MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/1986, pp. 46-53

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

From the experience of training troops and command and control agencies during the Great Patriotic War

Lieutenant GeneralA.I.TATANK

The GREAT Patriotic War from the first days significantly changed practically all spheres of life and activity of the Armed Forces, including the field of training troops and naval forces. The first operations showed that serious changes must be made to the system of combat and operational training of the army in the field, adapting it to the harsh requirements of wartime. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff throughout the war constantly paid special attention to this issue. Unfortunately, this area of ​​their activity has not been fully disclosed in military history works and studies. This article attempts, based on archival materials and works published during the war and in the post-war years, to show some aspects of the activities of the organs of the operational-strategic leadership in organizing and carrying out the training of troops and, mainly, operational headquarters in a combat situation.

In the prewar years, in the course of building the Red Army, work was launched on a broad front to improve the forms and methods of operational, combat and political training of troops and fleet forces, and to develop the theory of military training and indoctrination. It began to be carried out especially intensively, taking into account the experience of fighting near the lake. Khasan, in the Khalkhin Gol region, in Spain and during the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war years, the theory and practice of training and education were enriched with new forms and methods and absorbed invaluable combat experience, which largely retains its significance in our time.

The activity of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in organizing the targeted training of troops, forces and staffs throughout the war was constantly improved in strict accordance with the tasks solved by the Armed Forces at each stage of the armed struggle.

In the first period of the war, in extremely unfavorable conditions for our Armed Forces, it was necessary to simultaneously solve two tasks in the field of training troops (naval forces): to ensure their timely replenishment of military-trained contingents personnel and deploy the formation and training of operational-strategic reserves on a broad front.

The main form of replenishing current combat losses in units and formations of the active army in the initial period of the war was the sending of marching companies and battalions to the front. As a rule, they were formed and staffed by conscripts who had recently completed military service in the army and navy, who, on the whole, had sufficient military training. Therefore, their training and coordination were carried out in an extremely limited time frame or were not carried out at all.

However, the build-up of the combat efforts of the army in the field was carried out not so much by resupplying the existing formations (units), many of which were disbanded as a result of significant losses (especially in materiel), but by bringing operational reserves (armies, corps, divisions) into battle, forming or mobilization of which was carried out on the eve and with the outbreak of hostilities.

With the attack of the aggressor, the question of the training of command and command personnel also became extremely acute. The resources of the command staff accumulated by the beginning of the war soon began to be exhausted. Calculations for further replenishment of losses and provision of new formations only due to the return to service of those recovering after injury (illness) and release from military educational institutions turned out to be unrealistic. Therefore, urgent measures were taken to increase the number of military educational institutions and to significantly restructure the learning process in them. For this, new enrollments in military schools were sharply increased, training was transferred to a reduced program (the training period in the Shot courses, for example, was reduced to six months, the duration of the school day was increased to 12 hours), training was carried out in a narrow profile with a strict specialization of trainees . It was planned to give trainees only the necessary theoretical knowledge, but the main emphasis was on acquiring practical skills in preparing and conducting combat, the ability to control subunits and units in battle, etc. In addition, in the winter of 1941/42, the newly created army, district and front junior lieutenant training courses, where the best Red Army men and junior commanders were sent, mainly with combat experience or good general education.

At the same time, the necessary measures were taken to increase the contingent and improve the quality of military-trained personnel of military age. Already in July 1941, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a decision "On the training of reserves in the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy", and two months later (in September) - a resolution "On universal compulsory military training for citizens of the USSR." The training was carried out according to a 110-hour program on the job and gave the trainees elementary military knowledge, practical skills in the scope of training a single fighter.

All these and other measures made it possible by the beginning of 1942 to provide favorable conditions for the regular influx into the army and navy of a significant number of privates, sergeants and officers, who had, although limited, but already quite suitable knowledge and practical skills for a quick formation in the ranks.

To manage the preparation and formation of reserves in July 1941, the Main Directorate of Formation and Staffing (Glavupraform) was formed, which from August 8 was headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E. A. Shchadenko.

