the very Berezina, these detachments invariably achieved success. "The cudgel of the people's war - in the words of Leo Tolstoy - rose with all its formidable and majestic strength ... rose, fell and nailed the French until the whole invasion died."

Kutuzov reported to Alexander I: "The war ended with the complete extermination of the enemy."

II .4. Army partisan detachments

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​Dukhovshchina.

A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov, who was captured. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest, the poor protection of the rear in the French army.

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was to fight without an agreed plan of action for the flying peasant detachments. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For a "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavsky, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the Cossack troops and were not the same in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Headquarters of the Russian Army. . The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of operations of neighboring detachments in case of joint operations.

Partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.

Partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on the head, and quickly hide became the basic rule of the partisans.

Detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took tens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov's detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went out to Tsarev-Zaimishch. Not reaching 6 miles to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zaimishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The baggage train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of Frenchmen to resist was quickly crushed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 wagons with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans.

Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a sudden raid. So, General Wintsengerode, having established that there was an outpost of two squadrons of cavalry and three companies of infantry in the village of Sokolov, singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly broke into the village, killed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers , 83 soldiers.

The detachment of Colonel Kudashiva, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and captured 200.

Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of the detachment of General Dorokhov, acting along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 16, a detachment of Colonel Efremov, having met an enemy convoy heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people.

The detachment of Captain Figner, who was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up the artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers.

Later, partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, took the city of Vereya on September 28, 1812, destroying part of the French garrison.

CONCLUSION

The fight against Napoleon's army was a difficult military test. A strong and cruel enemy tried to enslave Russia. He threatened its very existence as an independent and sovereign state. That is why the war stirred up wide sections of society. The brunt of the struggle was borne by the working masses, and above all by the Russian peasantry. It is no coincidence that this war was called the Patriotic War.

The great Russian commander Kutuzov understood well that in the era of national wars, one can win the fight only by relying on the people. And he believed in the strength of the Russian people. Kutuzov's strategy was in line with the interests of Russia, which waged a Just Patriotic War.

The popular character of the war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in Russia's victory. The rise of the masses to fight the enemy was due to the fact that the war for the Russian people had a just, defensive character; peasants fought for the national independence of their homeland. They created partisan detachments and launched an armed struggle against the invaders. With their courageous and selfless struggle, the peasants provided significant assistance in defeating the enemy. In 1812, the Russian people showed their characteristic stamina, endurance, selflessness and heroism.

Activities aimed at attracting the masses of the people to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad possibilities that emerged in the national liberation war.

At all stages of the struggle of the Russian people against the aggressive invasion of the French, the partisan movement played a huge role and provided powerful support to the regular army. But the partisans also played the greatest role during the counteroffensives of the Russian troops. Together with the army of Kutuzov, the whole people defended their land. Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other nations rose up against the invaders. This shows the active participation of the people in the war of liberation: people dressed in soldier's greatcoats selflessly fought the enemy as part of regular troops. They participated in battles, prevented the Napoleonic troops from replenishing food supplies.

The Russian military historian N. S. Golitsyn noted: “... our partisans, in their justice, half shared with the line troops the glory of the expulsion of the French army from Russia.”

The militia made a great contribution to the defeat of the Napoleonic troops. Russian warriors showed high patriotism and courage. The militias were powerful reserves of the army.

Responding to reproaches of "a war against the rules," Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. In response to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people who have been embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland ... ".

The war of 1812 showed that Russian military art was at that time at a high level, the superiority of Russian art over the military art of the enemy was clearly manifested.

The patriotic feat of the peoples of Russia also manifested itself in various forms. They provided the armies with recruits and the means to wage war. Factory workers. Those who produced weapons worked day and night to provide the army with weapons and ammunition. The help of the peasants, who supplied the army with food and fodder, was of great importance.

A common misfortune, as you know, brings people together. In the struggle against the enemy, the population of the central provinces, which constituted the core of the Russian nation, rallied closely.

The serf peasantry - the main population of the country - who made an invaluable contribution to the expulsion of the French, hoped in 1812 that they - the liberator of the Fatherland - would receive liberation from serfdom. But when the war ended, the tsar found only one phrase for the people in the manifesto: “Peasants, our faithful people, may they receive their reward from God.”

