Westerners

Literature

Oleinikov D.I. Classical Russian Westernism. - M., 1996.

Volodin A.I. “Why are you pricking our eyes with Europe?” (strokes to the portrait of Russian Westernism) // In Thoughts about Russia (XIX). M., 1996.

Shchukin V.V. Russian Westernism. Lodz, 2001.

Levandovsky Andrey Anatolievich. T.N. Granovsky in the Russian liberation movement. M., 1989.

Saraeva E.L. Russian Westernism: the ideology of national self-determination. Yaroslavl, 2009.

Westernism- a system of ideas of the Westerners, developed in a dialogue with the Slavophiles about the fate of Russia in the 40s. XIX century. The fundamental ideas of Westernism are the inherent value of the individual, the possibility of interaction between civilizations, cultures and peoples. Modern researchers - V. Strada, D.I. Oleinikov, V.G. Schukin - introduced the concept classic westernism. Classic Westernism - the ideology of Russian thinkers who participated in ideological disputes with the Slavophiles in the forties of the 19th century, who defended the ideas of freedom, dignity of the individual, cultural interaction between peoples, and the civilization of society.

The ideology of the Westerners was liberal-democratic.

The theoretical basis of Westernism was Hegelian philosophy.

To the main ideologists of Westernism in the fortiesXIX V. attributed to V.G. Belinsky, A.I. Herzen, T.N. Granovsky, K.D. Kavelina, N.P. Ogareva, P.V. Annenkova, S.M. Solovyov. The circle of like-minded Westerners was significant, it included members of the Moscow and St. Petersburg groups of Westerners, intellectuals in the capitals and provinces, who were united by the ideas of individual freedom, the humanization of social relations, the establishment of law and order, and the interaction of cultures. The majority accepted the dogma in its finished form and only participated in general conversations and disputes with ideological opponents.

Many Westerners had a close friendship.

The Westerners created two circles: the Petersburg one, which united around Belinsky and Otechestvennye Zapiski (and since 1847, Sovremennik), and the Moscow one, whose soul was Herzen and Granovsky.

Allocate leftist, radical democratic Westernism. Belinsky, Herzen and Ogarev belonged to him. Radical Westerners were adherents of the idea of ​​social justice and equality. They considered it possible to turn to revolutionary methods of transformation. Moderate or liberal Westernism was more numerous. All other Westerners belonged to it, with the exception of the radical ones. Granovsky was its unspoken leader. Granovsky's closest associates were Korsh, Kavelin, and Botkin.

One of the main common features of liberal Westernism was the idea of ​​gradual liberalization of all relations in the country - the gradual expansion of freedom. Subsequently, they began to be called "gradualists." They rejected violent ways of social change. The definitions of "left" and "liberal" Westernism are arbitrary. Westernism has common ideas - the ideas of expanding the freedom of the individual, the rule of law, the civilization of society, the interaction of cultures.

The origin of Russian intellectual circles in the 30s - 40s.XIXV. Westerners explained needs of Russian reality. In the Nicholas era, the formation of official conservatism was completed. The Russian autocracy was alien to the spiritual needs of an independent cultural elite.

There are differences in the interpretation by researchers of the reasons for the origin of Westernism. In the literature of the topic, there is a tradition to explain the emergence of Westernism by strengthening the protective principles in the policy of Nicholas I, by the contradictions of Russian reality. Many historians see the origins of Russian thought in the forties in the philosophical culture of romanticism. Westernism is also characterized as an intellectual trend that was formed under the influence of the European culture of the New Age - the culture of Modern. Historians interpret Westernism and Slavophilism as a reaction to the process of modernization of Russia in the form of Europeanization. Russia is a country with a belated and resisted modernization. Anti-modernist theories of the 18th – 19th centuries. were a criticism of the destructive consequences of the Europeanization of Russia. According to the Italian philosopher V. Strada, Westerners are figures of Russian thought and culture who opposed anti-modernist forces. Leading experts consider the emergence of Westernism in the light of the theory of modernization, which connects the historical conditionality of Westernism with the need to support "Westernization" - borrowing the material and spiritual tools of the European civilization of modern times. Westernism arose as a result of the destruction of the patriarchal way of life and the formation of the society of the New Age, as well as the worldwide expansion of Western European culture.