In matters of training the Armed Forces, the General Staff focused special attention on the operational level. For this, as General of the Army S. M. Shtekhmenko wrote, “in the General Staff, on the basis of the operational training department, a department was created to use the experience of war,” which launched its work very quickly and efficiently. Already in the first issue of the "Collection of materials on the study of war experience" published by the department, an instructive article was published under the title "Experience in conducting an operational military game at the front", which deserves attention primarily because it summarized the experience of organizing operational training directly in a combat situation. , at the front, combining the combat work of commanders and staffs with study.

Commands of the combined arms armies, relying on the recommendations of the Sbornik, skillfully used the lull at the front in order to prepare commanders and staffs for the upcoming military operations and develop a common understanding and coordination in solving combat missions. Military games, in which, in addition to the army apparatus, commanders and headquarters of subordinate and interacting formations (units) were involved, were held on maps and terrain with communications equipment.

The theme of the war games and the initial environment created were fully consistent with the combat conditions. The availability of real data on the situation that had developed as a result of previous hostilities did not require much time to prepare the source materials for war games, which were usually distinguished by the utmost brevity. At the same time, only additional (training) intelligence about the enemy was developed, which was necessary for the leader to create an instructive environment (situations, episodes) during the drawing of hostilities, as well as instructions on what to execute by the trainees by the beginning of the military game. This was followed by the training of leadership and mediators. The leader, according to his plan, alternately went to the area and to the command post of the participants in the war game, where he worked with intermediaries and trainees, checking their preparation for classes. It should be noted that this method of work of a leader in a combat situation is expedient and deserves attention.

The conditions of the combat situation in which the war games were held were also taken into account, that is, calm is a very unstable category. Therefore, in order to ensure continuous leadership of the troops in the event of an intensification of enemy operations, only a limited number of officials (according to the approved list) were involved in them.

However, such operational training activities in the period under review were not enough. The tense combat situation and the difficult conditions in which the Red Army fought battles had their effect. Therefore, the main form of training of commanders and operational headquarters during the first year of the war was the generalization, study and use of its experience, to which the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff attached exclusively great importance. Thus, the Soviet command, already at the very beginning of the war, established that the fascist German troops were poorly prepared for night operations. A directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was sent to the fronts, in which it was required to widely deploy night fighting, for which to create small detachments and inflict sudden, short, daring blows.

The experience of our offensive battles and operations was quickly summarized and the conclusion was drawn that the lack of success was due to poor preparation and organization. Commanders often made decisions on the map without preliminary reconnaissance of the area of ​​the upcoming offensive, interaction was organized hastily, without taking into account the conditions of the terrain, enemy reconnaissance; combat orders were often brought to the troops late. The General Staff brought this generalized experience to the attention of the commanders (commanders) and staffs and demanded a decisive change in all levels of the method of preparing a battle (operation).

After the defeat of the Nazi troops in the battle of Moscow, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, deciding on the further actions of the Red Army, took measures to create several reserve armies. In her directives, she demanded that the main emphasis be placed on "tactical cohesion of a platoon, company, battalion and on the development of excellent machine gunners, mortarmen, artillerymen, tank destroyers, machine gunners and scouts from fighters." Measures were also taken for a deeper generalization of combat experience and the development of statutory documents.

On the whole, the first period of the war was characterized mainly by the low intensity of the operational training of formations and operational command and control bodies, the main focus of efforts on the training of the tactical level (divisions, brigades, regiments and below).

The training of subunits, units and headquarters at the tactical level had a strictly practical orientation and was carried out in relation to the upcoming combat operations. In this regard, the purposeful organization of the training of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at the end of 1942, when Operation Iskra was being prepared to break the blockade of Leningrad along the coast, was characteristic. Lake Ladoga. It was necessary in a short time to teach the troops to advance in the winter in the conditions of a wooded and swampy area with a breakthrough of a well-prepared, echeloned enemy defense. For these purposes, in the rear 2 beats. And the engineering troops of the Volkhov Front were equipped with training areas of defense, similar to the enemy. Similar work was done by the engineering troops of the Leningrad Front at the Toksovsky training ground. Numerous platoon, company, battalion, regimental and even divisional live-fire exercises were conducted at these training facilities and training grounds. On the Neva, in the area of ​​Colonia Ovtsino, divisions of the strike group of the Leningrad Front were training to overcome it on ice. To work out ways to overcome the river without stopping, with one throw for the command staff in 136 rifle divisions, a demonstration exercise was carried out. In each company of divisions of the first echelon 67 and 2 beats. And assault groups and obstacle groups were created, with which classes were conducted according to a special program. They learned to quickly overcome open spaces, make passages in minefields and barbed wire, storm long-term and field fortifications, conduct close fire and hand-to-hand combat in trenches and communications.

