V. DYMARSKY: Good evening, dear listeners. On the air of "Echo of Moscow" is another program from the series "The Price of Victory" and we, its presenters, Dmitry Zakharov ...

D. ZAKHAROV: And Vitaly Dymarsky, as well as our guest today, the historian Mark Solonin, who recently published a book called "On peacefully sleeping airfields."

V. DYMARSKY: And the book itself, or rather, its content, will probably be the main topic of our today's program, which we have called: “June 22, 1941. On peacefully sleeping airfields. I want to say right away that the book is very fresh, just out of print, and as soon as we receive it, the publishing house promised to send it to us in the next few days, we will definitely play it among you, dear listeners, as it is with us happens from time to time. Answer the question correctly - and get Mark Solonin's book. Everything is very simple.

D. ZAKHAROV: I would add literally two words, which, in my opinion, is one of the most detailed analyzes of what happened on June 22 with our aviation, and there is nothing similar to this day either in our country or anywhere else I don't think it was published. This is an absolutely invaluable contribution to the history of our aviation.

V. DYMARSKY: Mark, by the way, good evening. We haven't heard your voice yet.

M. SOLONIN: Good evening.

V. DYMARSKY: I also have to remind our listeners that the on-air pager 725-66-33 is working, you can also send your SMS by phone +7 495 970-45-45. We are waiting for your questions, comments, remarks and whatever you want. Now we will talk with Mark Solonin, taking advantage of his stay in Moscow, this does not happen so often. And the plan of our program - as usual, somewhere in the second half with you, dear listeners, we will enter into a dialogue, into a direct conversation on the phones known to you, which we, of course, will remind you of, and at the end, as usual, “Portrait Gallery » Elena Syanova, today the hero of Elena is a person, perhaps not directly related to what we will talk about today.

D. ZAKHAROV: I would say indirectly related.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, it is indirectly connected with everything that happened in the Second World War. This is Sir Winston Churchill. Here is a portrait prepared for us today by Elena Syanova.

D. ZAKHAROV: I think that we will give the floor to Mark and go through the most fundamental theses, which make it possible to imagine what happened. Let's start, I think, with mythology.

M. SOLONIN: Well, mythology should be very well known to our listeners, readers and in general to all those who are curious, since the myth that Soviet aviation was defeated on the first day or even in the first half day, and according to some versions of this myth, in the first hours , he somehow turned out to be the most enduring of almost all those myths that were once created by Soviet historical propaganda, as we call it. Even in the latest books, the latest textbooks, where they are already embarrassed to repeat the previous conjectures about this multiple numerical superiority or about obsolete Soviet tanks ...

V. DYMARSKY: Numerical superiority of the Germans?

M. SOLONIN: Yes, German, Germans, of course. Nevertheless, this story continues to circulate about how they flew in, destroyed everything ...

D. ZAKHAROV: The Germans are evil.

M. SOLONIN: ... the Germans are angry on peacefully sleeping Soviet airfields, and it also happened that Viktor Suvorov, oddly enough, poured water on the same mill, he also has this idea of ​​\u200b\u200ba sudden, disarming, lightning strike, so the myth really deserved to be given to us ...

D. ZAKHAROV: Dissect.

M. SOLONIN: Yes. The preparation took more than six hundred pages. When I saw this book myself, I was scared how people would read it, but, however, the first edition of seven thousand had already been completely sold out, which means that you can somehow read it. This will be the second edition, which should be brought.

V. DYMARSKY: But the questions are already coming. Oleg Borisovich from Moscow thanks for the program and asks: “Thanks to Mark Solonin. Where can I buy the book?

M. SOLONIN: No, well, we are not busy selling books, so God forbid even getting involved in these discussions. There are shops, there are shops in Moscow. So, the traditional version was such that ... Why is the traditional one - it is continuous, this figure, and it goes that in the first hours of the war during a surprise attack ... and then 1200 and 800 go. This spell - 1200 and 800 - it goes through all absolutely books, that is, in the very first hours or on the first day, at least 1200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, including 800 on the ground. The figure is so big, it is impressive, it affects the imagination, and since, again, in old books, it was stated that we actually had 1,500 aircraft of new types, well, and some amount of some kind of junk, then, respectively , a person perceived this “well, there were 1500, 1200 were knocked out in the first hours, and the rest, probably, finished off by the evening.” So what's interesting? When you start to promote ... Well, it's clear that it's nonsense. At least where did it come from, what are they referring to? Well, thin books refer to thick ones, the thickest ones refer to several fundamental monographs. For example, there is a very solid monograph by Kozhevnikov known to specialists. Let's open it and take a look. Well, at the end of this book by Kozhevnikov there are several hundred or five hundred references to archival funds, but 1200 and 800 are given a link to the Aviation and Cosmonautics magazine. Another such, even closed at one time, monograph on aviation, on tactical and combat examples, again, references were made to some completely propaganda pamphlets, that is, the circle closed, you won’t find the ends, that is, it’s even unclear where this came from started. But even if for now we take these figures on faith, then after the balance of forces became known in general, general composition Soviet grouping, the myth began to fall apart already at this stage. Because if the Soviet military aviation had by the beginning of the war, in fact, 20 thousand combat aircraft, combat - I emphasize, if in the western theater of operations (theater of operations), that is, as part of the aviation of five border districts and two fleets - the Black Sea and the Baltic - it was at the very best -the most minimized that I could only bring and collect was about 7-7.5-8 thousand aircraft, then how could the destruction of one-eighth - one-seventh of this number be considered a disaster?

D. ZAKHAROV: Moreover, Mark, excuse me, a small note, those new types of aircraft that were produced by that time, the evil German bombers in the first hours, and on the first day, and even in the next week of the war, were not destroyed en masse, they remained and there were quite a few of them. But we'll talk about this later. In this case, I would return to the myth and to the real numbers.

V. DYMARSKY: What was the real ratio after all?

M. SOLONIN: The real ratio - well, we, in fact, once talked about it ... You see, what's the matter, to a large extent the answer depends on the methodological approach. Firstly, it is necessary to very clearly indicate the idea that a military aircraft is a consumable item. The number of military aviation is not the number of aircraft. Generally speaking, usually an aircraft simply does not live in combat conditions for more than one or two months. With intensive use, it is simply written off due to wear and tear of the elementary. The number of aviation is the number of aviation units, that is, squadrons, regiments, and the number of flight crews. The flight crew is the golden fund of aviation, that is what determines its numbers. Here is the most minimal estimate that I could give, the approximate following situation gives us that at the very beginning of hostilities we had 7200 flight crews in the western theater of operations, which was about 3.5 times more than the Luftwaffe had, and approximately the same ratio in the number of combat-ready squadrons. This is common across the front. If we look at those three army groups, how the Germans advanced - "North", "Center" and "South" - then the situation is as follows: the only place where there was their quantitative superiority, and the Soviet Air Force is minimal - this is Belarus, that is, the western front, the offensive zone of the German Army Group Center. And then, there our advantage in fighter crews was 1.5:1, in bomber crews 1.3:1. This is the same area, the most unfavorable for Soviet Union.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, there were as many as two German fighter divisions - the 51st and the 3rd.

