Neither the Poles in 1939 nor the Nazis in 1944 did this.
The Soviet police shot masses - from machine guns, through the windows for the transfer of food.
Or throwing grenades at the cells. Some of these cells had to be walled up - and the exhumation was carried out in the winter.

June 1941 was remembered in Western Ukraine not only for the attack of Nazi Germany, but also for the bloody massacres allegedly committed by their own state in the rear.
We are talking about a hitherto unheard-of phenomenon, even in the practice of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR - mass executions of political prisoners in prisons in Western Ukraine during late June - early July 1941.

Below are examples of three such massacres: in the prisons of Lvov, the salt mines of Salina and in the prison of Lutsk. Today's post is dedicated to the massacres in Lviv.

The first page of the execution list of Prison No. 3 in Zolochiv. The inscriptions on the document are clearly visible - the sentencing by the head of the investigative unit of the UNKGB in the Lviv region, Shumakov, and the imposition of a sanction until the execution of the sentence by the prosecutor of the Lviv region, Kharitonov. Two men decided the fate of thousands... Archive of the Center for Liberation Movement Research (CIOD)

Using the example of Lvov, one can accurately show the bloody activities of the "valiant fighters against the counter-revolution."
There were three prisons in Lvov itself: No. 1 - on Lontsky, No. 2 - Zamarstynovskaya and No. 4 - Brigidki. Prison No. 3 was located in the castle of the city of Zolochev, which is about seventy kilometers from Lviv - prisoners were sent here when Lviv prisons were overcrowded (and they were overcrowded: there were 3,638 prisoners in the prison on Lontskogo with a limit of 1,500 people).

The left side of the previous document. The inscription in red pencil, made by the hand of the investigator Shumakov: "Sentence as enemies of the people to shoot." And the surnames are Barenleim (?), Didukh, Krachkovsky, Zwerling, Bondar, Mazurchak, Kotik ...

As of June 22, 1941, there were 5,424 prisoners in the prisons of the Lviv region. Most were charged with crimes under Article 54 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, counter-revolutionary activities.
Order No. 2445/M of the People's Commissar for State Security Merkulov of June 23, 1941 and the order of the Head of the Prison Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Captain of State Security Filippov of June 23, 1941, became immediate official measures in solving the problem of overcrowding in prisons.

The right side of the previous document. The inscription in black ink - permission for execution - was written by the prosecutor of the Lviv region Kharitonov: "I sanction execution as enemies of the people"

The first document dealt with the urgent registration of all prisoners in prisons and the division into those who are subject to deportation to the GULAG concentration camps, and those who need to be shot (this task was assigned to the local leadership of the NKGB).
The second document spoke about the evacuation of prisoners, it was accompanied by an "Evacuation Plan", according to which 5,000 prisoners were subject to deportation from the Lviv region. For this, 204 wagons were allocated.
According to the instructions of the NKVD of the USSR of December 29, 1939, one echelon car could accommodate thirty deported persons, therefore these cars would be enough to evacuate 6,800 prisoners. However, only 1,822 out of 5,000 planned were evacuated.

Stashinsky Petr Vasilyevich (1904-1941), a native of the village. Borschovichi Novo-Yarichevsky district, Lviv region. Arrested 9 October 1940
Member of the Enlightenment, the organization "Strength" and the OUN. Accused under Art. 54 paragraphs. 6, 11 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. He was shot in prison No. 1 in Lvov on Lontskogo street on June 26, 1941.
Pre-war photo taken on Rynok Square in Lviv. Archive CIOD

3,602 people remained in the prisons of Lvov. And where did the echelons go - the documents are silent.
The executions themselves began on June 22 - the executions of those sentenced to death.
From the interim report of the head of the prison department of the UNKVD of the Lviv region, Lerman, it is known that as of June 24, 2072 people were shot in the prisons of Lvov and Zolochev.
On June 26, the execution lists were approved - another 2068 persons were to be destroyed. They were killed during June 24-28.

The bodies of the executed prisoners in the cell of the prison on Lontskogo. Lvov, July 1, 1941. The Germans had to wall up some of these cells in order to avoid an epidemic. A second exhumation was carried out in February 1942, when the frost hit. Archive CIOD

Thus, 4140 prisoners were shot in the Lvov region. However, the calculations do not agree: 3,602 persons remained in prisons, and more were shot.
The answer to this question is given by the report of the same Lerman: here it was also about the admission of new prisoners. Prison documents for these people were not properly drawn up.
In most cases, they did not even bring charges, but they confidently called them involved in the OUN, spies, saboteurs - that is, persons who were to be shot.

This is just one piece of tragic statistics. The true picture is revealed if you look at the entire map of Western Ukraine - about 24 thousand killed.
At first they used the usual practice for the NKVD: individually, in a special cell, a shot in the back of the head. When the front was approaching, and the plans were not fulfilled, they were shot en masse: they drove the prisoners into the cells of the basements and fired from automatic weapons through the door for transferring food.
And in recent days they threw grenades into the cells. Or they opened the cell doors, the prisoners went out into the corridor, thinking that they were being fired, and at that moment they were shot with automatic weapons.
The bodies were taken out by trucks and buried in special places, which archaeologists are gradually discovering today.

However, just before the arrival of the Germans, the Chekists, in a hurry, buried the dead in the yards and cellars of prisons. Subsequently, the excavation of these hecatombs became material for Nazi propaganda - of course, not for reasons of humanity.
The destruction of evacuated prisoners also took place in the central-eastern regions of Ukraine - in transit prisons in Uman, Kyiv and Kharkov. These cities were the so-called intermediate points of transfer, where the mixing of prisoners took place in order to avoid uprisings and mass escapes during deportation.

Nazi propaganda called those shot in prisons - mostly Ukrainians, Poles and Jews - Volksdeutsch. The inscription of the German correspondent Gubner on the photo of the consequences of the mass executions of prisoners. Archive CIOD

The Zalishchytsia tragedy in the Ternopil region deserves special mention, when, for tactical reasons, the railway bridge across the Dniester was destroyed, and two echelons of seven wagons with prisoners arrived from both sides (14 wagons, each with 50-70 arrested people).
The NKVD solved the problem quickly: the cars were doused with fuel, set on fire and thrown into the river. The banks of the Dniester are very high and steep here - no one survived.
Of course, Soviet propaganda "hung" all these crimes on the Nazis (as well as the executions of Polish prisoners of war, by the way), and, unfortunately, these myths are haunted even in the present.

Surprise and horror on the face of a Lvov woman who had just entered the prison yard. July 3, 1941, Lvov. Archive CIOD

The Western Ukrainian public was shocked by what they saw. After all, the Poles did not do this at the beginning of World War II in 1939 (then prisons were opened and all political prisoners were released; and they were even warned: to move strictly to the east, since former prisoners could be shot in the frontline zone).
Subsequently, in 1944, the Nazis did not do this either (the administration left the prisoners of the concentration camps alive before the arrival of the allies). And this massacre, terrible in its meaninglessness, became one of the main factors in the rooting of the anti-Soviet positions of the then and subsequent generations.
Every year, the Lviv community comes to prisons to commemorate the dead, and in the former prison No. 1 on Lontsky, there is now a memorial museum in memory of all the victims of the occupation regimes.
Below are some photos of the museum-prison.

This was not done by the Poles in 1939, nor by the Germans in 1944. The executioners from the NKVD shot the prisoners en masse - from machine guns, through the windows for passing food. Or they threw grenades at the cells. Some of these cells had to be walled up - and the exhumation was carried out in the winter.

June 1941 was remembered in Western Ukraine not only by the beginning of the German-Soviet war, but also by the massacres perpetrated by the NKVD.

We are talking about a hitherto unheard-of phenomenon - the mass executions of political prisoners in the prisons of Western Ukraine during the end of June - the beginning of July 1941.

Three such massacres are best known: in the prisons of Lvov, the salt mines of Salina and in the prison of Lutsk.

Using the example of Lvov, one can accurately show the bloody activities of the "valiant fighters of the NKVD against the counter-revolution."

There were three prisons in Lviv itself: No. 1 - on Lontsky, No. 2 - Zamarstynovskaya and No. 4 - Brigidki. Prison No. 3 was located in the castle of the city of Zlochev, which is about seventy kilometers from Lviv - prisoners were sent here when the Lviv prisons were overcrowded (and all of them were overcrowded: in the prison on Lontskogo, with a limit of 1,500 people, there were 3,638 prisoners).

Order No. 2445/M of the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov of June 23, 1941 and the order of the Head of the Prison Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Captain of State Security Filippov of June 23, 1941, became immediate official measures in solving the problem of overcrowding in prisons.

The first document spoke about the urgent registration of all prisoners in prisons and the division into those to be deported to the Gulag concentration camps, and those who needed to be shot (this task was assigned to the local leadership of the NKGB).

The second document spoke about the evacuation of prisoners, it was accompanied by an "evacuation plan", according to which 5,000 prisoners were subject to deportation from the Lviv region. For this, 204 wagons were allocated.

According to the instructions of the NKVD of the USSR of December 29, 1939, one echelon car could accommodate thirty deported persons, these cars would be enough to evacuate 6800 prisoners. However, only 1,822 out of 5,000 planned were evacuated.

3,602 people remained in the prisons of Lvov. And where did the echelons go - the documents are silent.

The executions themselves began on June 22 - those sentenced to death were shot. From the interim report of the head of the prison department of the UNKVD of the Lviv region Lerman, it is known that as of June 24, 2072 people were shot in the prisons of Lvov and Zolochev.

On June 26, the execution lists were approved - another 2068 people were to be destroyed. They were killed during June 24-28.

Thus, 4140 prisoners were shot in the Lvov region. However, the calculations do not agree: 3,602 persons remained in prisons, and more were shot.

The answer to this question is given by the report of the same Lerman: here it was also about the admission of new prisoners. Prison documents for these people were not properly drawn up.

In most cases, they did not even bring charges, but they confidently called them involved in the OUN, spies, saboteurs - that is, persons who should be shot.

This is just one fragment of the criminal and monstrous nature of the communist regime. The true picture is revealed if you look at the entire map of Western Ukraine - about 24 thousand killed.

At first they used the usual practice for the NKVD: individually, in a special cell, a shot in the back of the head. When the front was approaching, and the plans were not fulfilled, they were shot en masse: they drove the prisoners into the cells of the basements and fired from automatic weapons through the door for transferring food.

