The era of palace coups is one of the most interesting pages of history Russian state. Struggle strong personalities, behind-the-scenes intrigues, high and low passions - everything can be found here.
When there is no law, the political question is usually decided by the ruling power. Such a force in Russian palace coups of the last century, there was a privileged part of the regular army created by Peter, two guards regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky., To which two others were added during the reign of Anna - the infantry Izmailovsky and Horse Guards. The Guard took an active part in all difficulties; arising from the question of succession to the throne, not a single almost change on the throne in the aforementioned 38 years did not do without the decisive intervention of the guard.

1. Introduction
2. Causes and driving forces of palace coups
- Causes of coups
- Coup mechanism
- Conclusions
3. Conclusion
4. Source

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The role of the guard in the era of palace coups

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"The role of the guard in the era of palace coups"

1. Introduction

2. Causes and driving forces of palace coups

- Causes of coups

- The main driving force of palace coups

- Coup mechanism

- Conclusions

3. Conclusion

4. Source

1. Introduction

The era of palace coups is one of the most interesting pages in the history of the Russian state. The struggle of strong personalities, behind-the-scenes intrigues, high and low passions - everything can be found here.

When there is no law, the political question is usually decided by the ruling power. Such a force in the Russian palace coups of the last century was the privileged part of the regular army created by Peter, two guards regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky., To which two others were added during the reign of Anna - the infantry Izmailovsky and Horse Guards. The Guard took an active part in all difficulties; arising from the question of succession to the throne, not a single almost change on the throne in the aforementioned 38 years did not do without the decisive intervention of the guard.

2. Causes and driving forces of palace coups

- Causes of coups

In the XVIII century. a situation arose in which palace coups became the simplest, and sometimes the only way to resolve contradictions within the ruling circles. It would be logical to look for the reasons for the formation of these conditions in the activities and state transformations of Peter the Great, immediately preceding the era of palace coups.

Peter I the Great died on January 28, 1725, leaving no legitimate successors. He was too consistent and sober-minded ruler not to realize before his death what he was dooming Russia to. In agony, the emperor, trying to draw up a will, "took a pen, wrote a few words, but they could not be made out." “He himself noticed that he was not writing clearly, and therefore he shouted to call Princess Anna to him, whom he wanted to dictate. They run after her; she hurries to go, but when she comes to bed, he has already lost his language and consciousness, which never returned to him. In such a situation, the enthronement of any sovereign can be regarded as a coup. Approximate "were only waiting for a minute when the monarch expires to get down to business" Peter was aware of the possibility of a dynastic crisis long before his death. The sovereign was married twice: to Evdokia Lopukhina (1692-1689) and Marta Skavronskaya, later Catherine I Alekseevna (1712-1725). From both marriages he had male children: Alexei Petrovich and Petr Petrovich. However, the father outlived both sons.

Alexey Petrovich had the greatest rights to the throne, being born in a marriage with a representative of a Russian aristocratic family. However, "Peter's legitimate heir did not share his political views, did not accept his reforms." After an unsuccessful attempt to escape abroad, Alexei Petrovich abdicated. He was sentenced to death, which, in accordance with the official version, did not have time to carry out, and the prince died a natural death.

Three years before the death of the prince, Ekaterina Alekseevna had a son, Peter. Although the child appeared when his parents were already married, the offspring of the Livonian "portomoi", the undivorced wife of a Swedish trumpeter soldier, had less rights to the throne than his half-brother. But the child died at the age of three.

The male line of the Romanovs has not yet ceased. The same year of Peter Petrovich was the son of Tsarevich Alexei, Peter Alekseevich. But Peter I could not allow the accession to the throne of the son of the prince he had tortured and decided to take a radical step.

On February 5, 1822, the emperor issued the "Charter on the Succession to the Throne." The sovereign did not hide the main reason for the appearance of the "charter": the position of the heir, Tsarevich Alexei, threatened the existence of the Russian state. The content of the document is presented in a few final lines: "... It is always in the will of the ruling sovereign, to whom he wants, he will determine the inheritance"

Thus, after the death of Peter I the Great, the traditional order of succession in the direct male line came into conflict with the principles declared by the “Charter of Succession” of 1722. As a result, a dynastic crisis developed, which was resolved by the first palace coup. The same contradiction will cause other palace coups.

The reforms of Peter the Great created not only political, but also social conditions for palace coups. The upper social strata suffered. In the decree on single inheritance of 1714, the difference between the estates of boyars and nobles, between the legal status of an estate and an estate, was eliminated. The boyar class ceased to exist: "... all immovable things, that is, ancestral, served and purchased estates and estates ...". As a result, the traditional confrontation between the boyar oligarchy and the noble service class was eliminated. The state could no longer use these contradictions, it was faced with a consolidated privileged class, which had to be reckoned with. This estate became the nobility. Of course, within the framework of the new estate, an upper layer quickly emerged, which can be conditionally called the noble aristocracy. Part of it was made up of people from the former boyars. However, they represented only one of the parties of the new socio-political elite, and after the defeat of the Dolgoruky and Golitsyn families, it practically ceased to exist.