M. SOLONIN: Quite right. In the “North” strip, that is, the Baltic Military District, the Baltic states, the ratio of fighter crews, well, that is, of fighter pilots, the aircraft were single-engine, it was 7:1, naturally, in our favor; bombers 4:1. In Ukraine, the ratio for fighters is 5.5:1 in favor of Soviet aviation, for bombers 4.5:1. Simply put, in order not to confuse listeners with all these figures, there was a huge overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force, and, what Soviet historiography always forgot, that the war does not develop in space and time. That is, if the Germans in the very first hours introduced literally everything they had at their disposal, and there was no reason to further practically increase their grouping, then those 80 air regiments that were directly part of four military districts, that is, the Baltic, Western, Ukraine - Kyiv and Odessa, accounted for about one third of all that Soviet military aviation had in general, that is, in the depths there was a huge grouping that was immediately transferred and transferred from east to west, especially since aviation, unlike all other branches armed forces, well, just by their very nature...

V. DYMARSKY: The most mobile.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, it can be moved in a few hours. For example, in the very first week or so, four air divisions were already transferred, and four air divisions at full strength - this will almost be about 1,500 aircraft and crews. In total, by the end of July, another 15 air divisions were deployed, that is, in fact, such a grouping was put into battle that corresponded in size to the original one, in addition to the fact that ready-made, completed formations were transferred, planes just went, just planes went in echelons. For example, the same Western Front, that is, Belarus, which suffered the greatest losses from this so-called "first disarming strike", only received 452 aircraft during June, the first week after the outbreak of hostilities. That is, those losses that were allegedly incurred, I emphasize that they were allegedly incurred, from the first German strike on airfields, were actually reimbursed in terms of equipment in a week, and since, I’m not too lazy to repeat once again, the aircraft is a consumable, and the basis aviation are pilots, then here, in general, the losses were minimal, such is the very nature of this most notorious strike on airfields. Even in the best, most successful scenario for the attacker, equipment is destroyed, pieces of iron are broken, and the base, that is, pilots, flight personnel, as a rule, remains intact.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, and if they die, then the technical staff, and then not numerous, who did not have time to reach the dug cracks.

M. SOLONIN: As a matter of fact, even the official version never hinted at or tried to assert that there were any big losses in the personnel of the flight crew, first of all.

D. ZAKHAROV: Mark, here another myth arises, which is always circulating with us, that our pilots ...

M. SOLONIN: Oh, yes. Six hours on the "box". This is a terrible thing, and for some reason it is even amplified in publications recent years. Maybe because it remains, so to speak, the last line of defense, there is nothing more to grab onto, and these “six hours on the“ box ”, untrained pilots, have not flown all winter” and so on.

V. DYMARSKY: Mark, if we go back to technology. Didn't it happen that this quantitative superiority of our technology and thus the quantitative deficit of the German one was compensated by technical superiority, that is, qualitative, qualitative parameters, qualitative indicators of the German aviation technology?

M. SOLONIN: Vitaly, I will be happy to answer, but, as they say, first one topic, and we will definitely note it. So, about untrained boys with six hours on the "box".

D. ZAKHAROV: Before the war.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, before the war. First, I will name one figure that is worth keeping in mind. 84 thousand sorties. 84 thousand sorties were carried out by the Soviet Air Force only during the Finnish war, that is, December 1939, January-February 1940. 84 thousand sorties. Is it a lot or a little? I answer. This is more than all the Luftwaffe sorties during the defeat of France, plus all the Luftwaffe sorties during the Battle of Britain. That is the whole of 1940. A larger air operation than the Soviet air attack on Finland in 1939-40. during this Winter War, there was none at all. What are six hours in a box if 84,000 sorties were flown? 3000 Soviet pilots at the time of the outbreak of the war had a real personal experience participation in hostilities.

V. DYMARSKY: Is it Finland and Spain?

M. SOLONIN: Of course, this is Spain, this is Khalkhin Gol, this is China. In fact, when you open any memoirs, any memoirs, or even any kind of document, we see that, say, from the level of a squadron commander, regiment commander, and sometimes a flight commander in those units that were, especially in the western districts , it was a man already with the Order of the Red Star or with the Heroic Star, who fought in Spain, fought at Khalkhin Gol, fought in Finland, on the one hand. On the other hand, when, well, it is quite rightly noted that the Luftwaffe has accumulated at least two years of experience in modern warfare, this is absolutely true, after 1939, plus the same Spain, while for some reason they always forget what kind of experience is needed to pay. You have to pay for education. In civilian life, they pay with money to the cashier or not to the cashier, but in war they pay differently. The Germans lost by the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, that is, by June 1941, I would not even be too lazy to give the exact figure, from September 1, that is, from the beginning of the Second World War, to June 22, 1941, the loss of flying, I emphasize, flying, not the technical, non-servant, flight personnel of the Luftwaffe amounted to 18 thousand 533 people, including 13 thousand 505 irretrievably, that is, they were killed, and 4998 wounded, and not every wounded after the hospital can again sit in the cockpit. It is already clear that this, of course, is a monstrous amount, but if we compare this with the initial number of Luftwaffe pilots, which was at the time of the start of the world war, then we get complete equality. Strictly speaking, how many there were - they were all knocked out. Well, this, of course, does not happen, the most tenacious survived, but, in general, the irretrievable losses of the flight personnel by the time the war with the Soviet Union began had already caught up with the original number. The question arises: who fought then? Those few who were lucky and became an ace fought, plus a huge number of those very untrained boys, pupils only not of the Komsomol, but of the Hitler Youth, who arrived to fight with minimal flying time, minimal experience.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, here I would object a little, Mark, because before the war they had a minimum flying time and up to 1943 inclusive, they still had 200 hours.

M. SOLONIN: And I will object to that. This is true, this is all true, but simply, as they say, all this must be brought into a certain framework of reality. For example, on the first day of the war on June 22, I just looked at a sign, a very interesting document, the losses of the Luftwaffe on the first day of the war, that’s just one group, now I won’t give a long German name, one fighter group, which was training, they defeated 7 aircraft for the first day of the war alone, crashed on takeoff and landing.

V. DYMARSKY: That is, not that they were shot down, but for technical reasons?

M. SOLONIN: Yes. And here we are smoothly moving on to what you, Vitaly, were talking about - about quality.

D. ZAKHAROV: About quality and accident rate.

M. SOLONIN: The fact that the Messerschmitt fought - it fought not only because the boys were not sufficiently trained. He was generally a good aircraft, but not without many shortcomings. In particular, one of the fatal, in principle, shortcomings in the design of this aircraft, and, generally speaking, this aircraft was born in 1935, although it is stubbornly called the newest, its year of birth was the same as that of the Ishak ", it had a certain chassis design, which resulted in a very narrow gauge plus poor visibility, so the Messerschmitts fought just fine on takeoff.

D. ZAKHAROV: And on landing too.

M. SOLONIN: Both on takeoff and on landing they fought wonderfully. Well, this is a private moment, as far as the Messerschmitt itself is concerned. As far as a serious comparison of analysis is concerned, comparative analysis the combat capabilities of the Soviet and German aviation at the beginning of the war, then I probably spent 200 or 250 pages of the book on this.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, the age-old thesis, again, from the category of mythology, the I-16 was such an outdated aircraft that the Messerschmitt immediately shot it and the unfortunate plywood fell.