Westerners did not mechanically borrow Western ideals. They connected the future of Russia with Western values, but, not living in the West, they imagined European civilization in a mythologized form.

The West in the minds of Westerners was associated primarily with respect for the individual. The greatest value of the Westerners was the personality. They argued the need to respect the dignity of the individual. This, from their point of view, is the goal of the historical process. That is why Westerners are rightly seen as "Russian humanists».

Westerners perceived themselves as " Russian Europeans”, “citizens of the new world”, “younger brothers of the European family”, “broad-minded people”. Westerners professed values ​​of personality, freedom, friendship, love, truth, family, homeland,enlightenment, common sense, law and order. To be a civilized person meant to be spiritually, morally and politically free.

They saw their role in the acclimatization of humane ideas in Russia, the development of human consciousness. Significant features of their culture were nobility, common sense, sense of reality, rational activity, creative individuality, independence of thought, developed spiritual inquiries, self-respect and recognition of the dignity of other people.

Westerners were aware of their socio-cultural otherness, the profound differences of their ideological and value system from other societies. They saw their intellectual role in shaping the humanistic culture of society.

One of the main concepts of Westernism is concept of progress. The ultimate goal of historical progress was recognized as "a moral, enlightened personality independent of fateful definitions and a society conforming to the requirements of such a personality" 1 .

According to Westerners, personality is the main figure in the historical process.

Problem "Russia and Europe".

Europe has developed universal ideas and values ​​that can be accepted by the Russian society. These are the ideas of freedom, human dignity, law and order, civil society. Human - that common thing that unites peoples into humanity. National - an original expression of the spiritual forces of the people.

They considered both universal and original principles to be equally significant for the life of the people, without giving priority to any of them in the long term.

They did not share the ideas of Eurocentrism, developing the idea of ​​the multivariate movement of peoples and the presence of distinctive features in the life of each society. Westerners formed a positive perception of European civilization, explained the significance of the interaction of peoples and cultures. They singled out the universal components of European civilization: the formation of civil society, the expansion of human freedom, the development of legal relations, the formation of a humanistic system of personality. According to Westerners, the main content of the historical process in the West was the creation of conditions for the development of personality. Westerners were not Eurocentrists, they did not believe that the models of political and socio-cultural movement developed in the West should be reproduced in Russia. But it was believed that universal human values ​​and ideas developed by Western thinkers could form the basis of Russian culture. They formed a positive attitude towards the best achievements of Western civilization: its values, ideas of civil society, and science. Their position is characterized by a tolerant attitude towards another culture, they were open to accepting new ideas.

Westerners were not Eurocentrists. They believed that Russia had and should continue to have its own national life in the future. Russians must remain Russians, taking into themselves elements of not only European, but also world life. They recognized the diversity of ways of social development. They asserted the importance for Russia of the entire world heritage. The development of the people should not be based solely on their traditions in the name of cultivating the national life. The perception of elements of other cultures is the most important factor in expanding the diversity of life and the progress of society. The basis for the interaction of peoples, according to Westerners, was the existence of a universal human principle in the culture of each people. Universal ideas are acceptable to all peoples.

In the 30s and 40s. Russian intelligentsia discussed the importance of national principles in the life of the people. In responding to this discussion, Westerners had to define their view of nationality. There is no reason to reproach the Westerners for their neglect of the national characteristics of the Russian people. From their point of view, concept of nationality can not be reduced only to the customs and traditions of antiquity. They defined nationality primarily as spiritual forces of the people. From their point of view, the Europeanization of Russia could not destroy the nationality of the Russians, since it is impossible to kill the spiritual strength of the people.

Borrowing the achievements of the West is only a means for the Russian people to solve their national problems. It enriches the life of society, expands the scope of its activities and the human content of life, without changing the original features of the Russian people:

The perception of the experience of other peoples is an inevitable process, it is characteristic of the history of all peoples, Belinsky believed. The people must creatively apply the borrowed experience without losing their identity and originality.

the most important reason for reforms in Russia at the beginningXVIIIV. Westerners considered the country's lag behind civilized European countries.

