The most mobile means by which the front commander influenced the course of the operation was aviation. The LaGG-3 fighter, which was put into service on the eve of the war, was inferior in terms of flight characteristics to the main German Messerschmitt-109 fighter of the R and C modifications. which significantly increased the speed and rate of climb, improved vertical maneuverability. The speed of the new LaGG-5 fighter in level flight at sea level was 8 km / h more than its predecessor, and at an altitude of 6500 m superior speed

increased to 34 km / h, the rate of climb was also better. He was practically in no way inferior to the Messerschmitt-109. But most importantly, its simple design, the absence of the need for complex maintenance and the unpretentiousness of the take-off fields made it ideal for the conditions in which units of the Soviet Air Force had to operate. In September 1942, LaGG-5 fighters were renamed La-5. In order to neutralize the actions of the "shops", the Wehrmacht decided to mass-produce the Focke-Wulf-Fw-190 218 fighter. By the beginning of the war, the MiG-3 was the most numerous new-generation fighter in the Soviet Air Force. On the Soviet-German front, throughout the war, air battles were fought mainly at altitudes up to 4 km. The high altitude of the MiG-3, which at first was considered its undoubted advantage, became a disadvantage, since it was achieved due to the deterioration of the aircraft's flight performance at low altitudes. Wartime difficulties in providing engines for armored attack aircraft Il-2 forced at the end of 1941 to abandon the production of engines for the MiG-3 219. In the first half of 1942, part of the armament and equipment was removed from the Yak-1 to improve flight performance. Since the summer of 1942, the Yak-1 began to be equipped with a more powerful engine, the pilot's visibility was significantly improved by installing a teardrop-shaped lantern, and the armament was strengthened (instead of two ShKAS machine guns, one large-caliber BS was installed) 220 . By the end of 1942, recommendations were implemented to improve airframe aerodynamics. The Yak-7, according to its data, was very close to the Yak-1, but differed from it in better aerobatic qualities and more powerful weapons (two BS heavy machine guns).

The mass of a second volley of the Yak-7 was more than 1.5 times higher than that of other Soviet fighters, such as the Yak-1, MiG-3 and La-5, as well as the best German fighter Messerschmitt-109 at that time ( Bf-109G). In the Yak-7B aircraft, instead of wooden wing spars, metal ones were installed in 1942. The weight gain was more than 100 kg. A. S. Yakovlev's new Yakovlev Yak-9 aircraft was close to the best German aircraft in terms of speed and rate of climb, but surpassed them in maneuverability 222 . The first machines of this series took part in the defensive battles near Stalingrad. At the beginning of the war, almost all Soviet fighters were inferior to the German ones in terms of firepower, since they had mainly machine-gun weapons, and German fighters used cannon weapons in addition to machine-gun weapons. Since 1942, the ShVAK 20 mm cannon armament began to be used on the Yak-1 and Yak-7. Many Soviet fighters resolutely switched to air combat using vertical maneuver. Air battles were fought in pairs, sometimes in squads, radio communications began to be used, which improved aircraft control. Our fighters and the distance of opening fire were reduced more and more decisively. From the spring of 1943, the La-5F fighter with a more powerful M-82F engine began to arrive at the front, and visibility from the cockpit improved. The aircraft showed a speed of 557 km / h at sea level and 590 km / h at an altitude of 6200 m - 10 km / h more than La-5. The rate of climb increased noticeably: La-5F climbed 5 thousand in 5.5 minutes, while La-5 gained this height in 6 minutes. In the next modification of this La-5FN aircraft, all measures were taken to further improve aerodynamics, the mass of the structure was reduced and a new, more powerful M-82FN engine was installed (since 1944 - ASh-82FN), controls were modernized. Almost everything that could be achieved without a significant change in design was squeezed out of the layout. The speed of the aircraft reached 685 km/h, while the experimental La-5FN had 650 km/h. The armament consisted of two synchronized 20 mm ShVAK 224 cannons. In terms of combat capability, the La-5FN in 1943 became the strongest air combat fighter on the Soviet-German front. During the modification of the Yak-9 (Yak-9D), to increase the flight range, two gas tanks were additionally placed in the wing consoles, due to which the maximum flight range increased by more than a third and amounted to 1400 km. The Yak-9T was equipped with such formidable weapons as the NS-37 cannon of 37 mm 225 caliber.

At the beginning of 1943, the Germans got the Messerschmitt-109G (Bf-109G) fighter with an increased power-to-weight ratio 226 engine, but the Yak-1 and Yak-7B with powerful engines began to enter the Soviet troops, which compensated for the advantage of the Germans. Soon, the Messerschmitt-109G6 (Me-109G6) used a device for a short-term injection of a water-methyl mixture, which briefly (10 minutes) increased the speed by 25-30 km / h. But the new La-5FN fighters outperformed all Me-109Gs, including those with a water-methyl mixture injection system. Since 1943, the Germans began to widely use the FockeWulf-190A (FW-190A-4) fighters on the eastern front, which developed a speed of 668 km / h at an altitude of 1000 m, but they were inferior to Soviet fighters in horizontal maneuvering and when exiting a dive . At the same time, the Red Army fighters were inferior in terms of ammunition (Yak-7B had 300 rounds, Yak-1, Yak9D and LaGG-3 - 200 rounds, and Me-109G-6 - 600 rounds). In addition, the hexogenic explosives of 30 mm German shells made it possible to have a damaging effect, like a 37 mm shell of Soviet guns.

In Germany, the development of new piston-engined fighters also continued. In this sense, the Dornier-335 (Do-335), structurally unusual (two propellers gave it thrust, one of which was in the nose, and the second in the tail of the aircraft), showed itself quite well during the first flight in October 1943. a promising car, having managed to develop a speed of 758 km / h; as weapons, he had one 30-mm cannon and two 15-mm machine guns. Despite the strange layout, Do-335 could be a good combat aircraft, but this project was closed the next year 227 . In 1944, a new La-7 fighter entered the test. On the plane, it became possible to put metal spars and reinforced weapons, which consisted of three new 20-mm B-20 cannons. It was the most advanced fighter of S. A. Lavochkin Design Bureau and one of the best combat aircraft of the Second World War. Put into service in 1944, the Yak-9DD had an even greater flight range - up to 1800 km228. The designers literally showed miracles of skill by placing another 150 kg of fuel in the wing and fuselage. Such ranges were in demand in bomber escort operations at the end of the war, when the relocation of airfields could not keep up with the rapid advance of our troops. The Yak-9M fighter had a unified design with the Yak-9D and Yak-9T. At the end of 1944, the Yak-9M began to be equipped with a more powerful VK-105PF-2 engine, which increased speed at low altitudes.

The most radical modification of the Yak-9 aircraft, the Yak-9U, appeared at the front in the second half of 1944. An even more powerful engine was installed on this aircraft. In the middle of the summer of 1944, the Yak-3 229 began to enter the troops, based on the Yak-1 fighter, while the wing dimensions were reduced, new, lighter metal spars were installed, and aerodynamics were improved. The effect of reducing the mass by more than 200 kg, reducing drag, installing a more powerful modification of the engine provided an increase in speed, rate of climb, maneuverability and acceleration characteristics in the altitude range where air battles were fought, which were not possessed by enemy aircraft. In 1944, Soviet fighters ensured superiority over the Germans in all areas of air combat. These were the Yak-3 and La-7 with more powerful engines. At the beginning of the war, the Germans used better quality C-3 gasoline. But in 1944-1945. they experienced a shortage of this gasoline and thereby were even more inferior in engine power to our fighters. In terms of aerobatic qualities and ease of control, our Yak-1, Yak-3, La-5 fighters in the second period of the Great Patriotic War had equal opportunity with the German ones. In 1944–1945 the aerobatic qualities of the Soviet fighters Yak-7B, Yak-9 and even more so Yak-3 were significantly improved. The effectiveness of Soviet fighters in the summer of 1944 became so great that the Germans transferred the Yu-88 (Ju-88) and Xe-111 (He-111) to work at night. The Xe-111 had powerful defensive armament and was inferior in speed to the Yu-88, but was quite effective in defense. The high accuracy of bombing was also ensured by good aiming equipment.

The appearance of the La-7 with three 20-mm B-20 cannons provided superior firepower, but these aircraft were few in the general fleet of fighters. It must be admitted that practically in terms of firepower throughout the war, German fighters in their mass either surpassed or were equal to Soviet ones. Admittedly, fascist Germany was ahead of Soviet Union and in the creation of a new generation of aviation. During the war years, the Germans created and began to produce three jet aircraft: Messerschmitt-262 (Me-262), Heinkel-162 (He-162) and Messerschmitt-163 (Me-163). The turbojet Me-262 was capable of reaching speeds of up to 860 km / h at an altitude of 6 thousand meters with an initial rate of climb of 1200 meters per minute. “With a combat radius of up to 480 km, it personified a giant leap in aircraft manufacturing technologies, since it surpassed most piston-engine machines in its characteristics ... (although it must be remembered that the British were also completing the development jet fighter, the first of which, the Gloucester Meteor, began to enter the flight squadrons at the end of July 1944)" 230 . In the USSR, they also worked on the creation of a jet fighter. As early as May 1942, the world's first BI-1 jet fighter, designed by VF Bolkhovitinov, was tested. But in the Soviet Union it was not possible to create a reliable jet engine. I had to start copying captured equipment, since several copies of German jet engines. In the shortest possible time, documentation was prepared for the release of "clones" under the designations RD-10 and RD-20. Already in 1946, the MiG-9 fighter with a turbojet engine, created by a team of scientists led by AI Mikoyan and MI Gurevich, was put into serial production. On the eve of the war, the design bureau of S. V. Ilyushin created a special type of aircraft - the Il-2 attack aircraft, which had no analogue in the world.

An attack aircraft is a low-speed aircraft compared to a fighter, optimized for flying at extremely low altitude - strafing flight. The aircraft had a well armored hull. The Luftwaffe used only Junkers-87 (Ju-87) dive bombers "thing" (Sturzkampfflugsaig - dive combat aircraft) as battlefield aircraft. The appearance of the Il-2 armored attack aircraft at the front came as a complete surprise to the enemy, who, as a result of serious losses and demoralizing effects, soon called him the "black death" 232 . And the Soviet soldiers dubbed it a "flying tank." A diverse composition of weapons (two machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber, two 20 mm or 23 mm cannons, eight rockets of 82 mm or 132 mm caliber and 400–600 kg of bombs) ensured the defeat of a wide variety of targets: columns of troops, armored vehicles, tanks , artillery batteries, infantry, means of communication and communications, warehouses, trains, etc. The combat use of the Il-2 also revealed its major drawback - vulnerability to fire from enemy fighters that attacked the attack aircraft from the rear unprotected hemisphere. In the Design Bureau of S. V. Ilyushin, the aircraft was modified, and in the fall of 1942, the Il-2 in a two-seater version first appeared at the front. An important role in increasing the firepower of the attack aircraft when attacking ground targets was played by air-to-ground missiles, which were adopted by the Il-2 in 1942. The high survivability of the Il-2 attack aircraft should also be noted. When it hit the gas tank, the plane did not catch fire and did not even lose fuel - it was saved by the fiber from which the gas tank was made. Even after several dozen bullet hits, the gas tank retained fuel. Neither the Henkel-118 nor the anti-tank aircraft Henschel-129, which appeared in 1942, could rise to the level of the Il-2 attack aircraft. Since 1943, the IL-2 was produced with a more powerful engine. To improve the stability characteristics, the attack aircraft wing was given a slight sweep. Being the main strike force of Soviet aviation, the Il-2 attack aircraft played an outstanding role in the war and had a noticeable impact on the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front. This combat vehicle successfully combined powerful weapons and reliable armor protection of the cockpit, engine, and fuel tanks.