V. DYMARSKY: Dim, I’ll read out to you, as it were, a question that came from Moscow from Valery and Olga, who write to us: “At the beginning of the war, our fighter aviation in the form of I-15 and I-16 was actually plywood. And what can we talk about? The pilot had no protection. We took, as always, by mass, and not by skill.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, mass by mass, nevertheless, there was armor protection on the I-16. One of the listeners reproached me for allegedly asserting that at the beginning of the war our fighters had no guns. I couldn’t say such nonsense simply by definition, because there were I-16s with guns, and all the so-called new ones, except for the MiG-3, had 20-mm guns. This accusation is beyond my ignorance.

M. SOLONIN: So, with all my might, I resisted discussing aviation technical problems on the air, by ear, but both the hosts and the listeners strongly want to drive me into this rut.

D. ZAKHAROV: Here is a small remark. Mark, in addition to being a historian, is also an aeronautical engineer. Go on.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, the absolute truth. Well, then, about plywood - in the booklet he specifically gave a detailed retelling of the structural power schemes and the materials used in all types and models of Soviet military aviation at the time of the start of the war. From the fact that the plane is made of plywood... Well, gentlemen, I don't understand how it is possible to discuss the issue of structural power scheme live. They are different, based on what it is chosen, such is the material. Generally speaking, that plywood sheet, that tarpaulin sheathing, that 2-mm, say, duralumin sheet - for any aircraft machine gun, this is the same as empty space, it is still empty space.

V. DYMARSKY: Like a piece of paper.

M. SOLONIN: What a sheet of paper. Even an ordinary Kalashnikov assault rifle, as each of you should know from elementary military training, pierces a steel rail, and even an aircraft machine gun of even the smallest rifle caliber, I repeat once again that the aluminum sheet on the Messerschmitt, that the plywood sheathing on the I-16 is simply nothing. Protection is created or not created for the pilot by an armored back, which appeared on the I-16, as Dmitry Zakharov quite rightly said, earlier than on the Messerschmitt, which was of sufficient quality and even held a large-caliber 12-mm machine gun. The second point of protection is the choice of the type of engine cooling - air or liquid. It was the Soviet obsolete so-called "Ishaks" - "I-16", "I-153" - that had an air engine, that is, such a star-shaped one with a blunt nose that could withstand several direct hits and flew with several broken cylinders. While the liquid-cooled engines that were on all Messerschmitts and almost all, with very few exceptions, German bombers, well, except for the Darnier-17, which was very small, as any car enthusiast should know, the first a hole in the radiator, the very first leak from the tube - and that's it, after two or three minutes the engine wedges. Therefore, from the point of view of combat survivability, the I-16, of course, surpassed the Messerschmitt. But this is where we will end our attempts to discuss military-technical issues and give a much clearer and simpler example.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, good.

M. SOLONIN: Dima understands what I want to say because he has read the book. This is an example of French aviation. Fighter aviation France in May 1940, when the battle began in France, she flew aircraft, the best of which

D. ZAKHAROV: "Devuatin-520".

M. SOLONIN: Yes, maybe it was a little better than the Ishak, and the bulk, this same Moran-Saulnier-406, was still worse than the Ishak. There are six hundred French fighter pilots on these planes, and we had at least 3.5 thousand fighters only in the western districts only at the very moment the war began, fighters are human fighters, not fighter aircraft, that is, it turns out about six times more, they filled one and a half times more German aircraft, and I give a breakdown there by day, by week, that is, at each stage - the losses of the first day of the Luftwaffe in France in May 1940, here are the losses on June 22, here are the losses for the first week, here are the losses for the first two weeks. That is, the French, who were six times less, who flew on the same, if you can call it old trash, like our "Donkeys", filled one and a half times more German aircraft.

D. ZAKHAROV: This is despite the fact that the French had no previous combat experience.

M. SOLONIN: Absolutely. All the same, ours flew at Khalkhin Gol, ours flew in Spain, and the French did not fly anywhere. There is an even more interesting example. This is a very interesting example - this is the military aviation of Finland. The Finns flew, this is generally a terrible case, what the Finns flew on ...

D. ZAKHAROV: To the Gloucester Gladiator.

M. SOLONIN: At the beginning of the war, the Finns were already the second, with the Soviet Union, now I’m naming from memory, about 156 fighters, six aircraft different types, there were English "Hurricanes", English "Gladiators", French "Morans", American "Hawk", American "Brewster", Italian "Fiat" ... Who else have we missed? Ah, the Fokker.

D. ZAKHAROV: Fokker-21, don't confuse it with the Focke-Wulf.

M. SOLONIN: Yes, of course, it was a Dutch Fokker-21 with a non-retractable landing gear, in comparison with which our Ishak was simply the height of perfection. On these planes, Finnish pilots shot down Soviet planes in a ratio of 18:1 throughout the war. The best Finnish ace, but a very long Finnish surname, I am not able to learn it by heart, he shot down 99 aircraft, not counting the German aces, this is the most productive ace of the Second World War. Recently, Zefirov’s book came out and there are two pages, just a sign - just look at it and, let’s say, everything will become clear to a thinking person, and there is a list of victories of this hottest Finnish guy who flew off the whole war until 1944, until Messerschmitt appeared on it, flew off on an American Brewster, this is an aircraft of the type and level of our Ishak with a rifle machine gun, not a cannon, and on this Brewster, just a sign - “date”, “place”, “ shot down", he beat everything, he beat our "Ishaks", beat "MiGs", "Yaks", "Hurricanes", "Cobras", at the end of the war he already beat what he came across, that's what he beat. And this table alone is a sufficient illustration of the fact that, on the basis of what I was taught at the institute, I am trying to somehow analyze clearly enough and show that in order for a skilled, trained and willing to fight pilot to achieve victory in combat, his aircraft, which he flies, must be in a certain range of tolerance. Yes, of course, if he flies on the "corn" with a slingshot - well, nothing will work on the "corn" with a slingshot. In all other respects, the best aircraft wins the one with the best pilot in the cockpit. This formula has been universal since World War I to this day.

D. ZAKHAROV: But from this, Mark, we can draw two conclusions. The first is that the German pilots were still much better than ours on June 22, despite the combat experience of our pilots.

V. DYMARSKY: How can this be explained?

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, study, study. They had a three-level school, I won't go into it now, but they were taught very well. When I was making the film, I reviewed 80 hours of the German chronicle. They had everything - there were pressure chambers, there were centrifuges where the pilot was twisted, there was very thorough preparation. This is the first. And the second. The French pilots, not to mention the English ones that they encountered in 1940, were also very well trained, despite their lack of combat experience, because otherwise they would not have struck the Luftwaffe ...

V. DYMARSKY: Excuse me, Dima, Mark, but I still think that we are approaching here, as it were, the key issue of our conversation. If this is all as you describe, the quantitative superiority of the Soviet Air Force, the qualitative superiority - even though Dima says that they are better trained, nevertheless, ours, too, as they say, are not born, already had sufficient combat training, went through fighting. How then to explain the catastrophe that occurred on June 22, 1941? Now let's get to the main point.

D. ZAKHAROV: The question is inescapable, I would say.

M. SOLONIN: The question is inescapable. To this question, it seems to me, there is a quite sufficient, if not exhaustive, answer. It consists in the fact that where the war was going on, the Germans were quite beaten there.