The tendency to suppress the boyar opposition originated in the oprichnina of Ivan IV the Terrible. In the year of accession to the throne of Peter and Ivan Alekseevich, localism was finally abolished, the procedure for holding positions “according to the fatherland”, i.e. according to origin. The final stage falls on 1722, when the building of the Russian "regular state" was crowned with the publication of the "Table of Ranks".

As a result of the reforms of Peter the Great, the nobility became the only politically active class. Palace coups and conspiracies that preceded them were prepared and carried out by the nobles. The nobles made up the parties, the nobles wove intrigues, the nobles were officers of the guards regiments and made up the majority of the guards themselves. The main contradictions in the nobility ran along the watershed between the local nobility and the noble aristocracy. The first saw the source of prosperity and social growth in the strong absolutist power of the emperor. The latter gravitated towards the establishment of a limited oligarchic monarchy.

- The main driving force of palace coups

The main driving force behind the palace coups of the XVIII century. became a guard. The first guards regiments, Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky, were transformed from the amusing regiments of the young Tsarevich Peter. The guard demonstrated its effectiveness already in the battle of Narva (1700), putting up stubborn resistance to the Swedish troops, while the rest of the Russian army fled in disarray. The guard became the nucleus new army, a source of recruitment for officers. The majority in the guards regiments were noblemen, the very ones who were now obliged to begin their service from the lower military ranks. The Guards were also entrusted with non-military tasks, for which qualified performers were required. “The guards conducted the first census, went abroad with responsible assignments, collected taxes, were appointed auditors and investigators, and sometimes a simple sergeant or officer was vested with greater powers than a governor or field marshal.” HELL. Menshikov, Prince. Dolgoruky, V.N. Tatishchev, M.M. Golitsyn, B.K. Minich, the brothers Razumovsky and Shuvalov served in the guards regiments, or commanded them. The Guard became a special non-estate corporation, which was characterized by rare unity, discipline and an exaggerated idea of ​​​​its role in court life. The guards were quartered in the capital, and, therefore, they were the force that could be quickly used as part of a palace coup. They were not just a toy in the hands of the parties, they themselves sought to realize their corporate interests. Serving at court, the guards were aware of all the events in government circles, reverence towards the authorities was alien to them.

Thus, during the reign of Peter the Great, elite paramilitary units were created, always located in close proximity to the center of political events.

By the end of the first quarter of the XVIII century. in Russia, a politically active consolidated class was formed - the nobility, the elite metropolitan paramilitary units - the guard, and a political oligarchy torn by contradictions. All these factors became, respectively, the social base, the driving forces and the organizational component of palace coups.

- Coup mechanism

Palace coups of the 18th century. had a significant number similarities, which allows us to speak about a certain mechanism for their implementation.

An indispensable condition for a palace coup was political instability. At the head of the palace coup was always one or another political group. Court parties have always existed, however, the aggravation of the conflict between them and their rigid opposition to each other were usually clear signs of an approaching coup. In 1725, the "chicks of Petrov's nest" enthroned the sovereign's wife, thus defeating the aristocratic opposition. Extraordinary gain A.D. Menshikov under Catherine I marks the beginning of the period of temporary workers. The Golitsyn-Dolgorukiy party takes revenge by deposing the “semi-power ruler” in 1727. When Anna Ioannovna came to the throne, the “supervisors”, putting forward conditions, entered into a confrontation with the rest of the noble mass, which was headed by S.A. Saltykov and A. M. Cherkassky. In the struggle against I. Biron in 1741, the party of A.I. Osterman. National-oriented parties of Elizabeth and Catherine II in 1741 and 1762 overthrew rulers associated with Russophobic politics. The paradox is that, unlike Peter III, in the veins of his wife there was not a drop of Russian blood. P.A. party conspiracy Palena in 1801, which objectively expressed the protest of society against the inconsistency of state policy, ended in regicide. The struggle of the court parties reflected the contradictions within the politically active public. Among them, firstly, one can note the struggle of aristocratic parties against groups of unborn nobles (coups of 1725, 1727, 1730). Secondly, we discover the confrontation between national parties and groups that, according to public opinion, pursued an anti-national policy (coups of 1740, 1741, 1762). Finally, one can single out the struggle of the noble parties for their privileges, which was most clearly manifested in the coup of 1801.

The palace coup was always preceded by a preparatory, conspiratorial stage. The conspiracy of the "Old Russian Party" against A.D. Menshikov could only be drawn up during his protracted and dangerous illness. In 1730 D.M. Golitsyn and V.L. Dolgoruky in deep secrecy drew up "conditions", and upon the arrival of Anna Ioannovna "gatherings of guardsmen began", "hundreds of landowners-nobles gathered in the houses of princes Trubetskoy, Baryatinsky and Cherkassky." Almost the same situation was repeated in 1741, when “the Ruler decided to explain herself to the opponent in private” about the conspiracy that was being prepared by the latter. The deposition of Peter III in 1762 was clearly planned, and the preparations were carried out both in the guards and at the court, much attention was paid to the formation of public opinion. Vice-Chancellor N.P. Panin, St. Petersburg Governor-General P.A. Palen, the Zubov brothers (Catherine's favorites) and several commanders of the guards regiments - these are the main participants in the conspiracy of 1801.