The main forms of training for commanders (commanders) and staffs were short command-staff, staff military games on maps (less often on the ground), staff training, and group exercises. Large exercises with troops above a brigade, division, as a rule, were not carried out. However, company and battalion exercises with live fire began to be practiced more and more.

The formation of the command staff of the middle and senior levels was mainly due to the promotion to the highest positions of generals, admirals and officers who showed the ability to competently and proactively manage the troops (navy forces) in a combat situation, on practical work, during which their high commanding qualities, military leadership talents were revealed. It is to this period that the promotion and formation of many commanders of divisions, corps, staff workers of the operational level, who by the end of the war had grown to the level of talented military leaders, commanders of the Soviet military school, belonged.

As a result of the work done, by the end of 1942, the basic requirements and principles for the training of troops (forces), command personnel and staffs in war time. On this basis, it became possible to carry out purposeful, more effective training of the troops of the active army and reserves in relation to the changing conditions of warfare in general and the nature of the tasks being performed. Valuable experience was accumulated in carrying out operational training activities directly in combat conditions, the methodological skills of the officers increased, and the general operational-tactical training of commanders of all levels improved, which made it possible to move on to more advanced and effective forms and methods of training troops and staffs.

In the second period of the war The Red Army has accumulated rich experience in preparing and conducting not only defensive, but also offensive operations on great depth and with determined goals.

This also determined a completely different approach to the training of troops and staffs. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the directive of April 23, 1943 demanded more effective training of troops, commanders and staffs for offensive combat and operations, for breaking through the enemy’s defensive line, quickly securing captured lines, repelling enemy counterattacks, countering massive strikes of his tanks, aircraft and for night operations . It was pointed out that it was necessary to carefully work out the issues of command and control of troops and the interaction of combat arms at all stages of the battle and operation. “Exercises with headquarters,” the directive noted, “to conduct, as a rule, multi-day, continuous, with means of communication and reconnaissance. Exercises with troops from a battalion and above should also be carried out for several days, working out a number of interconnected topics, bringing the conditions of study and life in every possible way closer to combat reality ... ".

During the period of restoration in the armies of the directorates of the army corps, abolished in the first months of the war, the desire of the army commanders to control the combat operations of divisions and brigades over the head of the corps commanders was manifested. This fettered the initiative of the latter and relieved them of direct responsibility for the performance of combat missions. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave comprehensive instructions on the procedure for using the corps command link.

Special attention began to be paid to the training of commanders and headquarters of the corps. With them, corps command and staff exercises on the ground with communications equipment, staff training and other exercises began to be carried out more often, during which the issues of planning and conducting an operation (battle) throughout the entire depth of the enemy’s defense, organizing interaction and command and control of troops using corps command and control units were practiced .

In the third period of war our troops conducted mainly offensive operations, and their activity increased significantly, there were fewer long operational pauses. Under these conditions, the time factor became decisive in the training of troops and command and control agencies. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff constantly took this feature into account. As soon as there was a pause in hostilities on one or another sector of the Soviet-German front, the commanders received specific instructions on combat and operational training. So, on May 1, 1944, signed by I.V. Stalin and A.I. Antonov, a directive was sent to the commanders of the fronts, in which it was required in all formations and units to make the most of the available time for combat training and coordination of units. Most of the time needed to be devoted to offensive combat, the formation of battle formations and the introduction of second echelons into battle, control of the battle, and organization of interaction. Characteristically, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded to organize a check on the progress of combat training and report on the results.