D. ZAKHAROV: Sorry, we missed one more thing. Let's just close this topic about the Fokker-21, in which the chassis stuck out and did not retract, about combat use. Dutch pilots, how many there were, 50 people, they stuffed for ...

M. SOLONIN: Yes, in one day, 150 German transport workers.

D. ZAKHAROV: On planes that we considered not only hopelessly outdated, but made during the time of Pharaoh Tutankhamun. Everyone, Mark, I'm sorry.

V. DYMARSKY: So, after all, the answer to the main question?

M. SOLONIN: The answer to the main question. Soviet aviation was swept away and crushed by the rampart of the fleeing Red Army. In short, this answer should be given as follows. Therefore, where this shaft of the fleeing Red Army was strong, it was primarily the Western Front and the North-Western, that is, the Baltic states and Belarus, and there this effect of crushing aviation by the fleeing army was the strongest ...

V. DYMARSKY: Is this an image, Mark, if I understand correctly? After all, a fleeing army, it does not run through the skies, and even if it runs through the ground, it cannot crush planes, so you will expand this image in a more concrete form.

M. SOLONIN: In a more concrete form…

D. ZAKHAROV: How many planes were actually destroyed on the ground? A little.

M. SOLONIN: I see. in a more concrete way. It can be traced literally in separate regiments, in separate divisions - in the book I describe this in detail, as far as I could gather from the available information, not only by days, by hours - in the first hours of the war, air battles began, which in general, although this is probably , it will seem very strange to our listeners, we passed, if I may say so, in a sporting way, I beg your pardon, in a draw, that is, there were minimal losses on both sides. Let's just say that an ordinary regiment, a fighter aviation regiment lost two or three aircraft during the day in the air, shot down two or three German aircraft, and now there is an opportunity to compare and contrast the reports of Soviet pilots with the losses that are reflected in German documents, I show it there - a normal standard threefold overestimation, this is normal. That is, if the 127th Fighter Aviation Regiment, this is our best regiment, which reported that it completed 180 sorties and shot down 20 German aircraft, we take and see that in the area of ​​​​the city of Grodno, where this regiment fought, German documents record the loss of seven aircraft.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, this is very good.

M. SOLONIN: This is very good, this is a standard threefold overestimation, it was in all aviation. Well, this is a certain standard, connected, we will not even go into what now. Here is a regiment that actively fought, nothing terrible happened to it in the air, seven Germans were shot down, which was confirmed by the Germans, they lost seven of their pilots, people died with the death of the brave, they completed 180 sorties, which is a lot. The Germans could not even find their airfield. Not only to bomb - they could not find it. And only in the evening, somewhere around 7-8 pm, they finally found this airfield, tried to bomb it, which, of course, did not work, because bombing the plane on which the aviation regiment is based is the same that poking a hornet's nest with a stick, at best, you will have time to escape. Here is the 127th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which fought. What happens after that? As far as the Western Military District is concerned, miracles generally took place there. Miracles occurred in Belarus, which have long been identified, but their cause is still not clear. In particular, in the 122nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, adjacent to the 127th, on the evening of June 21, high authorities arrived at the regiment, including the commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, the commander of the 11th mixed air division, and weapons were dismantled from the aircraft.

D. ZAKHAROV: Filmed, in Russian speaking.

V. DYMARSKY: It was called sabotage in those days.

M. SOLONIN: I have no answer to this question, there is only the fact that on the evening of June 21, weapons were removed from aircraft, and not some kind of suspension, which is removed, hung up, unscrewed from the wing, pulled out, cut off bloody hands, pulled out these most cannons and machine guns. This is Grodno. On the other flank of the Western Front, that is, in the Brest region, the 10th mixed air division was stationed there. On June 20, it, like all other Soviet air divisions, received another order to bring the units to full combat readiness - this is about the question of surprise - about the cancellation of all holidays, about concentrating flight crews in the airfield area, and so on, and at 6 pm on June 21, that is, in fact, at the same time when the 122nd air regiment was disarmed near Grodno, as Belov, the division commander, writes in his memoirs, he received an order to cancel the order of June 20 to cancel holidays , that is, again, let everyone go for a walk. Belov claims that he did not even begin to bring such a wild order to the attention of personnel However, strange things were happening. Equally strange things, of course, began to happen after the outbreak of hostilities, that is, on the evening of June 22, it seems that there really was a certain order, according to which the flight crew got into cars and left right up to the city of Balbasovo, and the city of Balbasovo is behind Orsha, about 700 km from the border. The equipment was simply abandoned, the flight crew departed, approximately if the same distance to the west, this is beyond Berlin. What it was is hard to say.

D. ZAKHAROV: Moreover, it was everywhere, I mean the Western Front…

V. DYMARSKY: And Northwestern.

M. SOLONIN: Unfortunately, I don’t have an answer yet, what took place here - there was a real flight that began, which was issued or not issued by order, or did such an order really take place, and it’s hard to find the ends, because the commander He was shot by the Western Front, the Chief of Staff of the Western Front was shot, the commander of the Air Force of the Western Front shot himself, the commander of the 11th division, where the planes were disarmed, Ganichev, died under rather strange circumstances - the Germans flew into the Lida airfield and fired at him, air shelling, planes flew; as a result of the air attack, not a single aircraft was injured, not a single private or junior commander was injured, but the division commander, his deputy, was killed. There are such miracles.

D. ZAKHAROV: Time is running, Mark, I want you to complete this thought. That is, in fact, the whole combat-ready equipment was abandoned in huge quantities on June 22 and, in Russian speaking, a global drape from airfields began?

M. SOLONIN: A global drapery from airfields has begun, attempts have begun to relocate, but relocation ...

D. ZAKHAROV: In quotation marks.

M. SOLONIN: No, they started, maybe even... I'm trying to soften it. Perhaps there were attempts at real relocation, but real relocation is a rather complicated operation, and since they tried to do it in the conditions of complete collapse and chaos in general at all levels of the military leadership, the attempt to relocate aviation turned into relocation in quotation marks, that is, it really was thrown. Without going into all those particular examples that make up this picture, which can be read, those who wish can read, I want to illustrate this from the other end. Let's look at what happened where this very redeployment, associated with the panicked retreat of the army as such, did not take place. Well, what is it? This, for example, Baltic Fleet. On the Hanko peninsula, that is, on the territory of Finland, under the agreement it then went to the Soviet Union, there was a naval air base. That is, the Soviet fighter aviation regiment from the KBF Air Force, the Baltic Fleet, really stood at a distance not only of a cannon, but in certain places even of a machine-gun shot. According to the logic that Suvorov continued interestingly after Soviet historians, this regiment was supposed to disappear in the very first hours. Nevertheless, this regiment successfully fought until the fall, fought on the "Ishaks", on the "I-16", became one of the first guards ...

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, they had I-16s, in my opinion, until 1943.

M. SOLONIN: Quite right. And until January 1943, this regiment successfully fought and beat the Germans, the "road of life" on Lake Ladoga on these same "Donkeys". Moreover, in one of the months of this struggle over the Ledyanaya highway, they shot down 54 German ones at the cost of losing two of their Ishaks. The northern front, that is, near Murmansk, where there was no retreat, was lost there, for example, on the ground 8 aircraft for the entire month of June. The situation is the same in Moldova, where until June 2 there was no movement of the enemy at all.

