In 1458, near the Buda fortress on the ice of the Danube River, the burghers and nobility proclaimed Matyas Hunyadi, the 14-year-old heir of the talented commander Janos Hunyadi, king of Hungary. As a result of the national liberation revolution, the teenager, thrown into prison by his competitors in the fight for the Hungarian crown, came to power. Thus appeared a commander whose army would become one of the most combat-ready armies of Medieval Europe.

Matyash's father, Janos, was a good warrior and strategist. Thanks to him, the Balkan Peninsula successfully held back the invasion of the Ottomans for a long time, and only death from the plague ended the chronicle of successful battles of this historical figure. Young Matyash was drawn to reading and, as a child, became engrossed in the works of Julius Caesar. This is exactly how the idea of ​​​​creating a professional army, later called "Black Army"(Fekete Sereg).

Historians disagree about the origin of the term "Black Army". The name apparently was not given during King Matthias's lifetime, but appears in documents written immediately after his death. There are various theories that the soldiers were dressed in black or wore black ribbons on their shoulders while mourning King Matthias. Another theory is that the name comes from the black breastplate worn by Captain František Hag, or, alternatively, the name is linked to the nickname of another Black Army officer, Captain Janos "The Black" Haugwitz.

And, if in other countries warriors in peacetime could be farmers, bakers, masons, then the “Black Army” was a highly paid army of professionals who were engaged in purely military matters. The backbone of the army consisted of 6-8 thousand mercenaries; in 1480 this figure increased to 20 thousand, and in 1487 it amounted to 28 thousand. Mostly, the soldiers were Bohemians, Serbs, Poles, Germans, and, starting from the 80s, Hungarians. The key to the victories of the “Black Army” was the widespread use of firearms. One in four soldiers carried an arquebus, an unusual ratio in armies of the time. Even at the beginning of the 16th century, only 10% of European armies used firearms.

The basis of the troops was infantry, artillery, light and heavy cavalry. The heavy cavalry protected the lightly armed infantry and artillery, while the rest of the army made surprise attacks on the enemy. The river fleet consisted of galleys, boats and small ships that could sail along the Danube, Tisza and Sava. In 1475, artillery was installed on river barges: mortars and bombards. In 1479, the fleet consisted of 360 ships, and the crew was 2,600 sailors and 10 thousand soldiers on board.

A regular paid army also had its drawbacks - in case of delay in payment, some soldiers could leave the battlefield or start a riot. However, this was compensated by the high level of training of the soldiers who served in it. For 30 years, the “Black Army” restrained the expansion of the Ottomans into Western Europe, contributed to the unification of Hungary and the conquest of new territories, thus creating a powerful state in the center of Europe, capable of resisting external enemies.

War was a normal state of the Middle Ages, but the weak development of the economy, and therefore the small number of heavily armed combatants (full knightly weapons were very expensive) led to the fact that wars were protracted and mostly came down to the devastation of enemy areas or to long sieges. Wars in general, as a rule, they did not provide a solution to the controversial issues that caused them, and military force served only as one of the arguments in the negotiations.

Big battles were very rare. During Charlemagne's wars with the Saxons, which lasted more than 30 years (772-804), there were only two battles; his campaigns in Italy (773 and 774) and against Duke Thassilon of Bavaria (778) ended without any battles at all .Major battles were viewed as “God’s judgment,” and therefore defeat was understood as the condemnation of the wrong and led to the end of the war. The lack of developed communications technology led to the fact that troop movements were often chaotic, fronts in the modern sense did not exist, the space of military operations (detachments on a march, convoys, reconnaissance groups, gangs of marauders more or less secretly accompanying the army, etc.) n.) covered a width of no more than 20 km. The commander was required to more or less successfully find a place for the battle and determine the time of its start. This was where his strategic and tactical possibilities ended. However, the desire to maintain knightly honor, the desire to give the enemy equal opportunities, greatly influenced the choice of time and place of the battle and its conditions. A knight, fully armed, does not have the right to retreat when faced with any number of enemies, so they went on reconnaissance without armor in order to be able to escape without damaging their honor. It was considered very noble to agree with the enemy on the time and place of the battle, preferably on an open field, so that the terrain conditions would not give anyone an advantage, and the outcome of the battle would be decided only by strength and courage. The contender for the Castilian throne, Henry (Enrique) of Trastamara, in 1367, in the fight against his rival, King Peter (Pedro,) the Cruel, deliberately sacrificed an advantageous position in the mountains, went down to the valley and lost the battle of Najera (Navarette).

