In the literature about the Second World War, the idea that Hitler did not defeat the USSR only because he did not have time to take Moscow before winter is a red thread. And he did not have time to do this because he made the invasion too late. For some reason, he waited until the end of June, instead of attacking in the spring. Moreover, the initial date of the attack seemed to be scheduled for May 15, 1941. That is, it turns out that Hitler lost precious time due to some whim or bewilderment? Or were there objective reasons that forced him to postpone the implementation of the Barbarossa plan?

First of all, let's clarify where it came from that Hitler set the date for the invasion of the USSR on May 15th. This date has only one source: the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command No. 21, otherwise the Barbarossa plan, signed by the Fuhrer on December 18, 1940. It reads: “I will give the order on the strategic deployment of the armed forces against the Soviet Union, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled date for the start of operations. Preparations requiring a longer time, if they have not yet begun, should begin now and be completed by 15.5.41.

It does not follow from this that May 15 was already scheduled as the date of the attack. By this date, the transfer of Wehrmacht troops to areas from where their strategic deployment for operations against the USSR could begin was only to be completed. The appointment of a start date for the operation is the subject of a special order. From the same text it follows that this order should have been given no later than eight weeks before the scheduled date of the invasion. That is, if this deadline was May 15, then the order should have been received no later than March 20, 1941. As you know, there was no such order. [S-BLOCK]

Of course, Hitler was interested in attacking the USSR as soon as possible, and the Barbarossa plan clearly indicates this: “German armed forces must be prepared to smash Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign." May 15 was the target date. As early as April 3rd, the OKH issued an order that called for the postponement of Operation Barbarossa "by at least four weeks." The delay was motivated by the need for a military operation in the Balkans. On April 30, after the completion of the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece, the new order for the first time named a specific date for the attack - June 22, and it was held. On June 17, the troops of Germany and its allies received the Dortmund code signal to advance to their original positions.

So, the reason for the delay seems to be beyond doubt, since the Germans themselves named it. However, some historians doubt the truth of this official version.

According to some mystically minded people, Hitler specifically timed the attack on the USSR to the day when the Russian Orthodox Church celebrated "The Day of All Saints Who Shone in the Russian Land." Considering that Hitler considered the campaign against the USSR as “a fight against godless Bolshevism”, and that the German administration everywhere opened churches in the occupied regions that had previously been closed by the Bolsheviks, this “version” should be discarded as an absurd myth. Let's consider more serious explanations.

According to such authors as V. Suvorov (Rezun) and M. Solonin, Hitler undertook the invasion at the most favorable moment in order to preempt the Soviet troops, who themselves were preparing to attack Germany. On July 6, 1941, Stalin allegedly appointed the start of the Red Army's campaign in Europe. Hitler, knowing this, chose the time to defeat the Soviet troops, concentrated near the borders and completely unprepared for defense, with a sudden blow. Therefore, he postponed the attack until June 22, in order to act for sure.

However, this version does not yet find direct documentary evidence. The problem for her is not even the secrecy of the most important Soviet archival documents of the pre-war period. In all German documents, there are absolutely no indications that the preparation of German troops for the invasion of the USSR was carried out depending on the information about the supposedly impending Soviet invasion and in order to forestall it. All the data available today indicate that Nazi Germany was preparing an attack on the USSR, completely regardless of what the Soviet leadership was doing.

The English historian A. J. P. Taylor wrote back in the 70s of the last century: “Subsequently, it was believed that the implementation of the Barbarossa plan ... was ... postponed due to events in Yugoslavia ... This is a legend invented by German generals to justify their defeat in Russia and actually based on nothing. Only 15 out of 150 [more precisely, out of 153 - Ya. B.] German divisions intended for the first strike were diverted to the Balkans. It's hardly a big loss. The plans for mobilization in Germany for the Eastern Front were not completed by May 15 ... due to a lack of supplies, especially vehicles ... The delay may even have been opportune, since after the spring snowmelt, the ground dried up by mid-June.

One more thought can be added to this. The factor of strategic surprise would certainly have been used by Germany to a greater extent if the invasion had been undertaken in the month of May. At this time, Stalin would have considered the German army the least capable of striking, since its ground operation in the Balkans had just ended, and it had yet to capture Crete.