V. DYMARSKY: Mark, I’m sorry, I’ll interrupt you, I understand that you have a lot of material, facts, but our listeners will simply be offended if we don’t give them the floor both live and on the questions that we were asked . Let me read a few. If possible, very briefly, here on the repressions before the war, how did they affect what happened in June 1941?

M. SOLONIN: I'll make it very short, I'll just read the list. Within a month from the end of May, just this month before the war, the following were repressed: Deputy People's Commissar for Defense of the entire Soviet Union Meletskov, People's Commissar for Armaments, People's Commissar for Ammunition, three Air Force commanders in succession, one after another, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the head of the Main Air Defense Directorate, the commander Air Force of the Far Eastern Front, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Front, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the North-Western Front, Commander of the Air Force of the North-Western Front, one commander of the Air Force of the Western Front shot himself, another was arrested, Commander of the Air Force of the South-Western Front, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the South-Western Front, Air Force Commander of the Moscow Military District, Air Force Commanders of the Oryol and Volga Military Districts, Head of the Air Force Research Institute Filin, Head of the Air Force Research Institute. After such a list, the only question is: after that, who could lead aviation at all? And all this was destroyed in a month and a half.

V. DYMARSKY: I see. Here, for some reason, they sent us a question several times with a request to tell us about the aircraft designer Gurevich, but today we will not take aircraft designers.

M. SOLONIN: Unfortunately, we will not have time, although a lot of time is devoted to it in the book.

V. DYMARSKY: Here many more times we are asked about various events of the Second World War, when we will cover them. We will when the time comes. We are asked about 1943, of course, we are still in 1941, we have not even gone beyond the summer of 1941. We still have literally four minutes, maybe we will have time to take a couple of calls. 783-90-25 Moscow, 783-90-26 other cities. We hear you, good evening.

LISTENER: Hello. Andrey Aganovsky, Moscow. First. How can you explain that until December 1944 the professional training of the Luftwaffe was much higher than the professional training of the pilots of the Red Army Air Force? Second. How can you explain that for seven sorties on the Il-2, on the orders of Stalin on July 7, 1941, they gave the Hero of the Soviet Union?

V. DYMARSKY: Thank you.

M. SOLONIN: I can’t answer, because, firstly, I’m not sure about this fact and I still can’t imagine the system of quantitative objective criteria by which we could weigh what was the level of training, let’s say, in the same 1944 with the bulk of the flight personnel of the Luftwaffe and the Red Army Air Force. As for the seven sorties, then, of course, not seven, but much more, and I quote this order in the book, it is also not on July 7, but a little later. How to explain? And the fact that no one manages to fly a lot, both Soviet and German. In a war, flying combat sorties 20 times is already a lot.

D. ZAKHAROV: I would add a little to Mark. Indeed, until 1944, two hundred hours was the norm during the training of German pilots, two hundred hours a year, and, accordingly, the tactics and the level of teaching were very high. Then, of course, all instructors and teachers were taken away from flight schools, with the ensuing consequences. As for the number of sorties that people survived, some of the German pilots survived more than a thousand, and Hans-Ulrich Rudel - more than two thousand sorties.

M. SOLONIN: However, the majority did not experience more than five.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, of course.

V. DYMARSKY: Hello, we are listening to you.

LISTENER: Good evening. Konstantin from Shchelkovo. I wanted to clarify a few things. Zhukov in his book reports that the war found the Air Force of the Soviet Union in the process of rearmament, that is, there were 20-25% of new aircraft.

V. DYMARSKY: Thank you, Konstantin.

M. SOLONIN: Any aviation at any moment is in the process of re-equipment. The same Frenchmen I spoke about, with the same Devuatin-520, literally first appeared in aviation in April 1940, on May 10 hostilities had already begun, by that time there were 36 of them ...

D. ZAKHAROV: 36 in total! Against the entire Luftwaffe!

M. SOLONIN: Yes, by the end of hostilities, which came in mid-June, the aviation industry transferred 300 French aircraft to aviation, and nevertheless, the French managed to do it in a few days - rearmament literally took place during hostilities - some pilots flew out, making it two or three sorties, while they shot down 108 German aircraft on the Devuatins, losing about 54 of their own, that is, the ratio was 2: 1.

D. ZAKHAROV: For how long?

M. SOLONIN: In a month and a half, even less. Any military aviation was continuously re-equipped. At any moment, which you do not poke, it was the moment of her rearmament.

D. ZAKHAROV: No, the Dutch did not rearm, they flew on the "lappet" ...

M. SOLONIN: Well, they fought for seven days, such was the fate of the Dutch aviation.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, and they shot down 150 German planes.

V. DYMARSKY: That's it, we, unfortunately, do not have time to receive a single call, we, of course, started talking.

D. ZAKHAROV: The topic is painfully interesting.

V. DYMARSKY: The topic is interesting, but it is never-ending. I would also answer Andrei, who asks for the details of the book. Mark Solonin is the author, the book is called “On peacefully sleeping airfields. June 22, 1941”, Moscow, Yauza Eksmo publishing house, 2006.

D. ZAKHAROV: Two words literally for "portrait". Why Winston Churchill? This prime minister did not teach his designers how to build airplanes.

V. DYMARSKY: Winston Churchill.

"PORTRAIT GALLERY" ELENA SIANOVA

At the very end of the autumn of 1874, in the midst of one of the high-society balls, Lord Randolph's wife Lady Jenny suddenly felt labor pains and barely managed to take refuge in the ladies' room. “He slipped out from under my corset like a small fish,” she joked later this seven-month-old, extremely unsympathetic baby was named Winston Leonard Spencer. And despite the wealth and nobility of the Marlborough family to which he belonged, fate, it would seem, doomed him to a completely ordinary existence. No abilities, not a single expressed interest, except for sea battles in a large basin, dislike of peers, laziness, negligence in everything, no matter what he undertakes. In our slang for young Winston there is a suitable word: "don't give a damn." Parents complained that they simply did not know what to do with "their useless Winnie", who, however, was very much loved. It was decided to give the boy to military school. A curious fact: before the exams, Winston fell from a tree and received a severe concussion, after which something seemed to fall into place in his head. His youth is a period of fearless searches and self-affirmation, military campaigns, romance novels , pen tests and oratory skills. This is worth reading in his numerous biographies. At the age of 26, Churchill tastes the main business of his life - politics. He becomes a member of parliament. Eight years later - the Minister of Trade, and after another three years - the First Lord of the Admiralty, in our opinion the commander of the navy. It was his dream. Naval battles in the basin on the floor of the nursery were transformed into a happy reality, however, now the picture was different: if Winnie fought only with boats, then Sir Winston planned grandiose air battles over naval battles. Strong naval aviation was his "fix idea". Around the same time, Churchill got married and acquired most of his future famous habits - cigars, Armenian cognac, marital fidelity, household chores that require regular physical activity, the ability to communicate with small children. Churchill was always distinguished by an amazing breadth of interests and a variety of activities, which cannot be said about his political convictions. A conservative, a patriot, an anti-communist to the tips of his nails - three pillars on which he stood. At the same time, it is amusing that his numerous relatives also showed firmness of conviction, but often in the enemy camp. For example, nephew Esmond Romilly was a communist and fought in Spain, and a second cousin, the sculptor Claire Sheridan, almost married the Chekist Jan Peters and always remained a militant opponent of traditional bourgeois values. It was to these British values, traditions and foundations dear to the heart, that Prime Minister Churchill appealed to the nation when waves of Lufstaffe bombers began to roll on the island. The superiority of the British in the air is one of Churchill's unconditional merits. The Germans made an average of a thousand sorties a day, and although Britain's air defense was at its best, and the losses of the Air Force were half that of the Germans, Britain still tasted the taste of modern warfare and really felt the threat of losing its state independence. “I have nothing to offer you but blood, sweat and tears,” Churchill said bluntly to his compatriots. What is our goal, you ask? I will answer in one word: victory. Victory at any cost, victory in spite of everything, victory, no matter how hard the path to it. If we do not win, we will have to say goodbye to our way of life.” I have always been interested in the question: if in 1940 Hitler still decided to throw his 25 divisions into the British Isles, cut off London, in a word, launch Operation Sea Lion, what would be the price of a British victory then? Based on what terrible weeks Churchill experienced in the late autumn of 1941, how mortally afraid and unwilling he was to defeat the Red Army near Moscow, then I think that for the victory over Hitler he really was ready to pay any price.