For most palace coups, the main driving force was the guard. In 1725, according to one version: Prince Menshikov went with a company directly to the imperial palace, broke down the doors of the room where the senators and generals were, and declared Catherine the empress and legitimate Russian empress. 1730, it was the guards who said the decisive word in favor of the autocracy of Anna Ioannovna. During the coups of 1741 and 1762. pretenders to the throne themselves led the rebellious guards regiments. The coup of 1801 was largely due to the emperor's preference for the "Gatchins" in comparison with the guards regiments. Anna Ioannovna added Izmailovsky and Horse Guards to the two Peter's regiments, and Biron tried to reduce the percentage of nobles in the guards by recruiting commoners. However, neither these nor other measures could stop the arbitrariness of the guard, which continued to "make governments."

Usually the conspiracy matured at the top, among the noble aristocracy. The guard was an instrument of noble groups, an instrument for enthroning the desired figure. Housing in the capital, she was always "at hand". A significant part of the guards regiments were nobles, i.e. the guard was close to the conspirators in social relations. The guard was quite homogeneous, so the situation when one part fights against another was unthinkable for the 18th century. The guards regiment attracted to the side of the conspirators automatically determined the position of the entire guard (loyal or passive). And, finally, there was no alternative to the guards, since they were the most trained, prepared and disciplined military units, susceptible to agitation and having a long tradition and experience in carrying out armed coups.

During palace coups, the government side usually behaved extremely passively, giving all the initiative into the hands of the rebels. During the events of 1725, only the president of the Military Collegium, Prince. Repnin was indignant at the actions of the guards, who were taken out of the barracks without his order. In 1762 B.K. Minich tried to organize the resistance of the troops, including the Kronstadt garrison, and even mobilize the peasants, but Peter III himself behaved passively and pretty soon came to the new empress with an expression of humility.

In conditions of political instability, a conspiracy arose, which was implemented in the capital of one of the noble groups with the help of the guard. The success of the coup was largely due to the decisiveness of the actions of the rebels and the passivity of the opposite side. After the power phase of the coup, the stage of legitimization of power began. The fate of the defeated opponent was usually unenviable, and the cruelty in deciding his fate increased throughout the entire “era of palace coups”.

The role of the guard in palace coups
After Peter I, his wife Catherine I ruled for two years, and after her death, the grandson of Peter I, Peter II.
Peter I did not have time to decide who would be his heir. Most of all the rights to the throne had his grandson (the son of the executed Alexei), the young Peter. But among the nobles, parties were formed that tried to put on the throne a king that was beneficial to them. Menshikov, Yaguzhinsky and others contributed to the coming to power of Catherine I. The troops gathered around the palace were especially convinced by the Senate, the Synod and the generals. Catherine was an intelligent, but uneducated woman, according to one foreign ambassador, when she ascended the throne, she could neither read nor write. But three months later she learned to sign government papers. In fact, Menshikov was the ruler under her, while the empress herself spent time in magnificent feasts and festivities. An important event of her reign was the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council to decide the most important state affairs.
Catherine died in 1727 and appointed Peter II Alekseevich as his successor. Passions boiled around the 11-year-old Emperor Peter II. Initially, he was greatly influenced by Menshikov, who wanted to marry him to his daughter. Then he annoyed the boy with his strictness and, on the advice of his enemies, was exiled to distant Berezovo. The huge fortune of Prince and Generalissimo Alexander Danilovich was taken away. The princes Dolgoruky now had a strong influence on the tsar, who agreed on the wedding of Peter II and Catherine Dolgoruky. But suddenly the monarch fell ill with smallpox. In January 1730, on the day of the planned wedding, Peter II died.
Among the candidates for the throne was the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth, but she was born before the official marriage to Catherine and was considered illegitimate. Therefore, they settled on the daughter of Ivan V, brother of Peter I, Anna. In addition, court groups sought to establish on the throne a ruler that was beneficial to them in order to receive some benefits, privileges, strengthen their position, etc. Among the members of the Supreme Privy Council (“supreme leaders”), an idea arose to limit the power of the king, “to make yourself feel better”, “ give yourself the will." They offered the throne to Anna, but with the condition that they sign an agreement - not to decide the most important matters without the consent of the "supreme leaders". On the one hand, theoretically, the limitation of autocracy could be positive. But a very narrow, oligarchic circle of advisers was appointed. The danger would be too great to use the Council as an instrument for narrowly selfish purposes. This body had very little support among the nobles. And Anna soon abandoned the obligation.
After the death of Peter II in 1730, the niece of Peter I, Anna Ivanovna, who lived in the Baltics, ascended the throne. The guards began to play an increasing role in the appointment (and then overthrow) of emperors and empresses, as well as influential dignitaries. These privileged troops consisted of nobles, even the rank and file here were nobles. To a certain extent, they reflected the mood of the upper class of the whole country, but, mainly, they began to turn into a force supporting this or that party, a person capable of carrying out a palace coup.
From the Baltics, Anna brought her entourage, among which her favorite (favorite) Biron was the main one. Anna's reign is inextricably linked with the growing influence of foreigners ("Germans"), many of whom were distinguished by rudeness, arrogance, greed, and disregard for everything Russian. Arbitrariness increased, political arrests and executions increased. This whole regime caused great discontent among the Russians, both the aristocracy and ordinary people. However, Anna happily reigned for ten years. After her death, palace coups began again. Formally, the baby Ivan Antonovich (Ivan VI), the great-grandson of Ivan V (brother of Peter I), was the tsar for almost a year. Then he was deposed, and the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth, ascended the throne.
Anna, dying, left herself a successor: the infant son of her niece Anna Leopoldovna, who was married to the German prince Anton-Ulrich of Brunswick. But the regent, i.e. the actual ruler until the king came of age, should have been the same hated Biron. For the nobles, who were looking forward to the departure of the temporary worker, it was unbearable. It didn’t even help that Biron began his reign with favors: he canceled a number of death sentences, reduced taxes, etc. A conspiracy arose, the soul of which was another “German”, Field Marshal Minich. Biron was arrested and in April 1741 exiled forever to Pelym. His young mother Anna became the regent under the tsar. But she didn't have long to rule. At the end of November 1741, the guards again made a coup and elevated their beloved Elizabeth to the throne (Ivan VI Antonovich was imprisoned in a fortress). Unlike her mother, Elizabeth received an education, but she herself understood that she was not prepared to govern the state. She was not a particularly distant woman, sometimes rude and using a strong word. The queen was very fond of fun and balls. After her death, 15 thousand (!) Dresses that belonged to her remained. However, she was also distinguished by great piety, very strictly observing fasts. During the conspiracy, she gave her word not to execute anyone by death and kept it. It is believed that she was married in secret to Alexei Razumovsky.
The reign of Elizabeth lasted a long time, 20 years. She did a lot for the development of Russian industry and culture, greatly reduced the influence of foreigners at court. She was succeeded by her nephew, the grandson of Peter I from his daughter Anna and the German Duke of Holstein, Peter III. This was a stupid person. He turned down the opportunity to gain benefits for Russia as a result of victories in a difficult war with Prussia. German influence again increased. As a result, the guards again made a coup and in 1762 put his wife Catherine II on the throne. Unlike previous coups, for the first time a conspiracy arose not after the death of the king, but with a living adult emperor. For the first time, the emperor was also killed.
Peter III considered the Prussian king Frederick II a model for himself, did not recognize anything Russian. He put the benefits of his tiny state in Germany above the interests of huge Russia. His development is evidenced by the fact that one of his favorite pastimes was playing with soldiers. One day, Catherine, entering his room, saw with horror that he had hung a rat, which, according to him, committed a criminal offense: it ate the heads of two soldiers. Peter tyrannized his wife and humiliated in every possible way. The latter, although she was also German, from an early age was imbued with the life of Russia, was much more intelligent and educated. The guards loved her. Having managed to wean themselves from the dominance of foreigners, many officers could not restrain their indignation at the new order. The Orlov brothers became the center of the conspiracy. Peter III was overthrown and later killed.555