As before, much attention was paid to the study of the experience of the war. At this stage arose and found wide application completely new form training commanders (commanders), staffs and generals (officers) on specific examples of their actions in battles and operations - analyzes of the most characteristic operations and battles carried out. Noteworthy in this regard is the directive letter dated May 29, 1944, signed by G.K. Zhukov and A.I. his study. It was ordered to organize reviews of the most instructive and characteristic operations (battles) carried out on all fronts. With the commanders (commanders), chiefs of staff of armies, corps, branches of troops of the fronts and armies, they were carried out under the leadership of the front commanders, and with the commanders and chiefs of staff of divisions, regiments and the corresponding chiefs of the branches of troops (services) - commanders.

However, along with the discussion positive sides combat actions, shortcomings that had taken place in the organization and conduct of operations (battles), the use of combat arms, the organization of interaction, and command and control of troops were revealed. The participants in the debriefing were given the opportunity to express their opinion on issues of combat experience, to justify their actions, which they recognized as worthy of attention or inappropriate, based on the specific results of the battle (operation).

During this period, the operational training of command and control bodies was significantly intensified. Data have been preserved on the conduct of a fairly large number of command and staff exercises, military games, staff exercises and training in almost all armies. Their theme was, as a rule, offensive. Characteristic in this regard, the KSHU, carried out in the 4th Guards. And in July 1944, on the topic "Development of the offensive in the tactical and operational depth of the enemy's defense", which involved the commanders and headquarters of the 21st and 78th sk, six divisions, and their regiments were designated as end intermediaries, through which the drawing of hostilities was carried out. During the exercise, much attention was paid to working out the issues of organizing reconnaissance, pursuit, encirclement and destruction of the enemy, moving command posts, etc.

In cases where, due to the conditions of the situation, it was impossible or inappropriate to conduct exercises simultaneously with all corps and divisions on an army scale, they were practiced in turn, as was the case at 40 A. Here, from July 19 to July 26, 1944, under the leadership of the commander (general F. F. Zhmachenko) were successively carried out two-degree KSHU with 50 sk, its two divisions and one fortified area (July 19-21), then with 51 sk and its three divisions (July 21-23) and, finally, with 104 sk and by his three divisions (July 24-26) on a common topic for all: "The development of the offensive in the tactical and operational depth of the enemy's defense and the organization of his pursuit."

It should be noted that in the period under review, operational and combat training approached the requirements of combat reality as closely as possible, various exercises and exercises began to be carried out in strict accordance with the nature of the tasks performed by the troops. Company, battalion, and often regimental exercises ended with live firing. Units of all branches of the armed forces participated in them, during which issues of interaction were practically worked out. In many live-fire exercises, captured military equipment was widely used to mark the enemy, which instilled confidence in the soldiers in the strength of their weapons. When in the summer operations of 1944 shortcomings were revealed in the organization of interaction between mobile (tank, mechanized, cavalry) troops and aviation during their operations in the operational depth, inconsistency in the time of strikes against the enemy, the General Staff paid serious attention to this and demanded, under the leadership of the chiefs of staff of the fronts “conduct a command and staff exercise of commanders and headquarters of mobile and aviation formations to develop practical issues interactions between them...

No less importance was attached to the training of the headquarters of the formations. For example, "for two recent years war with management officers of the 108th Guards Rifle Division, 4 staff and command-staff exercises, 10 joint staff trainings were held.

From the above facts, it is clear that the most characteristic features operational and combat training at that time were their maximum approximation to the tasks to be solved, a significantly increased intensity, especially in the operational link (corps, army, front), a wider range of forms and methods of training used, purposefulness in the study and use of war experience.

During this period, the troops received new statutory documents, developed taking into account the accumulated experience of the war. Among them, a prominent place was occupied by the draft Field Manual (PU-43), which, in accordance with the accepted organization of formations and on the basis of accumulated experience, set out the main requirements and installations for the combat use of rifle, tank, mechanized, cavalry corps and divisions, as well as combat aviation in the main types of combat (operations).

In 1944, the "Manual on the field service of headquarters (NPSSh-44)", "Manual on the breakthrough of positional defense" and many other charters, instructions, manuals for both combined arms formations (associations) and for types of Armed Forces were published and put into effect. Forces, military branches, which played an invaluable role in the training of troops and headquarters.