The constant increase in the combat capability of the Il-2 was largely due to the continuous improvement of its weapons in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against enemy tanks and assault guns. In 1943, two 37 mm cannons were installed under the wing of the Il-2. Equipping these guns with 37-mm armor-piercing incendiary shells BZT-37 of the NS-37 air guns made it possible to disable any German tank. In addition, the creation in 1943 of the PTAB-2.5-1.5 anti-tank cumulative air bomb designed by I. A. Larionov using the ADA bottom fuse significantly expanded the capabilities of the Il-2 attack aircraft in the fight against tanks and other armored vehicles. When such bombs were dropped by one attack aircraft from a height of 75-100 m, almost all tanks in the 15 × 75 m band fell under attack, the PTAB bomb pierced armor up to 70 mm thick. Since the summer of 1943, Il-2KR aircraft equipped with photographic equipment and a more powerful than usual 234 radio station were used to correct artillery fire and reconnaissance. The successful operations of the Il-2 attack aircraft at the front gave a powerful impetus to the further expansion of development work on aircraft of this class. The work went in two directions.

The first was to enhance the bomber properties of the aircraft and strengthen its armor protection: such a heavy attack aircraft was built (Il-18), but its tests were delayed, and it was not mass-produced. The second direction implied a sharp improvement in flight data with the same artillery and small arms and armor protection as the IL-2. The IL-10, which was built in 1944, became such an attack aircraft. Compared to the IL-2, this aircraft had smaller dimensions, significantly better aerodynamics and a more powerful AM-42 liquid-cooled engine. Four cannons were installed on the aircraft: at the first stage - with a caliber of 20 mm, later - with a caliber of 23 mm, eight RS-82 rockets were located on the wing beams.

The bomb bay and external suspension allowed the use of different-caliber bombs with a total weight of up to 600 kg. At maximum horizontal speed, the IL-10 outperformed its predecessor by 150 km/h. Several air regiments armed with Il-10 took part in the combat operations of the final stage of the Great Patriotic War. In the future, the IL-10 was widely used in the war with Japan. In Germany, since 1944, the assault version of the FV-109F (FW-109F) fighter was used, which was significantly inferior in combat effectiveness to the Il-2. At the same time, it should be noted that the German assault aviation had a fairly high efficiency of bombing and cannon strikes (a more powerful bomb salvo and higher accuracy from a dive). Since the beginning of the war, the main Soviet front-line bomber was the Pe-2, but it had a rather weak bomb load - only 600 kg, since it was converted from a fighter. German front-line bombers Yu-88 and Xe-111 could take on board up to 2-3 thousand kg. The Pe-2 used mainly small caliber bombs of 100–250 kg and a maximum caliber of 500 kg, while the Yu-88 could lift a bomb up to 1800 kg. In 1941, the Pe-2 developed a speed of 530 km / h and surpassed the German bombers in this respect. Repeated armoring and strengthening of weapons, as well as skin sheets that were supplied from rolled products, 1–1.5 mm thick, made the aircraft structure heavier (before the war, 0.8 mm rolled products were supplied), and this led to the fact that the real maximum speed did not exceed 470 -475 km / h (like Yu-88). In July 1941, a decision was made to adopt a new 103U front-line dive bomber. In terms of speed at medium and high altitudes, flight range, bomb load and the power of defensive weapons, it significantly exceeded the Pe-2 dive bomber that had just been put into series. At altitudes of more than 6 km, the 103U flew faster than almost all serial fighters, both Soviet and German, second only to the domestic MiG-3 fighter. However, in the context of the outbreak of war and large-scale evacuation aviation enterprises I had to remake the plane for other engines.

Tests of a new version of the aircraft, called 10ЗВ, and then Tu-2 236, began in December 1941, and already in 1942 it began to enter the troops. Front-line pilots highly appreciated the new bomber. They liked its good aerobatic qualities, the ability to fly confidently on one engine, a good defensive fire pattern, a large bomb load, and increased survivability of air-cooled engines. To ensure future offensive operations, the Tu-2 was an indispensable aircraft. The first vehicles appeared at the front in September 1942. The Tu-2, despite its lower weight than the Yu-88 and Xe-111 (11,400–11,700 kg versus 12,500–15,000 kg), had the same bomb load. In terms of flight range, the Tu-2 was also at the level of the German bombers and twice the Pe-2.

Tu-2 could take 1 thousand kg of bombs into the bomb bay, and Yu-88 and Xe-111 - only on an external sling. Produced since the end of 1943, the Tu-2 with more powerful engines, reinforced defensive weapons and a simplified design surpassed all bombers used on the Soviet-German front. Tu-2 front-line dive bombers of the second edition have been participating in battles since 1944. In June of this year they were used in the Vyborg operation. The air division of Colonel I.P. Skok, armed with Tu-2, flew during the day, worked perfectly and had no losses. Despite the relatively modest contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Tu-2 nevertheless remained in history as one of the outstanding aircraft of its time. Among other similar aircraft, both allies and the enemy, the Tu-2 did not stand out with any kind of record performance. Its superiority lay in an exceptionally successful combination of the main components of combat effectiveness, such as speed, flight range, defense capability, bomb load and the ability to bomb one of the then largest caliber bombs. This determined its very high combat capability. main aircraft bomber aviation Nazi Germany in 1941 had single-engine Yu-87 and twin-engine Yu-88 and Xe-111 238. In 1941, Do-17s also fought.

Yu-88 could dive at an angle of 80 degrees, which ensured high accuracy of bombing. The Germans had well-trained pilots and navigators, they bombed mostly aimingly, and not in areas, especially since they used 1000 and 1800 kg bombs, which each aircraft could hang no more than one. The weak point of Soviet aviation in the Great Patriotic War was radio communications. In the first half of 1942, 75% of sorties were made without the use of radio stations, and until the end of the year, the vast majority of fighters did not have radio communications. The lack of communication dictated dense battle formations.

The inability to warn each other led to heavy losses. The planes had to be within line of sight, and the commander set the task - "do as I do." In 1943, only 50% of the Yak-9 were equipped with communications, and on the La-5, radio stations were only on command vehicles. All German fighters were equipped with high quality radio communications from pre-war times. Il-2 attack aircraft also lacked reliable radio equipment; until 1943, radio stations were installed only on command vehicles. All this made it difficult to organize large groups, IL-2s most often flew in threes, fours or eights.

In general, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet Air Force, the expansion of their combat capabilities were one of the main factors that contributed to the development of the national military strategy and the achievement of victory in the war. An increase in the combat effectiveness of aviation was facilitated by the equipment of aircraft with radio stations and more advanced small arms and cannon weapons. Most of the new types of aircraft in a number of important indicators had a clear advantage over the Luftwaffe. AT English sources it was noted that “the Luftwaffe ... was hopelessly behind the enemy, and not only numerically. While Soviet technologies were constantly being improved when new types of aircraft were put into operation, the Germans, in pursuit of increasing production volumes, currently had to sacrifice quality for quantity - instead of presenting advanced design solutions, constantly modernize existing samples, increasing their armament, increasing survivability and increasing engine power, which eventually led them to a standstill. It became completely impossible to maintain air superiority under such conditions, and as soon as aviation could no longer guarantee this, ground forces became vulnerable and, as a result, doomed to defeat.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In 12 vols. T. 7. Economy and weapons
war. - M.: Kuchkovo field, 2013. - 864 p., 20 p. ill., ill.

The recognition of mistakes is that powerful factor that makes it possible to correct one's actions in the right (i.e., correct) direction. This is a kind of feedback that makes the process of government sustainable.

The origins of the problems

As you know, the mechanical transfer of experience civil war, political purges and the destruction of the military elite in 1937-1938, led to a strong drop in the combat potential of the Red Army. The subsequent forced restoration of the combat potential of the Red Army and aviation, including, as you know, was poorly supported by material resources and did not give a positive result. For example, if in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Armed Forces, then by May 1, 1941 there were already 100 of them ("Military personnel on the eve of the war." Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor F.B. Komal. Military History Journal » No. 2, 1990). But on January 1, 1941, the schools and colleges of the Air Force were only 44.1% full of teachers. In addition, in these educational institutions instead of 1276 SB aircraft in the state on September 1, 1940, there were only 535, and F-1 cabins with dual control, instead of the supposed 743 - 217. They were also poorly provided with fuel (by 41.4% of the need), the terms of training often changed ( from 1939 to 1940 - 7 times) and the number of flying hours.

Appointments and transfers in 1939 alone involved 246,626 people in the service cycle, which at that time accounted for 68.8% of the staff of the commanding staff. During this period, huge movements of officers took place in the army, there were especially many promotions to the positions of senior and senior commanding staff in 1938-1939. This is explained, firstly, by the fact that then new regiments, divisions, corps, armies and military educational institutions. Secondly, as a result of the dismissal of a large number of officers in 1937-1938. there was an additional shortfall in personnel. The voids were filled with new people, many of whom were immediately promoted to major leadership positions, although most of them did not have the necessary knowledge and experience. And the fact that in these conditions the doctrine of offensive military operations was adopted under any conditions in the event of aggression from the outside was evidence of the illiteracy of the leadership of the state and blatant irresponsibility. As it turned out very soon, already during the Finnish War, not a single branch of the armed forces was ready to conduct not only offensive, but even defensive hostilities.

It is quite natural that in such a situation there still existed: a bias in general views on the war, a denial of the objective laws of armed struggle in favor of authoritative opinion, clannishness in the leadership of the country and the armed forces. They led to distortions in the ideology of the formation of the Army's weapons system, including aviation, in determining priorities in the development of weapons and planning the combat training of troops. For a long time they could not determine the role of bomber aircraft. long range, could not come to a common opinion about what kind of fighter the Air Force needed, the Air Force itself was subordinate to the Ground Forces, etc. Nobody looked at the Air Force as complex system with their objective laws of development and functioning, and, accordingly, the issues of interaction between the Air Force and other branches of the military were poorly worked out.