The war made a very strong impression on contemporaries. “We are children of the twelfth year,” the Decembrists said about themselves. "Thunderstorm of the twelfth year" left an indelible imprint on the work of A.S. Pushkin. A.P. grew up on her legends. Herzen and N.P. Ogarev. She didn't go unnoticed.

After the expulsion of the French from Russia, the army, led by Barclay de Tolly, made its foreign campaign. Having liberated Europe from French oppression, the Russian people became more closely acquainted with the political ideas and institutions of Western Europe. This influenced the minds of many officers of the Russian army.

The fact that the Russian people and the advanced intelligentsia fought side by side with the Russian army also did not pass without a trace. The upper strata of the population got acquainted with the life of ordinary peasants, with their unique way of thinking.

They also gradually began to refuse to speak French, which, in general, is understandable, because this is a paradox: how can you speak the language of a country that attacked your land and was defeated?

Further strengthening of serfdom, which led to uprisings in various regions of Russia. But the apogee of this was the Decembrist uprising on December 14, 1825 on Senate Square. This, in my opinion, is one of the most important outcomes of the war. In particular, the abolition of serfdom in 1861 was also a consequence of the events of 1812. Of course, the liberation of the peasants was only a matter of time, but Napoleon's invasion of the Russian land served as a catalyst for this.

The main hero of the war of 1812 was the Russian people - the broad masses of peasants, townspeople, soldiers, who, under the leadership of the great Russian commander Kutuzov, destroyed the invader's army

REFERENCES

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11. Grachev V.I. "Letters from a French officer from Smolensk in 1812". - Smolensk: Printing house of P. A. Selin., 1911

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Annex 1

Reproduction of the drawing "Peasant Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812" by graphic artist Ivan Ivanovich Terebenev from the collection of the State Historical Museum in Moscow.

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

The invasion of the Napoleonic army into Russia in 1812.

Appendix 4

The action of the partisan detachments of Denis Davydov and the Yukhnovsky militia of Semyon Khrapovitsky during the Patriotic War of 1812 along the Gzhatsky tract, thanks to which the Yukhnovsky district was not occupied and devastated by Napoleon's army.

Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia. 1812. - M. -1992. – 304 p.

Troitsky N.A. 1812. The great year of Russia. - M. - 1988. - 348 p.

Knyazkov S.A. Partisans and partisan war in 1812" // Patriotic war and Russian society. - v.4. - M., 1912. - pp. 208 - 227.

Grachev V.I. Letters from a French officer from Smolensk in 1812. - Smolensk. - 1911

Pages of the military past. Essays on military history / Academy of Sciences of the USSR Institute of History. - 1968. - P. 220 Galyga V.V., Armicheva V.I., Dontsova A.I. Story. Part I. Course of lectures. - 1999. - P. 120

Ibid - S. 246

Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. – 1968 – S. 199

Popov M.Ya. Denis Davydov. - 1971. - S. 276

Pages of the military past. Essays on military history / Academy of Sciences of the USSR Institute of History. - 1968. - S. 246

Ibid - S. 246

There. – S. 247

Pushkin A.S. Eugene Onegin. - 1985. - S. 271

Galyga V.V., Armicheva V.I., Dontsova A.I. Story. Part I. Course of lectures. - 1999. - S. 124

The Patriotic War of 1812 gave birth to a new phenomenon in history - the mass partisan movement. During the war with Napoleon, Russian peasants began to unite in small detachments to defend their villages from foreign invaders. The brightest figure among the partisans of that time was Vasilisa Kozhina, a woman who became a legend in the war of 1812.
partisan
At the time of the invasion of French troops into Russia, Vasilisa Kozhina, according to historians, was about 35 years old. She was the wife of the headman of the Gorshkov farm in the Smolensk province. According to one version, she was inspired to participate in the peasant resistance by the fact that the French killed her husband, who refused to provide food and fodder for the Napoleonic troops. Another version says that Kozhina's husband was alive and led a partisan detachment himself, and his wife decided to follow her husband's example.
In any case, to fight the French, Kozhina organized her own detachment of women and teenagers. The partisans wielded what was available in the peasant economy: pitchforks, scythes, shovels and axes. The Kozhina detachment cooperated with the Russian troops, often handing over captured enemy soldiers to them.
Merit recognition
In November 1812, the Son of the Fatherland magazine wrote about Vasilisa Kozhina. The note was devoted to how Kozhina escorted prisoners to the location of the Russian army. One day, when the peasants brought in some captured Frenchmen, she gathered her detachment, mounted her horse, and ordered the prisoners to follow her. One of the captured officers, not wanting to obey "some peasant woman", began to resist. Kozhina immediately killed the officer with a scythe on the head. Kozhina shouted to the remaining prisoners that they should not dare to be impudent, because she had already cut off the heads of 27 “such mischievous people”. This episode, by the way, was immortalized in a lubok picture by the artist Alexei Venetsianov about the “old man Vasilisa”. In the first months after the war, such pictures were sold throughout the country as a memory of a national feat.