Therefore, the hypothesis that the Wehrmacht missed a convenient time to defeat the USSR only for purely technical reasons (difficulties in concentrating the material part), and not because of the sudden need to conduct an operation in the Balkans (carried out by very limited forces), deserves serious attention.

Not everyone knows, but the Great Patriotic War might not have happened, or at least it might have started much later. It is known that by the spring of 1941 Europe had already been conquered by Hitler. There remained a small and not very difficult "business" - to conquer England. In 1940, the German government issued a directive on this issue. Aircraft "Luftwaffe" have already begun work. But very suddenly everything changed. Hitler decided to go East. Why?

Muscovites listen to the message of the Information Bureau about the beginning of the war. 1941

Historians agree: England would not stand against German troops. And if Hitler had conquered the island state, he would have received additional resources and could have closed the rear in the war with the USSR. But the Fuhrer didn't do that. In 1941, as you know, the Wehrmacht troops crossed the border of the Soviet Union, and the Second World War began.

Historian Nikolai Starikov, in order to explain the reasons for such a “strange” behavior of Germany, suggests returning to 1938, when the Munich Agreement took place. Hitler and Chamberlain, who served as Prime Minister of England, agreed that the states they represent would not attack each other. In 1939, however, the Germans agreed on something similar with the USSR. But, apparently, Hitler did not consider England as a serious opponent, but he did not want to endure an empire under the leadership of Stalin on the world map.

London after an air raid in December 1940

Experts say that since the 20s of the last century, both England and the United States actively helped Germany and Hitler. The goal was simple: it was necessary to "nourish" such a "pet" that could "bite the throat" of the Union. In part, this worked out: Germany, in fact, became a superpower, Hitler felt the strength to go to war with the USSR. But here's the bad luck: the Fuhrer no longer considered the British as his "masters". At the very least, he considered himself their equal. Or, to be more precise, above them. After all, even in the days of Bismarck, they said that "Germany is above all."

A very curious situation has arisen. And here it is necessary to analyze the position of each of the parties - England and Germany.

What did the Fuhrer want?

He did not want to fight England. After an easy occupation of almost all of Europe, Hitler decided to fight a truly serious enemy. However, from the "Blitzkrieg" also breathes a certain frivolity. But that's a slightly different story.

What to do with the British? To intimidate, put pressure on, incline towards peace and, perhaps, submission, without getting involved in a serious confrontation. That is why German planes fly to the islands and bomb London. Not much, but noticeable.

British position

Fire after a German raid on the London docks. 1940

In England, they understand that Hitler is out of control, but they also understand that it is already difficult to “calm down” him. True, in 1940 the British were the first to launch an air strike on Freiburg, on civilians. It's not even a hint: "We are very unhappy." Hitler, as indicated, answers. And that is all. Performance. Or, if you like, "armed diplomacy." The British do not want to lose their soldiers and civilians. And Hitler decides not to start serious hostilities in the west of Europe, not seeing any real threat.

The real confrontation begins with the opening of the Second Front. However, by this time it is already clear that the Union survived, and Germany is losing its strength and power. Therefore, the British are again "on horseback" and confidently go to victory.

70 years ago, fascist Germany, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan (secret document of the Reich No. 33408/40), attacked the USSR together with its allies.

I recently read the latest (unfinished) book by Valentin Pikul, a famous author of historical novels. The book is largely based on the memoirs of Field Marshal Paulus, the operational developer of the Barbarossa plan. The given historical facts have enriched my idea of ​​what an adventure Hitler's war against the Soviet Union was.

Germany in 1940 had the highest standard of living in the world. Attacking the USSR under the flag of the fight against Bolshevism, Hitler wanted to gain access to natural resources our country. He did not need the population and was subject to destruction. Hitler explained the motives for starting the war by the fact that he could not ensure the growing standard of living of the Germans without expanding the living space.

On June 28, 1940, Hitler told Keitel: “The war against Russia - after the victory over France - will be for our Wehrmacht like a child's game of Easter cakes ... The sooner we defeat Russia, the better it will be for Russia itself. But the operation can only make sense if we destroy this entire state with one lightning strike. This will take no more than five months.

The initial finale of the war was planned along the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan meridian. But in the future, the final line was determined along the lines of Leningrad, Kharkov, Smolensk ... no further. It was assumed that "Russian power will die on this line, and in Germany long lines of disabled people will line up - for prostheses."