The periodization of Russian history was based on development criterion. In the traditional period, the state and society solved the problems of unification, ensuring independence, and the conditions of peaceful labor. The long isolation of Russia determined the development of Russian society on the basis of internal potential. The despotic state formed under the influence of the Horde, successfully solving the function of protecting the Russian lands, used the people's forces to realize the interests of the ruling circles. Slow economic development doomed the people to poverty. Social relations - the subordination of man to the collective - did not create conditions for the development of individual talents.

According to Westerners, traditional society in Russia by the end of the XVII century. has exhausted its exclusively national potential for development, being only able to repeat the previously established systems, forms and their content. The origins of Russia's development had to be sought outside its socio-political organism. Westerners associated the evolution of society with the assertion of the personal principle.

Westerners introduced into Russian thought ideas of civilized society. Main the content of the civilizational process, according to Westerners, should be the formation of a new type of personality - intelligently conscious, active, with broad interests, upholding the right to freedom of activity, assimilating civil and moral ideas; the formation of civil society and the rule of law, the dissemination of education, improving the well-being of people.

One of the basic ideas of Westernism is the idea of ​​borrowing the achievements of European civilization as a means for Russian society to solve its national problems. Mastering the elements of a different culture enriches the life of society, expands the scope of its activities, without changing the national spirit of the Russian people:

If the Slavophils in their teaching emphasized the justification of the national principles of the country's development, then the Westernizers paid considerable attention to the problem of the possibility of cultural contacts between peoples and the analysis of the real embodiment of Western ideas in Russia.

Solution Westerners problems of personality and society. They noted that individual freedom must be combined with public freedom.

Westerners recognized the question of faith as a private affair of each individual. A person was recognized the right to believe or not believe in God, to profess any religion.

Westerners preached civic action ideas.

Not setting themselves the task of radically changing the social and political system, they considered it necessary to proceed in their activities from real historical conditions.

Assessment of Peter's reforms.

Westerners interpreted Peter's modernization as a change of civilizational landmarks: the rejection of a closed existence based on centuries-old traditions and an appeal to the experience of the European civilization of modern times. Contacts with the West, acquaintance with the culture of the "other" expanded the variability of the movement, included Russia in competition with developed countries. Consequently, Westerners believed, the Russian state and society were placed in the situation of choosing effective development institutions. Preservation of the traditional way of life at the end of the 17th century. fraught with a threat to the independence of Russia, which was quickly lagging behind European countries. Peter had no interest in the previous experience of transformations in the country. He took the path of abandoning the former forms of existence, which he associated with ignorance, but in reality, Peter's reforms, Westerners argued, became a continuation of the policy of the Muscovite state, the reforms of the early 18th century. were radical and revolutionary. Peter's transformations were not organic, since they were carried out using someone else's experience. Westerners positively characterized the efforts of Peter I to bring the country out of a state of isolation and stagnation. Peter's reforms saved Russia, because they made it possible to strengthen its political influence in the world, developed a personal principle, increased the efficiency of the administration, and gave impetus to the movement.

Peter's policy of extensive contacts with European countries, according to Westerners, changed the content of Russia's civilizational development. For the "Russian Europeans" of the 40s. 19th century a significant consequence of the innovations was the launch of the mechanism of the movement of the nation. Recognizing development as the most important characteristic of the historical process, Westerners considered the change in its forms and content as a manifestation of movement. For this reason, unlike their ideological opponents, they were not inclined to dramatize individual negative results of the transformations. Westerners suggested paying attention to the formation of a new culture in Russia, the emergence of a layer of highly educated people, the assimilation of humanistic values.

The intellectuals of the forties comprehended the problem of the cost of Peter's reforms. Westerners did not shy away from talking about the cruel measures used by the Petrine state to plant new forms of life. They explained Peter's use of violent methods by the need to rapidly transform the country into a strong power. Violence, in their opinion, was due to historical circumstances: a lack of understanding even by the nobility of the significance of broad ties with other peoples and the opportunity to borrow their experience, as well as the threat of Western expansion, the lack of time for a gradual evolutionary movement, the centuries-old tradition of despotic governance, the need to subordinate the masses to the will of the autocrat.