It is believed that for her role in the liberation war, the peasant woman was awarded a medal, as well as a cash prize personally from Tsar Alexander I. The State Historical Museum in Moscow has a portrait of Vasilisa Kozhina, painted by the artist Alexander Smirnov in 1813. A medal on the St. George ribbon is visible on Kozhina's chest.

And the name of the brave partisan is immortalized in the names of many streets. So, on the map of Moscow, not far from the Park Pobedy metro station, you can find Vasilisa Kozhina Street.
folk rumor
Vasilisa Kozhina died around 1840. Almost nothing is known about her life after the end of the war, but the fame of Kozhina's military exploits spread throughout the country, acquiring rumors and fictions. According to such folk legends, Kozhina once lured 18 Frenchmen into a hut by cunning, and then set it on fire. There are also stories about Vasilisa's mercy: according to one of them, a partisan once took pity on a captured Frenchman, fed him and even gave him warm clothes. Whether at least one of these stories is true, unfortunately, is not known - there is no documentary evidence.
It is not surprising that over time, many tales began to appear around the brave partisan - Vasilisa Kozhina turned into a collective image of the Russian peasantry who fought against the invaders. And folk heroes often become characters in legends. Modern Russian directors could not resist myth-making either. In 2013, the mini-series "Vasilisa" was released, later remade into a full-length film. The title character in it was played by Svetlana Khodchenkova. And although the fair-haired actress does not at all look like the woman depicted in the portrait by Smirnov, and the historical assumptions in the film sometimes look completely grotesque (for example, the fact that the simple peasant woman Kozhina speaks fluent French), nevertheless, such films say that that the memory of the brave partisan is alive even two centuries after her death.

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The Patriotic War of 1812 was one of the turning points in Russian history, a serious shock to Russian society, which faced a number of new problems and phenomena that still require reflection by modern historians.

One such phenomenon was the People's War, which spawned an incredible amount of rumors and then enduring legends.

The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 has been studied to a sufficient extent, but at the same time there are many controversial episodes in it, since there are conflicting opinions in assessing this event. Differences begin from the very beginning - from the causes of the war, go through all the battles and personalities and end only with the departure of the French from Russia. The question of the popular partisan movement is not fully understood until today, which is why this topic will always be relevant.

In historiography, this topic is presented quite fully, however, the opinions of domestic historians about the partisan war itself and its participants, about their role in the Patriotic War of 1812, are extremely ambiguous.

Dzhivelegov A.K. wrote the following: “The peasants participated in the war only after Smolensk, but especially after the surrender of Moscow. If there had been more discipline in the Grand Army, normal relations with the peasants would have been established very soon. But the foragers turned into marauders, from whom the peasants “naturally defended themselves, and for protection, precisely for protection and for nothing else, peasant detachments were formed ... all of them, we repeat, meant exclusively self-defense. The People's War of 1812 is nothing more than an optical illusion created by the ideology of the nobility...” (6, p. 219).

The opinion of the historian Tarle E.V. was a little more condescending, but on the whole it was similar to the opinion of the author presented above: “All this led to the fact that the mythical“ peasant partisans ”began to be attributed to what the retreating Russian army actually carried out. There were classical partisans, but mostly only in the Smolensk province. On the other hand, the peasants were terribly annoyed by endless foreign foragers and marauders. And, of course, they were actively resisted. And yet “many peasants fled into the forests at the approach of the French army, often simply out of fear. And not from some great patriotism” (9, p. 12).

Historian Popov A.I. does not deny the existence of peasant partisan detachments, however, he believes that it is wrong to call them the word “partisans”, that they were more like a militia (8, p. 9). Davydov clearly distinguished between "partisans and villagers." In the leaflets, partisan detachments are clearly distinguished from "peasants from the villages adjacent to the theater of war", who "arrange militias among themselves"; they fix the difference between armed settlers and partisans, between “our detached detachments and zemstvo militias” (8, p. 10). So the accusations by Soviet authors of noble and bourgeois historians that they did not consider the peasants to be partisans are completely groundless, because their contemporaries did not consider them as such.