Conscious strategy and tactics did not exist in the Middle Ages. Writings on the topic of organization and tactics had little relation to reality. The authors either accurately retell Vegetius, or state something that has absolutely nothing to do with reality at all. The Treatise on War, compiled around 1260 by order of King Alfonso X the Wise of Castile, states without any irony that infantrymen should have their legs tied before battle so that they cannot flee from the battlefield; then, however, they will be unable to pursue the enemy, but this will only demonstrate contempt for him. The teacher of the King of France Philip IV the Fair, a student of Thomas Aquinas, a prominent church figure, Egidio Colonna, in his treatise “On the Principles of Government” (late 13th century) addressed to his royal student, seriously describes the “round” and “triangular” formation of the legions. Characteristic of the Roman army formation in dense groups was revived again only in modern times. The barbarian troops fought not in formation, but as a gang. The “wedge” formation, repeatedly mentioned in medieval sources, also called the “boar’s head”, “pig”, dates back to barbarian times and does not carry any tactical intent: the leader is in front of the detachment, a little behind him are his close comrades, then - the rest of the warriors. The appearance of heavy cavalry does not change the tactical principles at all. The description of the wedge-shaped formation of knights riding so closely that, as one poem said, “a glove thrown into the air could not fall to the ground,” refers only to the marching formation.

Since the battle is “God’s judgment” between 2 overlords, it was they who, ideally, should have fought in front of the line, and the outcome of the duel would decide the matter. In reality, the fights that were often proclaimed almost never took place. Fights between warriors were not uncommon. Sometimes the battle itself was replaced by something like a tournament: in 1351, near the town of Ploermel in Brittany, the converging French and English detachments selected 30 people from among themselves, whose fight, which took place according to stricter tournament rules, was supposed to replace the battle; the battle was called the “Battle of the Thirty.” With the transition from knightly wars to state wars, the value of such a tradition is questioned, although it itself was preserved until the beginning of the 17th century. If you believe the text of the 12th century, the last Anglo-Saxon king of England, Harold, was on the eve of the fatal Battle of Hastings for the Saxons (1066) refused to his opponent Duke of Normandy Guillaume the Illegitimate (who soon became King of England William the Conqueror) in the decisive duel, saying that the fate of the country cannot be made dependent on the accidents of a fight between 2 people. In XVIII. the French leader rejected the proposal of the English commander-in-chief to allocate 12 people from each army so that their fight would decide the issue of supremacy, saying: “We came to drive you out of here, and that’s enough for us.” Then the French military leader Jean de Buey forbade one of his subordinates to participate in the duel before the fight, adding that the combatant “desires to cause damage to the enemy, namely, to take away his honor, in order to ascribe to himself empty glory, which is worth little, but in fact neglects the service of the king and the public good (bien public).

The battle began with an attack by heavily armed horsemen, during which the marching formation crumbled, turning into a disorderly chain of cavalry, galloping at a not very fast gait; The battle ended with the same attack. The reserve, which was rarely used, was used to direct it to the most dangerous places in the battle, to places where the enemy was pressing especially hard, and almost never for a surprise attack from the flanks or, even more so, for an ambush, because all this was considered a military stratagem unworthy of a knight.

Controlling the battle was almost impossible. The knight's armor included a blind helmet, the slot in which (or in its visor) gave very little visibility, its design did not allow turning the head, so the knight saw only the one who was in front of him, and the battle turned into a series of duels. A blind helmet made it impossible to hear commands, cavalry vaulting, i.e. training horses and riders to stay in line during an attack arose only in modern times. In addition, it is more than difficult to control a barbarian warrior in the ecstasy of battle, or a knight fighting for personal glory. The only command that Roland gives in “The Song of Roland” is “Gentlemen Barons, slow down!”

Each strove to be the first to fight the enemy, not paying attention to the fact that by exposing himself, as befits a knight, to increased danger, he weakened the chain of horsemen as far as it could exist. The right to begin the battle was a privilege first attested in Germany in 1075, where was assigned to a certain clan, and in the Holy Land during the era of the Crusades in 1119, under which the chronicler mentions a special detachment of St. Peter, which had such a right.

A knightly army is a collection of individuals, where everyone has given a personal oath of allegiance to the military leader, and not a structure welded together by discipline. The goal of a knight is an individual fight in the name of honor and glory and to obtain a ransom, and not the victory of his army. A knight fights without regard for his comrades and commander. At the Battle of Poitiers (1356), two French commanders argued about the right to start the battle and rushed to the attack without waiting for the royal order, without coordination with others and interfering with each other. The British counterattack led to their retreat, and they were faced with the continuing advance of their troops, which caused confusion and panic, which turned into a rapid flight, including those who did not even join the battle. Sometimes the victors were so carried away by plundering the enemy convoy that they allowed the enemy to leave or regroup and attack again, often successfully. Attempts to impose at least some kind of discipline were unproductive and consisted only of punishments for individual violations. During the First Crusade, its leaders ordered to cut off the noses and ears of those who would engage in robbery until the end of the battle; before the mentioned battle of Bouvines, Philip Augustus ordered the erection of gallows for those who would grab booty from the enemy convoy before the end of the battle. Even in spiritual knighthood orders, whose members were required to follow monastic discipline, one of the few military prohibitions was the prohibition to let horses gallop without orders at the beginning of a battle.