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
federal state budgetary educational institution
higher professional education
Ulyanovsk State Technical University

Department of History and Culture

History abstract
Topic: "The role of the guard in the era of palace coups"

Completed by: Kochelaev A.S.

Group: PSbd–11

Checked by: Osipov S.V.

Ulyanovsk, 2013

1. Introduction

2. Causes and driving forces of palace coups

1) Causes of coups

2) Social causes of coups

3) Coup mechanism

3. Conclusion

4. List of used literature

Introduction

The era of palace coups is one of the most interesting pages in the history of the Russian state. The struggle of strong personalities, behind-the-scenes intrigues, high and low passions - everything can be found here.

When there is no law, the political question is usually decided by the ruling power. Such a force in the Russian palace coups of the last century was the privileged part of the regular army created by Peter, two guards regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky., To which two others were added during the reign of Anna - the infantry Izmailovsky and Horse Guards. The Guard took an active part in all difficulties; arising out of the question of succession to the throne, not a single change on the throne in 38 years was complete without the decisive intervention of the guards.

Causes and mechanism of palace coups

1. Causes of coups

In the XVIII century. a situation arose in which palace coups became the simplest, and sometimes the only way to resolve contradictions within the ruling circles. It would be logical to look for the reasons for the formation of these conditions in the activities and state transformations of Peter the Great, immediately preceding the era of palace coups.

Peter I the Great died on January 28, 1725, leaving no legitimate successors. He was too consistent and sober-minded ruler not to realize before his death what he was dooming Russia to. In agony, the emperor, trying to draw up a will, "took a pen, wrote a few words, but they could not be made out" 1 . “He himself noticed that he was not writing clearly, and therefore he shouted to call Princess Anna to him, whom he wanted to dictate. They run after her; she hurries to go, but when she comes to bed, he has already lost his language and consciousness, which never returned to him. 2 In such a situation, the enthronement of any sovereign can be regarded as a coup. Approximate "were only waiting for a minute when the monarch expires to get down to business" Peter was aware of the possibility of a dynastic crisis long before his death. The sovereign was married twice: to Evdokia Lopukhina (1692-1689) and Marta Skavronskaya, later Catherine I Alekseevna (1712-1725). From both marriages he had male children: Alexei Petrovich and Petr Petrovich. However, the father outlived both sons.