Warmongers liked to quote the words of the French educator Denis Diderot, who said that Russia is a colossus without a head and with feet of clay (for which he got hit by Catherine the Great).
General Franz Halder, in a conversation with officers of the General Staff, said: “Russia under the Stalinist regime is not even a country, but a huge soap bubble, lightly armored on the outside. Poke it with your finger - and it will immediately burst, exposing its emptiness ... All the fuss with Russia must be completed before the autumn leaf fall. If we wait for frost, Germany will fall into the hatch of a protracted war, from which she cannot get out ... "

They objected to him. “It seems to you that the fall of Moscow can decide the fate of the blitzkrieg… But Moscow is not Paris! The Russians will push their armies all the way to the Urals, where they have a large industrial complex, and the war will continue with the same fury. If it gets into your head to cross the Urals with tanks, the Russians can retreat as far as Baikal.”

There was something like a "conspiracy of generals" who did not agree with the Fuhrer's aggressive policy. “Don't you see that the Fuhrer opens his mouth wider than his stomach? Sooner or later, but he will drag Germany into a war that the German people are not able to endure.
General Franz Halder said: "It is difficult to believe in a pact between the British and Russians, but this is now the only thing that can stop Hitler."

Of course, at the same time, not only Bismarck's covenant never to fight with Russia was recalled, but also the teachings of Clausewitz, who believed that Russia would always remain invincible, and any army, even the most perfect, would dissolve like dust in its fatal and boundless expanses.
The Prussian king Frederick the Great said: "any enemy army that dares to penetrate to Smolensk and beyond will certainly find its grave in the Russian steppes."

General Jodl expressed doubts: “The war with Russia is such a war when you always know how to start it, but you will never know how it will end. Any war with any country can be brought to a victorious end. And only in the war with Russia it is not long before we see its finals in advance ... "

The famous German tank builder Ferdinand Porsche said: “Paulus, do not forget Bismarck's warnings: the Russians harness for a long time, but they drive fast. We know from history that Russia is always unprepared for war, but in some strange way it turns out to be the winner.”

Paulus believed that to defeat all the armies of the USSR, the Wehrmacht would need only four to six weeks: Napoleon had determined exactly that much for himself in 1812.
“I must disappoint you, Paulus: the Barbarossa plan is good in itself, but the war with Russia can hardly have a happy ending,” Gerd von Rundsted objected. He also ridiculed Hitler's delusional thoughts about the racial superiority of the Germans: "Is it worth talking about the purity of blood, if in ancient times even Berlin was a Slavic village on the banks of the Spree, in which the Slavs caught crayfish and sturgeon."

In what Soviet Union sooner or later will attack Germany, Friedrich Paulus never believed. “I don’t think at all that we will come to Russia as saviors, and the Russians will not meet us as great humanists ... Our ancient gods are always hungry for blood!”
Paulus warned Hitler that if the war dragged on until winter, then at a frost of forty degrees, the lubricant on the weapon would freeze, and the fuel in the tanks would thicken.

On September 28, 1939, a friendship pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, signed by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and USSR Foreign Minister Molotov. It turns out that they studied together at the same St. Petersburg gymnasium and both were in love with the talent of Anna Akhmatova.
While in Moscow, Ribbentrop said: "I feel in the Kremlin as if in the circle of my old party comrades ...". In the same place, Stalin raised a glass of wine - for the health of Hitler: “I know how the German people love their leader. So let's drink to Hitler's health ... "

Hitler once said about Stalin: “Stalin certainly deserves our respect, because in his own way he is simply a brilliant guy ...”

Stalin and Ribbentrop signed on the map of the division of Polish lands, while Stalin winked at his comrades-in-arms: “I fooled Hitler ... tricked him ...”

On December 18, 1940, Hitler approved the Barbarossa plan with a special directive, and exactly eleven days later this directive was already in Stalin's office - Soviet intelligence worked, but Stalin considered the directive a "fake" planted on him by the British.

At a meeting on March 30, 1941, Hitler told his military leaders: "We are talking about a war of annihilation ... This war will be very different from the war in the west. In the east, cruelty itself is good for the future."
30 million Slavs were subject to destruction, then the population had to be regulated in the amount necessary to serve the German masters.