The battle ended with flight, which marked the defeat of the enemy; long pursuit was very rare, and a symbol of victory was spending the night at the battle site. As a rule, there were few killed. Heavy weapons protected the knight well, and the purpose of the battle, as noted, was to capture the enemy, and not to kill him. In the Battle of Buvin, only two knights died, but either 130 or 300 noble captives were captured.

In the bloody battle of Crecy (1346), about 2,000 knights and about 30 thousand infantry fell from the French who lost this battle. However, the latest figures should not be unconditionally trusted, because the authors were prone to exaggeration. One of the chroniclers claimed that at the Battle of Hastings the British fielded 1 million 200 thousand people (in reality this is slightly less than the population of England at that time), another stated that in the Battle of Grunwald (1410) the combined Polish-Lithuanian army numbered 5 million 100 thousand people, and only 630 thousand fell in this battle on both sides. In fact, the medieval armies were very small because the number was small knightly fiefs due to low agricultural productivity. About 5 thousand people took part in the Battle of Hastings on the Norman side, including about 2 thousand knights; Harold’s army was smaller in number. In the Battle of Bouvines, on the French side there were approximately 1,300 knights, the same number of lightly armed cavalry and 4-6 thousand infantry. In the Battle of Crecy, the British had 4 thousand knights, 10 thousand archers and 18 thousand infantry, the French had about 10 thousand knights, but the infantry was most likely less than that of the British, and therefore the above figures for French losses look doubtful.

In the descriptions of the battles, most of the mention was made of knights, although, as can be seen from the calculations, other combatants took part in them. However, until the end of the Middle Ages, it was the heavily armed cavalry that formed the basis of the army, it was they who determined the nature of the battle, and only the knighthood was considered the “fighting” class (bellatores). Among the fighters there were also lightly armed horsemen of ignoble origin, servants of knights or ignoble captives (in France they were called sergeants). It was believed that war was an activity exclusively for the noble, therefore the opportunity to engage in battle with a commoner was rejected with contempt. When the sergeants-sergeants of the Abbey of Saint-Denis began the Battle of Bouvines, their opponents - the Flemish knights - considered this an insult and mercilessly killed horses and riders. Heavy weapons, as noted, were expensive, so the fighting non-knights, who did not have sufficient income, were easily vulnerable in battle. Their main weapons were weapons that struck from afar - a bow and (from the 12th century) a crossbow. The use of such weapons was contrary to the traditions of martial arts and was not used by knights. In 1139, the bow and crossbow were generally prohibited by the Church in battles between Christians - another example of the combination of Christian and knightly ethics. However, by the end of the 13th century. this weapon began to be widely used, especially by the British, who used it initially in wars in Wales and Scotland, where the hilly or mountainous terrain did not leave room for large horse battles. The dispute between the fighting qualities of the bow and crossbow continued throughout the Middle Ages (bow was faster-firing, the crossbow was longer-range) and did not come to a resolution. In any case, in the battles of Crecy and Agincourt (1415), English archers proved their superiority over French crossbowmen, and it was the powerful flow of English arrows that caused the attacks of the French knights to choke in both battles and enabled the British to successfully counterattack.

The archers fought on foot, their horses being the means of transport. Horse archers, borrowed from the East during the era of the Crusades, did not take root in Europe. Infantrymen, i.e. Foot soldiers armed with non-small weapons made up the bulk of the army until the advent of heavy cavalry in the 8th century.
The foot soldiers were the servants of the knights, they helped them mount their horses if they were knocked to the ground, they guarded the camp and the convoy. One of the forms of infantry participation was that the foot soldiers used sharpened hooks to pull the knights off their horses and kill or capture them. This was first recorded in 1126 in Palestine, but soon appeared in Europe. A chronicler telling about the Battle of Buvin, a witness to this battle, considers the weapon used - a hook - as “unworthy” and says that it can only be used by supporters of evil , followers of the devil, because it violates the hierarchy and allows the commoner to be thrown down - down! - a noble horseman. The main function of foot soldiers was to create a formation bristling with spears, tightly closed, from the ranks of a relatively wide formation, sometimes in the shape of a square, behind which or inside which retreating knights could hide from pursuit. At the Battle of Legnano in 1176 between the army of the emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, on the one hand, and the Italian knights and the militia of northern Italian cities, on the other, the Milanese infantry, after the flight of their horsemen, held off the attack of the German knights until the fugitives regrouped, again attacked the German knights and defeated them. Until the 14th century. nevertheless, the infantry performed only defensive functions.