Modern historian N.A. Troitsky in his article “The Patriotic War of 1812. From Moscow to the Neman” wrote: “In the meantime, a guerrilla war, destructive for the French, broke out around Moscow. Peaceful townspeople and villagers of both sexes and all ages, armed with whatever - from axes to simple clubs, multiplied the ranks of partisans and militias ... The total number of people's militia exceeded 400 thousand people. In the war zone, almost all the peasants who were able to bear arms became partisans. It was the nationwide upsurge of the masses, who came out in defense of the Fatherland, that became the main reason for Russia's victory in the war of 1812 "(11)

In pre-revolutionary historiography, there were facts discrediting the actions of partisans. Some historians called the partisans marauders, showed their indecent actions not only in relation to the French, but also in relation to ordinary residents. In many works of domestic and foreign historians, the role of the resistance movement of the broad masses, who responded to a foreign invasion with a nationwide war, is clearly belittled.

Our study presents an analysis of the works of such historians as: Alekseev V.P., Babkin V.I., Beskrovny L.G., Bichkov L.N., Knyazkov S.A., Popov A.I., Tarle E.V. ., Dzhivilegov A.K., Troitsky N.A.

The object of our study is the partisan war of 1812, and the subject of the study is the historical assessment of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

At the same time, we used the following research methods: narrative, hermeneutic, content analysis, historical-comparative, historical-genetic.

Based on all of the above, the purpose of our work is to give a historical assessment of such a phenomenon as the guerrilla war of 1812.

1. Theoretical analysis of sources and works related to the topic of our study;

2. To identify whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place according to the narrative tradition;

3. Consider the concept of "partisan movement of 1812" and its causes;

4. Consider the peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812;

5. Conduct their comparative analysis in order to determine the role of peasant and army partisan detachments in achieving victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Thus, the structure of our work looks like this:

Introduction

Chapter 1: People's War According to the Narrative Tradition

Chapter 2: General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

Conclusion

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Modern historians often question the existence of the People's War, believing that such actions of the peasants were carried out solely for the purpose of self-defense and that detachments of peasants should by no means be distinguished as separate types of partisans.

In the course of our work, a large number of sources were analyzed, ranging from essays to collections of documents, and allowing us to understand whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place.

Reporting documentation always provides the most reliable evidence, since it lacks subjectivity and clearly traces information that proves certain hypotheses. Many different facts can be found in it, such as: the size of the army, the names of the detachments, actions at various stages of the war, the number of casualties and, in our case, facts about the location, number, methods and motives of peasant partisan detachments. In our case, this documentation includes manifestos, reports, government messages.

1) It all started with the "Manifesto of Alexander I on the collection of the Zemstvo militia of 1812 on July 6." In it, in plain text, the tsar calls on the peasants to fight the French troops, believing that only a regular army will not be enough to win the war (4, p. 14).

2) Typical raids on small detachments of the French are perfectly traced in the report of the marshal of the nobility from Zhizdra to the civil governor of Kaluga (10, p. 117)

3) From the report of E.I. Vlastova Ya.X. Wittgenstein from the town of Bely "On the actions of the peasants against the enemy" from the government report "On the activities of peasant detachments against the army of Napoleon in the Moscow province", from the "Short journal of military operations" on the struggle of the peasants of Velsky district. Smolensk lips. with the army of Napoleon, we see that the actions of peasant partisan detachments really took place during the Patriotic War of 1812, mainly in the Smolensk province (10, p. 118, 119, 123).

Memoirs, like memories, are not the most reliable source of information, since, by definition, memoirs are notes of contemporaries that tell about events in which their author directly took part. Memoirs are not identical to the chronicle of events, since in the memoirs the author tries to comprehend the historical context of his own life, accordingly, memoirs differ from the chronicles of events in subjectivity - in that the events described are refracted through the prism of the author's consciousness with their own sympathy and vision of what is happening. Therefore, memoirs, unfortunately, in our case practically do not provide evidence.

1) The attitude of the peasants in the Smolensk province and their readiness to fight is clearly traced in the memoirs of A.P. Buteneva (10, p. 28)

2) From the memoirs of I.V. Snegirev, we can conclude that the peasants are ready to defend Moscow (10, p. 75)

However, we see that memoirs and memoirs are not a reliable source of information, since they contain too many subjective assessments, and we will not take them into account in the end.