Peter's reforms, according to the Westerners, led to the strengthening of the despotism of the government, which planted new state and social institutions. Reforms were carried out by despotic power. They were violence against the people, but they met the needs of the country's development, the radical Westerners believed.

Westerners saw the positive results of Peter's policy in the change of orientations of the movement of the noble society, which became the norms of life that ensured the development of the individual, independent activity, familiarization with education, science, and art. New socio-cultural traditions were established thanks to the appeal to the European experience. Westerners positively assessed the modernization of Peter the Great, since it opened up prospects for a constant renewal of the forms and content of the movement.

Westerners ambiguously assessed the role of the state in the formation of a new civilization in Russia during the St. Petersburg period. In their understanding, the mechanism for creating a new Russia was launched by the autocracy, which determined the priorities of the system - state power independent of society, a strong army that ensures Russia's foreign policy interests, the well-being of the aristocracy that supports the monarchy. The positive perception of Peter's reforms was determined by their assessment of the political and social potential of the Muscovite state at the end of the 17th century: there were no forces in the country interested in changing the goals and forms of life. The autocratic power of Peter I became the main political tool for reforms in the country, which did not have social and cultural conditions for changing the forms of life. Initially, the transformation consisted in using the power of a despotic state to involve society in the creation of a new Russia. The dictatorship of the government was necessary at the initial stage, when society passively followed the initiatives of the authorities and copied the lifestyle of the imperial court. Already during the reign of Peter I, state interests prevailed in government policy.

Disagreeing with the official praise of all the deeds of Peter as having ensured the people's good, Westerners drew attention to the historical circumstances that Peter had to take into account. Westerners interpreted Peter's reformist plans not as a free will of the ruler, but as an urgent need to overcome the isolation of the country, which doomed it to the reproduction of monotonous forms of life, political and social structures that did not even provide an external demonstration of the power of the state.

Westerners proceeded from the idea that long-term historical processes have a deep internal conditionality. They saw Russia's lagging behind the West as the reason for the inevitability of turning to the experience of a more developed historical and cultural world.

According to Westerners, Peter was not concerned about the problem of preserving national identity; it was important for him to overcome inertia and quickly create a mechanism for the country's sustainable development. The effectiveness of Peter the Great's policy of creating a strong Russia was linked by Westerners with the assimilation of European experience. They interpreted Peter's goal as turning Russia into a strong country capable of defending its sovereignty. They interpreted the struggle of Peter I with traditions not as hostility to Russian culture, but as an intention to force them to learn to perceive the norms of another civilization. The Westerners treated Peter's idea of ​​eradicating customs as the need, correctly understood by the monarch, to tear the Russian people away from traditions that prevent them from recognizing other norms of life. If the Slavophiles believed in the gradual progress based on traditions, then the Westerners positively perceived Peter's idea to quickly and radically change the guidelines for the country's development.

Westerners saw the most important result of Peter's activity in overcoming stereotypes, in creating a development mechanism, instilling in Russian society an interest in new forms of life. Westerners proceeded from the idea that a person who has realized the needs of the time has the right to influence the life of the country. The Westerners' positive assessment of the activities of Peter I is explained by their interpretation of the St. Petersburg period as a time of gradual assimilation of liberal ideas, hence the civilization of society.

Rejecting the official assessment of Peter's politics as popular, the Westerners linked the goals of the monarch's activity with the interests of the state. Peter ignored the interests of the people. Since the reforms were not caused by humanistic values ​​and ideas, then, according to Westerners, the process of civilization of society was slow.

Westerners considered the forcible imposition of the European model of state building, the rapid radical transformation of the conditions of service of the nobility, the change in the status of the country and the nature of its relationship with Europe as features of the initial stage of the change in the civilizational path of development of Russia.

The Westerners associated the modernization of Russia with state policy that determined the direction and content of the country's evolution. The underdevelopment of public life at the beginning of the 18th century ruled out the formation of an independent active position of the population.