On June 11, 1302, the first battle in the Middle Ages took place, where the attacking infantry played the main role. The foot militia of the Flemish cities - 13 thousand people - won the Battle of Courtrai against 5-7 thousand French knights, quickly attacking them when they crossed the stream and climbed the clay bank - i.e. in violation of all the rules of knightly combat. However, a two-time attempt by the Flemings to repeat a similar success - in 1328 under Kassel and in 1382 under Roosebeek - was unsuccessful, and the knights defeated the infantrymen. The spread of infantry in the XIV-XV centuries. is explained by the transition from knightly wars to national-state wars mentioned above. The centralized state needed significant armed forces, not excessively expensive and more or less controllable. Infantry required less expense than cavalry, commoners were more accustomed to submission than nobles, and less obsessed with the thirst for glory. The foot army could gather in dense ranks, it was easier to control the mass of people, and this gave an advantage over the better armed, but uncontrollable cavalry. Knightly combat (not tournament) weapons were, contrary to general opinion, not so heavy (12-16 kg; for comparison: the full equipment of a modern special forces soldier is 24 kg), so that it is impossible to fight on foot. The knights first fought dismounted in the battle between the English and the Scots at Northallerton in 1.138; The English knights repulsed the attack of their northern neighbors, but did not launch a counteroffensive. At the Battle of Crecy, the English king Edward III forced his knights to dismount and distributed them among the archers. This measure had not so much a tactical as a psychological significance. The infantrymen were afraid to let the enemy's cavalry get close to them, because, having encountered it, they could neither defend nor flee; the defeated knights relied on the speed of their horses, that is, the noble ones abandoned the commoners to their fate. By placing knights between the foot riflemen, Edward III strengthened the moral factor: it was believed that a sense of honor would not allow the knights to escape and they would help the foot soldiers to the end; the nobles supported the courage of the commoners, sharing with them all the dangers. Thus, the English king for the first time demonstrated the unity of the army, not divided into privileged and unprivileged, but united by the single task of victory and the single will of the monarch.

The army consisted of detachments brought by the direct vassals of the monarch - such an army was called a “ban”; in exceptional cases, an army ban was convened, which included vassals (arrier-vassals). In some places, especially in England, the principle of a general militia was preserved, by virtue of which Every free person, even if ignoble, was required, in accordance with his income, to possess certain weapons and to come to war at the call of the king. But in reality, such a militia was practically not used, and participation in it was replaced by contributions to the treasury. From the 8th century the basis of the army were vassals, but already at the end of the 11th - beginning of the 12th century. Mercenaries appear. In accordance with the vassal agreement, the vassals had to serve the overlord on campaigns only a certain number of days a year, and if the time of hostilities expired, the overlord had to support the vassal and pay for his military services. Here was already the germ of mercenaryism, although the warring vassal , unlike the later mercenary, bound by a contract, may not have agreed to such an extension of service. In the 12th century, mercenary detachments appeared, formed by their commanders. The creation of a military force directly subordinate to the sovereign caused discontent among influential social groups, and, for example, the English Magna Carta (1215) prohibited mercenarism, but in general such opposition was unsuccessful. Early (XII-XIII centuries) mercenaryism was not considered shameful ,if the mercenary was a person of noble birth. It was quite consistent with the norms of knightly honor, and, moreover, it was considered quite honorable for a situation in which a poor knight, in search of glory and food, entered the service of a large lord. Payment was considered as a gift from the master to his comrade-in-arms, although since 1108 we have known of mercenary agreements , where the remuneration is clearly stated. The craft of the mercenary became condemned only in the late Middle Ages, when the number of ignoble among the mercenaries increased, when in general the border between the noble and the ignoble in the army was erased. People who lived exclusively by war were condemned, because it was believed that their morals were very different from truly knightly ones. The Battle of the Thirty was a clash of mercenary detachments, but it was carried out according to all knightly rules (the leaders of the detachments declared that they would fight in the name of glory). The best warrior of the losing English side (the election of the most valiant separately among the winners and losers was typical for tournaments) was declared to be the commoner Crokar ( this may not even be a name, but a nickname), a former household servant, and the king of France offered him nobility and a noble bride if he left the service of England.