The elementary incompetence, disorganization and irresponsibility that prevailed in the leadership of the country and its Armed Forces are evidenced by memoirs and, which have recently become available, many orders and documents of that time1. Ultimately, it was this that led to the defeat of 1941 and the difficulties of 1942, although all signs of impending disaster were already on the surface in 1939.

The first wake-up call sounded back in May 1939, when the first days of fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River brought a simply depressing result: 18 of ours were paid for 2 downed Japanese aircraft. Things got to the point that the People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov in early June ... banned sorties (RGVA, F. 32113, Op. 1, D. 473). The situation changed only after the arrival of experienced pilots who were able to teach their combat comrades what they were not taught in flight schools.

The very first battles in the skies over Finland most cruelly dispelled the illusions about the combat readiness of the Red Army Air Force, especially bomber aircraft. On November 30, 1939, a squadron of the 35th high-speed bomber regiment flew out to strike at the most important objects of the enemy capital - the station and the power plant, but as a result of losing orientation, they dropped their deadly cargo ... on the residential and diplomatic quarters of Helsinki (RGVA, F. 34980, Op.12, D.1935). Commander P.S. Shelukhin, seconded to the headquarters of the North-Western Front, wrote to the People's Commissar of Defense 2: “The state of combat training of air units is at an extremely low level ... bombers cannot fly and especially maneuver in formation. In this regard, it is not possible to create fire interaction and repel an attack by enemy fighters with massive fire. This makes it possible for the enemy to inflict sensitive blows with his insignificant forces. Navigational training is very poor, resulting in a lot of wandering (sic) even in fine weather; in poor visibility and at night - mass wanderings. The pilot, being unprepared for the route, and due to the fact that the responsibility for aircraft navigation lies with the pilot-observer, carelessly in flight and loses orientation, hoping for a pilot. Mass blouses have a very detrimental effect on the combat capability of the units, tk. they lead to a large number of losses without any influence from the enemy and undermine the confidence of the crews, and this, in turn, forces the commanders to wait for weeks for good weather, which sharply reduces the number of sorties ... Speaking about the actions of aviation in general, it is necessary to say most of all about its inaction or action mostly in vain. For there is no other way to explain the fact that our aviation, with such a colossal superiority, could do almost nothing to the enemy for a month ... ”(F.34980, Op. 12, D. 1774, L. 23v.).

For the entire time of the Soviet-Finnish war, the USSR lost 627 aircraft of various types. Of these, 37.6% were shot down in combat or landed on enemy territory, 13.7% were missing, 28.87% were lost as a result of accidents and disasters, and 19.78% were damaged, which did not allow the return of the aircraft to service. At the same time, the Finnish side lost 76 aircraft shot down and 51 damaged in battle (K. Keskinen, K. Stenman Op.cit. p. 145.), although according to official Soviet data, the Finns lost 362 aircraft.

The last war showed a serious backlog of the Soviet Air Force both in technology and in the organization of hostilities and command and control. Sadly, it was not the Soviet side that learned the lesson from what happened, but the Finnish side.

It should be noted that the fiercest internecine struggle of party and government officials taking place in the second half of the 30s, which resulted in a landslide fragmentation of the main governing structures of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry (NKOP) into dozens of small, highly specialized people's commissariats ("The evolution of the management system of the Soviet defense industry in 1921- 1941 and the change in the priorities of the "defense" ", Ph.D. M. Mukhin. An abbreviated version of the article was published in the journal " National history"No. 3, 2000).

The deterioration of the foreign policy situation in Europe led to some understanding among the Soviet leadership of the inevitability of war with Nazi Germany. Obvious mistakes and blunders of the "leadership" began to be corrected by whipping up ideological psychosis with the help of patriotic slogans. A feverish investment of defense industry enterprises began, the accumulation of material resources in the Red Army and the deployment of new military formations.

A visit to German aircraft factories, purchases of equipment samples and their detailed study revealed a serious backlog of domestic equipment, both in terms of technical indicators and technology. Moreover, according to the conclusion of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Red Army, German aviation technology had the potential to increase its main characteristics without a significant change in design. It was suggested that in combat operations with the USSR, Germany would not use the demonstrated equipment, but its modernized versions with even higher flight performance.

By the end of 1940, the capacity of Soviet flying clubs had reached 100,000 pilots with independent flight time of up to 20 hours per year for each trainee. A sharp increase in the number and pace of training of flight crews, combined with a decrease in flying hours, led to an unprecedented increase in aviation accidents: up to 2-3 accidents and accidents per day 3 . However, nothing significant has been done with regard to the development of the strategy and tactics of the use of the Air Force, the improvement of issues of interaction with other types of troops. There was no time left to increase the level of technical equipment of the Red Army Air Force units and to take into account foreign (German) experience in aircraft construction in domestic designs.

After the war, for a long time at different levels and different people attempts were made to smooth out the obvious causes of the 1941 disaster. For example, in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, and then in other sources, it is stated that from 01.01.39 to 06.22.41 the Red Army received 17745 combat aircraft from industry, of which 3719 aircraft of new types: Yak-1, MiG-3, LAGT-3 , IL-2, Pe-2, etc. In fact, everything was much worse:

The Il-2 aircraft was accepted for mass production by decision of the Defense Committee under the USSR Investigative Committee at the beginning of January 1941. The first serial Il-2 at factory No. 18 (Voronezh) was accepted by the military representative only on March 21, 1941. tests of this aircraft at the Air Force Research Institute were not completed (V.I. Alekseenko. Soviet Air Force on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War). On June 22, this aircraft was not in the combat units: 2 were on trials, 8 - on retraining of the flight crew)!

The first serial LAGG-3 was accepted by a military representative at plant No. 21 (Gorky) on February 24, 1941. State tests of the LAGG-3 of the first series were completed a few days before the war, but a large number of defects were revealed. There were 29 units in service.

In total, in the combat units of the Soviet Air Force by the beginning of the war there were 706 aircraft of a new type, for which 1354 pilots were retrained. Of these, MiG-3 fighters - 407 (686 pilots retrained), Yak-1 - 142 (156 pilots retrained), LAGG-3 - 29 (90 pilots retrained), Pe-2 - 128 (362 pilots retrained), Il-2 - 0 (retrained 60 pilots). Including in the Western border districts there were 304 fighters and 73 Pe-2s, i.e. a total of 377 aircraft of the new type. - This was less than 6% of the total aircraft fleet of these five districts (V. I. Alekseenko. Soviet Air Force on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War). The situation was no better with combat training. Poor technical support for the combat operations of Soviet aviation (lack of radio communications, lack of topographic maps, etc.) in the very first months of the war led to unreasonably high losses and low effectiveness of the use of combat aircraft. Cases where only the leader of the group knew the combat mission for the flight and had a topographic map were the rule rather than the exception. In this case, the death of the lead aircraft or damage to its aircraft stopped the group from carrying out the combat mission and led to the demoralization of the rest of the pilots, making them easy prey for enemy fighters. There were frequent cases of recruiting fighter units at random, etc. In the orders and reports of that time, the phrases are often striking: “Our pilots are not familiar with the silhouettes of domestic aircraft. Cases of fire impact on own aircraft are not uncommon, ”etc.

Recognizing the courage and valor of the Soviet pilots of that time, bowing before their feat and self-sacrifice, one cannot fail to recognize the fact that the USSR managed to revive its Air Force after the 1941 disaster solely at the expense of enormous human resources 4, the relocation of almost the entire aviation industry to areas inaccessible to the German aviation and the fact that in the first months of the war the Air Force lost mainly equipment, and not flight and technical staff. It was they who became the basis of the revived Air Force.

However, the full use of the resources of the Red Army Air Force throughout the Great patriotic war was not observed. There were also no significant changes in the tasks of Soviet military aviation, in the tactics of its use, in contrast to the German one: the activity of aviation was completely subordinated to the interests of the ground forces, mainly in the front line (see the dynamics of aircraft production by the factories of the USSR and Germany). This can be seen from the ratio of the types of combat aircraft of the Red Army Air Force, produced by the industry - the share of bomber aircraft with the transition of the Red Army to offensive combat operations practically did not increase. The history of the Soviet Pe-8 5 bomber clearly illustrates the level of understanding of the role and place of aviation in the war, which the Soviet leaders had, and what it cost the country. So, long-range aviation did not "work" efficiently enough on the objects of the German military-industrial complex.

Despite the constant numerical superiority, air supremacy by our aviation was won only by the middle of 1944*. According to German sources, by this time specific gravity experienced pilots in military aviation has greatly decreased. Nevertheless, an analysis of the dynamics of the numerical superiority and losses of combat aircraft of the Red Army Air Force over the years of the Great Patriotic War shows that even on the eve of surrender, with the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army Air Force, Nazi aviation was still a very serious enemy. According to domestic sources, at the end of 1944, for a guaranteed victory in an air battle over a German pilot on a Bf 109 aircraft, at least two Soviet Yak-3 aircraft were required on average.

Thus, the way of managing the country and the national economy, the numerous mistakes made by the leadership of the USSR and its Armed Forces long before June 22, 1941 and constantly made in the conduct of hostilities due to incompetence, voluntarism and irresponsible attitude towards people led to the fact that we call the disaster of 1941. Its effects were felt throughout the war. And the consequences of the principles of governing the country adopted at that time and the cult of irresponsible attitude towards the population are still felt by us.

Just a few years after the Great Patriotic War, the sad military experience was safely forgotten, being supplanted by a wave of memoirs and praising the wise management of the country during the war. At the same time, the illiteracy and incompetence of the top leadership, its obvious miscalculations were presented as weakness and lack of performance, and sometimes even betrayal of the military leaders of the middle and lower levels 6 . A fundamental and objective assessment of the causes of the transcendent human and material losses in the last war was not made.

From all this follow trivial conclusions that are relevant in any era:

The smallest mistake, by the standards of peacetime, made in preparation for war, can turn into a whole catastrophe during the war;

Any underestimation or overestimation of any factor, the slightest incompetence of the leadership in the conduct of armed struggle greatly increases material losses and human casualties;

The military and economic weakness of a state is in itself a powerful "provoking" factor that stimulates "friendly" states to fight in one form or another for the redivision of the world. Moreover, relations between states do not play a special role here;

And, finally, and most importantly, a possible future war is won in peacetime long before it starts.

* - The thesis about the numerical superiority of Soviet aviation in the second half of the war is quite controversial. Indeed, the number of aircraft of the Red Army Air Force surpassed the Luftwaffe. But this is for aircraft in general. In reality, the number of aircraft that took part in the battle could not be in our favor due to the more intensive use of their aircraft by the Germans. In the course of many air operations, the number of sorties by the enemy was 2.5-3 times higher. Thus, despite the "paper" numerical superiority of the Red Army Air Force, numerical parity was maintained in the sky for quite a long time. Note. editor).