By this time, qualitative changes had also taken place in organizational structure some bodies of the General Staff: the department for the study of the experience of war, the statutory and military history departments were deployed to the corresponding departments. On the whole, they did considerable work, published a large number of regulations, manuals, bulletins, collections, brochures, instructions summarizing the positive experience of the armed struggle, revealed the shortcomings and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, developed useful recommendations and thus made a worthy contribution to Great Victory over fascism.

The Great Patriotic War enriched the Soviet Armed Forces with invaluable experience in the practical and creative solution of the tasks of operational and combat training of troops in wartime. It testifies that, no matter how perfect the system of training troops in peacetime, during the course of the war it will need to be seriously changed. However, this problem cannot be solved by trial and error. The experience of the last war teaches that the optimal system for training troops and naval forces in wartime should be worked out long before the war and put into effect in parallel with the transfer of the Armed Forces from a peaceful to a war footing. For this it is necessary, in our opinion, to clearly define the contours of this system, the forms and methods of operational and combat training even now. In addition, it is important that the system of education in peacetime itself contains everything necessary for a painless and quick transition to a military situation.

Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the war. Book Two.- M.: Military Publishing, 1973, p. fourteen.

Collection of materials for the study of the experience of war, No. 1. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1942, p. 31-40.

TsAMO USSR, f. 96-A, op. 1711, d. 1, ll. 22-23.

TsAMO, f 84-A, op. 1554, file 91. ll. 288-290.

There, f. 48-A, op. 1640, d. 79, ll. 79, 375, 377-379,

TsAMO, F.132-A, op. 2642, d. 33, ll. 111-113.

There, f. 132-A, op. 2642, d. 34, ll. 149-151.

TsAMO, f. 48-A, op. 1795, d. 3, ll. 1-2.

TsAMO, f. 16, on. 983, d. 4, ll. 204-208.

TsAMO. f. 16, op. 983, d. 4, ll. 216-218.

T a m e, f. 48-A, op. 1795, d. 16, ll. 75-76.

Military History Journal, 1986, No. 1, p. thirty.

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The needs of the war demanded the creation of a number of new allied people's commissariats. People's Commissariats were formed for the branches of industry that produced weapons:

in September 1941 it was created and operated until October 1945. People's Commissariat of Tank Industry of the USSR ;

from November 1941 to February 1946 worked People's Commissariat for Mortar Weapons of the USSR, converted from the People's Commissariat of General Engineering.

In August 1941 it was created Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army , headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Military councils of fronts, armies, fleets and flotillas were created. They were headed by the commander - the chairman of the Military Council.

Also at the beginning of the war was created Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo) .

During the war years, the rights of the Union republics were expanded. On February 1, 1944, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the law "On the Creation of Military Formations of the Union Republics" was adopted. As a result of this resolution, the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics established people's commissariats for defense, appointed people's commissars and, in connection with this, made changes to their constitutions. Thus, the all-union People's Commissariat of Defense "in order to strengthen the defense power" of the USSR was transformed into a union-republican one.

Along with the centralization of administration during the war years, another trend emerged in the relations between the central authorities and the republics. In late January - early February 1944, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held, which on February 1, 1944 adopted the Law "On granting powers to the Union republics in the field of foreign relations and, in this regard, transforming the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from the All-Union into the Union-Republican People's Commissariat ". This law was dictated by the desire of the Soviet leadership to take a more advantageous position in the post-war world order. For this it was necessary to include the union republics in international life as subjects international law. In connection with this law, the federal republics of the USSR could enter into direct relations with foreign states and conclude agreements with them.

There have been changes in the field of criminal law. Great responsibility during the war fell on the punitive bodies of the country.

In July 1941, a unified NKVD was recreated, in April 1943, an independent People's Commissariat of State Security stood out, and the Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (SMERSH) was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 approved the Regulations on military tribunals in areas declared under martial law and in areas of military operations. The rights of military tribunals were expanded. In connection with the war, the procedural order for considering cases in military tribunals was changed: complaints and protests against the verdicts of the tribunals were not allowed. The sentences were carried out immediately, sentences to capital punishment were reported by telegram to the chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

3. EXTRAORDINARY BODIES OF STATE ADMINISTRATION DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

An emergency situation developed in the country when the question of the very existence of the Soviet state arose.