The window opened and the prisoner, instead of food to support vitality, saw an instrument of destruction ... the last thing he saw in his life.

And in recent days, grenades were thrown into the cells. Or they opened the cell doors, the prisoners went out into the corridor, thinking that they were being released, and at that moment they were shot with automatic weapons.

The bodies were taken out by trucks and buried in special burial places, which are now gradually being discovered by archaeologists.

Just before the arrival of the Germans, the Chekists, in a hurry, buried the dead in the yards and cellars of prisons. Subsequently, the excavation of these hecatombs became the material for Nazi propaganda - of course, not for reasons of humanity.

The destruction of evacuated prisoners also took place in the central-eastern regions of Ukraine - in the transit prisons of Uman, Kyiv and Kharkov. These cities were the so-called intermediate points of transfer, where the mixing of prisoners took place in order to avoid uprisings and mass escapes during deportation.

Separately, the memory of the Zalishchytsia tragedy in the Ternopil region deserves special attention, when, for tactical reasons, the railway bridge across the Dniester was destroyed, and two echelons of seven wagons with prisoners arrived from both sides (14 wagons each with 50-70 arrested).

The NKVD solved the problem quickly: the cars were doused with fuel, set on fire and thrown into the river. The banks of the Dniester are very high and steep here - no one survived.

Of course, Soviet propaganda "hung" all these crimes on the "fascists" (as, indeed, the executions of Polish prisoners of war), and, sometimes, these myths are haunted even in the present.

The Western Ukrainian public was shocked by what they saw. After all, the Poles did not do this at the beginning of World War II in 1939 (then the prisons were opened and all political prisoners were released, and they were even warned to move exclusively to the east, since former prisoners could be shot in the frontline zone).

Subsequently, in 1944, the Germans did not do this either (the administration left the prisoners of the concentration camps alive before the arrival of the allies). And this terrible and monstrous massacre of those arrested became one of the main factors in rooting the anti-communist positions of the then and subsequent generations in the minds of the people of Western Ukraine.

Every year, Lviv residents come to prisons to commemorate the dead, and in the former prison No. 1 on Lontsky, there is now a museum-memorial in memory of all the victims of the occupation regimes.

Igor Derevyanny

Battalions "Nachtigal" and "Roland"

In early April 1941, the German command in the camps in southern Poland gathered the first group of Ukrainian volunteers from among the prisoners of war of the Polish army. From here they were transferred to the Neuhammer training ground (Silesia) for military training. The finally formed battalion, which received the code name "Nachtigal Special Group", consisted of about 300 people (3 companies). R. Shukhevych refused the oath to A. Hitler and Germany. At the request of R. Shukhevych and a protest sent by him, supported by the Revolutionary Wire of the OUN, Nachtigal took an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. Lieutenant A. Herzler was appointed German battalion commander, and Lieutenant T. Oberlander was appointed communications officer; Ukrainian commander - centurion Roman Shukhevych (Chuprynka), one of the leaders of the OUN and the future commander of the UPA. On June 30, 1941, the Nachtigal battalion entered the city of Lvov a day earlier than the German troops.

The involvement of the Nachtigall battalion in the repressions and murders of civilians in Lviv (and in the Massacre of Lviv professors in particular) is still a debatable issue. According to the Israeli center for the study of the Holocaust Yad Vashem, the archives of the center have preserved a selection of documents obtained from German and Soviet sources that indicate the involvement of the Nachtigal battalion under the command of the future UPA commander-in-chief Roman Shukhevych in punitive operations against the civilian population of Lviv in the summer of 1941 of the year. The same point of view is supported by some Polish historians. After the Ukrainian delegation visited Israel to verify this information, the representative of the SBU, Candidate of Historical Sciences Vladimir Vyatrovich, said that there were no documents in the archives of the memorial complex that would confirm the involvement of Roman Shukhevych and the Nachtigal battalion in the murders of Jews in Ukraine during the Second World War , also noting that Iosif Lapid, who previously reported the existence of the mentioned materials, is not an employee of the archive of the complex. Historian B. Sokolov, referring to the results of a hearing in the US Congress in 1954, claims that the Nachtigall was withdrawn from the city in order to avoid excesses due to disagreements over the future of Ukraine that arose between the leadership of the OUN (b) and the German command, and, accordingly, “Nachtigal”, had nothing to do with the extermination of the Jews and the Polish intelligentsia of Lvov that began later.

The formation of the second Ukrainian battalion "Roland" began in mid-April 1941 on the territory of Austria. Unlike the Nachtigall, its personnel were mostly represented by the emigrants of the first wave and their descendants. In addition, up to 15% of the total number were Ukrainian students from Vienna and Graz. The former officer of the Polish army, Major E. Pobigushchiy, was appointed commander of the battalion. All other officers and even instructors were Ukrainians, while the German command was represented by a communications group consisting of 3 officers and 8 non-commissioned officers. The training of the battalion took place in the Zaubersdorf castle, 9 km from the city of Wiener Neustadt. In the first days of June 1941, the battalion departed for Southern Bukovina, where for about a month it underwent intensive training, after which it marched to the Iasi region, and from there through Chisinau and Dubossary to Odessa.

Response code is 400

Security Police (Schutzmannschaft)

In the Galicia district alone, about 20,000 volunteers served in the Ukrainian police. In Lvov, where Ukrainians made up only about 15% of the population before the war, the local police staff was formed exclusively from Ukrainians. These formations participated in the genocide of Jews. The Ukrainian police herded the Jewish population of Dobromil, Zhovkva and Klevan into the synagogues and burned them there. According to Poles and Jews, the Ukrainian police and other Ukrainian nationalists took part in the pogroms, beatings of Jews in Lvov and their transfer to camps and prisons.

Battalions of the Ukrainian security police (Schutzmanschaft-battalions or “noise”) were formed from among the Ukrainian collaborators (not least the Kievsky kuren and Bukovinsky kuren) under the numbers 109, 114, 115, 116, 117 and 118. Their main purpose was to fight with Soviet partisans. Especially for the armed struggle against the Belarusian partisans from among the legionnaires of "Nachtigall" and "Roland", at the end of October 1941, the 201st Schutzmannschaft Battalion was formed, commanded by Major Pobeschiy, his deputy was Roman Shukhevych. In mid-March 1942, the battalion was transferred to Belarus. Here it became known as a unit of the 201st Police Division, which, together with other brigades and battalions, operated under the leadership of SS-Obergruppenführer E. von dem Bach-Zelewski. The 201st battalion accounted for dozens of burned Belarusian farms and villages, as well as the Volyn village of Kortelisy, where 2,800 inhabitants were shot.

The 201st security battalion participated in the executions of Soviet citizens in Zolochev, Ternopil, Satanov, Vinnitsa and in other cities and villages of Ukraine and Belarus.

The 50th Ukrainian security battalion participated in the anti-partisan operation on the territory of Belarus "Winter Magic" (Winterzauber) in the Sebezh - Osveya - Polotsk triangle, carried out in February - March 1943. During this operation, 158 settlements were looted and burned, including villages were burned along with the people: Ambrazeevo, Aniskovo, Bula, Zhernoseki, Kalyuty, Konstantinovo, Paporotnoe, Sokolovo.

Ukrainian battalions participated in the protection of 50 Jewish ghettos and 150 large camps created by the occupiers in Ukraine, as well as in the deportation of Jews from the Warsaw ghetto in July 1942 [source?]. The Ukrainian police participated in the liquidation of the Jewish population in Chudnov (500 people, October 16, 1941), in Radomyshl and Belaya Tserkov, Ukrainian police destroyed Jewish children. In Dubno on October 5, 1942, Ukrainian police shot 5,000 Jews.

The total number of Ukrainian security battalions is estimated at 35 thousand people.

Waffen SS division "Galicia"

On April 28, 1943, at the initiative of the governor of Lvov, Vladimir Kubiyovych, and the governor of Galicia, Otto Wächter, the formation of the Waffen SS division "Galicia" began. At least 70 thousand Galicians responded to the call, of which 13-14 thousand were accepted into the ranks of the division. The rest of the volunteers were included in the German police and made up five new police regiments (numbers: from the 4th to the 8th - to common numbering with regiments of the division). In July 1943, the 4th and 5th regiments were formed, in August - the 6th and 7th. Subsequently, they were abolished, and their personnel were sent to replenish the division; The 8th Regiment was disbanded shortly after its creation in November 1943.

Although many of the division's officers were Galicians, most of the senior command positions were held by Germans (including the Volksdeutsche). The first two division commanders were also Germans - SS Brigadeführer V. Shimana and F. Freytag, who replaced him on November 20, 1943. According to the general nomenclature of the SS troops, the division was assigned number 14, and its three grenadier regiments - 29, 30 and 31.

In April 1944 the division was sent to Neuhammer (Silesia) for further training. In May, it was personally inspected by Himmler, who for the first time addressed the soldiers and officers of the division not as Galicians, but as Ukrainians.

In July, the division, which never completed its training, arrived at the front and was thrown against the advancing Red Army near Brody. Once surrounded, in nineteen days of fierce battles, she was almost completely destroyed. Of the 14 thousand soldiers and officers, only 3 thousand escaped from the encirclement.

Its reorganization was carried out in August-November 1944 in Neuhammer, where the reserve regiment of the division, numbering about 8 thousand people, was sent, as well as volunteers who served in the 4th and 5th Galician police regiments, formed from the "surplus" April 1943 recruitment. On November 12, 1944, the division became officially known as the 14th SS Grenadier Division (Ukrainian No. 1).

The division no longer participated in the fighting at the front. In the autumn of 1944, one of its regiments was assigned to suppress the Slovak National Uprising, and in January 1945 the entire division was sent to Yugoslavia to fight local partisans, but no longer took part in major military operations. Also, the SS division "Galicia", according to Polish data, participated in the destruction of the Polish village of Guta Penyatskaya.

The Government Commission for the study of the activities of the OUN-UPA came to the same conclusion - they found that it was the 4th regiment of the division subordinate not to the military, but to the police command of the Germans, in particular to the supreme leader of the SS and police of the Governor General. Also, his soldiers were involved in the destruction in March 1944 of more than 250 Poles in the Dominican monastery in the town of Podkamin.