The spread of mercenaries in the late Middle Ages is explained by their independence from the feudal structure. As for non-knightly morals, this is generally characteristic of the transition from knightly wars to national-state wars, from feudal civil strife to civil conflicts, for a period of changing values ​​and priorities. However, only a professional regular army could become a reliable military support for the monarchs, which did not provide for an agreement of equals, like a vassal union, or a mercenary contract (in Italy, mercenaries were called condottieri, from the Italian condotta “agreement”) and subordination to the commander was assumed by the very fact of admission for service. For the first time such an army arose in France after, in 1439, the States General established a permanent tax intended to maintain such an army. This ARMY, created in 1445, was a heavily armed cavalry, mainly from nobles, but it was no longer a knightly army. The soldiers of this army were called “gendarmes” (French homme d "armes - “armed man”, plural gens d armes - “armed people”). Formally, the ban and arrière-ban were not abolished, but they lost all meaning. In 1448, the Dauphin Louis first tried to organize in his domain something like a conscription system, and when he became King Louis XI of France in 1461, he extended this principle throughout the country.One person was called up for 80 families from non-noble groups of the population, first of all peasants. At first, their mandatory weapons were bows and arrows, then it became more varied - pikes, halberds, firearms. The recruits retained the name “free shooters” due to the original weapons and due to the fact that the state exempted their families from paying taxes. Combat strength, however , it was not possible to create in this way, and in 1480 the king disbanded them. Real armies from recruits arose only in modern times.

In modern times, the modern division of the army into formations, units and subunits was also realized - detachments of soldiers of equal size, led by officers, and into branches of the military. In the Middle Ages, the branches of the army - cavalry, riflemen - turned out to be such not according to the organizational, but according to the functional, during the campaign, principle of division. The division of large detachments into units - the so-called “spears” (Iances), approximately 10 people each - occurred in the 11th century. among mercenaries. The composition of these initial "COPIES" is unknown, but it can be assumed that it was not too different from the composition of the later "copies" created by the standing troops. The French "gendarmes" were divided into companies, or "companies", of approximately 60 people, and those into 10 "spears" of 6 people each. The "spear" included: 1 heavily armed cavalry, 1 lightly armed, 3 riflemen equipped with transport horses, a page .sometimes, instead of one of the shooters, a servant. In 1471, the Duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold, made, like his overlord and main opponent, King Louis XI of France, but less successfully than him, an attempt to create a permanent army. It was very small, only 1000 people, divided the axis into 4 “squadrons”, a “squadron” into 4 “chambers”, a “chamber” into 6 “spears” of 10 people each; in addition, each “squadron” had one additional “spear” of its commander. The “spear” included: 1 heavily armed cavalry, 1 lightly armed, page, servant, 3 archers, crossbowman, arquebusier and pikeman. It should be noted, however, that The "spear" was not a military unit in the modern sense, and the heavily armed cavalry was not its commander, like a modern officer. Homme d'arme is the main fighter, and the remaining members of the “spear” are auxiliary.

In the late Middle Ages, some units consisted only of gun servants. Before modern times, the importance of artillery was not very great. The first mention of the use of cannons dates back to the beginning of the 14th century: cannons served as siege weapons during the Castilian siege of Gibraltar in 1308.

There is information that at the Battle of Crecy the British used 6 cannons in a salvo, which caused panic among the French. If this is true, then the impact was purely psychological; nothing is reported about the dead. Hand-held firearms - arquebuses - were first mentioned in 1347, and by the end of the XVI century. it became widespread, however, despite its relative range - 230-250 steps versus 110-135 for a crossbow, it was used mainly by the besieged in the defense of fortresses, because this weapon was inferior to the crossbow in rate of fire and ease of handling.

The effect of the use of firearms was not so much tactical or strategic as sociocultural: as already noted, in order to hit the enemy, neither courage, nor strength, nor nobility was required, but only certain professional skills. Losses from the use of artillery were small: in Orleans, which was besieged for more than six months in 1428-1429. those killed and wounded by the cannonballs were no more than 50 people out of 5-6 thousand, the garrison and about 30 thousand of the city’s population. The situation changed only at the turn of the 15-16th centuries. with the advent of field artillery. As for hand-held firearms, they completely replaced cold weapons - the pike, the bayonet. sword, saber - only in the twentieth century.

D.E. Kharitonovich “War in the Middle Ages” // MAN AND WAR: War as a cultural phenomenon

Thanks to the work of Delbrück ( Delbrück) and Lota ( Lot) we can get an idea of ​​the size of medieval armies. They were small because they existed in relatively small states. These were professional armies, composed of people descended from the same class; the number of such people was accordingly limited. On the other hand, the economy was underdeveloped, cities were just being formed or were still small. First of all, the limited financial resources of the princes did not allow them to field large professional armies consisting of mercenaries or their vassals. Recruiting such an army would take a long time, supply would be a major problem, transport for supplies would be insufficient, and agriculture would not be developed enough to support large armies.