1 “Russia in faces, documents, diaries. THE HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941. UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS. M.: RUSSIAN KNIGA, 1992. Comparison of the data and descriptions of events given in the orders and other documents of those years, with the memoirs of Soviet leaders of various levels and the studies of foreign authors, including German, unfortunately, does not allow us to consider the memoirs of Soviet leaders as a source of information that deserves complete trust. Nevertheless, upon careful study of what is written there, one can imagine the depth of the irresponsibility of the country's top leadership and the armed forces.

2 The document style is saved.

3 This situation was one of the formal reasons for the dismissal of Pavel Rychagov, Chief of the Air Force, who had replaced Ya.V. Smushkevich (see extract from the protocol of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 04/09/1941). According to the results of the combat use of Soviet aviation in the war with Finland, Ya.V. Smushkevich presented the country's leadership with an objective report, for which he paid the price. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, both Smushkevich and Rychagov, and Arzhenukhin (Chief of Staff of the Air Force under Smushkevich), who became the head of the Air Force Academy, were arrested, and in October 1941 they were shot in the city of Kuibyshev, in whose prison they were kept at that moment (Kanun and the beginning of the war, Documents and Materials, L. 1991, p.

4 "- What kind of raid do you have on combat aircraft? Answer:

One and a half to two hours, and then most often on old planes, rarely anyone flew on new ones.

I ask the commanders:

How will the development of the new material part take place?

The theory was explained to them during their studies, they were introduced to the features of the aircraft, but here we give one or two flights, and then to Stalingrad. Time doesn't wait." (From the memoirs of the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin about the farewell to the front at the end of 1942 of the air regiment, which received new equipment).

During the war, 44,093 pilots were trained. 27,600 pilots were killed in action. Of these, 11,874 fighter pilots, 7,837 attack pilots, 6,613 bomber crew members, 587 reconnaissance pilots and 689 auxiliary pilots. Non-combat losses amounted to 3994 pilots (V. I. Alekseenko. Soviet Air Force on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War).

5 "Flying Fortress" of the Red Army Air Force. V. Rigmant. AVIATION and SPACE yesterday, today, tomorrow. May-June 2002

6 The most striking example is the fate of General Pavlov. However, there were often cases similar to the one that occurred in the early days of the war in the Baltic states. In the zone of the Baltic Military District, the enemy attacked 11 Soviet airfields. The first bombs on the port of Libava and the airfield of the 148th IAP, commanded by Major Zaitsev, fell at 03:57. However, the commander of the 6th Smad, I.L. Fedorov, did not dare to give an order to repulse the aggressor. It did not follow after the second raid. The initiative was taken by ordinary pilots, and Commissar Golovachev outlined it to the command. But even after that, nothing has changed (Rytov A.G. “Knights of the Fifth Ocean”, M., Military Publishing, 1968). The fear of disobeying Stalin's order and "giving a pretext to the aggressor" suppressed common sense. This was one of the reasons why the aviation group, which outnumbered the enemy almost twice, allowed him to gain complete air supremacy.

Sources

• Aviation and cosmonautics / № 4, 2005, V.V. Rostopchin/

1. Aircraft technicians of the Leningrad Front of the 1st mine torpedo regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet for the preparation of the bomber for the next flight. 1941
Location: Leningrad region
Photographer: Kudoyarov Boris Pavlovich
TsGAKFFD St. Petersburg, unit ridge Ar-145181

2. Muscovites on Sverdlov Square inspecting a German plane shot down over the capital. 1941
Location: Moscow
Photographer: Oleg Borisovich Knorring
RGAKFD, 0-312216

3. The commander of the air unit Korolev (left) congratulates Captain Savkin on the excellent performance of the combat mission. 1942
Location: Leningrad
Photographer: Chernov D.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-177145

4. The soldiers are advancing on the copse occupied by the Germans. In the foreground - the wreckage of the downed German aircraft. 1943
Location: Leningrad Front
Photographer: Utkin
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-95081

5. Assembly of combat aircraft in the shop of one of the defense plants. 1942
Location: Moscow
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-154837

7. Professor Predchetensky A.M. inspects combat vehicles collected at the expense of the workers of the Ivanovo region. October 7, 1944

Photographer: Karyshev F.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256694

8. Appearance shop N-sky aviation plant. 1943
Location: not set
Photographer: Shaikhet Arkady Samoylovich
RGAKFD, 0-143832

9. Internal view of the aircraft assembly shop at an aircraft factory. March 1943
Location: not set
Photographer: Baidalov V.
RGAKFD, 0-154846

10. Suspension of test bombs to the aircraft at the aircraft building, Order of Lenin Plant No. 18 named after. Voroshilov. 1942
Location: not set
Photographer: Petrov
RGAKFD, 0-295669

11. A participant in the All-Union socialist competition, a student of a vocational school, Komsomol member A. Fedchenkova, finishing the armored glass of the pilot's cockpit. 1942
Location: not set
Photographer: Nordshtein A.S.
RGAKFD, 0-72488

12. Aerologist-sounder of the Tbilisi airport Krasnikova E. at the instruments after a high-altitude flight. February 02, 1945
Location: Tbilisi
Photographer: Lutsenko
RGAKFD, 0-274703

13. R.L. Carmen in a group at the plane on one of the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. 1941
Location: not set
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, F. 2989, op. 1, unit ridge 860, l. one

14. One of the aircraft of the squadron, built at the expense of the staff of the State Academic Maly Theater of the USSR, at the airfield before being sent to the front. June 1944
Location: Moscow
Photographer: Tikhonov
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-163735-in

15. Artists of the State Jazz Orchestra conducted by L. Utyosov inspect the fighter "Merry Fellows", purchased at the expense of the musical group. 1944
Location: Moscow

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-79801

16. Honored Artist of the RSFSR L.O. Utyosov speaks at a rally on the occasion of the transfer of aircraft built with funds from the State Jazz Orchestra to representatives of the Red Army command. 1944
Location: Moscow
Photographer: Trakhman Mikhail Anatolyevich
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-91935

17. Fighter squadron "Gorky worker", built at the expense of the workers of the Gorky region, at the airport. 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Mozzhukhin
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-84196

18. Fighter Yak-9, built at the expense of the collective farmer F.P. Golovaty. 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Arkhipov A.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-363668

19. F.P. Golovaty and Guard Major B.I. Eremin near the 2nd aircraft, purchased at the personal expense of F.P. Golovaty and handed over to the Soviet pilot. June 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Parusov
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-255910

20. Guard Major B.N. Eremin in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of F.P. Golovaty. January 1943
Location: Stalingrad Front
Photographer: Leonidov L.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-178698

21. Komsomol members of the Yaroslavl region at the airport hand over to Soviet pilots a squadron of aircraft built with funds raised by the youth of the region. 1942
Location: not set

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-121109

22. Member of the agricultural artel "Krasny Luch" A.M. Sarskov and Hero of the Soviet Union, Major F.N. Orlov near the plane, built on the personal savings of A.M. Sarskov. July 10, 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Sitnikov N.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256904

23. Guard Lieutenant I.S. Pashayev near the plane, built at the expense of the workers of Kyiv. September 13, 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Zaitsev G.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256304

24. Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation V.I. Shevchenko thanks the representative of the collective farmers of the Ivanovo region E.P. Limonov for the planes built at the expense of the working people of the region. October 10, 1944
Location: Ivanovo region
Photographer: Karyshev F.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256908

25. Attack aviation pilot G. Parshin thanks Evgenia Petrovna and Praskovya Vasilievna Barinov for the plane built with their personal savings. June 3, 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Konovalov G.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256899

26. A squadron of aircraft "Chapaevtsy", built at the expense of the workers of the city of Chapaevsk, and transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front, at the airfield. September 12, 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Avloshenko
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256911

27. Aircraft squadron "Moscow", built at the expense of the workers of the Kyiv region of Moscow, at the airport. October 16, 1944
Location: Moscow
Photographer: Less A.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256703

28. Squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the Komsomol members of Novosibirsk. 1942
Location: not set
Photographer: Shagin Ivan Mikhailovich
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-121104

29. Squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the youth of the Khabarovsk Territory. 1942
Location: not set
Photographer: Shagin Ivan Mikhailovich
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-121106

30. Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ryazanov, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and Colonel General S.K. Goryunov inspect aircraft built at the expense of the workers of the city of Znamensk. 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-77880

32. Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain I.N. Kozhedub in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of the collective farmer V.V. Konev. June 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Navolotsky Ya.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-191840

33. Collective farmer of the agricultural artel “Gudok” K.S. Shumkova is talking with Guard Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Sobolev, who received the Krasnoyarsk Komsomolets aircraft, built with her personal savings. 1943
Location: Krasnoyarsk
Photographer: Malobitsky S.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-66084

34. Loading ammunition on transport aircraft to be sent to the front. March 1943

Photographer: Chernov D.
RGAKFD, 0-164550

35. Loading ammunition at the airport. 1944
Location: Romania
Photographer: Trakhman Mikhail Anatolyevich
RGAKFD, 0-366841

36. Transport aircraft that delivered ammunition to forward positions. April 29, 1944
Location: active army
Photographer: Chernov D.
RGAKFD, 0-180804

37. Fighter pilots N.F. Murashov, A.G. Shirmanov and technician N.P. Starostin for the release of the Combat Leaflet. July 1941
Location: South Front
Photographer: Georgy Zelma
RGAKFD, 1-104649

38. Loading into the plane propaganda leaflets for German soldiers. 1942
Location: Western Front
Photographer: Velikzhanin Leonid Andreevich
RGAKFD, 0-256249

39. Junior Sergeant A.V. Smirnov, senior sergeant G.M. Ter-Abramov and military commissar S.I. Yakovlev load leaflets on the plane. 1942
Location: Western Front
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, 0-153749

40. Commander of the Air Force Black Sea Fleet ON THE. Ostryakov (left), Commissar of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, Brigadier Commissar N.V. Kuzenko and the head of the flight inspection, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Naumov (right) at the airport near the plane. 1942
Location: Sevastopol
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-56951

41. Captain I.I. Saprykin (left) assigns a combat mission to a fighter unit at the Kherson Mayak airfield. 1942
Location: Sevastopol
Photographer: Asnin N.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-157855

42. Fighter pilot, captain Balashov V.I. tells combat friends about his experience in air combat. August 1942
Location: Northern Fleet

RGAKFD, 0-54994

43. The commander of the squadron of the guard captain Balashov V.I. explains the course of combat flight to the navigator of the torpedo bomber Umansky A.S. 1943
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: Kovrigin V.
RGAKFD, 0-64681

44. Captain I.E. Korzunov near the damaged aircraft. In the background, the main aircraft of the Soviet long-range aviation - DB3F (IL-4). 1941
Location: not set

GARF, F.10140. Op.5. D.6. L.14

45. German fighter "Messerschmitt", made an emergency landing. 1942
Location: not set
Photographer: Temin Viktor Antonovich
GARF, F.10140. Op.5. D 7. L.10

46. ​​American aircraft, which is in service with one of the flight units of the northern navy. 1942
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: Khaldey Evgeny Ananyevich
RGAKFD, 0-107826