According to the Westerners, Russia's orientation towards Europe made it possible to change the value orientations: to recognize innovation as a significant factor in development, to accept the individual as the highest priority. Moderate Westerners positively assessed government reforms, while maintaining faith in the transformative potential of the autocracy. Radical Westernizers more clearly outlined the contradictions between government and society. Modernization in the socio-cultural sphere gave ambiguous results for the state. The Westerners showed that the desire of the authorities to form a state consciousness in society, no doubt, instilled in the best people a sense of duty, respect for the state interests of Russia, however, from the open window to Europe, a stream of ideas of amateur society was flowing into the country. From the end of the 18th century, when Russian society became acquainted with the ideas of the Enlightenment, the state was no longer able to stop the development of the self-consciousness of the individual.

Defining the type of Russian statehood, Westerners noted the despotism of the authorities, who sought to control society. There are divergences in the judgments of Westerners about the nature of power in the Petersburg period. Belinsky expressed the hope that the despotic pressure of the state on society would be weakened, Herzen drew attention to the non-recognition by the authorities of the right of the individual to free expression. Westerners traced the slow civilization of relations in the management system, which influenced the culture of secular society, forced to reproduce the stereotypes of social behavior at court.

The state, according to Westerners, during the entire XVIII and early XIX centuries. pursued a policy of Europeanization, in some periods it was limited, connected with the interests of the imperial court and the country's foreign policy, in others it had more fruitful results, manifested in expanding the possibilities of high society to study European culture.

According to moderate Westerners, the state model for the transformation of Russia contributed to the civilization of society. Radical Westerners noted a change in the nature of the relationship of power to society, when a layer of independently thinking people formed. Seeing a threat to power in freethinking, the autocracy inevitably had to react to the penetration of liberal ideas into the country from the West. According to radical Westerners, the state lost its initiative role in the process of transformation when it realized that an enlightened society was capable of defending its freedom. The Westerners considered the expansion of individual freedom to be the most significant achievements of modernization. The conflict between the authorities and the intellectuals, according to Westerners, was due to their different value orientations. The formation of a new type of Russian civilization on the basis of enlightenment ideas inevitably led to a collision between the state and the cultural layer of society.

Absolutism was seen by the Westerners as a political condition for the reforms carried out by the monarch. Westerners recognized the value of the state, but were not supporters of a strong autocracy. They noted the effectiveness of individual government reforms aimed at modernizing the country. Westerners condemned despotism in all its manifestations. The idea of ​​Westerners that the state built its relations with society, guided by its own interests, and sought to limit people's freedom of expression, seems to us significant, fruitful, adequate to the Russian realities of that time. Many modern researchers give essentially similar interpretations of the social policy of the autocracy of the St. Petersburg period.

The Westerners did not insist on the immediate implementation of their social ideal, but focused on the specific activities of people.

Westerners believed that Russia and in the middle of the XIX century. was not a Europeanized civilized country, since most of the population was represented by the peasantry, closed within the boundaries of traditional culture.

The civilizational development of society is one of the directions of social evolution in modern times. The Westerners considered it possible, real, necessary to influence the society of a cultural minority in order to root humane principles and ideas, to “humanize” a person. However, they were aware that the real historical process, which depended on diverse circumstances, is not a direct broad road to the ideal of a civilized society. The action of various forces, the ratio of which has changed over time, the multiplicity of influences, the terrible power of tradition, introduce variations into the movement.

Westerners gave an analysis of the development of society, revealing social changes - the collapse into various socio-cultural layers and the creation of conditions for dialogue between subcultures. They singled out such main trajectories of sociocultural processes as the uncritical perception of the culture of the European aristocracy, the formation of a new Russian humanistic culture, and the revival of interest in traditional Russian culture.

According to Westerners, the communication of cultures is the most important condition for the spiritual development of the individual, a way to smooth out the conflict between societies. The Westerners associated the formation of a new society in Russia with the reforms of the 18th century, the assimilation of elements of the culture of European civilization, and the creation of a new culture. They understood that the transformations of the 18th - early 19th centuries. created fundamentally different socio-cultural conditions for the life of Russian society. The most important condition for the movement of society, according to Westerners, was the expansion of its intellectual activity.