V. DYMARSKY: We have literally 10 seconds left to say goodbye to you, dear listeners, and to thank Mark Solonin for participating in our program. We will meet in a week, but we will not let Mark Solonin go like that, because we plan that in two weeks, on June 26, we will meet again. See you.

D. ZAKHAROV: All the best.

M. SOLONIN: All the best, success.

What happened on June 22, 1941? Let us turn to the events of that day and begin with the picture that German sources paint for us.

"June 22, 1941. 3.20 am. A little more - and the rising sun will dry up the dew ... on the wings of the fighters of the 23rd Air Force Division, lined up at the airfield near Rovno ... Suddenly, a dull roar of engines broke the silence. ... slipped out from the west three planes, crossed the border of the airfield at a strafing flight and rushed to the long lines of fighters.A second later ... a shower of two-kilogram fragmentation bombs poured from their belly, ... bombs whistled down and exploded among the standing fighters. Hot fragments crashed into the wings and fuselages, pierced gas tanks... Streams of burning gasoline flooded one fighter after another.A thick cloud of oily smoke swirled and grew over the airfield.

Three Heinkel-111s of the 53rd Bombardment Squadron... turned around and passed over the airfield once more, pouring machine-gun fire over the flaming wreckage. Then, having completed their task, they went west, while the stunned pilots jumped out of their beds. In less than 2 minutes, the 23rd Air Force Division as a combat unit ceased to exist, without having had time to fire a single shot in its defense. The division commander, Colonel Vanyushkin, stood among the rubble and wept. ... By noon on June 22, the Soviet Air Force lost 1200 aircraft: 300 were shot down in air battles, and 900 were destroyed at airfields ... "(Military pilots, pp. 58-59).

"... thanks to extensive photographic reconnaissance, carried out mainly by Colonel Rovel's Aufklaringsgruppe in the previous months, all air force bases were discovered. They came under attack by Ju-88 and He-111, while Bf-110 and carrying Bf-109 bombs.The few Soviet fighters that took to the air were easily destroyed.On this day, with the loss of only 32 aircraft, the Luftwaffe destroyed 1811 Soviet aircraft, almost all of them, except 322, were destroyed on the ground.

On the central and southern fronts, from June 22 to June 28, 1570 and 1360 Soviet aircraft were destroyed. The 1st Air Fleet (Army Group North, HQ Insterburg, East Prussia) announced 1,211 air and 487 ground kills from 22 June to 13 July 1941. ...these claims were no doubt exaggerated, but there is no doubt that Soviet losses were enormous (Hitler's Luftwaffe, p. 41).

"As a result of these unexpected blows air force Western districts on the first day of the war lost about 1,200 aircraft, including 800 that were destroyed on airfields. The editor writes in a footnote: “the Germans declared (for the entire front) about 322 aircraft destroyed in the air and 1,489 on the ground. Part of this discrepancy in the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground is due to the fact that some aircraft could be considered repairable, but many of them were lost when German troops took over the airfields.

Airfields (Tarnovo and Dolyubovo) located right on the border were fired upon by German long-range artillery (Luftwaffe, p. 239).

... "It was early Sunday morning and many soldiers were on leave," said Colonel Vanyushkin, commander of the 23rd Air Division, later taken prisoner [That Vanyushkin again! - E.K.]. With Russian proverbial nonchalance ... both old and new types stood together in uncamouflaged rows..." (Becker, p. 312-313).

The effect of the surprise attack on Soviet airfields was devastating. ... 4-pound fragmentation bombs ....

... "We could hardly believe our eyes," reported Captain Hans von Hahn, commander of I/JG3 operating in the Lvov area. "Row after row of scouts, bombers and fighters stood in lines as if on parade. We were surprised at the number of airfields and aircraft that the Russians were preparing against us" (Becker, p. 313).

In the sector of the 2nd Air Fleet near Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet squadron, which was trying to take off, was bombed at the moment of takeoff. Later it turned out that the perimeter of the airfield was littered with burnt debris (Becker, p. 314).

..."SD2 - fragmentation bombs, nicknamed the "devil's egg", which were on the secret list, are now dropped for the first time in large quantities. Only 4 pounds in weight, they were equipped with small stabilizers and were originally intended to attack infantry from the air With fuses triggered either on impact with the ground or above the ground, the result of the explosion was the scattering of 50 large and 250 smaller fragments of shrapnel at a distance of 12-13 meters (ibid.).

1811 aircraft destroyed: 322 in the air: 1489 - on the ground. ...for Goering, commander of the Luftwaffe, the results seemed so incredible that he ordered them to be secretly checked. For several days, officers of his headquarters traveled through the captured airfields, counting the burned-out wreckage of Russian aircraft. The result was even more stunning, the total number exceeded 2000. ... in the Western District sector, 528 vehicles were destroyed on the ground and 210 in the air (Becker, p. 317).

The German pilot Heinz Knock tells about his first sortie on June 22, after the war he wrote a book of memoirs "I flew for the Fuhrer" based on his diary entries. (The commenter apologizes to readers for quoting this rather odious document without cuts). Although this excerpt tells of a raid on the headquarters of one of the armies of the Baltic district, there can hardly be any doubt that the same thing happened that day over the airfields:

04:00: Alert to all staffers. The airport is bustling with life. All night I hear the distant hum of tanks and vehicles. We are located just a few kilometers from the border.

04:30: All crews gathered in the operating room for a briefing. Our commander, Captain Woitke, is reading the Führer's Special Order to all armed forces.

05:00: We take off and join the fight. In our staffel, 4 aircraft, including mine, were equipped with bombers, and over the past few weeks I have been intensively practicing bombing. Now under the belly of my good "Emil" (Bf 109E - "Emil") there are mounts for hundreds of 2-kg fragmentation bombs. I will gladly throw them to Ivan under his dirty feet.

Flying low over the wide plains, we spot endless German columns rolling east. Groups of bombers above us and frightening-looking Stuka dive-bombers at the same height as us are flying in the same direction. We have to attack from a strafing flight one of the Russian headquarters, located in the forests to the west of Druskininkai.