According to other sources, the regular units of the German army participated in the destruction of the village, and the division "Galicia" at that time was only in the formation stage. However, the descendants of the Western Ukrainian Poles are convinced that the SS "Galicia", the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and irregular formations of local Ukrainian peasants destroyed more than a thousand Poles on February 22, 1944 in Huta-Penyatskaya and burned 172 houses.

In March 1945, the Germans took a populist step, announcing the creation of the so-called. Ukrainian National Army under the command of General P. Shandruk. Most of this army was the former division "Galicia", which received the name of the 1st Ukrainian division.

After the surrender of Germany, most of the division (about 10 thousand people) broke into Austria and laid down their arms in front of the British, while 4.7 thousand of its soldiers and officers were taken prisoner by Soviet troops. [Used materials]

Photo: On June 29, residents of Lvov joyfully greet Hitler's soldiers.
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Publicism
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June 29, 1941. 8th day of the war:
- Ended tank battle in the area of ​​Lutsk-Brody-Rivne;
- In the Leningrad Institute of Physical Education named after Lesgaft, partisan detachments were formed consisting of 268 fighters for reconnaissance and combat operations behind enemy lines;
- A massive offensive of German and Finnish troops began in the Murmansk direction;
- A strategic defensive operation began in the Arctic and Karelia, which lasted from June 29 to October 10, 1941. The operation was carried out by the troops of the Northern Front, the 7th separate army, with the assistance of the forces of the Northern Fleet. As part of this operation, defensive operations were carried out in the Murmansk, Kandalaksha and Kestenga directions, the Vyborg-Kexholm front-line defensive operation, defensive operations in the Ukhta, Rugozersky, Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions.
- The German army "Norway" went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to
Murmansk and auxiliary - on the Kandalaksha and Ukhta directions.
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Germany:
- The troops of the Army Group "North" accumulated forces on the bridgeheads captured on the Western Dvina River. The 41st Motorized Corps crossed the Dvina near Krustpils. On the left flank of Army Group North, the advance detachment of the 1st Army Corps broke into Riga. On June 29, Soviet troops left the city of Liepaja.
- Belostok-Minsk battle. Goth's 3rd Panzer Group and Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group linked up east of Minsk. The 2nd Panzer Group continued its advance towards Bobruisk.
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THE USSR:
- Mikoyan: “On the evening of June 29, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and I gathered at Stalin's in the Kremlin. Detailed data on the situation in Belarus had not yet been received. Alarmed by such a course of affairs, Stalin suggested that we all go to the People's Commissariat of Defense and deal with the situation on the spot.
Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin were in the People's Commissariat. Stalin kept calm, asking where the command of the Belarusian military district was, what kind of connection was there. Zhukov reported that the connection was lost and could not be restored for the whole day. We talked for about half an hour, quite calmly. Then Stalin exploded: what kind of General Staff, what kind of chief of staff, who is so confused, has no connection with the troops, does not represent anyone and does not command anyone. Zhukov, of course, experienced the state of affairs no less than Stalin, and such a shout from Stalin was insulting to him. And this courageous man burst into tears like a woman and ran out into another room. Molotov followed him. Stalin was very depressed. When they left the people's commissariat, he said this: "Lenin left us a great legacy, we, his heirs, screwed it all up!" Everyone was amazed by this statement of “master. There was an ominous silence. At this, the meeting of the chief leadership of the country on this tragic day was closed.
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THE USSR. Western front:
- Defensive operation in Western Ukraine. Fierce fighting continued in the Dubno area. The enemy reinforced his grouping with new formations. The 11th Panzer Division of the 1st Panzer Group continued to hold the line in the Ostrog area. The Soviet mechanized corps, which suffered heavy losses in battles, began to be withdrawn from the battle by order of M.P. Kirponos. Part of the 8th mechanized corps was surrounded in the Dubno area. By the end of June 29, the Germans broke through to Lvov, and the Soviet troops were forced to leave the city.
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Sovinformburo:
- On June 29, Finnish-German troops went on the offensive along the entire front from
Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland, trying to break through our fortifications along the state border. In the Vilna-Dvina direction, attempts by the enemy's mobile units to influence the flanks and rear of our troops retreating as a result of the fighting in the Siauliai, Keidany, Ponevezh, Kaunas regions to new positions were not successful.
- In the Minsk direction, by the efforts of our ground forces and aviation, the further advance of the enemy's motorized mechanized units that had broken through was stopped. Cut off by our troops from their bases and infantry, the enemy motorized mechanized units, being under continuous fire from our aircraft, are placed in an exceptionally difficult position.
- In the Lutsk direction, the battle of large mechanized masses continues. Despite the introduction of fresh tank units by the enemy in this direction, all his attempts to break through in the Novograd-Volynsky and Shepetovsky directions were repulsed; in a series of successive and continuous strikes by our tank troops and aircraft, most of the enemy's tank and motorized troops were defeated.
- Hitler and his generals, accustomed to easy victories throughout the second imperialist war, report on the radio that in the seven days of the war they captured or destroyed more than 2,000 Soviet tanks, 600 guns, destroyed more than 4,000 Soviet aircraft and captured more than 40,000 Red Army soldiers ; at the same time, over the same period, the Germans allegedly lost only 150 aircraft, and how many tanks, guns and prisoners were lost - German radio is silent about this. We are even embarrassed to refute this obvious lie and boastful nonsense. As a result of stubborn and fierce fighting over a period of 7-8 days, the Germans lost at least 2,500 tanks, about 1,500 aircraft, and more than 30,000 prisoners. During the same period we lost: 850 aircraft, up to 900 tanks, up to 15,000 missing and captured.
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Summary:
06/29/41 Summary:
Memoirs of N.A. Antipenko - on 06/22/1941 deputy supply officer
commander of the Lviv border district:
“On June 24, 1941, we sent our families on trucks in the direction of Kyiv without specifying a specific address. The apartments were locked up and the janitors were instructed to keep order, assuring them that we would return soon. We ourselves believed it. On the same day, by order from the center, we began to send all the empty railways and steam locomotives to the east.
I called my direct boss, General Vurgaft, in Moscow and asked for his permission to load the outgoing wagons with property located as an emergency reserve in the district warehouse subordinate to me. There were stored 15 thousand pairs of leather boots, the same number of felt boots, overcoats, short fur coats; there was also artillery equipment. In response, I was scolded, and I was threatened with execution for "panic moods"
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From a memorandum to the headquarters of the district of the Red Army:
- “On the second day of the war, OUN combat groups stepped up their actions, shooting began in the streets. The air line to Tarnopol was damaged. We left to repair the damage, but two machine guns installed in the church prevented us from doing so. Only with the help of a tank, which was sent at our disposal by the head of the border troops, was it possible to suppress the firing point and restore communication. The fighting became more and more violent. The OUN members fired at the territory of the NKVD Directorate, fired at individual military units, at units stationed on the streets. In some areas of Lvov, even before the German invasion, street fighting began. On the 3rd or 4th day, heavy fighting, involving a large number of tanks on both sides, unfolded between Lvov and Lutsk. The situation in Lviv itself in the first days of the war was extremely tense. The enemy bombed the city almost around the clock, the number of casualties among the population grew every day. Among the servicemen there were, however, few, victims also from shots from around the corner: the "fifth column" from among local chauvinist groups, as well as from German saboteurs who had leaked into the city, became more active. Clashes between the OUN underground and the Red Army in Lvov took place between 24 and 28 June. Starting from June 24, in different parts of the city, parts of the 8th mechanized corps were subjected to shelling from the roofs and windows of houses, which was redeployed to the combat area by a forced march. The strongholds from which the OUN fired were: "High Castle", city gas distribution stations, "Lychakovsky Park", churches in the center
Lvov and the tram depot.
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From the report of the KE OUN on the events in Lvov:
- “25 chervnya in the barracks on Kleparov, shooting to the Bolsheviks, partisans in the strength of 5 people. No one is wicked. On the 26th of the house at the street of Peratskogo h. 8, Ukrainian partisans fired at the column
red armored viysk. The Bolsheviks put a garmata against the booth
zruynuvali strіhu i another on top. The partisans, maybe, perished.
24 chervnya fired on the marching Bolshevik columns, a rapid fire and then at once from a number of points: from the Lichakivsky tsvintar, from a number of houses along the street Kurkovy and from the fresh bone of Elizabeth. The Bolsheviks lowered the middle of the bone. However, on the vіd vtorka until Saturday, yshov zvіdti razіv razіv fire on the Bolshevik colony ".
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Soviet troops responded by firing indiscriminately from rifles, machine guns, and tanks at suspicious windows and attics. Fighting with the rebels did not stop around the clock, they were carried out by units of the Red Army, police patrols and soldiers of the 233rd regiment of the NKVD escort troops. In an effort to protect their soldiers from unexpected shelling, the military commandant's office of Lvov issued an order to all residents of the central part of the city to keep the windows that overlook the main streets and squares closed. It was also forbidden to appear near the windows. At all open windows, the troops opened aimed fire without warning. Trucks filled with soldiers drove around Lvov, holding rifles aimed at windows and attics. On June 25, round-ups began in houses in the city center, while all suspicious ones were shot on the spot. Despite such unprecedented security measures, during June 25-26, 1941, both individual fighters and Red Army units continued to be shelled in different parts of the city. Particularly intense machine-gun fire was fired from behind the walls of the Basilian Fathers monastery. Six searches were carried out in the monastery, but no militants were found.
**********
From the telegram of the operational report No. 7 of the headquarters of the 13th division of the NKVD Convoy Troops
reported: The regiment, on the orders of the head of the UNKVD, departed from the city, but
then returned to the barracks. On the same day, the prison administration and security
left the city. The prison was bombarded with rifle and machine-gun fire from
adjacent buildings. The situation in Lviv is unclear. During the raids, shooting in the city from machine guns, rifles, revolvers from windows, attics, nooks and crannies and mainly churches and churches by local counter-revolutionary elements at the moving troops and prisons, in prison No. 1 a panic arose among the supervision, as a result of which the supervision left the prison. This panic also succumbed to the guard, led by Lieutenant Leshchinsky, including 30 people, without the sanction of the command, retreated to the rear, to the village of Vinniki, moving away from Lvov at a distance of 10 km. From the composition of the guard, only one Red Army machine gunner with a light machine gun, comrade. Terentiev, who withstood the onslaught of the prisoners until the arrival of the new guard and the first company as a whole, led by Lieutenant Comrade. Blokhin.
The order without a single escape in prison No. 1 was established by the composition of the new guard, and until the return of prison supervision, the functions of the latter were carried out by the guard with the participation of Deputy. Beginning UNKVD region Art. Lieutenant of the State Security Comrade. Stupnitsky.
**********
In addition to Lviv, an uprising broke out in Lutsk, Przemysl, Przemyshlyany,
Verbakh, as well as in Samborsky, Mostysky, Gorodotsky, Rudkivsky, Bibrsky, Zhovkvivsky, Yavorivsky districts of Drohobych and Lviv regions. In the forests near the town of Przemyshlyan, the OUN military department was stationed, the personnel of which consisted of 87 well-armed and trained fighters. The nationalists had at their disposal a secret base-camp, code-named "The Ravine". Attacking units of the Red Army and NKVD troops, the OUN on the first day of fighting killed 35 and captured 188 servicemen. The next day, OUN members from the Ovrag camp joined the German units and began fighting in Przemyshlyany, capturing the regional center on June 28. In a forest near the town of Vinniki, a Bandera detachment was operating, the personnel of which consisted of up to 40 fighters. From a pre-prepared camp, they attacked the columns of the retreating Soviet troops and, after a short shelling of the Red Army from automatic weapons, retreated to the forest, where they occupied defensive positions equipped in advance. Lviv-Sambir, which are respectively the southern and northern borders of the forest. On June 27, Ukrainian nationalists captured the settlements of Kupnovichi, Lyashki, Kostilnyki and Mokryany, Rudkovsky district, Lviv region. By the arrival of the Wehrmacht, almost the entire area was controlled by the OUN. Hundreds of young people who joined the rebels volunteered to help the Wehrmacht and police departments in the fight against scattered groups of Red Army soldiers. Until June 30, 1941, the OUN insurgent detachments cleared the Zhovkvivsky and Bibrsky districts of the Lviv region from the Red Army and the Soviet administration. It is known that two Bandera detachments operated in the Bibrsky district. One - numbering 54 fighters (over time, 41 more joined him), and the other - consisting of 18 underground fighters. These detachments carried out armed attacks on units of the Red Army and NKVD troops near the villages of Vilkhivtsi and Yatvyagy, and also disarmed 24 Red Army soldiers, 14 policemen and 3 employees of internal troops. In this region, where powerful fortifications were located and significant forces of border troops were stationed, it was difficult to operate large partisan detachments, so the rebels focused their main attention on reconnaissance of border military installations. The nationalists managed to obtain valuable operational information, which was immediately transferred to the Germans advancing on the Rava-Russian fortified area.
*******
Red Army:
- “By the end of the day on June 25, a new order from Moscow followed at the headquarters of the military district - to immediately evacuate the district warehouse. But it was already too late, we did not have a single carriage left: the railway workers showed high mobility and managed to send to the rear, one after another, probably more than a hundred empty trains. And calls from Moscow became more and more frequent, but there was no way to do anything. It was dangerous to move along the Lion: from their windows of five-story houses and from attics more and more shots were heard. More and more columns of Soviet troops retreated east along the streets of Lvov, having already withstood heavy battles, which were also reflected in their equipment. The head of military warehouses, having loaded leather shoes and summer uniforms into cars, took them all to the crossroads and began to distribute them to the passing troops. Traffic jams formed at the intersections. In the conditions of unceasing enemy air raids, this could cause great trouble, but everything turned out well. Everything that was left after that in the warehouses was doused with gasoline and burned. Precious winter uniforms burned down. It was a terrible sight! But it was pointless to offer warm clothes to the soldiers at a time when it was hot: they were already overloaded with weapons and ammunition. But it was possible to evacuate everything two or three days earlier!
- On June 30, our troops finally left Lvov. A lot of weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, uniforms were left to the enemy in front of our troops, who were retreating in battle and in dire need of this property. But it's hard to blame warehouse managers. What if the war would stop at the very moment when they were distributing property without permission from above?
*******
Conclusion: "Sometimes naivety is worse than theft"