The process of civilization of society, the main trend of which Westerners saw in the formation of an educated society, the development of humanistic values ​​and ideas by it, their transmission to other segments of the population, should be facilitated by cultural interaction in the national community. Westerners, recognizing the diversity of cultures, proved the importance of cultural contacts, intellectually and morally developing a person. The expansion of cultural contacts that influence the change in the system of worldview coordinates, the formation of a new humanistic culture of the individual can ensure the civilization of society. Westerners, defining the historical role of intellectuals in Russia, argued that they should direct their activities towards creating a cultural environment in order to transmit the ideas of the new time, to promote free communication between people. The main line of the development of society, according to Westerners, was the formation of a free enlightened personality, influencing the transformation of society through its culture and experience.

Westerners - a liberal ideological trend of the 1840s - early 1860s in Russia.

Na-cha-lo for-mi-ro-vat-sya in 1839, when the Moscow circle of T.N. Gra-nov-sko-th. P.V. An-nen-kov, V.P. Botkin, K.D. Ka-ve-lin, M.N. Kat-kov, P.N. Kudryav-tsev, N.Kh. Ket-cher, E.F. Korsh, N.F. Pavlov, B.N. Chi-che-rin. At this time, the views of Westerners once de la V.G. Belinsky, A.I. Ger-tsen, N.P. Oga-roar, P.Ya. Chaa-da-ev. To the Westerners would be close to I.A. Gon-char-ditch, S.M. So-lov-yov, I.S. Turgenev, M.E. Sal-you-kov-Shched-rin. After the death of Gra-nov-sko-go (1855), Moscow Westerners (Bot-kin, Ket-cher, E.F. Ko-ni, Korsh, So-lov-yov, Chi-che-rin) -e-di-ni-lis around pi-sa-te-la A.V. Stan-ke-wee-cha. In St. Peterburg, at the end of the 1840s, a second group of Westerners formed, consisting of a hundred young chi-news no-kov led by N.A. Mi-lu-ti-nym and D.A. Mi-lu-ti-nym. Later, they are lu-chi-whether known as “part-tia of pro-gres-sa”, or “li-be-ral-nye by-ro-kra-you”. Another circle of Westerners formed in the early 1850s around the re-hav-she-go in St. Petersburg K. D. Ka-ve-li-na. Many Westerners would-we-we-we-profess-so-ra-mi and public-li-qi-hundred-mi, an hour you-stup-pa-whether with lectures and in pe-cha-ti, that can-so-st-in-va-lo races-pro-country-non-ing of their ideas. You-ra-zi-te-la-mi to me-of Westerners would be the journal-on-ly “Mo-s-kov-sky on-blu-da-tel” (1835-1839), “Father-che- st. kov-sky ve-do-mo-sti "(1851-1856).

Ter-mi-ny “for-pad-no-ki” and “for-pad-no-che-st-vo” rise-nick-whether in the course of the Westerners from the glory but-fi-la-mi and first-at-first-but sa-mi-mi Westerners were perceived as insulting poly-tic nicknames (in disputes 1840 1990s, they also used the same pro-names “for-western”, “eu-ro-pei-sty” and “but-in-ve-ry”).

In the political sphere, Westerners would be parties-no-ka-mi of freedom of co-weight, public opinion and pe-cha-ti, as well as public-personal-no-sti of government actions and publicity-no-sti su-do-pro-from-water-st-va. In relation to the application to the application of the re-in-revolutionary on-force for changing the su-sche-st-in-vav-she-th system of the first at first, among Westerners on-me-ti-moose, there are two-right-le-niya - ra-di-kal-noe (in is-to-rio-graphics, sometimes they have well-et-sya re-in-lu-qi-on-no-de-mo-kra-ti-che-skim), to-pus-kav-neck use-pol-zo-va-nie on-si- liya, and moderate, for someone-ro-go it would be ha-rak-ter-but from-ri-tsa-nie violent ways of fighting against power and striving for a step-by-step-no-mu pre-ob-ra-zo-va-niyu society. To the first-to-right-le-niyu tra-di-qi-on-but from-no-syat V.G. Be-lin-sko-go, A.I. Ger-tse-on and N.P. Oga-ryo-va, one-to-one their zi-tion would not always be-la after-to-va-tel-but ra-di-kal-noy. To the second-ro-mu-to-right-le-niyu-over-le-zha-lo pain-shin-st-in Westerners. The gap between Ger-tsen-na and the Westerners (1845) and the death of Be-lin-sko-go (1848) are late-cha-tel-but op-re-de-li-whether the essence of the ideological in-zi-tion for-pad-no-che-st-wa how moderate-ren-but whether-be-ral-no-th-th-che-niya. The pain-shin-st-in-the-Westerners would be mo-nar-hi-sta-mi, consider-ta-whether it is possible to os-shche-st-in-le-ne-on-mature-re-forms sa-mim go-su-dar-st-vom.