Notes And letters are also subject to subjectivity, but their difference from memoirs is such that they were written directly at the time of these historical events, and not for the purpose of subsequently familiarizing the masses with them, as is the case with journalism, but as personal correspondence or notes, respectively, their reliability although it is questioned, but they can be considered as evidence. In our case, notes and letters provide us with evidence not so much of the existence of the People's War as such, but they prove the courage and strong spirit of the Russian people, showing that the peasant partisan detachments were created in large numbers based on patriotism, and not from the need for self-defense.

1) The first attempts at peasant resistance can be traced in a letter from Rostopchin to Balashov dated August 1, 1812 (10, p. 28)

2) From the notes of A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin dated August 31, 1812, from a letter to P.M. Longinova S.R. Vorontsov, from the diary of Ya.N. Pushchin about the battle of the peasants with the enemy detachment near Borodino and about the mood of the officers after leaving Moscow, we see that the actions of the peasant partisan detachments during the Patriotic War of 1812 were caused not only by the need for self-defense, but also by deep patriotic feelings and the desire to protect their homeland. enemy (10, p. 74, 76, 114).

Publicism at the beginning of the XIX century in the Russian Empire was subjected to censorship. So in the "First censorship decree" of Alexander I of July 9, 1804, the following is stated: "... censorship is obliged to consider all books and writings intended for distribution in society", i.e. in fact, it was impossible to publish anything without the permission of the controlling body, and, accordingly, all descriptions of the exploits of the Russian people could turn out to be banal propaganda or a kind of “call to action” (12, p. 32). However, this does not mean that journalism does not provide us with any evidence of the existence of the People's War. With the seeming severity of censorship, it is worth noting that she coped with the tasks set not in the best way. Professor of Illion University Marianna Tex Choldin writes: "... a significant number of "harmful" writings penetrated the country despite all the efforts of the government to prevent this" (12, p. 37). Accordingly, journalism does not claim to be 100% reliable, but it also provides us with some evidence of the existence of the People's War and a description of the exploits of the Russian people.

Having analyzed the “Notes of the Fatherland” about the activities of one of the organizers of the peasant partisan detachments Yemelyanov, the correspondence to the newspaper “Northern Post” about the actions of the peasants against the enemy and the article by N.P. Polikarpov "Unknown and elusive Russian partisan detachment", we see that excerpts from these newspapers and magazines reinforce the evidence of the existence of peasant partisan detachments as such and confirm their patriotic motives (10, p. 31, 118; 1, p. 125) .

Based on this reasoning, one can conclude that the most useful in proving the existence of the People's War was reporting documentation because of the lack of subjectivity. Reporting documentation provides proof of the existence of the People's War(description of the actions of peasant partisan detachments, their methods, number and motives), and notes And letters confirm that the formation of such detachments and the People's War itself was caused by Not only in order to self defense, but also based on deep patriotism And courage Russian people. Publicism also reinforces both these judgments. Based on the above analysis of numerous documentation, we can conclude that contemporaries of the Patriotic War of 1812 were aware that the People's War had taken place and clearly distinguished peasant partisan detachments from army partisan detachments, and were also aware that this phenomenon was not caused by self-defense. Thus, from all of the above, we can say that there was a People's War.

Chapter 2. General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an armed conflict between the multinational army of Napoleon and Russian partisans on the territory of Russia in 1812 (1, p. 227).

Guerrilla warfare was one of the three main forms of the Russian people's war against the invasion of Napoleon, along with passive resistance (for example, the destruction of food and fodder, burning their own houses, going into the forests) and massive participation in militias.

The reasons for the emergence of the Guerrilla War were associated, first of all, with the unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the whole people. In the overwhelming majority of the areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the "Great Army" not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at the beginning promising phrases were uttered about the liberation of serfs from serfdom and even talked about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France, and it was difficult for him to preach the revolution in Russia” (3, p. 12).

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The provisional Lithuanian “government”, subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landowners, continue to perform all work and duties, and those who evaded were to be severely punished, involving for this , if circumstances so require, military force (3, p. 15).

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

In reality, things were somewhat different. Even before the start of the war, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuikevich compiled a note on the conduct of an active partisan war, and in 1811 the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini "Small War" was published in Russian. This was the beginning of the creation of partisan detachments in the war of 1812. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement "a pernicious system of divisive action of the army" (2, p. 27).