On Russian territory, on the contrary, everything seems to be asleep. We find the headquarters and fly over the wooden buildings, but we do not see a single Russian soldier. I swoop down on one of the barracks and press the bomb release button. I distinctly feel how the plane, getting rid of the load, bounces up.

Others are dropping their load too. Huge masses of earth rise into the air in fountains and for some time we cannot see anything because of the smoke and dust.

One of the barracks is burning furiously. The camouflage was torn off the cars standing nearby, and they themselves were overturned by the explosion. Finally, the Ivans woke up. The scene below resembles a torn anthill, below everyone is fussing in confusion. Stalin's stepsons in their underwear seek shelter in the forest. Anti-aircraft gunners start shooting at us. I take aim at one of them and open fire with cannon and machine guns. Ivan, who fired a cannon in only his underwear, falls to the ground.

And now for the next one!

One more turn and I'll treat you to lead. The Russians quickly jump up and fire back. "Well, wait, now it's my turn to have some fun, bastards!"

I turn for a new attack.

I have never shot as accurately as today. I descend to a height of two meters, almost cutting off the tops of the trees. Then I pull the control stick sharply towards me. My Ivans lie prone near their guns. One of them jumps to his feet and rushes towards the trees. The rest continue to lie.

I do five or six more passes. We circle the camp like wasps. Almost all barracks are on fire. I'm shooting at the truck. It lights up after the first turn.

05:56: Flight in formation.

The commander sees our laughing faces during the report.

The spell is finally broken. We have long dreamed of doing something similar to the Bolsheviks. We feel not so much hatred as extreme contempt. It is a real pleasure for us to trample the Bolsheviks into the mud from which they have grown" (Knoke, p.44-46).

Commander of the German bombers, General Werner Baumbach:

"... in 24 hours, 1817 Russian aircraft were destroyed, of which 1498 were on the ground, 322 were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft fire. Goering refused to believe these figures and sent special units to explore the airfields, which in the meantime had been captured by the army. They counted the wreckage of 2000 Russians airplanes" (Paul, p. 219).

"... in total there are 12,000-15,000 Soviet aircraft, of which 7,000 were concentrated in the western districts and in the occupied territories."

"...according to German intelligence, there are 5,700 aircraft on the European territory, of which 2,980 are fighters. This turned out to be a serious underestimation, the aircraft in reserve fleets were not taken into account."

"June 22 ... complete surprise ... at many airfields, construction has not yet been completed and the planes were standing wing to wing as if for inspection. It was an incredibly attractive target. The Luftwaffe pilots were sure that the Russians themselves were planning a massive attack. ... When the bombers finished their work, the fighters shot down everything that was left."

"The Luftwaffe claimed 1489 destroyed on the ground and 322 in the air or by anti-aircraft guns. Official soviet history admits 1200 losses, 800 of them on the ground... Although the planes on the ground were destroyed, their pilots were not injured, and most importantly... this simplified the task of forming new units later" (Spick, p.75-78) .

"1200 aircraft in the first 8 hours..."

"... attacks on Soviet air bases led to the collapse of the Russian command, unable to control its units. Desperate calls broadcast in clear text leave the impression of chaos. According to Milch's personal diary: 1800 aircraft were destroyed on the first day, 800 - on June 23, 557 - on the 24th, 351 - on the 25th, 300 - on the 26th The question of whether the Luftwaffe could destroy so many aircraft is not even discussed, ... a catastrophe of colossal proportions ... "(Murray, p.82-83).

"For several days, He-111, Ju-88, Do-17 made four to six sorties every day, Ju-87 from seven to eight, Bf-109 and Bf-110 - from five to eight, depending on the distance Between 22 and 25 June I Corps attacked 77 airfields in 1,600 sorties, the first bombers found enemy vehicles on the ground, unprotected, often standing in long rows, extremely vulnerable to fragmentation bombs, 4-pounder SD-2s, which bombers and fighter-bombers carried in large numbers... on June 22, 1,800 enemy aircraft were destroyed, on June 29, the OKW reported the destruction of 4,017 Soviet aircraft and German losses of 150 vehicles.

"Goering did not believe Kesselring that 2,500 aircraft were destroyed in the central sector alone, and ordered an investigation. His check showed that Kesselring even downplayed the success of his pilots and the true figure was 200-300 more than he reported at the beginning."

"... On June 30, large air battles broke out in the Bobruisk region, when Soviet aircraft tried to prevent the Germans from forcing the Berezina River. 110 Soviet aircraft were shot down."

"In the first 3 days, the 1st Air Fleet shot down 400 enemy aircraft and destroyed 1100 on the ground, in the next three months - the same number ... By August 30, the 2nd Air Fleet shot down 1380 aircraft and destroyed 1280 on the ground." (Cooper, 222-223).

"The first attack ... 31 airfields near the border were attacked, by the end of the day 1800 Russian aircraft had been destroyed. By the end of the week, Goering announced the destruction of 4990 aircraft, the Luftwaffe lost 179 aircraft. On July 9, JG3 shot down 27 Russian bombers trying to attack their airfield, for 15 minutes By July 26, Me-110s made 1,574 sorties, shot down 92 enemy aircraft in the air and destroyed 823 on the ground. The ZG 26 account is 620 Soviet aircraft."

"On August 30, JG3 pilots destroyed the 1000th Russian aircraft. On August 19, when attacking a Soviet airfield 17 miles southwest of Leningrad, ZG 26 aircraft burned 30 fighters, damaged 15 and shot down 3, increasing their score to 191 in the air and 663 on earth".

"September 8 JG 51 - 2000th air victory. By September 10 - 1357 enemy aircraft in the air, 298 on the ground."

"By November 12, the 2nd Fleet - 40,000 sorties, 2169 Soviet aircraft destroyed in the air, 1657 - on the ground. Probable losses of the enemy - another 281 aircraft destroyed and 811 damaged" (WWII ... p.55-56).

“During the first flight, I notice countless fortifications built along the border. They stretch for many hundreds of kilometers. Some of them are still unfinished. We fly over unfinished airfields: there is a newly built concrete runway, planes are already parked here. For example, along the road on Vitebsk, on which our troops are advancing, there is one of these almost completed airfields with many Martin bombers. They lack either fuel or crews [emphasis mine - E.K.]. Flying over these airfields and fortifications, everyone understands : "We hit just in time..." It looks like the Soviets were making these preparations to set up a base for an invasion against us. Who else in the west would Russia want to attack? If the Russians had completed their preparations, there would be little hope of stopping them." (Rudel, p.21-22).

And now - Soviet sources.

The very first reports make it possible to judge the most serious situation in which the Air Force found itself after the start of the German attack. The operational report of the Northwestern Front, signed at 10 pm on June 22, reports that during enemy attacks 56 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in the air and 32 at the airfields themselves (Collection of combat documents ... further - issue 34, unless otherwise indicated , p. 43). Another report, sent next to the NPO, increases the losses to 100 vehicles and admits that the enemy has achieved complete air superiority (Collection of Combat Documents ... p. 44). The reports always raise the problem of lack of communication with aviation units.

On June 26, front commander Kuznetsov reported: "75% of the crews were not injured. Material losses are 80%. I ask you to reinforce the front with three mixed air divisions. First of all, materiel and pilots are needed."