On May 1, 1941, the newspaper "Der angrif" was published under the old motto "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" The rapacious eagles of the Hitlerite empire still tenaciously held the hammer and sickle in their outstretched claws.

By the spring of 1941, German railways were passing up to a hundred military echelons to the east. Near the western borders of the USSR, the Fuhrer kept about four million Wehrmacht soldiers. When Stalin was informed about this, he called the speakers alarmists, cowards and provocateurs.
On the night of the German attack on our country, 22 huge echelons with grain and metal proceeded from the USSR to Germany.

During the time from the autumn of 1939 (immediately after the Ribbentrop-Molotov friendship pact) and until the very beginning of the war German planes more than five hundred (!) times violated Soviet border- and at least that! Stalin ordered not to open fire.
A TASS statement dated June 14, 1941 stated: "In the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are completely groundless."

Not only Richard Sorge warned Stalin about the outbreak of war. The German ambassador to Russia, Count Schulenburg, personally informed the Soviet representatives that the German attack on Russia would take place on the twenty-second of June. Even Churchill warned Stalin that on June 22 he was ready to repulse the attack of the Wehrmacht.

Having destroyed fifty thousand commanders in 1937, Stalin in 1940 promoted 13 thousand yesterday's soldiers to lieutenants. The launch of the T-34 tank into mass production was slowed down, they refused to equip the infantry with machine guns, and the production of anti-tank rifles was frozen.
Experienced military men said that ammunition depots should not be left near the border. But all the weapons and food depots, fuel bases and ammunition arsenals were left on the border, and on the very first day of the war they went to the enemy safe and sound.

On the very eve of the war, in order to avoid conflicts with the Germans, ammunition was taken away from the soldiers in the border units. The rifles were left to them, but the cartridges were taken away. The guns were also left at the border, but the servants were deprived of shells. And all because Comrade Stalin was very afraid of border incidents that could displease Hitler.

When Stalin was informed about the beginning of the war, he said bitterly: “The great Lenin bequeathed to us a great proletarian state, and you, all of you, forgot it!”

On the very first day of the war, the Germans destroyed 1200 of our aircraft, which did not have time to take off into the sky. Replenishment was sent to the front with training rifles. The militias armed themselves, often picking up the rifles of the dead.

Before the war, the USSR had no allies at all, and Germany recorded almost all of Europe as its allies. The coalition troops, along with the Wehrmacht, included formations from Romania, Italy, Spain, etc.
Hitler said: “Only the complete annihilation of the primitive masses of the enemy can bring us final and decisive success. Don't push the Russians away, destroy them!"

But some German newspapers at the beginning of the war wrote: “The Russian soldier surpasses our enemy in the West with his contempt for death. Endurance and fatalism make him hold on until he is killed in the trench and falls dead in hand-to-hand combat.

Reichsmarschall Goering called for open robbery:
“Don’t be silly there in Russia,” he instructed the front-line soldiers. - If you see a sheep, shear it immediately. It's not for you to cry, but for the Russians! Got a copper handle on the door, turn it off without any talk. Cut down forests. Requisition horses ... "
Franz Halder echoed him: “Let Russians eat ersatz, and we will decorate stores with natural products of the East ...”

During the first six months of the war, 3 million 800 thousand of our soldiers and officers (70% of the army personnel) were captured. Hitler did not expect this and did not know what to do with them. He was forced to withdraw 150,000 soldiers from the front to guard Russian prisoners of war.

Field Marshal Keitel said: “We are not waging a chivalrous war with the Bolsheviks. We are talking about the complete destruction of their worldview. I see no reason to change the POW regime. We do not intend to cook soups for them from concentrates for a soldier's diet.
Hitler made a proposal: “I don’t mind! If the prisoners are dying of hunger, then let them devour one another. We are calmer…”

When it became clear to everyone that the blitzkrieg had been thwarted, Hitler justified himself: “Unfortunately, Stalin had much more tanks and aircraft than we foresaw. If I had been aware of this in advance, it would have been more difficult for me to decide on the war ... Now I understand that we can no longer embrace the entire boundless Russian mass.

At the end of the book, Valentin Pikul suggests: “Churchill had reason to suspect Stalin of wanting to reconcile with Hitler. Back in July 1941, Stalin, Molotov and Beria came to the conclusion that only capitulation to Hitler could save. “If the great Lenin,” Molotov said, “even if he conspired with the Kaiser, then we are now also ready for peace with Germany ...”
But this information is still classified in the archives.