47. Naval aviation bombers at the airport. October 1942
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: Khaldey Evgeny Ananyevich
RGAKFD, 0-155013

48. Suspension of a torpedo on a torpedo bomber at the airfield of a mine-torpedo aviation regiment. 1943
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: Kovrigin V.
RGAKFD, 0-154110

49. Return from a combat flight to the naval reconnaissance seaplane base. June 1943
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: Kovrigin V.
RGAKFD, 0-3935

50. Hurricane fighters at the field airfield of one of the air units. 1942
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, 0-63665

51. The commander of the torpedo bomber aircraft of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet, which sank four transports and one enemy patrol ship, guard captain Bolashev V.P. talks with crew members: navigator, guard captain Umansky A.S., gunner, sergeant Emelianenko V.A. and gunner-radio operator Biryukov M.M. - at the plane. 1943
Location: Northern Fleet
Photographer: Kovrigin V.
RGAKFD, 0-156896

52. Soviet fighter pilot Maksimovich V.P. learns to drive an English Hurricane fighter
under the leadership of the English pilot Votsevis Paul. 1941
Location: Northern Front
Photographer: Khaldey Evgeny Ananyevich
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-109848

53. English fighter pilot Sergeant Howe, who fought on the Northern Front,
awarded the Order of Lenin, at his plane. 1941
Location: Northern Front
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, unit ridge 4-24056

54. Captain Druzenkov P.I. introduces a group of pilots "Fighting France"
(Squadron "Normandie-Neman") with the route of the upcoming combat flight. 1942
Location: active army
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-107266

55. French pilots of the military unit of the Fighting France "Normandy" leave the airfield after completing a combat mission. 1943
Location: active army
Photographer: Chernov D.
RGAKFD, 0-110134

56. Major A.F. Matisov. talks with the pilots of the Fighting France "Normandy", operating as part of the air force of the Red Army. 1943
Location: active army
Photographer: Chernov D.
RGAKFD, 0-110133

57. Aces group "Normandy" part of the Fighting France is developing a plan for the next flight. 1945
Location: active army
Photographer: Less A.
RGAKFD, 0-109082

58. The crew of the American "flying fortress" bomber, upon returning from a combat mission, talks with Soviet pilots. 1944
Location: not set
Photographer: Tikhanov
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-107383

59. Senior Lieutenant N.I. Dobrovolsky (left) and captain A.G. Machnev - order-bearing pilots of the assault aviation unit, who distinguished themselves in battles in the Oryol direction at the field airfield near the aircraft. 1943
Location: Oryol region
Photographer: unknown
SAOO, unit ridge 9763

60. View of a downed U-2 liaison aircraft in the Oryol-Kursk direction. 06 July 1943
Location: Oryol-Kursk direction
Author of the photo: Kinelovsky Viktor Sergeevich
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-285245

61. Soviet attack aircraft in the sky near Berlin. 1945
Location: Berlin
Photographer: Redkin Mark Stepanovich
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-294780

62. One of the ten gliders captured by the Yugoslav partisans at one of the German airfields near Belgrade. 1944
Location: Yugoslavia
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, 0-77856

63. A rally at one of the airfields near Berlin before the departure of the Victory Banner to Moscow for the Victory Parade. 1945
Location: 1st Belorussian Front
Photographer: Grebnev V.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-291452

64. Warriors carry the Victory Banner along the Central Moscow airfield on the day it arrives in Moscow from Berlin. June 20, 1945
Location: Moscow
Photographer: Chernov D.
RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-99993

65. The crew of flight commander M. Khazov before departure at the airport. 1945
Location: 2nd Far Eastern Front
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, 0-81819

66. Female calculation of "hearers". 1945
Location: Manchuria
Photographer: Stanovov Alexander I.
RGAKFD, 0-331372

67. Military photojournalist V. Rudny with the crew of the Catalina aircraft. Shooting year unknown
Location: China
Photographer: unknown
RGAKFD, 0-329245
Author DERULUFT
original source

Konshina Natalia and Levina Anastasia Grade 9

The project "Military Aviation in the Years of the Great Patriotic War" explores the role of aviation, changing tactics, and strategies for conducting air combat.

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Preview:

Branch of MBOU "Gorelskaya secondary school" in the village. Surava

Project

"Military aviation during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)"

Completed:

Levina Anastasia,

Konshina Natalia

Project Manager

Voronova O.A.

A history teacher

year 2013

Relevance of the problem

At present, the issue of forming a steady interest among schoolchildren in studying the history of our country during the Great Patriotic War is quite acute.

In order to develop cognitive interest, the students were offered the problem of search and research activities about the features of rearmament and the use of military aviation during the Great Patriotic War.

This project is being implemented in class hours, within the framework of the week of history, preparation and holding of events dedicated to the celebration of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. In addition, it is part of my work on civic-patriotic education.

This project is part of the work to develop the cognitive interest of schoolchildren - one of the most significant motives for learning.

Participation in such a project enriches children, instills in the student the desire to constantly replenish their knowledge, broadens their horizons, and develops thinking.

Project Goals

1. To form students' understanding of military aviation during the Great Patriotic War.
2. To draw students' attention to the problems of aviation development.
3. To promote the manifestation and development of creative and intellectual abilities of students.
4. Contribute to the formation of a culture of communication and interpersonal relationships.
5. Develop students' research skills.
6. To instill in students a sense of patriotism and love for their homeland.

Project objectives

1. Create study groups of students to work on the project.
2. Study various sources on this issue.
3. Create research work, presentation.
4. Distribute the material at the school, district level (class hours, school-wide events, participation in the municipal competition "Russian Military Aviation").

Project stages

1. Creation of a problem situation.

Formulation of the research topic.

2.Design stage.

Formulation of private questions and research topics.

Formation of creative groups.

3.Technological stage.

Collection of information. Creation of a package of documents.

Creation of a research paper.

4. The final stage.

Presentation and defense of the project.

1. Creating a problem situation

To study the features of the rearmament and use of military aviation during the Great Patriotic War.

2. Design stage

Questions for research.

1. Military aviation missions.
2. The state of military aviation at the beginning of the war.
3. Ways to increase the effectiveness of the use of combat aviation.
4. Rearmament, i.e., equipping the Air Force with new types of aircraft.
5. Forms of combat use of aviation.
6. Methods of combat operations and tactics of military aviation.
7. Change organizational structure Air Force.
8. Research results.

3. Technological stage

Research work "Military aviation during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945)".

1. The Great Patriotic War severely tested the basic provisions of Soviet military science on the role and significance of aviation in the war, developed before the war. In general, they were confirmed. Combat aviation in those years was intended to assist the advancement of ground troops or hold the line of defense. If in the airspace over the battlefield the aviation of one of the belligerents gained dominance, that is, it did not allow the aviation of the other belligerent to carry out combat missions of interacting with its ground forces, then the side that won air supremacy received a clear advantage. Fighter aircraft fought for air supremacy. Bombers and attack aircraft paved the way for ground troops or provided assistance to defending troops. The Soviet Air Forces in the war solved three main tasks: gaining strategic air supremacy, air support and cover for ground and naval forces, and conducting aerial reconnaissance. From time to time, Soviet aviation solved the tasks of destroying objects deep behind enemy lines. The struggle for strategic air supremacy was an integral and inalienable part of the entire armed struggle on the Soviet-German front, the primary task of the Soviet Air Force, and one of the indispensable conditions for the successful conduct of operations.

2. By the time of the attack on the USSR, Germany was producing new types of aircraft. Our aircraft industry was just mastering their production. By the beginning of the war, a total of 2,739 Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2 aircraft had been produced. However, aviation regiments have only just begun their development. In 1940, our aviation industry produced fighter planes that reached an average speed of 420–450 km/h (only one I-16 of the latest modification had a speed of more than 500 km/h). And they were armed mainly with machine guns. And the best foreign aircraft had a speed approaching 600 km / h, besides, they were armed not only with machine guns, many with cannons, they took a significant supply of cartridges and shells. By the beginning of the war, we had 304 new-type fighters in the five western border districts, which were under development and undertested. In addition, 3156 obsolete fighters: the so-called "maneuverable" fighters I-15, I-153 "Chaika" and "high-speed" fighters - I-16. On obsolete fighters, as well as on new types of fighters, there was essentially no radio communication. The maximum speed of the Me-109F is higher than the speed of the I-153 fighter by 162 km/h, and compared to the speed of the I-16 fighter by 123 km/h. The Air Force (Luftwaffe) concentrated 1233 fighters against us, of which: Me-109F - 593, Me-109E - 423 and Me-110 - 217 units. Total combat aircraft of the new type - 2604 units. In addition, there were about 1000 obsolete aircraft. From the above data it is clear that the Luftwaffe had complete superiority over our Air Force, especially in fighter aircraft. We desperately needed time to fine-tune, test and master the mass production of new types of combat aircraft. In the first days of the war, fascist aviation won strategic air supremacy. In the heavy defensive battles of the Red Army during the period of its retreat, Soviet aviation suffered heavy losses. But even in such difficult conditions Soviet pilots inflicted significant blows on enemy aircraft. The fact that the Soviet Air Force inflicted tangible damage on the vaunted Luftwaffe aviation speaks of the high morale and combat qualities and sufficient flight and tactical training of the flight personnel and their commanders. As for the heavy losses of our aircraft, this should be understandable: the vast majority of aircraft were of an obsolete type, which could not counteract the Luftwaffe fighter aircraft. It should be noted that many pilots of combat units did not know about the appearance of the Me-109F fighter at the front, which significantly strengthened the Luftwaffe fighter aircraft. It was noticed that some "Messers" easily escape from the blow, quickly take advantageous positions to attack our aircraft. In combat units, in connection with the combat operations of the Me-109F fighter, an extremely difficult situation has developed in our fighter aviation. In October 1941, the MiG-3 fighter was discontinued, on which great hopes were pinned. As for the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 fighters, as you know, they were also inferior to the Me-109F. Our combat aviation needed to reach a new level, make a qualitative leap, so as not only not to be inferior to the aircraft of fascist Germany and other countries, but also to surpass them in flight, tactical and combat terms.