Today's lecture topic is the battle in the sky on June 22, 1941, the confrontation between the Red Army and the Luftwaffe. Today we will talk both directly about the battle and about the background.

I want to note that in Soviet times this issue was given little attention in the literature. There were no special publications on this topic at all, and in some studies that covered the development of the Soviet armed forces and, in particular, the Air Force, several paragraphs or, at best, a chapter were devoted to this problem.

Everything led to the fact that by the beginning of the 90s stereotypes had formed, a quite definite picture of this day and previous events, which can be briefly characterized by the following moments: the defeat of the Red Army Air Force was due to the suddenness of the German attack, as a rule, it was always added that there were more than 60 Soviet airfields were attacked, more than 1200 aircraft were destroyed. Almost all publications added that the Luftwaffe had a numerical superiority over the Soviet Air Force and that most of the Soviet aircraft were obsolete or technically faulty. Aircraft of new types, Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2, were around 2 thousand. The Luftwaffe, together with the allies, in all publications was given about 5 thousand aircraft, so they were superior to the Red Army Air Force technically and numerically.

This information wandered from book to book, and there were few variations. Basically, people who were interested in this topic could draw information from the memories of eyewitnesses or participants. By the early 90s, certain myths had developed. This had negative consequences: in connection with the so-called. “freedom of speech” appeared pseudo-theories that tried to answer who is to blame. It turned out that in fact, either the generals betrayed, and this catastrophe occurred, or de Soviet soldiers were not going to fight. In particular, such a theory was put forward by the well-known Mark Solonin, who devoted several books to this topic. In them, he tries to prove that allegedly no battle took place in the air, and the Russian pilots simply fled, abandoned their equipment and retreated far to the east. It started already in the early 2000s. The first publication was called: “Where did the Stalinist falcons fly to?”. Briefly, I would like to dispel doubts: they fought the enemy as best they could, using all the forces and means that were at that moment, just the lack of documentary material made it possible for such people to operate with unverified facts.

The first thing that the same Solonin is wrong about is that he starts from the wrong tasks. He could not even determine the composition of the Soviet Air Force grouping on June 22 in the Western border districts, since at that time he did not have information about the real composition and deployment of the Air Force in the western districts. And then he, using operational reports, operational documentation, combat reports, draws incorrect conclusions. He believes that if, for example, some regiment had 50 aircraft, and the next day the report says that 20 aircraft remained, and according to losses in the same operational report, 10 aircraft are written, against this background he says: “Where Share the rest of the cars? And he makes some theses that are completely untrue, because the operational reports were very different from the loss reports, and often what was written in the morning’s operational report, for example, on June 22, 1941, did not at all correspond to what was later , a few days later was given to the higher command as losses. That is, a person initially set the wrong direction, then “planted” certain documents under his version that do not correspond to the format of the study. Roughly speaking, he starts talking about the number, and in the end he operates with operational documents that had nothing to do with this number. Thus, a person makes incomprehensible conclusions and puts forward crazy theories. The strangest thing is that this is picked up by many on the Internet, and some sort of conspiracy discussion practically begins.

How did things really work?

The state of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of World War II, by September 1, 1939, by June 22, 1941, was far from optimal. Why? There were quite objective reasons. Firstly, the very geography of our country played against the Red Army, which meant the presence of a very powerful group in the Far East, including the air force, and in the Transcaucasus. The forces that the Soviet Union should have had at that time could not be transferred quickly. For example, aviation from Central Russia to the Far East. There was not even a flight route, so the plane had to be disassembled first, transported in echelons. It took a lot of time, so the Soviet leadership was forced to keep very powerful groups in the Far East and Transcaucasia. That is, initially the Soviet Union needed to have much more forces even in peacetime, respectively, to produce more aircraft, produce more pilots, spend more resources, fuel, engine hours, and so on.

The second aspect: the Soviet Union began industrialization only in the early 1920s. It is a very difficult task to develop such an industry as aircraft construction in 10–15 years, given that in Tsarist Russia, as such, neither production nor development was carried out. Purchased engines and aircraft structures were used. Although there were outstanding designers, Sikorsky is the same, but basically what was used at the front was the equipment of the allies, which, at best, was produced under license. In general, it was not possible to overcome the problem of creating our own high-quality aircraft industry and models of equipment by the beginning of World War II.

Map of the construction of operational airfields

A striking example: by September 1, the Luftwaffe received several engines with a power above 1000 hp. Unfortunately, the Red Army Air Force did not have such equipment and lagged behind for almost a whole period.

Thus, in technical terms, Soviet aircraft lost to German ones. Another reason for this was the production of aluminum, which in the USSR was 3-4 times behind the German one. Accordingly, the Germans could afford to build all-metal aircraft from duralumin, which, naturally, is lighter, and the USSR was forced to build aircraft of mixed designs, heavier, which, in the presence of weak engines, created a difficult situation.

The second issue, which, as a rule, was not covered and is not covered, is the organizational and mobilization measures that were carried out from 1938 until the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union, as you know, although it did not fully enter the war on September 1, it began to conduct preparations long before. There was a "skew" towards quantitative parameters. There were reasons for this, including the territory. We took the path of more aircraft, pilots, formations, units, to the detriment of quality. The training of the flight crew, which was already not up to par in the 30s, completely fell to an unacceptable minimum in the 38-40s, and produced pilots, as a rule, the maximum that they could master on a combat aircraft was takeoff and landing . It was not uncommon for graduates to have literally 20-30 flights on a combat aircraft. They didn't even have to take off and land. At the beginning of 1939, the Red Army Air Force had about 150 aviation regiments, in 1940 they added another 100, in 1941 they began to form another 100 regiments. Thus, according to the quantitative characteristics of the Red Army Air Force, they had a perfect armada - 350 aviation regiments, more than 20 thousand combat aircraft, 23 thousand pilots in combat units, plus 7 thousand instructor pilots in military schools and 34 thousand simultaneously trained cadets. With such indicators, there was no question of any quality of training. This is another reason that the events were rather tragic.

In many countries, such as Japan, the opposite trend was observed. They paid too much attention to the quality of pilot training and due to this they lost a lot in numbers. When in 1942-44 the Americans knocked out the bulk of their experienced pilots - probably everyone knows this story - it turned out that the Japanese simply did not have personnel. The bias in both directions is not very good, and only the Americans managed to find the golden mean, and only due to the fact that they had the richest country. They were able to train good pilots in huge numbers and at the same time produce excellent aircraft and engines.