All changes in the control system could not solve the problems of wartime. Therefore, along with the traditional forms of power and control, with the outbreak of war, special emergency authorities with special powers. These bodies were extraordinary because, firstly, their creation was not provided for by the Constitution of the USSR; secondly, their powers were higher than those of the constitutional bodies of power and administration. Already in the first days of the war, the insufficiency of the measures taken to repel the aggression became visible.

It became obvious that all power should be concentrated in one hand, where there would be no division into party, state and military bodies, where any management issues would be resolved quickly and authoritatively. This body became State Committee Defense (GKO), created by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 30, 1941. Initially, the GKO included 5 people, and then it was expanded to 9 people, and by the end of the war it was reduced to 8. Stalin headed the GKO.

On September 17, 1941, the GKO issued a decree “On universal compulsory military training for citizens of the USSR”, according to which, from October 1, 1941, compulsory military training was introduced for all male citizens of the USSR from 16 to 50 years old. The organization of this training was entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Defense and its local bodies. As part of the People's Commissariat of Defense was formed Office of General Military Training (Vseobuch) .

Through the people's commissariats, the State Defense Committee supervised the work public institutions and departments, and through the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, he led the armed struggle against the invaders. The State Defense Committee was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 4, 1945. The State Defense Committee had unlimited powers. Its composition testified that it brought together the most capable and authoritative people from the highest party and government agencies endowed with legitimate authority. Despite the small number of GKOs, wartime conditions did not allow it to meet regularly and in full force. Decisions were made by the chairman or deputy in agreement with other members of the GKO.

The resolutions of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime laws. All organizations - party, Soviet, economic, public - were obliged to strictly comply with any resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee. The committee made do with a small administrative apparatus of its own. He exercised leadership through party and Soviet power structures. In the republics, territories and regions, as well as in the military, industrial people's commissariats, positions of authorized GKOs were established.

In the front-line areas, by decision of the State Defense Committee, regional and city defense committees were created, which united the party, Soviet and military authorities in the region. Their activities were subordinated to the interests of defense. They supervised the creation of the people's militia, the construction of defensive structures, the repair of military equipment, conducted social and educational work, and established a peaceful life in the areas liberated from the invaders.

The State Defense Committee created auxiliary bodies to strengthen control over certain industries of the defense complex. In July 1942, at a joint meeting of the Politburo and the GKO, the Transport Committee . This committee has become a single governing body for all modes of transport. He mobilized the resources of railway workers, watermen, aviators of the country, ensured the interaction of all links of the transport system. The Transport Committee included people's commissars of communications, sea and river fleet, representatives of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In December 1942, the Operational Bureau GKO. This body supervised the work of industrial and transport people's commissariats, drew up monthly and quarterly plans for the production of the most important branches of industry, monitored their timely supply of metals, coal, oil, and electricity. The operational bureau also took over the functions of the abolished Transport Committee.

The Armed Forces of the USSR underwent changes during the Great Patriotic War. To guide military operations on the day after the start of the Great Patriotic War, by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a Headquarters of the High Command . July 10, 1941 she was transformed into Headquarters of the Supreme High Command . The bet was to carry out strategic leadership armed forces of the country. Stalin headed this body and was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

On June 24, 1941, by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was formed Evacuation Council . The Council worked in close contact with the people's commissariats, under which evacuation departments were created. In June 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR determined the procedure for the removal and deployment of human contingents and the most valuable property. In September, under the Evacuation Council, Department for the evacuation of the population . Along with the Evacuation Council in October - December 1941, the Evacuation Committee . The committee supervised the evacuation of equipment, stocks of raw materials and food. The placement of evacuated enterprises and organizations was carried out jointly with local authorities and administrations. Along with the Council and the Committee for the evacuation of June 22, 1942, by the Decree of the State Defense Committee, Evacuation Commission . The commission operated until the autumn of 1942. Also, such emergency management bodies as Committee for food and clothing supply and Transport Cargo Unloading Committee .

At the first stage of the war, due to the country's insufficient preparedness for active defense, many regions of the USSR were occupied by fascist troops. Despite the most severe repressions, the Nazis failed to completely paralyze and eliminate the Soviet system of government in the occupied territory. In the zone German occupation Party and Soviet bodies continued to operate or were created again. They relied on the underground movement and partisan formations.