3. The first period of the struggle for air supremacy - from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942 - is characterized by a fierce struggle in the air, the rearmament of the Soviet Air Force, the improvement of the organizational structure of aviation associations, formations and units, the growing role of centralized control of aviation forces, the search for the most effective forms of struggle for air supremacy and air support for troops. At the beginning of the war, the Soviet command countered the massed raids of Nazi aviation by active offensive air battles of fighter aircraft and periodic strikes on enemy airfields within the boundaries of each front. As the strike power of the Soviet Air Force increased in certain strategic directions, where the situation allowed, massed strikes were carried out by aviation forces of adjacent fronts, long-range aviation formations, naval aviation and air defense of the country. These actions in some cases took the form of air operations. Important stages in the struggle for strategic air supremacy during this period were the active actions of aviation during the battle of Moscow and the defensive battle of Stalingrad. The fight in the air was carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions for us, with the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the enemy. Considering this, the rate Supreme High Command considered it possible to gain air supremacy by concentrating large aviation forces. This was the main prerequisite for the gradual transfer of the initiative in the air to the Soviet Air Force. By the end of November 1941, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, it was possible to gain operational air supremacy. Thus, conditions were created for the transition of the ground forces to the counteroffensive. The myth of the invincibility of Nazi aviation was dispelled. The whole world then spread the glory of the Soviet pilots V.V. Talalikhin and A.N. Katrice, who made the first night and high-altitude rams in the sky of Moscow, as well as V.A. Shishov, A.F. Loktionov, F.M. Fatkuline, E.M. Gor6atyuk and other courageous air fighters. During the winter and summer of 1942, a tense struggle for strategic air supremacy continued. However, she already had a different character. Having suffered significant losses in military equipment and in the most trained flight personnel, the Nazi command was forced to abandon the simultaneous active operations of aviation on the entire Soviet-German front, and concentrated its efforts only on the main directions. The actions of Soviet aviation were decisive, the pilots showed heroism and selflessness. Will never be forgotten heroic deeds fighter pilot V.E. Pyatov, who rammed an enemy plane twice in one air battle and successfully landed at his own airfield; attack pilots N. Abdirov and A.A. Rogalsky, who repeated the feat of N.F. Gastello; masters of bomb strikes A.I. Molodchiy, V.S. Efremova, V.V. Senko. Here, the innovative abilities of I.S. Polbina. The second period of the struggle for air supremacy - from November 19, 1942 to August 23, 1943 - is characterized by qualitative and quantitative superiority over the enemy air force, the use of more decisive forms of struggle: air operations carried out according to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command; major air battles; increasing the professional training of command personnel and the combat skills of flight crews. Important stages in the struggle for strategic air supremacy in this period were the combat operations of aviation in the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, air battles in the Kuban and the Battle of Kursk. The new high-speed fighters La-5, Yak-7b, Yak-9, which entered service, made it possible to conduct effective air battles with new German aircraft such as the Me-109, FV-190. The almost identical balance of forces and the qualitative state of the aircraft fleet made it possible in the very first days of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad to gain operational air supremacy, and then to maintain it until the end of the strategic offensive operation. During the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Air Force initiated a radical change in the struggle for strategic air supremacy on the Soviet-German front. Subsequently, not a single major operation of the fascist German aviation succeeded in seizing the initiative in the air for any long period of time. The use of new tactics that made it possible to make the most of the increased combat capabilities of Soviet fighters, the high morale and combat qualities of our pilots, and centralized control were the main components of the victory of Soviet aviation in the Kuban. In those days, the glory of the outstanding masters of air combat A.I. thundered over the Kuban. Pokryshkin, brothers D.B. and B.B. Glinka, V.I. Fadeeva, V.G. Semenishina, G.A. Rechkalov and many others. The victory of Soviet aviation in the Kuban became an important prerequisite for completing the struggle for strategic air supremacy. By July 1943, the enemy had finally lost its qualitative superiority in aviation technology. The struggle for air supremacy on a strategic scale reached its highest intensity in preparation for and during Battle of Kursk. For these purposes, an aviation grouping was created, which was one and a half times superior to the enemy aviation grouping. The annals of the history of those harsh days included the names of such famous air fighters as A.E. Borovykh, V.L. Popkov, V.A. Zaitsev, I.P. Vitkovsky, I.P. Laveikin, M.Z. Bondarenko, F.V. Khimich and many others. In the sky over Kursk, I.N. Kozhedub opened the list of his victories. Unforgettable is the feat of A.K. Gorovets, who shot down nine enemy bombers in one air battle. The unparalleled heroism and courage of Soviet pilots and the irreparable losses inflicted on the enemy made it possible to complete the struggle for strategic air supremacy in our favor. With the gain of strategic air supremacy, favorable conditions were created for the Soviet Armed Forces to conduct major strategic offensive operations simultaneously in several directions, and for the Air Force to more decisively mass the forces and conduct continuous offensive operations. Enemy aviation, on the contrary, was forced to significantly reduce its activity. Until the end of the war, she could no longer provide effective support for her ground forces, reliably cover them in operations, and also carry out raids on objects deep in the rear of our country. From the battle of Kursk, the fascist German army switched to strategic defense both on the ground and in the air.