In view of the so-called organizational and mobilization measures, the composition of the personnel units was greatly "liquefied". Even those units that were formed in the 30s and reorganized into regiments in 1938, experienced pilots and commanders were regularly taken from them over the course of 40-41 years and sent as commanders to the newly formed units. This led to negative consequences, because the personnel structure of the personnel units was greatly weakened.

Let's move on to preparing for war. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were preparing to conduct combat operations in the air quite decisively. Both sides intended to conduct the first operations specifically to gain air supremacy and were preparing to act on airfields in the first place. However, the approaches differed. The German Air Force approached this issue in more detail. An important factor here was that the Germans held fewer organizational events, formed fewer units, keeping the pre-war ones in very good personnel. Of course, they had losses in the campaign in the West, the campaign of 1940, but on the whole the backbone remained. If the Germans at the beginning of World War II had 23 fighter groups, then on June 22 they had about 40 fighter groups, i.e. The composition has increased, but not by much. And the Soviet Air Force, which had 55 fighter regiments on September 1, 1939, by 1941 had about 150, and the number of personnel and equipment in them was greater than that of the Luftwaffe. The quality of training suffered because of this, but there were other reasons related to intelligence activities. The Germans at one time created a powerful reconnaissance aviation even before the war, which included units at all levels of subordination, starting from the Wehrmacht high command, which had eyes in the form of a specialized unit, or rather, a formation, the Rovel Ober-Group, which included both reconnaissance aviation units , and infrastructure, laboratories, airfields, which allowed them to conduct reconnaissance at the highest level. The Germans began preparing for military operations against the Soviet Union immediately after the final approval of the Barbarossa plan, which was adopted in December 1940, respectively, the Germans began preparations from the beginning of January. Aircraft were specially built, or rather, converted from existing models: high-altitude engines were installed on them, they received camouflage in the form of civilian identification marks, and all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several Yu-86 aircraft were designed with pressurized cabins, which allowed them to operate from heights of 12–13 km. At that time, this was the maximum height for interceptors, and it was difficult to use interceptor fighters effectively. Plus, the fact that there was no radar field over the Soviet-German border played a role. The Soviet Union had several radar stations, but they were all located in the region of Leningrad and Moscow, so the activities of German intelligence officers were absolutely unpunished. You can see a map, a real map from TsAMO, which gives an idea of ​​the activities of German reconnaissance aircraft.

This is the region of East Prussia and the Baltic states. One of the squadrons, based in the Königsberg area, the 2nd squadron of the Obergroup Rovel, carried out reconnaissance flights along the route: they took off from the Seerappen airfield along Königsberg, further over the Baltic Sea, entered approximately in the Libava area, further in the Riga area, carried out reconnaissance flights over the entire territory of the Baltic states, Belarus and went to their territory in the Brest region, landed at an airfield in the Warsaw region, refueled and performed a reverse reconnaissance flight along the same route in the opposite direction. Soviet VNSO posts, that is, observations and detections, very rarely recorded these flights, because they were carried out at high altitude. How many such flights were made, unfortunately, we do not know. Soviet data speaks of 200 flights, but in fact there were many more. There is no German data, but there is actual confirmation of these German actions: the Germans at one time were able to film almost all the main Soviet airfields, railway stations, and troop concentrations. For example, an aerial photograph taken from a German intelligence officer on April 10, 1941.

Aerial photography. Kaunas, April 10, 1941

Kaunas is visible on it, the famous Kaunas fortress, the airfield, more precisely, the southern part of the airfield, in which the 15th Fighter Regiment of the 8th Mixed Division was based, is visible. Visible hangars, aircraft parking. The detail of these shots was amazing, you can see everything, including every plane. The crews of the Luftwaffe, for which such tablets were being prepared, had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with future targets in detail. This activity was carried out on a daily basis, without stopping until almost June 22, until the moment of the invasion, and we have some opportunities to look in retrospect how the situation has changed.

For example, here is a later picture taken on June 9, the entire Kaunas airfield is already visible, including what we saw in the previous picture - the hangars of the 15th IAP, the planes stand in three rows in front of the hangars, you can even now count each plane. In the northern part of the airfield of the 31st IAP, you can count all the planes, plan approaches for bombing from both sides.

Aerial photography. June 9, 1941

What could the Red Army oppose in terms of intelligence? Many have noticed that recently there has been a layer of publications devoted to the intelligence activities of various structures. She, of course, was very important, but, unfortunately, she did not provide materials similar to the Germans. By the way, here is the Yu-86 aircraft with a pressurized cabin, civilian registration plates are visible. This is the only vehicle lost during these reconnaissance flights. Unique photo. The crew landed in the Rovno area - their engines failed. The Germans managed to blow up the plane before they were captured, but, nevertheless, the Soviet specialists managed to extract several remnants of the photographic equipment, including a film where it was clear that the Germans were photographing the railway lines in the Korosten region.

Downed Yu-86

The Soviet Air Force could rely on intelligence information collected, as a rule, in the 30s, because permission for intelligence activities was not received until at least the beginning of June. There are several notes written by the heads of the Red Army Air Force - first Rychagov, then Zhigarev, who asked Timoshenko and Stalin to start reconnaissance over German territory, but there was no such decision until mid-June. Soviet pilots were forced to rely on less relevant data that was collected back in the 30s. For some objects, they were of sufficient quality - for example, the plan of Königsberg is quite good, there are map materials, even some photographic materials, on which the Devau airfield is marked. But the bulk of the data was represented by approximately such diagrams, on which at best there were target coordinates, a small description and the simplest diagram, which, of course, can be used as a visual aid, but it was almost impossible to find an airfield using it.

Soviet pilots were forced to act in such situations, often at random. The difference in intelligence that the Germans and the Red Army Air Force had was approximately understandable. According to the plans (we do not take political questions, who was going to attack first, who was not going to), the Soviet cover plans for the Red Army were to act aggressively, inflicting a number of attacks on German airfields. But the problem was that due to the lack of up-to-date intelligence information, part of the strikes, even according to these plans, would have been carried out on empty airfields where there were no combat units, and vice versa, those airfields where combat units were located, according to the plan, should not have been attacked .

The Germans, accordingly, could adjust their plans until June 22 and have up-to-date information, seeing the movements of the Red Army Air Force as if online. And when some comrades doubt that the Germans had such successes on June 22, this is rather strange. Because, having information where it was necessary to strike, the Germans did not even need to expend energy for this, only highlighting small groups of aircraft that delivered accurate strikes.

An interesting aspect of technical preparation for combat operations. The Luftwaffe conducted research even after the Polish, French events, and especially during the "Battle of Britain". The tactics of actions against enemy airfields were worked out, which included both tactical methods and the use of specialized ammunition. A target range of weapons was developed, including fragmentation bombs, which were supposed to become a know-how, an effective method of destroying aircraft at airfields. This is a small SD-2 bomb, weighing 2.5 kg, the smallest bomb at that time designed for military operations. Next came the SD-10 in the nomenclature, then the SD-50 fragmentation bomb, and the last one, the SD-250, is already a very heavy bomb, but it was rarely used. The main bombs that were used were precisely the SD-2 and SD-50.

Air bombs SD-2 and SD-50

What was their advantage? German aircraft received holders for these bombs, which made it possible to hang a very large number of them. Suppose an ordinary Messerschmitt fighter had the ability to hang 96 such bombs. Despite the fact that the bomb was small at first glance, it had an effectiveness equal to an 82-mm mine, that is, very serious: hitting an aircraft almost always disabled it. In addition, some of these munitions were provided with clockwork, which made them even more of a problem for airfields. They could explode an hour or two after they were dropped.

This is how an aircraft from the second group of the 27th fighter squadron looked in the field, equipped with bombs.

A real shot of June 1941 in the Suwalki area. Suspension SD-2 for the BF-110 heavy fighter, it has 48 bombs under each wing, the total load is 96 bombs. The suspension of 4 SD-50 bombs was also practiced, which, in principle, is also effective. I draw your attention to the fact that, for example, a typical SB, the main bomber in the Red Army Air Force by 1941, as a rule, carried a load of only 6 FAB-100 bombs, that is, the Mi-109 fighter was actually equivalent to the SB.

An interesting video of the attack with SD-2 bombs, which shows how much airfields could be sown with them. These are the first shots, this is the SD-50 bombing, by the way. But the SD-2 is being bombed. That is, even a small group of German fighters equipped with such bombs could, with a high degree of certainty, guarantee the destruction of materiel that was not covered.

German bombers were also trained specifically for operations on airfields. They, as a rule, carried (Junkers-88 and Dornier-17) 360 of these bombs, what we have just seen. A group of three aircraft could drop 1,000 of these bombs. In addition, even larger ammunition was used, mainly SD-50 bombs. In the nomenclature of the German Ju-88 and Dornier-17 bombers, 20 such bombs could be suspended without reloading, and the Heinkel-111 bomber could hang 32 such bombs without reloading. That is, the attack of the Junkers-88 link was equivalent to the attack of the SB group of 9 aircraft.

Accordingly, the Heinkel-111 link could drop almost 100 such bombs, and this is equivalent to the actions of a squadron of DB-3 aircraft, in which 10 "acres" were suspended. In addition, all German fighters at that time already carried cannon armament, two guns each or one each, if we talk about the Me-109F. Soviet aircraft were armed mainly with machine guns, there were a very small number of I-16 aircraft with cannon armament, and the Yak-1 aircraft have just gone into production.

An important factor was the very organization of the enemy. The Luftwaffe is clearly a branch of the armed forces in Germany, which reported directly to the Reichsmarschall and further to the Fuhrer and had its own fully built structure. In addition to the actual aviation units, it was also the rear and anti-aircraft artillery, very powerful. The Red Army Air Force was not fully a branch of the armed forces, it was rather a kind that was subordinate to the ground forces. An interesting fact: until June 30, 1941 there was no post of commander of the Red Army Air Force, there was a head of department. The air force commanders of the fronts reported directly to the commanders of the fronts, and this subsequently played a negative role. In addition to mobilization and organizational measures, the Soviet Air Force in 1939-40. moved to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic states, so they were forced to build a new network of airfields along the entire border. For example, this is part of the map for the construction of airfields in the Baltic States. Accordingly, that system of subordination to the ground forces created a very serious problem: the Soviet Air Force was stretched along the entire front from Murmansk to the Black Sea in a thin layer. Part of the forces, because the construction of airfields was only underway, the Red Army Air Force was forced to keep much to the east, approximately along the Smolensk-Kyiv-Zaporozhye meridian. It turned out that the air force was divided into at least two echelons, approximately 400–500 kilometers apart. The units located in the area of ​​Tallinn, Smolensk, Orsha, Mogilev, Kyiv, Proskurovo, Krivoy Rog could not help the units of the first echelon in the first battles. And the construction of airfields was not properly carried out either in 1939 or 1940. The 41st was the year when they tried to close these gaps. The construction of 800 operational airfields immediately began, in addition, concrete standard runways began to be built at 240 airfields, which also did not add optimism, because even a person who is not familiar with construction understands that such a huge number of construction projects in six months is simply impossible build.