Partisan movement originated shortly after the occupation of part of the Soviet territory. However, it gained wide and organized scope after the proper management of partisan detachments and formations was organized. On May 30, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted the Decree “On the Creation of the Supreme High Command at the Headquarters Central headquarters of the partisan movement ". In the republics, territories and regions, appropriate headquarters were created, which led partisan movement. Under the Military Councils of the fronts, partisan headquarters were also created. In the rear of the Nazi troops, partisan territories were created, zones where Soviet authorities, collective farms, local industries, medical, cultural and other institutions were restored.

The Great Patriotic War made significant changes in the composition, structure and command and control of the armed forces. The attack on our country by a multimillion-strong mass of fascist troops required immediate mobilization. In accordance with the mobilization plan, already on June 22, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, guided by the Constitution of the USSR, announced the mobilization of 14 ages liable for military service in 14 military districts of the country. In the first days of the war, 5 million people were drafted into the army. Later, mobilization was carried out in other districts, and men aged 18 to 55 were subject to conscription. By the end of the war, the number of Soviet armed forces reached 11,365 thousand people. In total, during the war, about 31 million people who were born before 1927, inclusive, served in the Red Army.

One of the most important tasks of military construction was the mass training of the defenders of the Motherland to replenish the army in the field. The Soviet state took measures to ensure that each new recruit came to the army and navy already with the skills of military affairs. In accordance with the GKO resolutions "On the training of reserves in the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy" dated July 16, 1941 and "On the universal compulsory military training of citizens of the USSR" dated September 18, 1941, all men aged from 16 to 50 years old. In total, about 18 million people went through the system of military preliminary general education during the war years.

Military mobilizations were not the only source of replenishment of the armed forces. In the very first days of the war, a patriotic upsurge embraced all Soviet citizens. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers joined the army. Divisions of the people's militia, destruction battalions, volunteer women's units and subunits began to form. In early July 1941, the creation of divisions of the people's militia was authorized by the GKO. These divisions were formed on a voluntary basis in areas that were directly threatened by the fascist troops, from citizens who were not subject to mandatory mobilization. Providing assistance to the cadre army, the people's militia covered itself with unfading glory.

On the territory temporarily captured by the Nazis, the number of partisan formations grew - a clear evidence of the activity of the masses in liberation struggle against the invaders. According to official data alone, there were more than 1 million fighters in partisan detachments and formations. The peoples of the USSR consciously went into battle, made sacrifices and hardships for the sake of approaching victory over the fascist invaders.

Much has been done to improve the system of training command personnel. During the war years, about 2 million servicemen passed through it.

In January - February 1943, new insignia were introduced for the personnel of the Red Army and the Navy, shoulder straps were restored.

In the most difficult, initial period of the war, the Soviet guard was born in battles. Military units, ships, formations and associations (armies), which showed heroism, high organization and the ability to smash the enemy, were assigned the names of the Guards with the presentation of the Guards Red Banners. For the personnel, special distinctions were established in the form of military guards ranks and a badge. To encourage soldiers and officers who especially distinguished themselves in battle during the war years, nine new military orders were established, including the orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War, Glory, and many medals.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War brought significant changes to the organization military administration .

In June-August 1941, the system of strategic and operational leadership of the Armed Forces was reorganized. On June 23, 1941, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created as an organ of the highest military leadership of the country. On July 10, 1941, it received the name of the Headquarters of the High Command, and on August 8 - Headquarters of the Supreme High Command . It included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense: S.K. Timoshenko (Chairman), SM. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, G.K. Zhukov, N.G. Kuznetsov, V.M. Molotov, I.V. Stalin.

During the war, a number of senior party and state posts were held by Stalin. He was simultaneously General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (since May 6, 1941), Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander-in-Chief (since August 8, 1941), People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (since July 19, 1941), Chairman Transport Committee of the State Defense Committee.