Alexey Petrovich had the greatest rights to the throne, being born in a marriage with a representative of a Russian aristocratic family. However, "Peter's legitimate heir did not share his political views, did not accept his reforms" 3 . After an unsuccessful attempt to escape abroad, Alexei Petrovich abdicated. He was sentenced to death, which, in accordance with the official version, did not have time to carry out, and the prince died a natural death.

Three years before the death of the prince, Ekaterina Alekseevna had a son, Peter. Although the child appeared when his parents were already married, the offspring of the Livonian "portomoi", the undivorced wife of a Swedish trumpeter 4 soldier, had less rights to the throne than his half-brother. But the child died at the age of three.

The male line of the Romanovs has not yet ceased. The same year of Peter Petrovich was the son of Tsarevich Alexei, Peter Alekseevich. But Peter I could not allow the accession to the throne of the son of the prince he had tortured and decided to take a radical step.

On February 5, 1822, the emperor issued the "Charter on the Succession to the Throne." The sovereign did not hide the main reason for the appearance of the "charter": the position of the heir, Tsarevich Alexei, threatened the existence of the Russian state. The content of the document is presented in a few final lines: "... It is always in the will of the ruling sovereign, whoever he wants, will determine the inheritance" 5

Thus, after the death of Peter I the Great, the traditional order of succession in the direct male line came into conflict with the principles declared by the “Charter of Succession” of 1722. As a result, a dynastic crisis developed, which was resolved by the first palace coup. The same contradiction will cause other palace coups.

The reforms of Peter the Great created not only political, but also social conditions for palace coups. The upper social strata suffered. In the decree on single inheritance of 1714, the difference between the estates of boyars and nobles, between the legal status of an estate and an estate, was eliminated. The boyar class ceased to exist: "... all immovable things, that is, ancestral, served and purchased estates and estates ...". 6 As a result, the traditional confrontation between the boyar oligarchy and the noble service class was eliminated. The state could no longer use these contradictions, it was faced with a consolidated privileged class, which had to be reckoned with. This estate became the nobility. Of course, within the framework of the new estate, an upper layer quickly emerged, which can be conditionally called the noble aristocracy. Part of it was made up of people from the former boyars. However, they represented only one of the parties of the new socio-political elite, and after the defeat of the Dolgoruky and Golitsyn families, it practically ceased to exist.

The tendency to suppress the boyar opposition originated in the oprichnina of Ivan IV the Terrible. In the year of accession to the throne of Peter and Ivan Alekseevich, localism was finally abolished, the procedure for holding positions “according to the fatherland”, i.e. according to origin. The final stage falls on 1722, when the building of the Russian "regular state" was crowned with the publication of the "Table of Ranks".

As a result of the reforms of Peter the Great, the nobility became the only politically active class. Palace coups and conspiracies that preceded them were prepared and carried out by the nobles. The nobles made up the parties, the nobles wove intrigues, the nobles were officers of the guards regiments and made up the majority of the guards themselves. The main contradictions in the nobility ran along the watershed between the local nobility and the noble aristocracy. The first saw the source of prosperity and social growth in the strong absolutist power of the emperor. The latter gravitated towards the establishment of a limited oligarchic monarchy.

2. The main driving force of palace coups

The main driving force behind the palace coups of the XVIII century. became a guard. The first guards regiments, Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky, were transformed from the amusing regiments of the young Tsarevich Peter. The guard demonstrated its effectiveness already in the battle of Narva (1700), putting up stubborn resistance to the Swedish troops, while the rest of the Russian army fled in disarray. The guard became the core of the new army, the source of staff recruitment. The majority in the guards regiments were noblemen, the very ones who were now obliged to begin their service from the lower military ranks. The Guards were also entrusted with non-military tasks, for which qualified performers were required. “The guards conducted the first census, went abroad with responsible assignments, collected taxes, were appointed auditors and investigators, and sometimes a simple sergeant or officer was vested with greater powers than a governor or field marshal.” 7 A.D. Menshikov, Prince. Dolgoruky, V.N. Tatishchev, M.M. Golitsyn, B.K. Minich, the brothers Razumovsky and Shuvalov served in the guards regiments, or commanded them. The Guard became a special non-estate corporation, which was characterized by rare unity, discipline and an exaggerated idea of ​​​​its role in court life. The guards were quartered in the capital, and, therefore, they were the force that could be quickly used as part of a palace coup. They were not just a toy in the hands of the parties, they themselves sought to realize their corporate interests. Serving at court, the guards were aware of all the events in government circles, reverence towards the authorities was alien to them.

Thus, during the reign of Peter the Great, elite paramilitary units were created, always located in close proximity to the center of political events.

By the end of the first quarter of the XVIII century. in Russia, a politically active consolidated class was formed - the nobility, the elite metropolitan paramilitary units - the guard, and a political oligarchy torn by contradictions. All these factors became, respectively, the social base, the driving forces and the organizational component of palace coups.

3. Mechanism of coups

Palace coups of the 18th century. had a significant number of similar features, which allows us to speak about a certain mechanism for their implementation.