The layout of the lanes at the airport

Accordingly, here is one of the photographs of how the Red Army soldiers mount the grid for pouring the concrete strip.

Laying the mesh for pouring the concrete strip

Distribution of forces. In the Baltics, the first aviation corps is located approximately from Königsberg to the border, and, accordingly, the Red Army Air Force opposing it is located here the 6th division, here the 7th division, here the 8th, here the 57th, and the fourth, for example, is already located in the region of Tallinn, Tartu, and in such formation it cannot start hostilities. It cannot effectively conduct combat operations, even with bombers. That is, the Germans could use all their forces in the first strike, the Soviet Air Force could not. Moreover, even according to the cover plan, part of the forces still had to be located along the line of the Western Dvina, that is, at a distance of about 250 km from the border, and, accordingly, I also can’t imagine how they could participate in the border battle in this perspective. This happened everywhere, not only in the Baltic states, along the entire length of the Western Front, and the South-Western, and the Air Force of the 9th Army in Moldova. The Soviet Air Force entered far from being optimally composed, having been divided into several echelons. Even the first echelon was then divided into two echelons along the border, and at a distance of about 250 km, and the third echelon was at a distance of 400-500 km from the border. Everyone knows the textbook data that the Luftwaffe had somewhere around 2.5 thousand combat aircraft, the Red Army Air Force had somewhere around 7.5 thousand combat aircraft in the Western districts, but it is impossible to actually use most of the forces for the above reasons. In addition, the Red Army Air Force was under deployment, and if the Germans could field all their 20 fighter groups in the optimal composition on June 22, then out of the 69 fighter regiments represented in the western districts, 24 were of real combat value, 7 of which were in the second or third echelons. It was simply impossible to use the notorious numerical superiority. The Soviet Air Force had to enter the battle in parts, which gave the Germans an excellent opportunity to defeat them, which subsequently happened.

The preliminary part, unfortunately, is not so rosy, but, nevertheless, it was in reality. Being in such a formation, in such a state, with such forces and preparation, it must be said honestly that the Soviet Air Force did not have the slightest chance of winning the preliminary battle. They could only delay the inevitable defeat of the first echelon and wait for the approach of the second and third echelons in order to continue the battle with a more powerful composition.

Let's move on to the war itself. Here, for example, are the results of the first strike. The western and northwestern direction was planned for 4 in the morning, that is, the German planes were supposed to cross the Soviet-German border with the first salvos of the artillery offensive, after 15-20 minutes they had already struck at the forward airfields. In the southwest and south direction, it was an hour later, apparently due to light conditions.

Here is the Kaunas airfield, its southern part. The same parking lots that we saw in the first series are visible bomb craters. Not everything is obvious, because I had to crop the picture a little.

Kaunas. the result of the bombing

People who say that it was impossible to destroy such a large number of aircraft on June 22 are sinning against the truth, because this is confirmed by objective data from German control. Shooting on June 23, this is photo control. And this is what it looked like on the ground. This is the same parking lot, hangars, standing in three rows of planes. It can be seen that the second row is completely destroyed, the back row is completely destroyed, but in the first row there is something more or less alive. The shooting was carried out on these two aircraft, in fact, they were also half burned down.

Kaunas. The result of the bombing

This gives an idea of ​​the effectiveness of German strikes. In reality, on June 22, the Red Army Air Force faced an incredibly strong enemy, persistent in achieving its goal, and there was no chance of winning this confrontation, at least the first operation.

These are photographs from the Signal magazine - the same group of aircraft, but from a different angle. Here is a spread of this "Signal". Here all the photos from the Baltics are Kaunas, Kedanyai, Alytus, a clear German report on the hostilities.

Signal magazine

As for the very first point: another negative factor was that on the morning of June 22 there was no agreement from the military-political leadership, and for a very long time no clear order was given to start hostilities. In fact, there was no surprise as such, because the troops of the Soviet border districts had long begun to rise on June 22 on alarm, and in the Baltic states, on the 19-20th, the planes were dispersed where possible, due to airfield construction, along field airfields , and one squadron was constantly at readiness number two, that is, ready to take off within 5-10 minutes. But for some reason, this completely normal state was violated on the night of June 21-22 by the infamous "Directive No. 1", which was handed over to the troops at about one in the morning on June 22. Such postulates were expressed there that when attacking, do not get involved in battle, and do not open fire in return until enemy aircraft open fire. This very much brought down the mood of the Soviet commanders and pilots. In the films of the Soviet era, they saw where, roughly speaking, Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, or some other characters, call Tymoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense, and say: "Look, the Germans are attacking." And in response they are told not to succumb to provocations, to remain calm and so on. Instead of clearly and clearly telling the commanders how to act, they were given a choice: either to attack, or to fight, or not to fight, to wait, maybe this is a provocation. And in the context of the Air Force, this played a negative role, because on June 22, the ground forces did not enter the battle everywhere, but on June 22, the Air Force entered the battle almost at full strength. This moment, when the first blow was not repelled, had a completely negative impact in the future. Even Kaunas, the destroyed airfields that we saw - this was done during the first raid, although the Germans did not set such a goal of destruction in this first raid. They had it more like a sighting, basically they set the task of conducting additional reconnaissance, once again clarifying the goals. However, where they had excellent intelligence records, they operated in powerful groups. In the Baltic States, several airfields were destroyed, and our Air Force suffered serious losses. In Ukraine, in Belarus there was a similar situation. Even the very first blows were very effective. But I emphasize once again that this was not their main task, the main one was additional reconnaissance. Then it happens like this: some Soviet military leaders who were given such a puzzle solved it in a normal way: for example, in the Baltic States, the commander of the Air Force was Alekei Ivanovich Ionov, Major General of Aviation.

Ionov A.I., Major General of Aviation

Here he is, still a brigade commander, in a pre-war rank. He most likely received an order from the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, Klenov, to conduct combat operations, and in response to the first strike, they were raised (I honestly do not know if a cover plan was introduced, but at least the orders, which were given to the formations, clearly corresponded to the cover plan), bomber regiments were raised into the air, which went to bomb German airfields and other targets. For example, a man, at that time a captain, Mikhail Antonovich Krivtsov, he was the commander of the first Soviet squadron, which on the morning of June 22 dropped bombs on Tilsit.

Krivtsov Mikhail Antonovich

There is an interesting fact related to this man, which, again, speaks of the role of the individual: a directive gave people a choice, and the most decisive commanders acted decisively, such as Ionov, Krivtsov, a number of other commanders, while others simply sat on the ground and did not succumb to provocations, some regiments did not even take off into the air. And those who took off followed the order not to open fire first, and the German Air Force suffered very small losses in the first raid because of this. Not only did the directive not regulate these actions, but when the planes of the North-Western Front were already on their way to German airfields, bases, etc., from the People's Commissariat of Defense or from the General Staff, it is now difficult to say whether the order came over the radio to turn around, bombard do not produce on German territory. One squadron of the 46th Sbap returned from a combat course. But people like Krivtsov showed determination, their own opinion, and nevertheless dropped the bombs, thanks to which the Germans received at least some kind of retaliation at that moment. Further more.

They returned all the planes, they were allowed to operate only up to the border. At about 7:15 a.m., there was the so-called “Directive No. 2”, which again did not allow the plan to be put into effect, she spoke “interesting” language, and set local tasks. There was a completely incomprehensible phrase to bomb Koenigsberg and Memel - it is not clear why it was said. Otherwise, it was allowed to shoot down enemy planes, act in the tail, that is, after the strike, pursue the enemy plane and bomb its parts, but, unfortunately, it arrived in the districts by 9 in the morning. What is 9 am? The Germans carried out the first series of strikes at 4–5 am, the next series was at 7–8 am. The purpose of the latter was not only a reconnaissance mission, but also the destruction of aircraft at airfields. The second raid of German aircraft was accentuated in terms of materiel, additionally explored, that is, the German pilots had already visited German airfields once, they had no questions, they acted clearly. Several regiments in Belarus were simply completely destroyed as a result of these raids. Indeed completely, they then did not act at all. For example, the 113th and 16th bomber regiments were completely destroyed, none of their aircraft after that took part in any actions. This is not an isolated case. When the directive arrived, because of these morning stop orders, apparently, the comrades were a little on edge and were already afraid to produce some kind of independent things, and this directive also raised questions in them. An interesting fact: in the documents of the 125th high-speed bomber regiment of the Western District Air Force, the division commander persistently, several hours after receiving the directive, tries to force the regiment commander to fly out on a combat mission, he eventually, somewhere at 11.45, agrees to do this, and asks for him every 5 minutes a radiogram on board, if the order was canceled. This is what people have been driven to by such nonsense. As a result, his last doubts disappeared when they listened to Molotov's speech about declaring war in the air at 12-odd. By such actions, before dinner, aviation was put in the role of manager: either we are at war, or we are not at war. Many said and wrote that the connection was interrupted. Here are many units, whose connection with the higher authorities was interrupted, just the same, they worked better, because, having no connection, they began to conduct military operations without looking back at anyone, making a decision on their own. Before lunch, the Germans managed to complete three sorties, if we take the Baltic and the Western Front, and two sorties, if we take the Southwestern Front, on our airfields. The effect was devastating.

Here, if we take Tilsit, there were the results of the first flight of nine from Mikhail Krivtsov's 9 sbap, which was the first to drop bombs on the Tilsit railway station.

Tilsit. The result of the bombing

These are the results of the SD-2 strikes on the Vilnius airfield. You can see the burned Seagull and, possibly, its "killer", here you can see that the pylon for SD-2 is suspended.