The General Staff, the Departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy served as the working apparatus of the Headquarters. The decisions taken by the Headquarters were communicated to the command of the fronts and fleets in the form of directives from the Supreme High Command. In its activities, the Headquarters relied on the military councils of the fronts. Communication with the fronts was also carried out through representatives of the Headquarters, whose tasks included: coordinating the actions of the fronts, monitoring the implementation of the directives of the Supreme High Command, and helping the fronts in planning, preparing and carrying out operations. Most often, the Stavka was represented by G.K. Zhukov, appointed in August 1942 as First Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky.

Since July 1941, the highest formations of troops have been the three most important strategic directions headed by their High Command (North-West - K.E. Voroshilov, Western - S.K. Timoshenko, South-West - S.M. Budyonny), and after the reform of directions from July 1942, fronts led by commanders and military councils became the highest formations of troops. They were in charge of military operations.

The military councils of the fronts and armies were constantly connected with the GKO and Supreme High Command, bore before them full responsibility for military operations, military training, political and moral state and material and technical support of the troops.

The formations during the war included corps, divisions, brigades. Commanders of fronts and armies, commanders of formations who directly led combat operations were given the right to assign military ranks, appointment to positions of commanding and commanding staff, awarding orders and medals on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to those who distinguished themselves in battles. The units in the Red Army were regiments, as well as a special category of units that received the name "separate" (separate battalion, separate division), the command of which enjoyed the rights to a step higher.

Political agencies played an important role in the army and navy. The general management of party political work in the army was carried out by the Main Political Directorate (GPU) of the Red Army and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy (both as military departments of the Central Committee of the Party. By the end of the war, more than 2 thousand political agencies operated in the army, about 78 thousand primary organizations.

On July 16, 1941, the institution of military commissars was introduced in units and formations, who, while directing party political work, along with commanders, were fully responsible for the combat training and combat capability of the troops. But unlike the times civil war The commissars did not have the functions of controlling the command staff. In the divisions, the positions of political instructors were introduced. After the successful deployment of a multimillion-strong army, the rise of its morale and political spirit and combat effectiveness, and the accumulation by commanders of experience in political work, it became possible to strengthen unity of command in command and control of troops. In October 1942, the institution of military commissars in the army and navy was abolished. The positions of deputy commanders for political affairs were introduced. In partisan detachments, military commissars were retained. Partisan departments existed under the Main Political Administration and under the political administrations of the fronts.

May 30, 1942 to unite the leadership of the partisan struggle behind enemy lines on an all-Union scale and coordinate actions partisan detachments with units of the Red Army at the Headquarters, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created (chief - first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko) and republican (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian) headquarters. At the headquarters of the armies, special departments were created to communicate with partisan detachments.

From this moment on, the partisan movement acquires a more organized character and coordinates its actions with the army (Belarus, the northern part of Ukraine, Bryansk, Smolensk and Oryol region). By the spring of 1943, sabotage underground work was carried out in almost all cities in the docked territory. Large partisan formations(regiments, brigades), led by experienced commanders: S.A. Kovpak, A.I. Saburov, A.F. Fedorov, N.Z. Kolyada, S.V. Grishin and others. Almost all partisan formations had radio contact with the Center. Since the summer of 1943, large formations of partisans carried out military operations as part of combined arms operations. Particularly large-scale were partisan actions during Battle of Kursk, operations "Rail War" and "Concert". As the Soviet troops advanced, partisan formations were reorganized and merged into regular army units.

In total, during the war years, the partisans disabled 1.5 million enemy soldiers and officers, blew up 20 thousand enemy trains and 12 thousand bridges, destroyed 65 thousand vehicles, 2.3 thousand tanks, 1.1 thousand aircraft, 17 thousand km of communication lines.

More than 1 million partisans fought behind enemy lines throughout the war. The central headquarters of the partisan movement established links with the partisan formations, directed and coordinated their activities, spread the partisan struggle again, trained personnel, supplied the partisans with weapons, ammunition, medicines, and most importantly, organized their interaction with the troops. For some time (from September 6 to November 19, 1942) there was the position of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement (Marshal Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov).

The combat experience of all military branches during the war years was regularly summarized and was clearly reflected in new regulations and instructions, including the Infantry Combat Regulations of 1942, the Field Service Manual of Headquarters of 1942, and the Military Intelligence Manual.