The balance of power on June 22, 1941 was approximately as follows: Germany and its allies - the USSR ( personnel 4.3 million - 5.8 million) guns and mortars (43 thousand - 57 thousand); tanks and assault guns (4 thousand - 14 thousand); aircraft (5 thousand - 25 thousand).

The troops of the German coalition occupied the territory where 80 million people lived. That is, 110 million people remained at the disposal of the leadership of the USSR. There were 80 million Germans plus allies.

“Why did the Germans reach Moscow and even Stalingrad?” - Igor Borisovich Chubais, Doctor of Philosophy, Director of the Center for the Study of Russia at the University of Peoples' Friendship, was asked at the conference "Days of St. Petersburg Philosophy 2008". He replied:
- The traditional answer is simple: because the war started unexpectedly, because superiority in technology, manpower, etc. This is an absolute lie. Because from the first day of the war to the last (May 9, 1945), the superiority in manpower was on the side of the Red Army (significant superiority). And in technology (in one year 1942), our industry, our women and children produced as many tanks as Germany did not produce during the entire war from 1939 to 1945.
Why lie that we had no technology. Our superiority in aviation was 6 times! The Germans had 2,000 aircraft on our front, and we had up to 20,000 aircraft. We have always had an advantage...
Therefore, it cannot be said that this is a victory for the Soviet system, and Stalin is the great commander in chief, if 27 million Soviet people died in the war, and six times fewer Germans.

The total demographic losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War amounted to 27 million people. Irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR 11.5 million people, and Germany with satellites (including prisoners of war) 8.6 million people. respectively.
The ratio of irretrievable losses of the armies of Germany with the satellites and the USSR is: 1:1.3.

The son of Paulus, Major of the Wehrmacht Ernst-Alexander in Nuremberg in 1946, almost angrily told our correspondent: “You are too proud of your victory. But soon all of you, both Russians and your allies, will open their mouths in amazement when the battered Germany rises from the squats on which you put it ... It has already happened! It was after the Treaty of Versailles, so it will be after the Treaty of Potsdam ... "

Already in 1951, the standard of living in "defeated" Germany was significantly higher than in the "victorious" USSR.

© Nikolai Kofirin – New Russian Literature –

Until his death in July 1996, Adolf von Thadden was a prominent and respected figure in German "right" and "nationalist" (conservative) circles. In his latest book, he briefly and convincingly explains why Hitler was forced, for political and military reasons, to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. His book "Stalin's Trap" is a legacy for future generations, a kind of testament for young Germans.

For decades in the US and Europe, the official view was that the crazed Adolf Hitler attacked without warning, betraying the gullible Joseph Stalin in a treacherous surprise attack on the completely unprepared Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Von Thadden's book, which is based in large part on recently disclosed data from Russian archives, Stalin's own statements, and new revelations from Russian military experts, convincingly debunks this notion.

Many Soviet documents came to the Germans during the war, German intelligence also reported on the accumulation of Soviet troops on the border in 1941, justifying Hitler's decision to strike. Presented before an impartial tribunal, this evidence would certainly justify the German military and political leadership. Unfortunately, all these documents have been confiscated and are in the possession of the victorious allies.

In a speech dated December 11, 1941, Adolf Hitler detailed the "Red Menace" in the East, which had arisen with the assistance and instigation of England and the (still officially neutral) United States. At this historic moment, the German leader said:

"Already in 1940, it became clear that the Kremlin's plans were aimed at domination, and thus the destruction of all of Europe. I have already spoken about the buildup of Soviet troops in the East at a time when Germany had only a few divisions in the areas bordering on Soviet Russia. Only the blind can fail to see that there was a build-up of military power. And it was not to keep the defense, but rather to attack someone who seemed incapable of defending ...