The partisan forces consisted of detachments of the Russian army operating in the rear of Napoleon's troops; Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity; volunteers from the local population.

§2.1 Peasant partisan detachments

The first partisan detachments were created even before the Battle of Borodino. On July 23, after connecting with Bagration near Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly formed a flying partisan detachment from the Kazan Dragoon, three Don Cossack and Stavropol Kalmyk regiments under the general command of F. Wintzingerode. Wintzingerode was supposed to act against the left flank of the French and provide communication with Wittgenstein's corps. The flying detachment of Wintzingerode also proved to be an important source of information. On the night of July 26-27, Barclay received word from Wintzingerode from Velizh about Napoleon's plans to advance from Porechye to Smolensk in order to cut off the Russian army's escape routes. After the Battle of Borodino, the Wintzingerode detachment was reinforced by three Cossack regiments and two battalions of rangers and continued to operate against the enemy's flanks, breaking up into smaller detachments (5, p. 31).

With the invasion of the Napoleonic hordes, the locals initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from hostilities. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army, M.B. Barclay de Tolly urged his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was obviously based on the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to wage guerrilla warfare.

It arose spontaneously and was a speech by small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to the memoirs of D.V. Davydov, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms” (8, p. 74).

The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers.

Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. Here the popular resistance also gained the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would then be held accountable. However, later this process became more active (3, p. 13).

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked parties of the French that made their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people (7, p. 209).

Residents of the Roslavl district created several peasant detachments on horseback and on foot, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many peasant detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Organizing defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the path of the enemy in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydov.

In the Gzhatsk district, another detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. The detachment of Chetvertakov began not only to protect the villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, in the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the inhabitants of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side” (5, p. 39).

Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.

The actions of the peasant detachments were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.

In the Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasiev (5, p. 46).

The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications for 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya, the head of Yegor Stulov, the centenary Ivan Chushkin and the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the head of Amerevsky, Yemelyan Vasiliev, gathered peasants under their jurisdiction, and also invited neighboring ones” (1, p. .228).

The detachment numbered in its ranks about 6 thousand people, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle with the enemy troops.

It should be noted that even women participated in sorties against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes were overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is with Vasilisa Kozhina, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed neither more nor less leadership of the peasant detachment, which in reality was not.

During the war, many active members of the peasant detachments were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward people subordinate to Count F.V. Rostopchin: 23 people "in command" - insignia of the Military Order (St. George's Crosses), and the other 27 people - a special silver medal "For Love for the Fatherland" on the Vladimir ribbon.

Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militias, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone controlled by him and create additional bases for supplying the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to get additional communications that would link the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv.

§2.2 Army partisan detachments

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon, 11 Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​the city of Dukhovshchina.

A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to find out the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest, the poor protection of the rear in the French army (8, p. 83).

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was to fight without an agreed plan of action for the flying peasant detachments. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration allowed him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For a "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavsky, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

In the autumn of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.

Between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated. From Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. Kudashiv. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I.E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Vintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, to the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region (6, p. 210).

The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him , and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I give away important parts from me in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk ”(2, p. 74). Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the Cossack troops and were not the same in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Headquarters of the Russian Army. . The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of operations of neighboring detachments in case of joint operations.

Partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.

Partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on the head, and quickly hide became the basic rule of the partisans.

Detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took tens and hundreds of prisoners.

On the evening of September 3, 1812, Davydov's detachment went to Tsarev-Zaimishch. Short of 6 miles to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zaimishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The baggage train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of Frenchmen to resist was quickly crushed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 wagons with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans (1, p. 247).

Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a sudden raid. So, General Wintsengerode, having established that in the village of Sokolov - 15 there is an outpost of two squadrons of cavalry and three companies of infantry, singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly broke into the village, killed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers -officers, 83 soldiers (1, p. 249).

The detachment of Colonel Kudashiva, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.

Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of the detachment of General Dorokhov, acting along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 6, a detachment of Colonel Efremov, having met an enemy column heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people (5, p. 56).

The detachment of Captain Figner, who was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up the artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers (7 , p. 215).

Later, partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, on September 28, 1812, took the city of Vereya, destroying part of the French garrison.