4. Soviet aviation industry with honor withstood the test of war. Serial production of 25 types of new aircraft was launched, including MiG-3, Yak-3, Yak-9, La-5, La-7, Il-2, Il-10, Pe-2, Tu-2, Pe- 8, etc. In terms of their combat qualities, they not only were not inferior to the best German aircraft, but also surpassed them in certain indicators. In the most intense years of the struggle for strategic air supremacy in 1941-1943, about 60,000 combat aircraft were produced in our country in total. In fascist Germany - a little over 39 thousand. This was largely due to the convincing victory of the Soviet Air Force over the Nazi aviation. As for the problem associated with improving the flight performance of our fighters, it turned out to be complex, requiring a lot of time and a large amount of research and development work. It was decided to improve the flight data of the serial LaGG-3, Yak-1 and Yak-7 fighters to increase the power of the engines installed on them by boosting. As a result of control tests, it was found that the LaGG-3, Yak-1 and Yak-7 aircraft with forced M-105PF engines, according to flight data, practically approached the Bf 109F, and their serial production began in June 1942. In addition, in April 1942, tests were carried out on a modified LaGG-3 aircraft with a more powerful air-cooled engine developed by designer S. Lavochkin. The aircraft was recommended for serial production and began to be mass-produced from July 1942. Control tests of the serial aircraft, which received the name first LaGG-5, and then La-5, showed that its maximum speed is almost equal to the speed of the Bf 109F. However, our fighter aircraft did not stay in this position for long. In the air battles near Stalingrad, the Germans had new modified Bf 109G-2 fighters with more powerful engines and significantly enhanced small arms and cannon weapons. These fighters had complete superiority over our Yak-1, Yak-7, LaGG-3 with uprated M-105PF engines and the La-5 with the M-82 engine, which entered service, both in maximum speed and vertical maneuver, and in terms of fire power (5-point Bf 109G-2). The enemy fighters had a great advantage in choosing the most advantageous position for attack, they pinned down the numerically superior group of our fighters in a smaller group. The flight crew of combat units armed with Yak-1 and Yak-7 fighters believed that for a successful outcome of the air battle near Stalingrad, it was necessary to have two Yak fighters for each German fighter. Thus, the Luftwaffe fighter aviation again went ahead, and ours, unfortunately, again found itself in the position of "lagging behind - catching up. This was also confirmed during tests at the Air Force Research Institute in January-June 1943 of two Me-109G-2 aircraft repaired after evacuation from the places of forced landings near Stalingrad. important decisions and, above all, the decision to increase the output of fighter planes by our industry. In October 1942, by a decree of the State Defense Committee, the production of fighters was increased by reducing the production of Il-2 attack aircraft and Tu-2 dive bombers. According to the decisions of the GKO, work was simultaneously launched on a broad front to further improve our fighters, their flight performance through aerodynamic improvements (aircraft Yak-1, LaGG-3, La-5, Il-2 and Pe-2 in full size were TsAGI wind tunnel), reducing the flight weight (mass) of fighters. On La-5 aircraft, forced engines M-82F and M-82FN were installed. By the end of 1943, all fighters were equipped with moving parts of the cockpit lights with emergency reset (before that, the pilots flew with open lights), since the moving parts on high speed the pilot could not open, and besides, the lantern lost its transparency due to oil from the engine getting on it. And with the open canopy of the cockpit, the speed of the aircraft decreased. In addition, the kinematics of retracting the tail wheel was improved, which became retractable in flight, which also gave some increase in speed. Numerous other works were carried out to improve flight performance, especially for La-5 aircraft, but they did not give the required results. Our fighters were inferior to enemy fighters. This problem was solved only in 1944, when fighters were put into mass production and began to be produced from April-May: La-7 - a modification of La-5 with M-82FN with a significant improvement in aerodynamics and with a lower flight weight (mass), but with serial engine ASh-82FN, Yak-9U - modification of the Yak-9 with M-105PF with a more powerful engine of the new modification VK-107A. The Soviet Air Force finally received fighter aircraft, which, in terms of their flight performance, not only reached, but also surpassed all new types of German fighters. However, at altitudes of more than 5300-5500 m, they were inferior to the German ones. Despite the shortcomings, our La-7 and Yak-3 fighters passed military tests for combat use. They showed superiority over enemy fighters Bf 109G-2 and Fw 190 of all modifications in terms of flight performance. Air battles have shown that La-7 and Yak-3 aircraft can fight enemy fighters with great success, even if the latter have a numerical superiority. Our pilots on the La-7 and Yak-3 made some changes to the practice of air combat: there was no need for the covering (fettering) group to be in excess of the strike group (in the "whatnot"), since the La-7 and Yak-3 aircraft in the case necessary, they managed to quickly gain the required height and take an advantageous position for the attack. Combat flights on aircraft, as a rule, took place in pairs (in the link of 4 aircraft - 2 pairs) with a total number of 2 to 12 aircraft. As is known, our aviation had won strategic air supremacy even before the appearance of the La-7, Yak-3 and Yak-9U fighters, which were superior to the Luftwaffe fighters. In all operations, the fighter aircraft of the Soviet Air Force outnumbered the German aircraft in number: near Moscow by 3 times, near Stalingrad - by 1.8 and near Kursk - during the offensive operation in the Orel direction by 3.5, in Belgorod-Kharkov - by 1, 9 times. In connection with the absolute gain by aviation of strategic air supremacy and a significant reduction in losses, the production of combat aircraft, starting from October 1944, began to exceed their needs. The longer the war went on, the more and more significantly we surpassed the fascist bloc in the production of aviation equipment. Moreover, the level of this technology has constantly increased. The achievements of Soviet engine building have decisively influenced the increase in the flight performance of aircraft. A stronger engine made the entire combat vehicle stronger. Nothing had such an impact on the increase in speed, rate of climb, flight altitude, as an increase in engine power. Design Bureau V.Ya. Klimov, along with further improvement of the VK-105pf engine, which was installed on the fighters of designer A.S. Yakovlev and dive bombers V.M. Petlyakov, created a more powerful engine - VK-107a, which in November 1943 was put into mass production. This engine developed a power of 1650 horsepower and was distinguished by a more advanced design, was small and reliable. The pinnacle of Klimov's design activity during the war years was the VK-108 engine, on which it was possible to achieve a speed of 745 km / h - the highest achievement in fighter aviation with a piston engine of all countries during the war years. A serious achievement of the domestic motor industry during this period was the creation of a design bureau under the leadership of A.D. Shvetsov ASh-82 air-cooled engine. The installation of this engine on the LaGG-3 aircraft turned it, in essence, into a La-5 fighter with high flight and combat characteristics. The forced ASh-82, which received the name ASh-82fn, and had a capacity of 1850 horsepower, began to be used not only on S.A. fighters. Lavochkin, but also on Tu-2, Pe-8 bombers and other aircraft. In June 1942, they decided to resume the production of aircraft diesel engines. Aviation diesel was installed mainly on the Er-2 long-range bomber. Having solved the problem of flight range due to the low specific fuel consumption, diesel engines could not solve the problem of speed, just as gasoline engines could not solve it either. piston engines. The problem of speed was solved by jet gas turbine engines . By the beginning of the war, we already had armored aviation steel. This steel was used to protect the most vital parts of the aircraft - the engine, cockpit, radiator, primarily in attack aircraft. The so-called shielded armor was created, consisting of two separate sheets. She provided protection for the crew in a zone of high saturation with fire. At the first stages of the war, metal gasoline tanks were installed on our aircraft, which gave the pilots a lot of trouble. Often, after several flights, cracks appeared in the places of welding, the tanks flowed. A metal substitute was found. It turned out to be the so-called sheet fiber, a specially processed grade of paper. The industry has not produced such material before. Aircraft with new gas tanks, the pilots called impenetrable. Later, under the guidance of the scientist A.V. Ermolaev, soft tanks were created and put on airplanes, the walls of which consisted of rubber and fabric. This even more met the requirements for the survivability of combat aircraft. The enemy, however, was not able to replace the metal tanks with more resilient ones. Our scientists created a complex of enamels, which in various combinations made it possible to camouflage aircraft, and they turned out to be “invisible” in flight for the enemy, not only from the air, but also from the ground. It was possible to significantly increase the strength and reliability of welded joints, improve the quality of frames, increase labor productivity, and put things on stream. Work was carried out to further improve the technology for manufacturing high-strength steel semi-finished products. Technological processes for the manufacture of open profiles for spars were found instead of pipes used for this purpose. Significantly reduced the weight of the aircraft structure. At that time, steel profiles were not used in foreign aircraft construction. At the end of the war, they switched to the use of higher quality aviation gasoline, which increased engine power. In 1944, the factories that produced fighter aircraft switched to the production of even more advanced aircraft. The power of the engines increased, aerodynamics improved, the flight speed of aircraft and their maneuverability increased significantly. The main distinguishing features of the fighters that rolled off the production lines at that time were the automatic control of the propeller group, the increase in the safety of the pilot with the help of an additional armor protection device. A lantern dropped in flight appeared, the power of weapons increased significantly, and the performance of aircraft improved. The range of their flights was increased, primarily due to the manufacture of a wing with metal spars, which made it possible to place additional fuel tanks in them. The attack aircraft of S.V. Ilyushin continued to improve. First, the IL-8 appeared, and then the IL-10, the creation of which took into account almost all the wishes of the pilots and air gunners. Now it was an all-metal aircraft with more powerful engine, reinforced weapons and a fully armored air gunner's cockpit. The new machine had significantly better maneuverability in comparison with the IL-2, its flight speed exceeded the previous one by almost a third. During the war, German aircraft designers tried to build an aircraft similar to our "flying tank". However, the Nazis did not have a suitable design or the right engine. As an attack aircraft, the enemy was forced to use the Focke-Wulf-190 fighter, which could not withstand comparison with the Il-2, especially with the Il-10. Further changes were made to the main Pe-2 front-line bomber. With an engine designed by V.Ya. Klimov's aircraft had a speed of over 650 km / h, which was more than 100 km / h higher than the speed of the Pe-2 of the first releases, and could carry up to 3 tons of bombs, while the first samples lifted a maximum ton. Other designers who worked in various fields aircraft industry. A.S. Derenkovskiy, A.S. Patskan, M.I. Ogryzkov created a high-end bombing sight for level-flight bombing, which for the first time automatically takes into account altitude and airspeed. At the plant where propellers for aircraft were manufactured, designers led by K.I. Zhdanov, improving this important unit, provided many combat vehicles, including attack aircraft, with high flight performance, good rate of climb and a slight takeoff. Other aircraft and engine units of an improved design were also created: a gasoline pump with an ejector, which made it possible to ensure the reliable operation of an aircraft engine up to a height of 13 thousand meters; supercharger for pressurized cabins of high-altitude bombers, which created normal conditions for the aircraft crew when flying at high altitudes for a long time; supercharger speed switch; an automatic machine that combines the control of the propeller and the gas of the motor. This significantly improved the operation of the engines in difficult flight conditions. Soon, under the leadership of V.N.Chelomey, an unmanned vehicle with a "pulsating" engine began to be designed. During 1943 this work was basically completed. A further impetus to the development of unmanned vehicles was given by the appearance of the FAU-1 projectiles among the Nazis, which they first used in June 1944 for attacks on England. And already in December 1944, dozens of domestic projectiles were tested using Pe-8 aircraft, and later on Tu-2, Tu-4 aircraft. The effect of their application was extremely strong. In the very first air battles, such an important feature of the aircraft as its survivability was revealed. It included the ability of the aircraft, despite the damage received, to continue combat operations or flight. In the autumn of 1942, a new Soviet fighter aircraft appeared in the sky over Stalingrad - La-5, created by a design bureau led by Lavochkin. The easily controlled La-5 developed a speed of 40-50 km / h more than the German Me-109 fighter. With the advent of the La-5, a problem of great national importance was solved, since it had an air-cooled engine, not a water one. By the time of the Battle of Kursk, the Nazis sent to the front their newest fighter, the Focke-Wulf-190, which also had an air-cooled engine. But Lavochkin's new aircraft, in terms of its flight performance, was superior to the heavier and inert Focke-Wulf-190. At the end of 1943, a fighter appeared, the flight speed of which reached 680 km / h at a combat altitude, and 705 km / h at an altitude of over 7 thousand meters. It was a new La-7, and a third 20mm cannon was installed on it. A team of designers headed by A.S. Yakovlev, subsequently created an even more advanced fighter, called the Yak-9 and which became the most massive Air Force fighter during the war years. They were built over 14 thousand. The Yak-9 gave rise to a whole family of long-range multipurpose fighters: high-altitude interceptor, fighter air defense, reconnaissance, fighter-bomber. The Yak-9U (reinforced) was also created with a new powerful engine designed by Klimov. The maximum speed of the Yak-9U was 700 km / h, and the range was 900 km. The design bureau of A.S. Yakovlev developed in 1943 another aircraft - a light, highly maneuverable, high-speed Yak-3 fighter. It was the fastest fighter in the world. The creation and development in mass production of more advanced fighters made it possible in 1943-1944 to completely stop the production of the LaGG-3, Yak-1, Yak-7, and even such a wonderful La-5fn. Fighter aviation began to be replenished mainly with La-7, Yak-3, Yak-9 aircraft. The La-7 aircraft, as well as the Yak-3 and Yak-9U, were a kind of result of the work of Soviet designers on the development of propeller-driven fighter aircraft during the war years. On the eve of the war, short-range bomber aviation began to receive Pe-2 dive bombers, created by a design team led by V.M. Petlyakov. They surpassed the enemy in speed and were not inferior to some types of fighters. Another front-line bomber was an aircraft designed by A.N. Tupolev. Tests showed that the Tu-2 was superior to all front-line bombers that existed at that time. Its speed was almost 100 km / h higher than the speed of the main serial German bomber Junkers-88. The aircraft had a large ceiling and could carry a significant bomb load. The situation with long-range bomber aircraft was more difficult. A few years before the war, the design team of V.M. Petlyakov created a long-range bomber Tb-7 (Pe-8), which embodied the latest achievements of advanced aviation science and technology and surpassed similar foreign models in flight range. However, the development of the aircraft was delayed. In 1940 and in the first half of 1941, only 11 combat vehicles were produced. When the war began and it was necessary to drastically increase the fleet of long-range bomber aircraft, they decided to do this at the expense of the Il-4, which was already mastered in mass production, although it could not completely replace the Pe-8 in terms of its flight performance and combat data. Another long-range bomber Er-2 designed by R.L. Bartini and V.G. Ermolaev with a long range, possessing good aerobatic qualities, with a diesel engine could take a maximum bomb load of up to 5 tons, a bomb weighing 2 tons could be placed inside the fuselage. The Il-4 remained the main long-range bomber throughout the war. According to many reports, the IL-4 was not inferior to foreign models of this class, and sometimes even surpassed them. As the aircraft became more advanced and their number grew, we removed obsolete models from production. At the beginning of 1942, new aircraft accounted for 46.4% of fighter aircraft, and by the end of the war, 96.2%. We have ceased to produce aircraft of old brands. Of the eight types of fighters produced in 1941, only three remained by the end of the war. During this time, the number of types of bombers was reduced from nine to five. Of the 18 types of combat aircraft produced at the beginning of the war, only 10 remained by 1945. During this time, the number of types of engines was almost halved. From total number most of all combat aircraft of all purposes were produced during the war years of attack aircraft designed by S.V. Ilyushin - 40 thousand, then fighters designed by A.S. Yakovlev-37 thousand and fighters designed by S.A. Lavochkin - 22 thousand. Front-line bombers designed by V.M. Petlyakov created 11 thousand bombers designed by S.V. Ilyushin - 6.5 thousand, front-line bombers designed by A.N. Tupolev - about 800. Fighters designed by A.I. Mikoyan and M.I. Gurevich released 3.5 thousand. Thus, during the war years, not just the technical equipment of the Air Force was carried out, but, one might say, their complete re-equipment with new types of military equipment. From month to month, from year to year, the overall correlation of forces of Soviet and fascist aviation on the Soviet-German front also changed in our favor.

5. The main forms of use of aviation formations, formations and units were systematic combat operations as part of front-line offensive and defensive operations, air operations, air strikes, air battles and battles. It is known that the main damage to the Nazi aviation was inflicted during the actions of the Air Force as part of the operations of the fronts. However, experience shows that an air operation was a very effective form of combating enemy aircraft. During the war years, nine air operations were carried out for this purpose. As a rule, they were carried out before the start of strategic operations and had a significant impact on their outcome. The experience of organizing and conducting the operation showed the exceptional need for covert planning and organization of air operations, achieving surprise in delivering especially the first massive strikes. The practice of conducting an air operation showed that the first massive strike accounted for 42.5 percent of all destroyed aircraft, the second - 31.2, the third - 23.1 and the fourth strike - only 3.2 percent. An analysis of aviation combat operations suggests that the greatest results were achieved in cases where the issues of simultaneous destruction of enemy aircraft both at airfields and in the air were worked out quite deeply, with strict centralization of control of large aviation forces in the hands of the Supreme High Command. With the gain of strategic air supremacy, air operations to defeat enemy air groupings were not carried out. Aviation actions were mainly focused on supporting and covering the troops. The task of maintaining air supremacy was successfully solved by delivering individual massive air strikes, conducting air battles and battles, both as part of front-line operations and independently. Air combat, as a form of combat use of fighter aircraft, which finally took shape in the second period of the Great Patriotic War, became a new phenomenon in the operational art of the Air Force. For the first time, elements of air battles took place when repulsing Nazi air raids in the air defense system of Moscow and Leningrad. In the second and third periods of the war, they acquired a wide scope, especially in the skies of the Kuban, on the Kursk Bulge and in the Berlin offensive operation. During air battles and battles, the Air Force destroyed 44,000 enemy aircraft. An analysis of aviation combat operations showed the high efficiency of air battles conducted during the war years by the most trained pilots. So, for example, fighter pilots Heroes of the Soviet Union shot down over 10.5 thousand aircraft, which is almost a quarter of all enemy aircraft destroyed Soviet aviation in air battles. The effectiveness of the air battles they conducted was 3.5 - 4 times higher than the average performance.