When I became aware of the possibility of a threat in the east of the Reich in 1940 through [secret] reports from the British House of Commons and by observing the movements of Soviet troops on our border, I immediately ordered the formation of new tank, motorized and infantry divisions.. .
“We were very clear that under no circumstances could we give the enemy the opportunity to strike first. However, the decision in this case was very difficult ...
“A truly impressive amount of material is now available confirming that a Soviet offensive was planned. We are also sure when this offensive was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that he enlightened me and gave me the strength to do what had to be done Millions German soldiers can thank him for their lives, and the fact that Europe still exists.
"I can say today: if a wave of more than 20,000 tanks, a hundred divisions, tens of thousands of guns, along with more than 10,000 aircraft, moved against the Reich, Europe would be lost ..."

During the Nuremberg trials, former high-ranking officials of the Third Reich testified to the background of the Barbarossa plan, characterizing the Soviet threat in 1941, and what huge amounts of weapons, fuel and other materials they found when their troops invaded Soviet territory. But this fact was not accepted by the tribunal.

Von Thadden cites, for example, cites the testimony of Hermann Göring:

"We realized very quickly who was behind the coup in Yugoslavia and General Simović [in Belgrade on March 27, 1941]. Shortly thereafter, it was confirmed that the reports from Yugoslavia were correct, namely that there was a strong political influence of the Soviets, as well as facts significant financial assistance for the coup by England, later we found evidence of this.It was clear that this idea was directed against the policy of the former Yugoslav government towards Germany ...

The coup of Roman Simovich was certainly the last and decisive factor that dispelled the Fuhrer's last doubts about the intentions of the USSR, and prompted him to take preventive measures in this direction.

Von Thadden cites the testimony of General Alfred Jodl, one of Hitler's closest military advisers, who gave similar testimony:

“This is undoubtedly a purely preventive war. Later we discovered huge stores and all kinds of preparations for war right in front of our border. I will skip the details, but I can say that although we managed to achieve some degree of tactical surprise, there was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war."

The Allies at Nuremberg restricted the defendants' access to German documents that would exonerate them. Germany's military and political leaders were hanged, committed suicide, or were deported to the Soviet Union for slave labor. As a result, the task of establishing historical truth was left to others, including scientists from Russia and the United States, as well as such respected Germans as von Thadden.

Additional evidence cited by von Thadden was provided by Andrey Vlasov, a prominent Soviet general who was captured by the Germans. During a conversation in 1942 with SS General Richard Hildebrandt, he asked if Stalin was going to attack Germany, and if so, when. Hildebrandt later said:

"Vlasov replied that the attack was planned for August-September 1941. The Russians had been preparing the attack since the beginning of the year, the preparations took quite a long time due to poor railways. Hitler correctly assessed the situation, and struck right at the time of the build-up. This, Vlasov said, is the reason for the huge initial German successes.

A significant contribution was made by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), a Soviet military intelligence official, who revealed that Stalin was preparing to attack Germany and the West as part of a long-term project of global Sovietization, and that Hitler had no reasonable alternative to counter this but to launch his attack . In Stalin's Trap, von Thadden discusses and corroborates Suvorov's analysis, also referring to the findings of Russian military historians who, working in archives available since 1990, by and large corroborate Suvorov's work. Retired Soviet Colonel Aleksey Filippov wrote an article "On the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941" published in 1992 in the Russian military journal "Voyenny Vestnik" and Valery Danilov, another retired Soviet colonel, who wrote the article "Did the General base Red Army preemptive strike against Germany?," which first appeared in " Russian newspaper", and later, in translation, in the respectable Austrian military journal, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift.

More recently, two eminent European historians, a German and an Austrian, have presented further evidence of the Soviet preparations for an attack on Germany. The first of these is Joachim Hoffmann, a historian at the military history research center in Freiburg. Wrote the fundamental work Stalins Vernichtungskrieg, 1941-1945 ("Stalin's War of Annihilation"), consisting of 300 pages, which went through three reprints. The second is Heinz Magenheimer, a member of the National Defense Academy in Vienna and the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. His book has recently appeared on English language titled Hitler's War: German Military Strategy, 1940-1945 (London, 1998).

Von Thadden also commented on a number of articles in the German weekly Der Spiegel about the Soviet plans devised by General Georgy Zhukov to attack northern Germany and Romania in early 1941. Commenting on this, Colonel Vladimir Karpov stated:
"Just imagine if Zhukov's plan were accepted and carried out. At dawn, in May or June, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our guns would strike at a densely concentrated enemy force whose positions were known down to battalion level - a surprise even more unthinkable than a German attack on us."