§2.3 Comparative analysis of peasant and army partisan detachments in 1812

Peasant partisan detachments arose spontaneously in connection with the oppression of the peasants by the French troops. Army partisan detachments arose with the consent of the top command leadership due to the insufficient effectiveness of the regular regular army, on the one hand, and with the chosen tactics aimed at disuniting and exhausting the enemy, on the other hand.

Basically, both types of partisan detachments operated in the region of Smolensk and adjacent cities: Gzhaisk, Mozhaisk, etc., as well as in the following counties: Krasnensky, Porechsky, Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky, Vyazemsky.

The composition and degree of organization of the partisan detachments were radically different: the first group consisted of peasants who began their activities due to the fact that the invading French troops aggravated the already poor situation of the peasants with their first actions. In this regard, this group included men and women, young and old, and at first acted spontaneously and not always in a coordinated manner. The second group consisted of the military (hussars, Cossacks, officers, soldiers), created to help the regular army. This group, being professional soldiers, acted more cohesively and harmoniously, most often taking not by quantity, but by skill and ingenuity.

Peasant partisan detachments were armed mainly with pitchforks, spears, axes, and less often with firearms. Army partisan detachments were equipped better and better.

In this regard, peasant partisan detachments carried out raids on carts, set up ambushes, and sorties to the rear. Army partisan detachments exercised control over roads, destroyed food depots and small French detachments, carried out raids and raids on larger enemy detachments, and staged sabotage.

In quantitative terms, the peasant partisan detachments outnumbered the army ones.

The results of the activities were also not too similar, but, perhaps, equally important. With the help of peasant partisan detachments, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone he controlled and create additional bases for supplying the main forces, while with the help of army partisan detachments, Napoleon's army was weakened and subsequently destroyed.

Thus, the peasant partisan detachments stopped the strengthening of Napoleon's army, and the army partisan detachments helped the regular army to destroy it, which was no longer able to increase its power.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 was called the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to reproaches of "a war against the rules," Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. In response to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people who have been embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland...” (1, p. 310).

In our work, based on evidence from multiple analyzed sources and works, we proved that peasant partisan detachments existed on a par with army partisan detachments, and this phenomenon was also caused by the wave of patriotism, and not out of people's fear of the French "oppressors".

The activities aimed at attracting the masses of the people to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad possibilities that manifested themselves in the national liberation war.

The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.

Bibliography

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The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, ragged and frozen, Napoleon's army was brutally beaten by flying and peasant partisan detachments of Russians.

Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants

The greatly stretched Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive him of food and fodder.

During World War II, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of the commander-in-chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of peasant partisans, united spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to the actual sabotage actions, the flying detachments were also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces basically fought off the enemy from their villages and villages.

Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and offered it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, to capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, to beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. More than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment were killed by Davydov's cavalrymen, another 100 were captured. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first, the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant's caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants did not believe him.

Over time, the detachment of Denis Davydov increased to 300 people. The cavalry attacked the French units, sometimes having a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking the carts and freeing the prisoners, it even happened to capture enemy artillery.

After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. Mostly these were Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the city of Vereya near Moscow. The combined partisan groups could withstand the large military formations of Napoleon's army. So, at the end of October, during a battle near the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousandth brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat was a terrible blow. On the contrary, this success encouraged the Russian troops and set them up for further victories.

Peasant Initiative

A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of the French units was made by the peasants who organized themselves into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov's instructions. While willingly helping the flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the peasants at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, often at the approaches of the enemy they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce resistance on the ground intensified as the demoralized French army became more and more a crowd of robbers and marauders.

One of these detachments was assembled by the dragoons Yermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy carts with food and livestock. At one time, up to 4 thousand people entered the Chetvertakov compound. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by military personnel, noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of the Napoleonic troops, were not isolated.

Essay on the history of a student of grade 11, school 505 Afitova Elena

Partisan movement in the War of 1812

Partisan movement, armed struggle of the masses for the freedom and independence of their country or social transformations, conducted in the territory occupied by the enemy (controlled by the reactionary regime). Regular troops operating behind enemy lines may also take part in the Partisan Movement.