For military history, the problem of the number of armies is key. It is quite unusual for an inferior army to defeat a superior enemy: therefore it is necessary to find out who had the larger army. Medieval sources constantly report victories of inferior armies, speaking at the same time of the help of God or at least a patron saint. God's help is constantly mentioned in connection with the Crusades, as are references to the Maccabees. St. Bernard of Clairvaux is superior to all. When agitating to join the Order of the Temple, he wrote about the Templars: “They want to conquer by the power of God. And they have already tested it, so that one alone has defeated a thousand, and two have put 10,000 enemies to flight.”

Based on the reports of some chroniclers, who saw the Judgment of God in the outcome of the battle, it was long believed that the Flemings and Swiss defeated their powerful enemies with inferior armies. These ideas appeal to the national pride of the winners and are therefore readily accepted. From a critical point of view, the ratio of the number of fighters tends to be diametrically opposite: the infantry was more numerous than the knights, which was the reason for these significant victories. A revolution was taking place in the art of war - a revolution that was preceded by another, in the method of recruiting an army, its social structure. This was largely due to the rise of a new class that had a sense of its own power to improve its position.

It is generally accepted that medieval man did not attach importance to numbers, and that even commanders were rarely interested in exact statistics. Fantastically huge numbers were accepted and repeated on their behalf in the chronicles. The case of the chronicler Richer is typical: where he follows the Annals of Flodoard, Richer arbitrarily changes the numbers, almost always upward. However, there were clerics who gave precise figures, which provides valuable information about the small number of cavalry. This was true for the First Crusade and the Kingdom of Jerusalem that followed. Heermann, based on a comparison of all sources, obtained the following results:

Reliance on the small army sizes given in the few reliable sources can be justified. Other chroniclers often give large numbers to give the appearance of strong armies, but these are based on guesswork rather than calculations. Data on small armies are probably the result of calculations, especially if the troops were paid. Chroniclers like Gilbert of Mons ( Gilbert of Mons), chancellor and confidant of Count Ino ( Hainault), can be trusted, since they were in positions that allowed them to know the truth. Sometimes they give accounts related to military campaigns. Their information is thus freed from the demon of exaggeration, which grows from the desire to demonstrate the power of the prince. Gilbert's figures range between 80 and 700 knights, and in connection with the latter number he specifically mentions two knights not originally from Inau. Moreover, he knew the exact number of men from Ino, and given his position in the earl's court, his guesses about the number of knights in other domains had some weight. These data should be taken into account, although they are not indicated for all campaigns, to assess how many knights a particular domain could field. The largest number indicated by him for Flanders (1000 knights) and Brabant (700 knights) can be confirmed not only by modern sources, but also by sources from other times. They are not directly confirmed by the record of the Prince-Bishop of Liege, which gives the number of knights in the bishop's army - 700 people.

In many cases, you can be sure of one thing: the most reliable sources give correct figures, at least as long as these figures are not large. Which is completely logical, knights in battle and on the march were divided into small tactical units subordinate to their lord. For these small units ( conrois), from which large units were formed ( batailles), the strength of the army can be calculated. In addition, the number of horses can be estimated if the prince reimbursed the cost of the dead, and this can give us additional information about the strength of the army. The strength of Ino's army can be correlated with similar data for other domains. Just like Gilbert of Mons, who served the counts of Ino, and other high-ranking chroniclers provide similar information for their principalities: Suger ( Suger) for France, Archbishop William of Tire ( William of Tire) for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Villehardouin ( Villehardouin) and Henri of Valencia ( Henry of Valenciennes) for Constantinople

In addition to these few well-informed chroniclers, we also have archival resources. For Brittany, the number of knights called into the ducal army is known. And for the Duchy of Normandy this number is more or less known. In the army of Philip Augustus we know the number of sergeants ( sergeants), infantry of the communes, between 1194 and 1204. There are a number of documents in England
13th century, extremely rich archives for the 14th century. A careful study of these archives shows that the army of the King of England rarely exceeded 10 thousand people, foot and horse. In Flanders there are several incomplete figures in feudal rolls and feudal books, and several documents listing members of the noble class serving the city of Bruges in 1302. All this information indicates a small force. In Normandy in 1172, only 581 knights appeared in the duke's army with 1,500 fiefs. In reality there were more than 1500 fiefs, perhaps 2000, for some barons the number of their vassals is not included. In Brittany in 1294 there were 166 knights and sixteen noble squires ( squires) were obliged to serve in the Duke's army.

In addition to narrative and documentary sources, there is other evidence showing that medieval armies were small. A useful indication of this may be to examine the battlefield itself. Where the front is known, for example Courtray ( Courtrai) or Mont-en-Pevel ( Mons-en-Pévèle), it is not much more than a kilometer, which proves that the armies that fought here were not very large. The size of the terrain does not provide as precise a picture as other evidence, but the width of the battlefield allows information gleaned from narrative sources to be verified. It is quite obvious that on a field about a kilometer wide it is extremely difficult to maneuver an army of 20 thousand people, unless, of course, we exclude a frontal attack by detachments in a very deep formation, following one after another.