Stalin's speeches

Perhaps the most revealing of Stalin's speeches is delivered at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939. Told in a narrow circle of his like-minded people, it shows his accurate, but absolutely cynical assessment of political forces, and reveals his cunning intentions.
Four days after this speech, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop met with Stalin in the Kremlin to sign the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

It is important to note that Stalin could have prevented war in 1939 by agreeing to support Britain and France in their "guarantee" of Poland's integrity, or simply by announcing that the Soviet Union would strongly object to Germany's violation of Polish territory. He instead decided to give Hitler the "green light" to attack Poland, expecting that England and France would then declare war on Germany, turning the local conflict into a full-scale pan-European war.
In this speech, Stalin outlined his cunning and prudent view of the situation in Europe:

“The question of peace or war is entering a critical phase for us. If we conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with France and Great Britain, Germany will give up Poland and seek "modus vivendi" with the Western powers. War will be prevented, but in the future events may take on a dangerous character for the USSR. If we accept Germany's offer to conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will, of course, attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war will become inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious unrest and unrest. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay out of the conflict, and we will be able to hope for our advantageous entry into the war.
The experience of the last twenty years shows that in peacetime it is impossible to have a communist movement in Europe strong enough to enable the Bolshevik Party to seize power. The dictatorship of this party becomes possible only as a result of a great war."

We will make our choice, and it is clear. We must accept the German offer and politely send back the Anglo-French mission. The first advantage that we will extract will be the destruction of Poland to the very approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.
Let us now consider the second assumption, i.e. German victory. Some are of the opinion that this possibility poses a serious danger to us. There is some truth in this statement, but it would be a mistake to think that this danger will be as close and as great as some imagine it to be. If Germany wins, she will come out of the war too exhausted to start an armed conflict with the USSR for at least ten years.

Her main concern will be to watch over the defeated England and France in order to prevent their recovery. On the other hand, victorious Germany will have vast territories at its disposal, and for many decades it will be busy “exploiting” them and establishing German orders there. It is obvious that Germany will be very busy elsewhere to turn against us. There is one more thing that will serve to strengthen our security. In defeated France, the Communist Party will always be very strong. The communist revolution will inevitably take place, and we can use this circumstance to come to the aid of France and make her our ally. Later, all the peoples who fell under the “protection” of victorious Germany would also become our allies. We will have a wide field of activity for the development of the world revolution.

Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR, the motherland of the working people, that a war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done to make this war last as long as possible in order to exhaust the two sides. It is for this reason that we must agree to the conclusion of the pact proposed by Germany and work to ensure that this war, declared once, lasts for the maximum amount of time. It will be necessary to intensify propaganda work in the warring countries in order to be ready by the time the war is over...”

The Soviet leader's audacious calculation was to use Germany as an "icebreaker," von Thadden argues in his "Stalin Trap."

A version of this speech has been known since 1939, but for decades it was considered a fake. However, in 1994, Russian historians found its text in special secret Soviet archives, and quickly published it in a Russian scientific journal, as well as in an academic publication. Novosibirsk University. Shortly after this speech in August 1939, von Thadden notes, Stalin ordered a build-up of forces that culminated in the summer of 1941 with a powerful grouping of Soviet troops on the border with Germany.

On May 5, 1941, just seven weeks before the German attack, Stalin delivered another important speech at a gala banquet in the Kremlin to the graduates of the Frunze Military Academy. Members of Stalin's "inner circle" were also present, including Molotov and Beria. During the war, the Germans reconstructed the text of this speech, based on the memories of captured Soviet officers who were present at the banquet.
As von Thadden notes, a number of historians predictably deny the authenticity of the speech, accepting it as a product of German propaganda and disinformation. However, a few years ago, Russian historian Lev Bezymensky found parts of the speech in the text that had been edited for intended publication in the Kremlin archives. He published this text in 1992 in an issue of the scientific journal Osteuropa.

In this speech, Stalin emphasized that the peace-loving policy of the Soviet state had played its role. (With this policy, the Soviet Union significantly expanded its borders in the west in 1939 and 1940, "capturing" about 30 million people.) So, Stalin bluntly announced that it was time to prepare for war against Germany, a conflict that would begin in the near future. time. He mentioned the huge buildup of Soviet troops over the past few years. The recent "occupation" of Bulgaria, and the transfer of German troops to Finland, provide several "reasons for a war against Germany."