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, the armed struggle of the people, mainly the peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of the Napoleonic troops and on their communications. The partisan movement began in Lithuania and Belarus after the retreat of the Russian army. At first, the movement was expressed in the refusal to supply the French army with fodder and food, the massive destruction of stocks of these types of supplies, which created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic troops. With the entry of the pr-ka into the Smolensk, and then into the Moscow and Kaluga provinces, the partisan movement assumed an especially wide scope. At the end of July-August, in Gzhatsky, Belsky, Sychevsky and other counties, the peasants united in foot and horseback partisan detachments armed with pikes, sabers and guns, attacked separate groups of enemy soldiers, foragers and carts, disrupted the communications of the French army. The partisans were a serious fighting force . The number of individual detachments reached 3-6 thousand people. The partisan detachments of G.M. Kurin, S. Emelyanov, V. Polovtsev, V. Kozhina and others became widely known. Tsarist law treated the partisan movement with distrust. But in an atmosphere of patriotic upsurge, some landowners and progressively minded generals (P.I. Bagration, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, A.P. Yermolov and others). The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Field Marshal M.I., attached particular importance to the people's partisan struggle. Kutuzov. He saw in it a huge force capable of inflicting significant damage on the avenue, promoted in every possible way the organization of new detachments, gave instructions on their weapons and instructions on the tactics of partisan struggle. character. This was largely facilitated by the formation of special detachments from regular troops, who acted by guerrilla methods. The first such detachment of 130 people was created at the end of August on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov. In September, 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry and 5 infantry regiments, 5 squadrons and 3 battalions acted as part of army partisan detachments. The detachments were commanded by generals and officers I.S. Dorokhov, M.A. Fonvizin and others. Many peasant detachments that arose spontaneously subsequently joined the army or closely cooperated with them. Separate detachments of the formation of bunks were also involved in partisan actions. militia. The partisan movement reached its widest scope in the Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces. Acting on the communications of the French army, the partisan detachments exterminated enemy foragers, captured carts, and provided the Russian command with valuable information to the ODA. Under these conditions, Kutuzov set broader tasks for the Partisan movement to interact with the army and strike at individual garrisons and reserves of the pr-ka. So, on September 28 (October 10), on the orders of Kutuzov, a detachment of General Dorokhov, with the support of peasant detachments, captured the city of Vereya. As a result of the battle, the French lost about 700 people killed and wounded. In total, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino in 1812, the pr-k lost more than 30 thousand people as a result of partisan strikes. Throughout the retreat of the French army, partisan detachments assisted the Russian troops in pursuing and destroying the enemy, attacking his carts and destroying individual detachments. In general, the Partisan movement provided great assistance to the Russian army in defeating the Napoleonic troops and driving them out of Russia.

Causes of guerrilla warfare

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of folk heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle came to the fore.

Why, then, did the disenfranchised peasantry, ruthlessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not think of any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at first promising phrases about the liberation of the serfs were uttered, and even it was said that it was necessary to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move, with the help of which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleonunderstood that the release of Russian serfs would inevitably lead torevolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was "important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach the revolution in Russia."

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the landowners. work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this, if circumstances so required, military force.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In reality, things were different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, the inhabitants went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

The peasants did not quickly realize that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom

Peasants' War

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the departure of the population to forests and areas remote from hostilities. And although it was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This immediately affected the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers starve, looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.

French foragers sent to the villages for food encountered not only passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: "The army could only eat what the marauders, organized in whole detachments, got; Cossacks and peasants daily killed many of our people who dared to go in search." In the villages there were skirmishes, including shooting, between the French soldiers sent for food and the peasants. Such skirmishes occurred quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance was born - partisan struggle.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the area of ​​Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasant partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind the chief of staff Berthier about the great losses in people and strictly ordered that an increasing number of troops be allocated to cover the foragers.

The partisan struggle of the peasants acquired the widest scope in August in the Smolensk province. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky counties, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be held accountable.

Vg. In the Belsky and Belsky districts, partisan detachments attacked the French who made their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk partisans, police officer Boguslavskaya and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their detachments with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and took 325 prisoners.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several partisan detachments on horseback and on foot, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Elnensky county. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the path of the enemy in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisans to the detachment of Denis Davydov.

The largest Gzhatsk partisan detachment operated successfully. Its organizer was a soldier of the Elizavetgrad regiment Fedor Potopov (Samus). Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself behind enemy lines and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2 thousand people (according to other sources, 3 thousand). Its strike force consisted of an equestrian group of 200 men armed and dressed in French cuirassiers. The Samus detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system of warning the population about the approach of the enemy by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages were empty, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes told when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, it was necessary to go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture a cannon. Detachment Samusya inflicted minor damage to the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.