An indispensable condition for a palace coup was political instability. At the head of the palace coup was always one or another political group. Court parties have always existed, however, the aggravation of the conflict between them and their rigid opposition to each other were usually clear signs of an approaching coup. In 1725, the "chicks of Petrov's nest" enthroned the sovereign's wife, thus defeating the aristocratic opposition. Extraordinary gain A.D. Menshikov under Catherine I marks the beginning of the period of temporary workers. The Golitsyn-Dolgorukiy party takes revenge by deposing the “semi-power ruler” in 1727. When Anna Ioannovna came to the throne, the “supervisors”, putting forward conditions, entered into a confrontation with the rest of the noble mass, which was headed by S.A. Saltykov and A. M. Cherkassky. In the struggle against I. Biron in 1741, the party of A.I. Osterman. National-oriented parties of Elizabeth and Catherine II in 1741 and 1762 overthrew rulers associated with Russophobic politics. The paradox is that, unlike Peter III, there was not a drop of Russian blood in the veins of his wife. P.A. party conspiracy Palena in 1801, which objectively expressed the protest of society against the inconsistency of state policy, ended in regicide. The struggle of the court parties reflected the contradictions within the politically active public. Among them, firstly, one can note the struggle of aristocratic parties against groups of unborn nobles (coups of 1725, 1727, 1730). Secondly, we discover the confrontation between national parties and groups that, according to public opinion, pursued an anti-national policy (coups of 1740, 1741, 1762). Finally, one can single out the struggle of the noble parties for their privileges, which was most clearly manifested in the coup of 1801.

The palace coup was always preceded by a preparatory, conspiratorial stage. The conspiracy of the "Old Russian Party" 8 against A.D. Menshikov could only be drawn up during his protracted and dangerous illness. In 1730 D.M. Golitsyn and V.L. Dolgoruky in deep secrecy drew up "conditions", and upon the arrival of Anna Ioannovna "gatherings of guardsmen began", "hundreds of landowners-nobles gathered in the houses of princes Trubetskoy, Baryatinsky and Cherkassky." Almost the same situation was repeated in 1741, when “the ruler took it into her head to explain herself to the opponent in private” 9 about the conspiracy being prepared by the latter. The deposition of Peter III in 1762 was clearly planned, and the preparations were carried out both in the guards and at the court, much attention was paid to the formation of public opinion. Vice-Chancellor N.P. Panin, St. Petersburg Governor-General P.A. Palen, the Zubov brothers (Catherine's favorites) and several commanders of the guards regiments - these are the main participants in the conspiracy of 1801.

For most palace coups, the main driving force was the guard. In 1725, according to one version: Prince Menshikov went with a company directly to the imperial palace, broke down the doors of the room where the senators and generals were, and declared Catherine the empress and legitimate Russian empress. 1730, it was the guards who said the decisive word in favor of the autocracy of Anna Ioannovna. During the coups of 1741 and 1762. pretenders to the throne themselves led the rebellious guards regiments. The coup of 1801 was largely due to the emperor's preference for the "Gatchins" in comparison with the guards regiments. Anna Ioannovna added Izmailovsky and Horse Guards to the two Peter's regiments, and Biron tried to reduce the percentage of nobles in the guards by recruiting commoners. However, neither these nor other measures could stop the arbitrariness of the guard, which continued to "make governments."

Usually the conspiracy matured at the top, among the noble aristocracy. The guard was an instrument of noble groups, an instrument for enthroning the desired figure. Housing in the capital, she was always "at hand". A significant part of the guards regiments were nobles, i.e. the guard was close to the conspirators socially. The guard was quite homogeneous, so the situation when one part fights against another was unthinkable for the 18th century. The guards regiment attracted to the side of the conspirators automatically determined the position of the entire guard (loyal or passive). And, finally, there was no alternative to the guards, since they were the most trained, prepared and disciplined military units, susceptible to agitation and having a long tradition and experience in carrying out armed coups.

During palace coups, the government side usually behaved extremely passively, giving all the initiative into the hands of the rebels. During the events of 1725, only the president of the Military Collegium, Prince. Repnin was indignant at the actions of the guards, who were taken out of the barracks without his order. In 1762 B.K. Minich tried to organize the resistance of the troops, including the Kronstadt garrison, and even mobilize the peasants, but Peter III himself behaved passively and pretty soon came to the new empress with an expression of humility.

In conditions of political instability, a conspiracy arose, which was implemented in the capital of one of the noble groups with the help of the guard. The success of the coup was largely due to the decisiveness of the actions of the rebels and the passivity of the opposite side. After the power phase of the coup, the stage of legitimization of power began. The fate of the defeated opponent was usually unenviable, and the cruelty in deciding his fate increased throughout the entire “era of palace coups”.

Palace coups - a change of power as a result of the struggle of groups within the ruling class while relying on the army (its privileged part). In modern usage - "silent" change of power.