Stalin said:

"Our war plan is already prepared ... we can start a war with Germany in the next two months ... a peace treaty with Germany is only a deception, a curtain behind which one can openly prepare ...
A peaceful policy ensured peace for our country. Peace politics is a good thing. For the time being, for the time being, we carried out a line on the defensive - until we re-equipped our army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle.

And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we need to move from defense to offensive.

In defending our country, we must act offensively. From defense to move on to a military policy of offensive operations. We need to reorganize our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army.

The successes of the German army are explained by the fact that it did not face an equally strong opponent. Some Soviet commanders falsely overestimate the successes of the German army...

Therefore, I propose a toast to the new era that has begun in the development of our socialist Fatherland. Long live the active offensive policy of the Soviet state!"

In the face of all the new evidence that has become available in last years, von Thadden argues that it is necessary to revise the official history of this period.
A group of concerned scientists met at an international conference in Moscow in 1995. Historians from Europe, Israel, the United States and Canada met with their Russian counterparts to coordinate the "official" line, both in Russia and in the West, about the German-Soviet clash and its origins. These historians have simply ignored most of the new evidence to revise this chapter of history, including Stalin's speeches and other evidence provided by von Thadden, as well as some of the conclusions of Russian historians.

Von Thadden quotes the French historian Stephen Courtois:

"I am working on a reassessment of the personality of Stalin. He was the greatest criminal of our century. But at the same time he was the great politician of the twentieth century: the most competent and professional. He understood best of all how to use all available means to achieve his goal. Starting in 1917 "He got his way, and in the end, he achieved his goal ... of course, you can say that Hitler started the war. But the evidence of Stalin's guilt is staggering. Stalin wanted to eradicate everyone who opposed the Marxist-Leninist social order."

"Because of the resistance of the German soldiers," concludes von Thadden, "the Russian and Anglo-American 'liberators' did not meet each other in Western Europe, but on the Elbe, in the very center of Germany".

Notes:

1. Von Thadden wrote numerous articles and essays, and was a co-publisher of the Coburg monthly Nation und Europe. Other books by him include Zwei Angreifer: Hitler and Stalin, 1993; Adolf Hitler, 1991; Die verfemte Rechte, 1984; Guernica: Greuelpropaganda oder Kriegsverbrechen?

2. "Hitler's Declaration of War Against the United States," The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1988-89 (Vol. 8, No. 4), pp. 389-416.

3. This portion of Göring's testimony, given on March 15, 1946, is in the IMT "blue series" (Nuremberg), vol. 9, pp. 333-334. On March 27, 1941, Serbian officers in Belgrade, with backing from Britain, and possibly also the United States, overthrew the pro-German Yugoslav government of prime minister Cvetkovic. 6, delayed the Barbarossa attack against the USSR by several weeks, See: Germany and the Second World War (Oxford Univ. Press: 1995), vol. 3, pp. 480, 498, 499.

4. This portion of Jodl's testimony, given on June 5, 1946, is in the IMT "blue series," vol. 15, pp. 394-395.

5. See David Irving's study, Nuremberg: The Last Battle, reviewed in the July-August 1998 Journal of Historical Review. See also, M. Weber, "The Nuremberg Trials and the Holocaust," Summer 1992 Journal, pp. 167 -213.

6. Suvorov "s first three books on World War II have been reviewed in The Journal of Historical Review. The first two, Icebreaker and "M Day," were reviewed in Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal (Vol. 16, No. 6), pp. 22-34. His third book, "The Last Republic," was reviewed in the July-August 1998 Journal (Vol. 17, No. 4), pp. 30-37.

7. A portion of this speech is quoted in part in the Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal of Historical Review, pp. 32-34, and in the July-August 1998 Journal, p. 31.

8. Works by Courtois include Histoire du parti communiste français (1995), L "etat du monde en 1945 (1994), Rigueur et passion (1994), 50 ans d" une passion française, 1991), Qui savait quoi? (1987), and, perhaps best known, Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, repression (1997).

"New Evidence on the 1941 "Barbarossa" Attack: Why Hitler Attacked Soviet Russia When He Did" by Daniel W. Michaels

From The Journal of Historical Review, May-June 1999 (Vol. 18, No. 3), pp. 40ff.