Sometimes a useful indication of the number of people can be information about the length of the column on the march. Or, conversely, from the fact that the army advanced in one column, it can be concluded that its strength could not exceed a certain maximum number. A small calculation can refute reports of a huge number of troops, and sometimes shed light on the reasons for victory or defeat.

This method, of course, will not allow us to determine once and for all whether there were 10, 12 or 15 thousand people in the army, with the exception of special cases in which we know exactly when this or that detachment arrived. As a test, you can use the passage of an army onto the battlefield along a bridge or through a city gate. As in the Battle of Antioch in 1098. Since only a few knights can pass through a gate or bridge at a time, for 30 thousand horsemen the deployment process will take too long. If knights pass through a gate or across a bridge 5 in a row, then such an army will have a depth of 6,000 horsemen. Since the horsemen occupy a length of about 3 m, we get a column of about 18 km in length, and it will take three or four hours to pass through the gate or cross the bridge, not counting the time required to form into battle formation. If only 4 knights pass in a row, then the length of the column will be 22.5 km. Now back to the Battle of Antioch, we have assumptions about the strength of Orderic Vitaliy ( Orderic Vitalis). He says that no less than 113 thousand fighters took part in the battle, while 20 thousand remained in the city [in fact, 200 people remained in the city under the command of the Count of Toulouse]. If 5 knights rode in a row, then such an army would have a depth of 22,600 people. If we assume that infantry is also taken into account here, and if we assume approximately 1.8 m for a group of 5 people, then we will get a column more than 45 km long. Such a passage through the gates and across the bridge would have taken at least 9 hours, so the army would have arrived on the battlefield only in the evening, and it would still have to form into battle formation. Naturally, Orderic's data must be rejected.

During a normal march, carts containing equipment and supplies must be taken into account. A column of 50 thousand people will be unnaturally long if it includes a convoy. The size of the camp may also indicate inflated numbers in reported numbers. The camp of the Roman legion of 6 thousand people occupied the area
approx. 25 hectares (500x500 m). The marching camp could have been smaller, but these classic ratios remained for armies until the end of the 19th century: bivouac per 1000 people. occupied approximately 4 hectares (200x200 m).

All these considerations are already used in serious studies of military affairs: they speak as clearly as narrative and archival sources about small armies. When we say that in 1119 under Bramuhl ( Brémule) Louis VI of France and Henry I of England, also Duke of Normandy, fought with each other, having about 400 and 500 knights respectively; and that at the second battle of Lincoln ( Lincoln) in 1217 the army of the King of England, numbering 400 knights and 347 crossbowmen, fought against the army of the rebel barons, which supposedly included 611 knights and 1000 foot soldiers, it becomes clear that a re-estimation of numbers is required. First of all, when studying battles, it is simply necessary to keep in mind that it was a struggle between relatively small forces, and only then talk about the art of war as a whole.

1. Bilmen

Source: bucks-retinue.org.uk

In medieval Europe, the Vikings and Anglo-Saxons often used in battles numerous detachments of billmen - infantry warriors, whose main weapon was a battle sickle (halberd). Derived from a simple peasant sickle for harvesting. The battle sickle was an effective bladed weapon with a combined tip of a needle-shaped spear point and a curved blade, similar to a battle ax, with a sharp butt. During battles it was effective against well-armored cavalry. With the advent of firearms, detachments of billmen (halberdiers) lost their importance, becoming part of beautiful parades and ceremonies.

2. Armored boyars

Source: wikimedia.org

Category of service people in Eastern Europe during the period of the X-XVI centuries. This military class was widespread in Kievan Rus, the Muscovite state, Bulgaria, Wallachia, the Moldavian principalities, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The armored boyars come from the “armored servants” who served on horseback wearing heavy (“armored”) weapons. Unlike servants, who were exempt from other duties only in wartime, the armored boyars did not bear the duties of the peasants at all. Socially, the armored boyars occupied an intermediate level between peasants and nobles. They owned land with peasants, but their civil capacity was limited. After the annexation of Eastern Belarus to the Russian Empire, the armored boyars became close in their position to the Ukrainian Cossacks.

3. Templars

Source: kdbarto.org

This was the name given to professional warrior monks - members of the “order of mendicant knights of the Temple of Solomon.” It existed for almost two centuries (1114-1312), emerging after the First Crusade of the Catholic army to Palestine. The Order often performed the functions of military protection of the states created by the Crusaders in the East, although the main purpose of its establishment was the protection of pilgrims visiting the “Holy Land”. The Knights Templar were famous for their military training, mastery of weapons, clear organization of their units and fearlessness, bordering on madness. However, along with these positive qualities, the Templars became known to the world as tight-fisted moneylenders, drunkards and debauchees, who took with them their many secrets and legends into the depths of centuries.