The period (epoch) of palace coups in national history it is customary to call 1725 - 1762, when in Russian Empire the supreme power passed from hand to hand mainly through coups, which were carried out by noble groups with the support and assistance of the guard. During 1725 - 1761. There were six monarchs on the Russian throne. In accordance with classical historiography, “the era of palace coups is the period 1725-1762, when the change of power in the Russian Empire took place mainly through palace coups carried out by noble groups with the assistance of guards regiments. In 1725 A.D. Menshikov enthroned Catherine I; in 1727, the Dolgorukovs obtained Menshikov's exile from Peter II; in 1740, the guard overthrew E.I. Biron; in 1741, Elizaveta Petrovna overthrew the infant emperor Ivan VI Antonovich, in 1762 Catherine II overthrew her husband Peter III. ”Thus, there are 5 palace coups in the period from the death of Peter I to the accession of Catherine II.

Background and features of palace coups. In the second quarter of the 18th century, a period began in the history of Russia, which, according to the figurative expression of the historian V.O. Klyuchevsky, the name of the "epoch of palace coups". During this period, the struggle of court factions for power began, which was facilitated by the fact that after the death of Emperor Peter I in January 1725, there were no direct male heirs to the Russian throne.

In accordance with the law on succession to the throne, caused by the case of Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich, the emperor himself had to appoint a successor to himself, but did not have time. The struggle for the throne between noble groups brought to power mainly women from the royal family, or children.

Their change was in the nature of palace coups. This was explained by the narrowly selfish interests mainly of two noble groups: titled, but not well-born nobility (A.D. Menshikov, P. Tolstoy, G.I. Golovkin, F.M. Apraksin, P.I. Yaguzhinsky, I.I. Buturlin ), who owed their elevation to Peter I and the "Table of Ranks" and the well-born hereditary nobility (D.M. Golitsyn, Dolgorukov, N.V. Repnin), who believed that governing was their primordial right. Between them there was a struggle for power and the new advantages and privileges associated with it.

At that time, the guards began to play an active role in the political life of the country, which Peter brought up as a privileged "support" of the autocracy, which, moreover, assumed the right to control the conformity of the personality and policy of the monarch to the legacy that its emperor left.

The alienation of the masses from politics and their passivity served as fertile ground for palace intrigues and coups.

On the role of the guard in history. Independent political force

In the history of Russia of the XVIII century there is a phenomenon that has no analogues in life European countries the same period. This phenomenon is a special political role of the Russian guard. It is not possible to fully understand the period Russian history from Peter I to Paul I, and even to Nicholas II, without examining the political history of the guard. Meanwhile, this work has not yet been done. The social composition of the guard, the nature and dynamics of its change have not been studied with sufficient accuracy. And this lack of knowledge gives rise to historical myths.

We are talking specifically about political history, because after the Poltava victory and the Prut defeat for many decades of the 18th century, the guard did not take any active part in hostilities. The sphere of activity of the guards regiments was politics.

The decisive force in the palace coups turned out to be the guards, a privileged part of the regular army created by Peter (these are the famous Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, in the 30s two new ones, Izmailovsky and Horse Guards, were added to them). Her participation decided the outcome of the case: on whose side the guard was, that group won. The guard was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, it was a representative of the whole estate (nobles), from whose midst it was almost exclusively formed and whose interests it represented.

Creating a guard in 1692, Peter wanted to oppose it to the archers - privileged infantry regiments Moscow tsars, who by the end of the 17th century began to interfere in politics. "Janissaries!" Peter called them so contemptuously. He had reasons for hatred - forever he, a ten-year-old boy, remembered the terrible archery riot of 1682, when his closest relatives died on the spears of the archers. The guard is the first and, perhaps, the most perfect creation of Peter. These two regiments - six thousand bayonets - could compete with the best regiments of Europe in combat training and military spirit. Guards for Peter was a support in the struggle for power and in the retention of power. According to contemporaries, Peter often said that among the guards there was not a single one to whom he would not dare to entrust his life. The guard for Peter was a "forge of personnel." Guards officers and sergeants carried out any orders of the king - from the organization of the mining industry to control over the actions of the highest generals. The Guard has always known its duty - it was brought up that way. It seemed to Peter that ideal model, focusing on which he dreamed of creating his own "regular" state - a clear, obedient, strong militarily, working smoothly and conscientiously. And the guards idolized their creator. And for good reason. It was not only about honors and privileges. Peter managed to inspire the Semenovites and Preobrazhenians with a sense of participation in the construction of a new state. The guardsman not only was, but also realized himself as a statesman. And this self-awareness, completely new for an ordinary Russian person, gave the Petrine guardsman extraordinary strength.

Sagittarius Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was also a patriot. But he stood for tradition, for the inviolability or slow evolution of the state life, merging for him with the life of the home, his ideal was the preservation of the life around him, its reference values. The Petrovsky Guardsman felt like a creator of something new and unprecedented. Unlike the archer, he was much less connected with everyday life. He was committed to the future. He lived with a feeling of constant impulse, movement, improvement. He was a man of reform as a life principle. It was this attitude and self-awareness, and not a shaved chin and a European uniform, that fundamentally distinguished the Peter's guardsman from the pre-Petrine soldier.

But before the founder and first colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment closed his eyes, his favorites in green uniforms turned into new Janissaries.

Perfectly equipped, exemplarily armed and trained guardsmen have always been the pride and support of the Russian throne. Their courage, steadfastness, selflessness many times decided the fate of battles, campaigns, entire wars in favor of Russian weapons.