6. At the same time, the methods of combat operations were also improved. Attack aircraft widely used concentrated strikes, layered operations, independent search and destruction of objects in a given area or zone ("hunting"), as well as blocking enemy airfields. Fighter aviation, in solving combat missions, acted mainly in three ways: patrolling in the air, taking off from a position of duty at an airfield, and directly escorting bombers and attack aircraft. The development of methods of combat operations was carried out mainly in the direction of increasing activity when repulsing massive raids by enemy aircraft due to the removal of duty zones beyond the front line; the use of the most advantageous battle formations; separation of forces in height; creation of groups for various tactical purposes; improving the tactics of air combat in pairs, units, larger formations; wide application in air combat of vertical maneuver. The high intensity of the armed struggle required the flight personnel to constantly search for new tactical methods that were unexpected for the enemy in performing combat missions and battle formations. Thus, dive bombing began to be widely used in bomber aviation, and the method of striking at targets was called the "Polbin turntable". Attack aviation pilots developed and began to widely use a new tactical technique - the "circle of aircraft". It provided continuous fire impact of attack aircraft on the target and mutual fire support between aircraft (subunits). The highly effective battle formation of the fighters was the famous "whatnot".

7. The development of forms and methods of using aviation formations, formations and units was carried out in an organic relationship with changes in the organizational structure of the Air Force, equipping them with new aviation technology. Soviet military art drew important conclusions about the need for a transition from frontal air forces to air armies and the creation of powerful aviation reserves. In total, during the war years, 17 air armies of front-line aviation and one long-range aviation were formed. The creation of air armies as large aviation operational associations was a new direction in the construction of the Soviet Air Force. The established organizational structure of front-line and long-range aviation during the war fully justified itself, showed its vitality, put an end to the dispersion of aviation, made it possible to increase the maneuverability of formations and units, mass efforts in the most important areas, maintain close interaction with the troops and stable centralized control of aviation forces in ongoing operations. From the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Headquarters of the All-Union Command felt the need to have large reserve aviation forces in their hands in order to build up aviation groupings in the most important areas. It took a year and a half of the war to find the most acceptable form of organizational structure for aviation reserves. The practice of combat operations confirmed the expediency of creating homogeneous aviation corps and reserve divisions of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. The presence of powerful operational aviation formations and reserve formations of the Air Force allowed the Soviet command to ensure the necessary balance of aviation between the parties, to use aviation massively to solve the main tasks in the most important areas, to carry out a wide maneuver in order to concentrate the main efforts to gain and maintain air supremacy and solve other strategic tasks.

8. The main results of the military operations of the Air Force in the Great Patriotic War. The effectiveness of the combat operations of the Air Force was determined by the development during the war of the forms and methods of their use, the organizational structure, the acquisition of combat experience by command and flight personnel, rearmament, i.e. equipping the Air Force with new types of aircraft. The Air Force made a significant contribution to the victory over the enemy. In difficult defensive conditions, they exhausted and bled the enemy strike groupings and thereby reduced their offensive capabilities and destroyed suitable reserves. The massive and purposeful actions of the Air Force contributed to an increase in the scope and decisiveness of offensive operations. The air force was the most long-range means of influencing the objects of the operational and strategic rear of the enemy, the main means of conducting tactical, operational and strategic reconnaissance. They were widely used for the transportation of material resources. For the first time in armed struggle, they were used on a large scale to provide comprehensive assistance. partisan movement. However, the main and decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war was the strategic air supremacy won by the Soviet Air Force. The history of wars does not know feats similar to those that Soviet pilots performed during the Great Patriotic War.

4. The final stage.

Creating a presentation. Holding class hours. Participation in the municipal competition "Military Aviation of Russia".

Literature

1. Alekseenko V.N. Soviet Air Forces on the Eve and in the First Years of the Great Patriotic War // Aviation and Cosmonautics. - 2000. - No. 2.

2. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945 Short story. - M.: Military Publishing, 1965.

3. Davidenko A.Z. On the military art of the Soviet troops in the operations of 1943 // Military Thought. - M., 1993. - No. 10.

4. Desnitsky G.S. Hours of the air spaces of the Motherland. - M.: Military Publishing, 1961.

5. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, v.2. - M .: Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1961.

6. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, v.5. - M .: Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1961.

7. Romanov D.I. Air combat weapon. - M .: Military business, 2000.

8. The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 / Ed.A.M. Samsonov. – M.: Nauka, 1997.

Internet resources

Aviation during the Second World War - Armament - The Great Patriotic War. http://www.otvoyna.ru/aviazia.htm

Aviation of the USSR Armed Forces of the Great Patriotic War.http://bogdanclub.info/showthread.php

Aviation of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.http://rufor.org/showthread.phpt

Aviation of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. http://sesii.net/technics

Aviation of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. http://www.coolreferat.com

Role Air Force in the Great Patriotic War.http://militera.lib.ru/h/vvs.html

Attachment 1.

Annex 2

Aircraft in years

Great Patriotic War

MiG-3

Type: fighter

Production period: 1940 - 1942

Total built: more than 3300 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1941 - 1945

Engine power: 1350 hp With.

Maximum speed: 640 km/h

Practical range: 1250 m

Rate of climb: 877 m/min

Practical ceiling: 12000 m

Armament: one 12.7 mm UBS machine gun, two 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns

Yak-3

Type: fighter

Production period: 1943 - 1945

Total built: 4848 aircraft

Maximum speed: 646 km/h

Practical range: 648 km

Rate of climb: 1111 m/min

Practical ceiling: 10400 m

Armament: one 20 mm ShVAK cannon, two 12.7 mm UBS machine guns

Yak-9

Type: fighter

Production period: 1942-1948

Total built: 16769 aircraft

Engine power: 1180 l. With.

Max speed: 599km/h

Practical range: 875 km

Rate of climb: 820 m/min

Practical ceiling: 11100 m

Armament: one 20 mm ShVAK cannon with 120 rounds and one (left) 12.7 mm UBS machine gun with 200 rounds

LaGG-3

Type: fighter

Production period: 1941-1944

Total built: 6528

Engine power: 1240 l. With.

Maximum speed: 591 km/h

Practical range: 650 km

Rate of climb: 893 m/min

Practical ceiling: 9800 m

Armament: one 20mm cannon and one 12.7mm UBS machine gun

La-5

Type: fighter

Production period: 1942-1945

Total built: 10,000

Used in military operations: 1942-1945

Engine power: 1330 l. With.

Maximum speed: 580 km/h

Practical range: 1190 km

Rate of climb: 833 m/min

Practical ceiling: 9500 m

Armament: two 20 mm ShVAK cannons and two 100 kg FAB-100 bombs

La-7

Type: fighter

Production period: 1944-1945

Total built: 5757 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1944-1945

Maximum speed: 680 km/h

Practical range: 635 km

Rate of climb: 1111 m/min

Practical ceiling: 10750 m

Armament: three 20 mm UB-20 cannons or two 20 mm ShVAK cannons

TB-3

Type: bomber

Production period: 1932-1945

Total built: 818 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1941-1945

Engine power: 900 HP With.

Maximum speed: 300 km/h

Practical range: 2000 km

Rate of climb: 75 m/min

Practical ceiling: 8000 m

Armament:

U-2 (Po-2)

Type: night bomber

Production period: 1928 - 1954

Total built: 33,000 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1941 - 1945

Engine power: 110 HP With.

Maximum speed: 150 km/h

Practical range: 430 km

Practical ceiling: 3820 m

IL-4

Type: long range bomber

Production period: 1942 - 1946

Total built: 5256 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1942 - 1945

Maximum speed: 398 km/h

Practical range: 4000 km

Rate of climb: 264 m/min

Practical ceiling: 9000 m

Armament: four 7.62-mm machine guns YES, 3000 kg of bombs

Yer-2

Type: long range bomber

Production period: 1941-1945

Total built: 462 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1941-1945

Engine power: 1500 hp With.

Maximum speed: 415 km/h

Practical range: 5300 km

Rate of climb: 455 m/min

Practical ceiling: 7500 m

Armament: one 20 mm ShVAK cannon and two 12.7 mm machine guns

Bomb load: normal - 1000 kg, maximum - 5000 kg.

Pe-2

Type: bomber

Production period: 1941-1946

Total built: 11247 aircraft

Used: 1941-1945

Engine power: 1100 l. With.

Max speed: 540 km/h

Practical range: 1500km

Rate of climb: 588 m/min

Practical ceiling: 9000 m

Armament: two bow 12.7 mm UBK machine guns and up to four 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns

bomb load - normal - 500 kg, maximum - 1000 kg

Tu-2

Type: bomber

Production period: 1940-1948

Total built: 2527 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1941 - 1945

Engine power: 1850 hp With.

Maximum speed: 521 km/h

Practical range: 2020 km

Rate of climb: 490 m/min

Practical ceiling: 9000m

Armament: two 20 mm ShVAK cannons, three 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns and one 12.7 mm UBT machine gun, 10 rocket launchers for RS-132 shells

IL-2

Type: attack aircraft

Production period: 1941 - 1945

Total built: 36183 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1941-1945

Engine power: 1575 hp With.

Maximum speed: 450 km/h

Practical range: 638 km

Rate of climb: 625 m/min

Practical ceiling: 7800 m

Armament: two 20 mm ShVA cannons, three 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns and one 12.7 mm UBT machine gun, 10 rocket launchers for RS-13 shells

Bomb load: maximum - 2000 kg, overload - 3000 kg

IL-10

Type: attack aircraft

Production period: 1944 - 1949

Total built: 4966 aircraft

Used in military operations: 1944 -1945

Engine power: 1750 hp With.

Maximum speed: 551 km/h

Practical range: 800 km

Rate of climb: 625 m/min

Practical ceiling: 7250 m

Armament: two 23 mm VYA-23 or NS-23 cannons mounted on the wing, and two 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns, or one 20 mm UB-20 cannon and a 12.7 mm UBS machine gun bomb load - normal version - 400 kg, reloading - 600 kg