4. Crossbowmen

Source: deviantart.net

In the Middle Ages, instead of a combat bow, many armies began to use mechanical bows - crossbows. A crossbow, as a rule, was superior to a regular bow in terms of shooting accuracy and destructive power, but, with rare exceptions, it was significantly inferior in rate of fire. This weapon received real recognition only in Europe from the 14th century, when numerous squads of crossbowmen became an indispensable part of knightly armies. A decisive role in raising the popularity of crossbows was played by the fact that from the 14th century their bowstring began to be pulled by a collar. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the pulling force by the physical capabilities of the shooter were removed, and the light crossbow became heavy. Its advantage in penetrating power over the bow became overwhelming - bolts (shortened crossbow arrows) began to pierce even solid armor.

To fight like that, sign up for the convoy!
When thinking about the size of armies, one cannot fail to mention such a component as supply, and here, too, it turned out that it does not fit in with what the author writes.

Robb Stark's Army: 298 AC;
Robb Stark: 20,000 foot and horse
Freys: 3,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry
Edmure Tully: 16,000 foot and horse
Lord Vance, Clement Piper: 4,000 foot and horse
Moat Cailin: 400 infantry
Howland Reed: several thousand infantry and archers (guarding the Isthmus) 2000
Total: 46,400 people on foot and on horseback

Medieval armies did not care much about the supply of food and medicine. They lived mainly by looting and taking supplies from the local population. Usually, for civilians, the passage of a friendly army was as devastating as the raids of enemies. Medieval armies did not stay in one place for long, as local supplies of food and fodder quickly ran out. This was a real problem during sieges. If the besieging army did not take care in advance to organize constant supplies of food, then the besiegers, as a rule, began to starve even earlier than the besieged. If the army remained in one place, then there was also a problem of hygiene. Medieval armies carried a large number of animals besides horses and were not known for cleanliness, so problems with dysentery often arose. Disease and exhaustion greatly reduced the number of feudal armies. During the campaign in France, the English king Henry V lost about 15 percent of his army to disease at the siege of Harflo and even more during the march to Agnicort. In the battle itself, he lost only 5 percent of the soldiers. Henry V himself also died from an illness associated with unsanitary conditions.
The basis of the army's diet was bread, and approximately 2.5 kg of it was required per soldier per day. and there was no sugar and butter in the Middle Ages. And with meat, things were much more scarce, so 2.5 kg of bread per person per day was the necessary minimum for a medieval army on a campaign.
Let's do some simple calculations. For example, let's take Stark's army in 298 AC. Whispering Forest. Martin writes about 46.4 thousand warriors. Great, let's multiply 46,400 by 2.5 kg and get = 116,000 kg per day. Thus, the carrying capacity of an ordinary one-horse peasant cart is approximately 200 kg. We find that the daily ration of the army is supplied by 580 carts. For a month of travel (30 days), 17,400 carts will be required. To visualize it clearly, if these convoy carts are placed in increments of 10 meters, they will stand almost 170 km away,
from King's Landing to Winterfell (distance - approx. 1200 km)
According to the regulations of the 18th and 19th centuries, the speed of movement of a foot army was approximately 25 km. In reality, the army usually moved at a speed of 15-20 km per day. During a forced march, they could cover up to 50 km in a day, but they couldn’t walk at that pace for long.
To illustrate, let’s calculate what kind of convoy an army of 10 thousand people needs for a month of campaign. We multiply 10,000 by 2.5 kg and multiply by 30 days and get = 750,000 kg. Accordingly, 3,750 wagon carts. That's not all. Now let’s take into account that the transport workers (one per cart) also need to be fed. And the horses need to be fed. Let's say horses can graze on the oncoming meadows themselves. However, where to find early pasture for horses on a hike?.. To simplify the calculations, let’s abstract from this problem. Taking into account the fact that transport workers consume no less than soldiers, we get for a month of march for 10,000 soldiers that 6,000 transport workers will be required and, accordingly, a train of 6,000 carts loaded with food. By the way, moving in one column, such a convoy will stretch for 60 km.
Of course, our calculation is approximate; in practice, factors appear that both reduce the size of the convoy and increase it. But in any case, the general scale of the disaster can be imagined.
Of course, the army could feed itself at the expense of the local population. However, in the Middle Ages, the population density was low (for example, in the 17th century, a village of 2-3 households was typical) and the immediate surroundings could not feed an army of several thousand people. That is, in principle, it was probably possible to feed oneself by robbing the local population, but then one had to stop the campaign and search the surrounding area for food for people and horses.
In connection with the above, the size of the armies must be reduced by 10 times.
“Amateurs do tactics. Professionals study logistics” (c)
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