The result of the SD-2 strikes on the Vilnius airfield

Accordingly, the Western Front - advanced airfields of three divisions were attacked, on which by 10.00, after the second raid, they were completely defeated, for example, in the 10th division - the 74th regiment, the 33rd regiment, the 123rd regiment. In the 10th mixed division, the 124th and 126th regiments were defeated. In reality, there remained in the regiments: in the 33rd - not a single aircraft, in the 74th - not a single combat-ready aircraft, the 123rd IAP was able to withdraw 13 fighters, the 126th IAP was able to withdraw 6 fighters, the 124th - 1.

I have one interesting comrade from Poland who said and wrote several times: “Mikhail, this is impossible, only a nuclear strike ...” Well, everything was possible, these are our documents, not German, it is the documents of the Red Army Air Force that confirm this level losses. At the airfield, which had 50-60 aircraft, the Germans could destroy almost all equipment in 2-3 sorties. Well, of course, these were both destroyed and damaged cars. But a damaged aircraft, if your crankcase is pierced or even the tires are shot, you cannot fix it in the near future.

The 13th sbap was completely destroyed, the 16th sbap of the neighboring 11th division, the 122nd IAP received heavy defeats. Thus, by 10 am the situation was completely unbearable. There is such a telegram, intercepted by the Germans, of the commander from Bialystok, Cherny, who almost openly asked for help. Ultimately, the only thing he was allowed to do was withdraw to the Pinsk-Baranovichi-Volkovysk-Lida line, that is, 100 kilometers away. And by 12 o’clock these formations were almost at full strength, one fighter regiment only remained, they were redeployed to the second line. But then the fact that the Red Army was just deploying, that is, there was no mobilization, therefore, the rear services were in a state of peacetime, therefore, retreat and quickly transfer the materials that were available: bombs, a supply of fuel and lubricants, to the airfields of the second runway, to which relocated, it was difficult. The airfields were in the process of being built, there were not even garrisons there, but there were mainly builders, units that were building runways. But even this retreat did not guarantee anything: the Germans bombed the Lida airfield, Pinsk, in the afternoon. It is interesting that units from the Bialystok ledge first retreated to the Bialystok area, they were bombed out from there during 2-3 sorties, and they, too, were forced to travel further after lunch. Having moved to the second line, the regiments did not conduct combat operations due to lack of material resources and became passive witnesses. Approximately the same situation developed in the Baltics, but with the addition that the energetic commander of the Air Force all the time tried to act according to his plans. He was one of the few leaders of the Red Army Air Force who understood that it was necessary to fight for dominance to the very end, but, unfortunately, on June 22, certain circumstances did not allow him to do so. Why? I have already said, the subordination of the Air Force to the ground forces, the ground commanders. At 8–9 o’clock in the morning, there were breakthroughs of German groups on Taurage and on Alytus, so the front commander or chief of staff - it is difficult to establish who really led it there - gave the order to strike at these retractable tank wedges, respectively, the entire Northwestern Air Force front were focused on combating these units. That is, German aircraft continued to attack new Soviet airfields or repeat attacks on old ones, they operated throughout the day without stopping, even in small groups. The Soviet Air Force did not answer them in principle, acting on the motorized units of the Wehrmacht.

The belated reaction of the Western Front, what I have already described, the commander of one of the regiments asked him to give a radiogram every 5 minutes on board, whether the flight was canceled. A little later, General Pavlov gave the order for active hostilities against the enemy, somewhere at 5.30. An order was issued for actions on German airfields, but at 6–7 “amateur activity” was banned, the Air Force stood for several more hours under a hail of blows. The strikes of the Air Force of the Western Front were belated, but they were. By the way, what is interesting is that one of the regiments, the 125th Sbap, as I said, attacked the Berzhniki airfield in the Suwalki ledge. Nine attacked, bombed, damaged even one German aircraft and returned completely without loss. Another airfield was Biala Podlyaska, it was even later: from the 130th Sbap, one nine also attacked, the Germans had losses. The most interesting thing is that the Security Council was bombed from a height of 5 kilometers and nevertheless hit. To be objective, only two strikes were made against German airfields: one airfield in the Suwalki ledge, Berzhniki, and one in Byala Podlaska, this is in the Brest region, to the west.

The plan for the location of the air force in the Baltic States

Despite these timid attacks, on June 22, morning in the Baltic states and midday in the area of ​​​​Suwalki and Brest, they were practically ineffective (the loss of three aircraft cost nothing). However, the Germans did not use fighter aircraft after that in repeated attacks, but used it for loitering and even made an airfield maneuver, that is, they transferred fighter regiments to their airfields so as not to be under attack. This again suggests that if the Red Army Air Force acted according to the cover plan for German airfields, no matter how effective it was, we now understand that most airfields would be attacked empty, since there would be no German aircraft there. However, the actions themselves, like a magnet, would attract German aircraft, respectively, did not give them the opportunity to attack Soviet airfields. And so it happened: the regiments of the advanced Western Front were thrown back from the border before lunch on June 22, in the Baltic states the same process took place after 2 hours. As soon as the sorties on the German columns ended, most of the units were immediately moved to the Riga region, in the Daugavpils, Mitava region, that is, most of the airfields, and most of the airfields of the district were generally in the 200 km zone, they were abandoned and the units moved to a distance of 200– 250 km from the border. Accordingly, the advanced units of the Soviet troops, which were still fighting on the borders, were thus completely deprived of support from fighters. That is, if the bombers could still fly quite normally with a bomb load, then the fighters could not practically operate from such a distance. The withdrawal from the Baltics suggested itself even earlier, and the commanders of all levels asked for it, but the task was to bomb the tank columns, and they nevertheless carried out these sorties and only after that they redeployed.

Approximately the same situation was in the Kiev military district. The Germans also attacked practically advanced airfields along the entire border period, starting from Kovel to Lvov, along the border to Chernivtsi. The Germans had the audacity to confront the Kyiv military district, having a limited number of forces, even to bomb Kyiv. Neither Minsk was bombed on June 22, nor Riga was bombed, but for some reason Kyiv was, although the Germans had very limited forces in the Kyiv district. KOVO itself had the most powerful air force, more than 2,000 aircraft, and most importantly, most of the fighter regiments of the Kiev district were personnel, that is, they could repulse German aircraft, which was done. The Luftwaffe suffered the greatest losses precisely in the zone of the Kyiv military district. For example, the 3rd group of the 51st bomber squadron operating in the area of ​​​​Stanislav and Lvov lost about half of its strength, that is, they were 15 aircraft. The 7th squadron of the 3rd group of the 55th squadron, which in the first sortie bombed the airfield near Brody and Dubno with 6 planes, out of 6 planes that took off 2 lost over the target, 2 burned out (one fell on Soviet territory, one landed there at the airfield , but burned down), and two were damaged with wounded arrows and landed at the airfield in Klimentsovo. That is, the Soviet Air Force also gave a very definite answer if the commanders had the determination to speak out without an order from above. But, nevertheless, all the airfields were practically attacked, some airfields were simply destroyed, for example, the airfield of the 62nd cap of Lisyachich was attacked several times, and literally 50 aircraft were destroyed in the first sortie. The Chernivtsi airfield was attacked twice, but even after the first sortie, most of the 149th was destroyed. The neighboring airfield was also attacked, most of the 247th IAP was destroyed, and the total losses somewhere reached 100 aircraft.

There is an opinion that in Moldova, through some incredible tricks, the district command managed to avoid defeat due to the fact that they were dispersed over operational airfields. I would like to say that this is a myth. The fact is that the Germans had a division with the Romanians somewhere along the meridian of Chisinau, and, accordingly, the German 4th air corps, which was based in Romania, operated exactly at the airfields in the Chernivtsi region. A little west of Chisinau was the airfield of the 55th IAP, Balti, was attacked several times on June 22, and also suffered heavy losses that were not reflected in the reports, which made it possible for some of the officers of this district to write in memoirs, to promote themselves that they succeeded . Although, in fact, if their opponents were not the Romanians, but the Germans, most likely, the fate of the district air force would also be sad.

In the Kiev Military District, Soviet units practically did not retreat to airfields, only some units retreated on June 22, including from Chernivtsi. Why did this happen? In fact, the strip from Kovel to Stanislav (on the Ukrainian side) is a rather undeveloped strip, and there was a problem with airfields in general. Therefore, the Germans also had airfields quite far from the border, and our closest airfields in the Lvov region were about 100 kilometers from the border. Accordingly, German aircraft were forced to operate in some places at full range and they did not succeed in achieving decisive success at all airfields by bombing. They suffered heavy losses.

The command of the Air Force front, apparently, did not even try to draw any conclusions. In addition, according to some reports, the commander of the Air Force of the front, Ptukhin, was already removed from the leadership, and, apparently, on June 22 he did not even participate in combat planning. At least there is no serious combat order.

Scheme of the deployment of Air Force units on the Western Front

If we take the Baltics and the Western Front, who at least tried to act on German airfields in response, then there was no 9th Army on the Southern Front and in the Air Force, although reconnaissance activities were carried out. If someone read Pokryshkin's memoirs, there he describes a reconnaissance raid on Romanian airfields around noon on June 22, when he flew in, reported to the command, and he was told: "Sorry, we will have other goals." And the Air Force of the 9th Army in the afternoon received an order to bomb the crossings on the Prut, and from the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, 2 regiments received the task of bombing the German tank units that crossed the Bug and advanced on Vladimir-Volynsky. That's all.

That is, on June 22, by 18:00, the Soviet Air Forces in the Baltic States and Belarus were knocked out on the rear line of airfields, there were no practical combat operations after 18:00, and the only thing they could do was barrage, patrol over their own airfields, cover it. The Luftwaffe finished its sorties on airfields somewhere later, around 20 o’clock, but it was already “after” when the German intelligence officers discovered that detour to the rear line and tried to reconnoiter in order to continue the operation the next day. The same - in the strip of the South-Western Front, the Southern Front. The enemy completely controlled the sky over the front lines, the Red Army Air Force practically did not participate in patrolling over the borders, advanced units, and the only thing that happened was a strike on German troops who were crossing the Bug in the Vladimir-Volynsky region.

The Germans, by their actions on June 22, especially in the first half of the day, secured dominance in the strip of the North-Western and Western fronts somewhere at a distance of 200–250 km from the border, completely knocking out Soviet units from there. They have not yet completely defeated, but they defeated, and the territory remained with the enemy. In the zone of the Southwestern Front, many units were also kicked out of their airfields, not all, but very many. When leadership of the Southwestern Front was resumed on June 23, almost all units were redeployed further inland, 50–100 km, that is, to the Ternopil and Rovno region. There was a situation when there were no Soviet air units somewhere 200 km from the borders. For a fighter, 200 km at that time is just to fly and come back, there is no time for air combat. The units that were along the border had already completely lost their cover. Conclusion: thanks to its unique training, its technical capabilities, perseverance in achieving goals, a well-planned plan, and tactically competent actions, the Luftwaffe, unfortunately, managed to defeat the Red Army Air Force on June 22.