By July 4, the damage done to the aviation of the front becomes clear from the list of what remains: "6th mixed air division ... 69 aircraft, 7th - 26 aircraft, 8th - 29, 57 - 29 aircraft. In 12 days since the beginning of hostilities, out of 887 aircraft of the front, only 153 aircraft remained in stock (Collection of combat documents ... p. 119).

On June 21, 1942, General D. Kondratyuk, commander of the 6th Army, prepared a report on the air operations of the Northwestern Front in the first days of the war. In this report, he wrote about the problems faced by the front. He noted the lack of airfields and the construction of almost all available airfields - 21 permanent and 49 operational. Despite efforts to camouflage aircraft, German reconnaissance flights reduced this work to nil. He highlighted the following problems of the air units of the front: the concentration of aircraft on existing airfields and the lack of airfields in depth, which increased the vulnerability to German attack; proximity of airfields to the border, poor dispersal of aircraft and planning of movements of units; the presence of old aircraft and equipment; the inability of pilots to fly at night and in bad weather; insufficient staff work and lack of interaction between military branches; poor radio and wire communications; extreme lack of aerial reconnaissance; incomplete reform; inadequate mobilization planning of logistic support.

In conclusion, Kondratyuk writes: "The year of the war showed. That the air forces of the Red Army did not meet the requirements of the war. ... a regiment based on two or three airfields was losing operational control over its constituent parts, the headquarters organization did not provide combat control. ... The frequent reorganization of aviation had a negative effect on the combat effectiveness of the units ... The lack of an action plan for the air forces in the event of war led to the loss of a significant number of aircraft and pilots. Radio control ... was not worked out "(Collection of combat documents ... pp. 179-183).

The air bases of the Western District suffered even more in the first days of the war. The Germans began hostilities with devastating attacks on the entire network of airfields in the Western District, and German sabotage groups cut off land lines of communication. As communications were disrupted, reports of casualties were slow to arrive, if at all, and commanders could only imagine the havoc the German air force was wreaking in the air and on the ground. It is clear that the Germans were able to immediately achieve overwhelming air superiority. The commander of the aviation of the front, I. Kopets, having made sure that it no longer exists, committed suicide, thereby avoiding the fate that soon befell the commander of the front, D. Pavlov, who was shot on the orders of Stalin along with the officers of his headquarters.

The first detailed report on the aviation of the Western Front appeared on December 31, 1941. Two sections of the report written by N. Naumenko were devoted to a sober assessment of the state of the Air Force before the war and its participation in hostilities in the first eight days of the war: "By April 1941, the combat readiness of the air force units can be characterized as follows: to conduct air combat, bombers - limited ability, no reconnaissance aviation, since its 8 squadrons received 6 aircraft.. 313th and 314th reconnaissance regiments: all crews of young pilots are available, but no aircraft ... 314th regiment reconnaissance aviation... by the beginning of the war, only 6 crews flew the Yak-4. The 215th assault aviation regiment - 12 pieces of I-15, pilots were being trained on the Il-2, which at that time the district did not yet have "(Collection of combat documents ... p. 127)

Naumenko noted that all air divisions had old aircraft, except for the 9th mixed division, which was equipped with 262 new MiG-1 and MiG-3 aircraft. But only 140 pilots of the division could fly these new aircraft, training was accompanied by serious accidents ... "Interest in training flights on old aircraft fell, everyone wanted to fly on new machines ... an experience...". He writes further: “As a result of the actions of German and White Pole saboteurs, from 23:00 on June 21, all wire communications between the district headquarters, headquarters of air divisions and regiments were cut ... each airfield was left to itself. This is how the Great Patriotic War"(Collection of military documents ... p. 130).

Then Naumenko proceeds to the results of the first eight days of fighting: "On June 22, during the first attack, the enemy destroyed 538 of our aircraft (out of 1,022 fighters and 887 bombers) and lost 143. After 8 days, our losses amounted to 1,163 aircraft. By June 30, 498 aircraft remained ( Collection of military documents ... pp. 131).

The most powerful units of the Air Force were, as in the case of ground forces, in the Kiev military district. Despite their strength, the aviation units suffered from the same problems. On August 21, Air Force Commander Zhigarev received a report on the aviation of the Kyiv district in the pre-war months and the first days of the war.

According to the report's author, Colonel Astakhov, there were 1166 fighters, 587 bombers, 197 attack aircraft and 53 reconnaissance aircraft in 11 district air divisions and 32 regiments. This number included 223 new Mig-3 and Yak fighters, new Pe-2 and Su-2 bombers, and 31 Yak-4 reconnaissance aircraft. Most of the pilots of the old aircraft were well trained to fly under normal conditions, but could not perform more complex tasks. On the other hand, pilots of new types of aircraft had only basic training and could not be considered combat-ready.

Astakhov summarizes the characteristics of the district's aviation combat readiness: "In general, the aviation of the South-Eastern Front was not sufficiently prepared for combat operations for the following reasons:

A. During the re-equipment of the front aviation with new weapons, some of the old, fully formed aviation regiments (the 52nd and 48th short-range aviation regiments) did not have enough new types of aircraft to conduct combat operations, and their old machines were used in new parts. As a result, before the start of the war, these regiments were in a state of low combat readiness ...

C. Some aviation regiments formed in 1940 (224th, 225th, 138th) had only 20-50% of the equipment of the norm, and as a result, their participation in hostilities was insignificant.

D. Divisional and regimental commanders made poor use of the winter period of 1940-1941 for training, while the airfields were covered with snow and as a result the vast majority of young pilots flew very little in winter ... and the period from May to June did not give them sufficient training for conduct of hostilities.

D. Before the war, the aviation of the Southwestern Front was unable to solve the problem of camouflaging airfields and aircraft and organize air defense. This was due not only to the lack of necessary camouflage and air defense equipment, but also to the fact that commanders at all levels did not pay much attention to these issues.

E. The lack of the necessary organization ... in the actions of front-line aviation in repelling enemy attacks on our airfields in the first three days of the war confirmed that the combat capability of the front's air units is low and during this critical period ... aviation actions do not meet the requirements of NPO order No. 075.

Because of these and other problems," Astakhov wrote further, "the aviation of the Southwestern Front was not ready to repel a surprise enemy attack on 06/22/41." As a result, from June 22 to June 24, the Germans destroyed 237 aircraft at airfields. the training resulted in the loss of another 242 aircraft due to accidents between June 22 and August 10, which is 13% of all losses (1861 aircraft) (Collection of combat documents ... issue 36, pp. 109-116)

And the last. Data on Soviet aircraft captured by the Germans are known. For example, according to German data, (see comments on page 35 of the book "The Soviet Air Force in World War II") by July 8, 1941, troops of the Army Group Center captured 242 airfields Soviet aircraft, and the total number of captured aircraft in all the western districts could hardly exceed 1000 aircraft, simply because the aviation of the Western district had the most aircraft (after Kyiv) and the Germans advanced faster here. The Germans hardly counted the aircraft that were out of order and destroyed during the raids among the captured ones. Why did they have to fix these cars? They most likely referred to the latter only technically sound aircraft, some of which, having received Luftwaffe identification marks, were used in German air units (see section 6).