But there is another, less heroic page in the annals of the imperial guard. The guardsmen, these handsome men, duelists, red tape, spoiled by the attention of metropolitan and provincial ladies, constituted a special privileged military unit of the Russian army with their own traditions, customs, and psychology. The main duty of the guard was to protect the peace and security of the autocrat, the royal family and the court. Standing on the clock outside and inside the royal palace, they saw the wrong side of court life. Favorites sneaked past them into the royal bedrooms, they heard gossip and saw ugly quarrels, without which the court could not live. The guardsmen did not experience reverent awe of the courtiers sparkling with gold and diamonds, they missed the magnificent ceremonies - for them all this was familiar, and they had their own, often impartial, opinion about everything.

It is also important that the guardsmen had an exaggerated idea of ​​their role in the life of the court, the capital, and Russia. Peter I created a force that throughout the 18th century acted as the main arbiter of the destinies of monarchs and pretenders to the throne. Guards regiments, noble in composition, were the closest support to the throne. They represented that real armed force at the court, which could contribute to both the enthronement and the deposition of kings. Therefore, the rulers tried in every possible way to enlist the support of the guard, showered her with signs of attention and favors. A special relationship was established between the guards and the monarch: the guards barracks and the royal palace were closely bound friend with a friend. Service in the guard was not profitable - it required a lot of money, but it opened up good career prospects, the road to political ambition and adventurism, so typical of the 18th century with its dizzying ups and downs of "random" people.

Nevertheless, it often turned out that the "fierce Russian Janissaries" could be successfully controlled. With flattery, promises, money, clever court businessmen were able to direct the red-hot stream of the Guards in the right direction, so that the mustachioed handsome men did not even suspect their miserable role as puppets in the hands of intriguers and adventurers. However, like a double-edged sword, the guard was also dangerous for those who used its services. Emperors and the first nobles often became hostages of an unbridled and capricious armed crowd of guardsmen. And this ominous role in Russian history of the guard was shrewdly understood by the French envoy in St. Petersburg, Jean Campredon, who wrote to his master Louis XV immediately after the accession to the throne of Catherine I: "The decision of the guard is the law here." And it was true, the 18th century went down in Russian history as the “age of palace coups”. And all these coups were made by the hands of the guards.

On January 28, 1725, the guardsmen played their political role for the first time in the drama of Russian history, immediately after the death of the first emperor, they brought the widow of Peter the Great to the throne, bypassing other heirs. This was the first independent performance of the guard as a political force.

When Catherine I fell dangerously ill in May 1727, officials of the highest government institutions gathered to resolve the issue of a successor: the Supreme Privy Council, the Senate, the Synod, and the presidents of the collegiums. Majors of the guards appeared among them, as if the guards officers constituted a special political corporation, without whose assistance such a situation could not be resolved. important question. Unlike other guard corporations - Roman Praetorians, Turkish Janissaries - the Russian Guard turned into political corporation.

The historian Klyuchevsky, who did not specifically deal with this issue, sensed the essence of the phenomenon. After giving a brief overview of the “epoch of palace coups” in a few sentences, he further formulates the fundamental provisions: “This participation of the guard in state affairs was of the utmost importance, having a powerful influence on its political mood. Initially an obedient tool in the hands of its leaders, it then becomes an independent mover of events, intervening in politics on its own initiative. The palace coups were a preparatory political school for her, developed in her certain political tastes, instilled in her a certain political way of thinking, created a mood. The Guards barracks is a counterbalance and sometimes an open opponent of the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council.

This is a wise passage. However, there is something to object to here. Firstly, the guards went through a certain political school under Peter. By the era of palace coups, she came already as a "political corporation." Her claims to resolve issues within the competence of government institutions - the Senate and the Supreme Council, were based on memories of the role that Peter assigned to her in the last decade of his reign, the role of a controlling and regulating force, accountable only to the king.

Secondly, it is unlikely that in 1725 and 1727 the Guard was an “obedient tool” in the hands of Menshikov and Buturlin. She was an "obedient instrument" - an ideal instrument - in the hands of her creator, and with his death immediately became a force in her own right. The guards followed Menshikov and Buturlin because their program at that moment was really organically close to the guards: Catherine appeared to the Preobrazhenians and Semenovites as a guarantor of literally following the plans of the first emperor.

The guard chose not just a reigning person, she chose a principle. Moreover, the guard did not choose between Peter the Great and pre-Petrine Russia, but it made its choice in January 1725 between two trends in the political reform of the country - a moderate but undeniable movement towards limiting the autocracy and the inevitable increase in freedom in the country, on the one hand, and further development and strengthening of the military-bureaucratic state based on total slavery, on the other hand.

Guards in 1725 chose the second option.

About the month of March and the role of the individual in history March 14, 12:57 I now live mainly in the sixteenth century, writing the third volume of my "History". This is the period when the role of the individual has grown to colossal proportions in Russia. The one and only - the sovereign of all Russia (the rest were his

Chapter 1 About the history of real, virtual, rational. On the role of personality in history. And about Stalin's main mistake. What should be considered the most significant in honest historical research? Lenin's niece, Olga Dmitrievna Ulyanova, told me that once