Loading ammo

What are the positive aspects? First, there was no defeatist mood, despite the fact that many are now trying to create some kind of image of scurrying pilots, fleeing generals. All this is obvious nonsense. Part of the Air Force of the North-Western Front, and part of the Air Force of the Western Front, retreated, having strictly received orders, but if they had retreated earlier without an order, they could have saved part of the forces, part of the funds. The Soviet pilots did, in my opinion, everything possible. There are confirmed episodes of 4 or even 5 ramming. Sufficiently fierce fighting took place along the entire front line. However, the Germans were not "whipping boys", they received very serious experience in Western Europe, and besides, they tried to avoid serious military clashes on occasion. As an example, these are the actions of the 1st German bomber squadron against the Liepaja airfield. The 148th Fighter Aviation Regiment was based there. The Germans in a day, using such a simple technique as entering from the sea, destroyed and damaged 41 aircraft of this regiment in a day. There were no German fighters there at all. Some serious air battles were not carried out for the reason that the Germans entered, bombed and dived towards the sea. It was very problematic to catch up with the Yu-88 on the I-153. This served, at one time, as one of the theories of Solonin, when he found the operational report of the North-Western Front, where it was written that the losses were 14 aircraft per day, and on the morning of the 23rd there were 27 aircraft of the regiment in Riga. And he says: “Where did the 30 cars go?”. In fact, due to the inconsistency of operational documents, only the very first operational report of the regiment or combat report got to the front headquarters. After that, the battles for Liepaja began, respectively, the headquarters of the regiment began to move towards Riga, trying to retreat. Apparently, the data was not transmitted, so that only the first encryption reached the front headquarters, which mentioned 14 destroyed aircraft. Then there were more losses, and the last loss was around 8 pm, when the Germans, apparently, accidentally hit, at the moment when the aircraft were refueling, and destroyed almost the entire squadron. But this again suggests that the Germans did not stop acting. They had morning success, they did not stop developing it and, characteristically, even attacked targets that had already been abandoned by the Soviet units. Some airfields, for example, Vilnius, Kaunas, there were no combat-ready units of the Red Army as such, there were rear services, there were planes that did not have pilots, or they were out of order, old and subject to transfer to other units. However, the Germans continued to hammer until the evening, thus depriving the pilots, who could move there from other airfields and pick up the materiel, of such an opportunity. The Luftwaffe was not going to end the fight for air supremacy on June 22, and what they succeeded they continued with pleasure on June 23, and started even earlier, around 3 o'clock in the morning.

Some of the Soviet commanders understood this very well. Alexey Ivanovich Ionov, for example, as soon as the opportunity allowed him, as soon as they completed the battle with the German mechanized units, he withdrew the regiment to the Dvina line. Even before the appearance of Directive No. 3, which implied a Soviet offensive against Lublin, he had already given the order from the morning of June 23 to act according to the cover plan. As pilots, commanders of regiments, squadrons all day tried to counteract the enemy as best they could, so there were people at the level of Air Force commanders who were well versed in the situation, understood and tried to respond adequately. Unfortunately, the tools that were then available did not yet allow this to be done in full. That is, it was almost impossible to fight those Luftwaffe that were at that moment. Another point: anti-aircraft artillery could protect, to a certain extent, from the first strikes. Why did this happen? The Red Army was in the process of reorganization, most of the anti-aircraft units in the territory of western Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states were in the process of formation. Many people remember from Soviet films, especially when they bring charges and say: why were your anti-aircraft divisions somewhere at the training ground? The answer is obvious: anti-aircraft gunners carried out combat coordination, because for the majority of the Red Army soldiers of these units it was the first year of service, and they still had to train. Again, the Red Army was not mobilized, so the regular units of anti-aircraft machine guns that were available at each airfield were not only understaffed and instead of 9 machine guns they had only 3, well, quadruple Maxim installations, but they also felt a shortage of personnel , and there was simply no one to put into action many machine guns. Again, unlike the Germans. The Luftwaffe had a completely different organization, and the anti-aircraft units were subordinate to the Wehrmacht, and less, most of the anti-aircraft units and anti-aircraft guns were subordinate to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe command could line up an umbrella over the location they saw fit. Accordingly, the anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht were in a combat-ready state by the beginning of the war, they had a huge amount of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. If in the Soviet Union, before the war, about 1.5 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns of 25-mm and 37-mm were fired, which they practically did not have time to master in the troops, because they were mostly fired at the end of the 40th and the beginning of the 41st and just started to enter the army. In addition, there was a very big problem, because there was very little ammunition for these anti-aircraft guns. All the documents that we looked at are 1 BC in part, and in the warehouses of the districts there were no 37-mm shells at all, as well as 85 mm - for heavy anti-aircraft guns.

What conclusion could be drawn from this and why was it not drawn? Probably, that defeat was morally difficult, so there was no serious analysis. Some formation commanders wrote reports in hot pursuit, but they were still unable to rise above the situation, respectively, everyone had their own opinion, no one analyzed it, did not collect it, but reports on the military operations of the Southwestern Front, Northwestern and Western , they were made: the South-Western - in August 1941, the Western Front - in general at the beginning of the 42nd. By this time, there were no people at the headquarters of the Air Force of the Western Front who participated in all these events, that is, the reports are half-hearted, to be honest, about nothing. The situation was not analyzed, no conclusions were even drawn close to why this unfortunate cruel defeat happened. Later, in 42-43, the Soviet Air Force stepped on the same rake. There are no examples when an attack on German airfields could end up with such an effect as that of the Luftwaffe. To discard, for example, parts of the Luftwaffe from these airfields and gain air supremacy over some area, even if it is local. That is, no tool was created, it even seems to me that it was not created throughout the war, some kind of adequate tool, nor were any specialized bombs technically prepared. This lecture was conceived in many ways to say that history does not teach anyone anything. The fact that it was possible to draw conclusions and then effectively conduct military operations - unfortunately, was not analyzed, did not materialize in conclusions, instructions. The Red Army then, unfortunately, almost the entire war attacked the same rake. And such serious operations, like those conducted by the Luftwaffe, cannot even be remembered. The events of the Battle of Kursk are often cited, allegedly there was something there, but recent studies show that preparatory things, when attempts were made to destroy raids in May-June, failed miserably and were akin, for example, to attempts on June 25, 1941 to bomb Finnish aviation from military operations. The same thing: the lack of serious targeted intelligence, specialized ammunition, strike tactics. The Germans must be given their due: they continued this operation, expanded it, that is, on June 23–24–25 they bombed Soviet aircraft in this zone, somewhere 200–250 km. This was the last line, because, as we saw, the configuration of the border is new, mainly airfields were built in these annexed territories. And after that, in fact, the Soviet Air Force had a paradoxical situation, they were forced to retreat to the area of ​​Pskov, Smolensk, Mogilev, Proskurovo, Kyiv, and so on. The retreat was irreversible, the vast expanses were no longer covered by anything, and the Germans could do whatever they wanted there. Soviet aviation was no longer there. Literally on the 26th, the relocation began to an even more rear line 400-500 km from the border, and the battles, in general, were still going on. Lviv was taken on June 30, the battles for Riga were on June 27-28-29, Minsk, respectively, everyone also knows when the encirclement was closed at the end of June. They lost air support, and all because of the actions of the Luftwaffe. This is not connected with defeatist moods, with an unwillingness to fight, with a lack of fighting spirit and patriotism. In no case. The people on the ground did everything they could. They fought to the last opportunity, having that technique, that training. Many died heroic deaths. Most of the heroes we do not even know - the same Krivtsov, who was the first to drop bombs on German territory. He died in the 44th regiment commander, he was not even a Hero of the Soviet Union. The same Ionov - unfortunately, he was arrested on June 24 in a large group of aviation commanders. Absolutely unique destiny at the person. He was a pilot back in the First World War, then went through all the stages of a military career, commanded a squadron, a brigade for a very long time, graduated from the academy, participated in the Finnish campaign as the chief of staff of the 14th Air Force Army, acted adequately in the border battle. This person had a clear focus, a clear understanding of the essence of the first operation and, in general, many processes. His talent was not even in the field of knowledge, but in the field of military art. Nevertheless, he was arrested and shot on February 42 with a large group of commanders, although I believe that this man was worthy of becoming an air marshal and commander of the Red Army Air Force.

In conclusion, maybe I'll add a spoonful of honey to our gloomy story. The only place where the Soviet Air Force managed to defend their airfields, and defend them for a whole month, is Moldova. Romanians operated in Moldova, who were not at all as professional as their counterparts in the Luftwaffe, plus they did not have such tools as the Luftwaffe had, that is, technical training, ammunition, intelligence, and so on. The first flights of the Romanians were akin to the Soviet ones. The Romanian Air Force, allocated for combat operations, all ran into the Bolgarika airfield, this is in the Izmail region, only one Soviet fighter regiment, the 67th, was based there, and all day the Romanians tried to bomb this regiment, attack, and as a result lost more than a dozen aircraft, actually confirmed shot down. At the same time, the regiment itself lost a minuscule amount: in the air one pilot with an aircraft, 5 aircraft damaged and two more pilots wounded. That is, all day the regiment fought off all the Romanian Air Force, in fact, and did not give the descendants of the Roman patricians the slightest opportunity to do anything. That is, all groups were dispersed, defeated, suffered losses with minimal losses of the Red Army. In many ways - the role of the individual. The chief of staff of the regiment developed a tactic, this is confirmed in documents and memoirs - patrolling in large groups over the airfield. He constantly kept one or two fully equipped squadrons over the airfield, they succeeded each other, and only single groups of aircraft could break through to the airfield, quite by accident, which could slip between patrols. Here is such a story. If the 4th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe had not operated in parts of the South-Western Front in the Chernivtsi region, but had advanced on Chisinau, Odessa, I think the outcome would have been different. And so it allowed the Soviet units in the area of ​​Izmail, Chisinau, Odessa to make their own contribution to the beginning of victorious actions.