Westerners, as well as slav-vya-no-fi-ly, did not have their own or-ga-ni-za-tion. Until 1845, when there was a conflict between two te-che-niya-mi, leading to a raz-ry-vu from-but-she-me -zh-du ni-mi, Westerners and glo-vya-no-fi-ly vos-pri-ni-ma-li se-bya as a single “ob-ra-zo-van-noe less-shin-st -in", striving to awaken the society from the "mind-st-vein-noy apathy". One-to-the world-ro-vision of the Westerners sharply from-whether-cha-moose from "sa-mo-life-no-che-st-va" s-va-no-fi-lov , as well as from the state-under-stvo-vav-shey "ofi-qi-al-noy on-rod-no-sti" theory. The basis of the world-view of the Westerners would be the ideas of the European Enlightenment and the German class-si-che-philosophy, recognition of the ve-du-ro-whether ra-zu-ma in knowledge, not-about-ho-di-mo-sti of philosophical os-thinking in practical os-voe-nii ok-ru-zhayu-schey dey-st-vi-tel-no-sti. Westerners believed that the mind allowed to know the world (including social relations) as a system of cause-and-cause st-ven-ny connections, in some-swarm dey-st-woo-yut-know-we-we (ho-tya, sometimes not yet known) for-to-us, the same for all living and non-living nature. The pain-shin-st-in of the Westerners was attached to the atheistic ubi-de-nii.

Westerners would be against-no-ka-mi kre-by-st-no-go right-va. They do-ka-zy-va-li pre-imu-sche-st-va of the Western European mo-de-li-public device-swarm-st-va, however, they are resurrecting-with-no-ma- they were used only as an orientation of development, and not an object of a next sub-ra-zha-niya. From-a-flock-wa-whether li-be-ral-ny values-no-sti, pre-zh-de everything is not-for-vi-si-bridge of personality. From the point of view of the Westerners, it could be right that there was such a society, in which we created all the conditions for su -sche-st-in-va-nia and sa-mo-rea-li-for-tion of personality. In this way, they are from-ver-ga-whether ha-rak-ter-nye for the traditional society of the idea of ​​pat-ri-ar-khal-no-go-one-st-va in- me-shchi-kov and kre-st-yan, as well as pa-ter-na-liz-ma of power according to from-no-she-niyu to under-data.

In the field of eco-no-mi-ki, Westerners considered that the state-su-dar-st-vo, with minimal interference in the development of pro-mice -len-no-sti, trade-gov-whether and trans-port-that should provide-ne-chi-va-vat non-attack-but-vein-ness of own-st-ven-no-sti.

In the center of the is-to-rio-sophic representations of the Westerners, on-ho-di-elk, the understanding of the historical progress, which they present becoming-la-whether as a chain of not-about-ra-ti-my, ka-che-st-ven-nyh from me-not-ny of individual people and general-st-va in in general, from worst to best. In this way, Westerners considered Peter I to be one of the main figures of Russian history, someone who turned the movement of the country along the path of pro-gres-sa to the “great-vi-tel-st-ven-ny sys-te-mu”. Ideas for-pad-no-th-st-wa found you-ra-same in the creation of K.D. Ka-ve-li-nym, S.M. So-lov-yo-vym and B.N. Chi-che-ri-nym in the 1840-1850s on the right-le-nii of historical science, later on, better-chiv-shem, the name “go-su-dar-st- vein school. Its essence lies in the statement of the or-ga-nich-no-sti and for-ko-no-mer-no-sti of Russian history, one-st-va historical development of Russia and Za-pa-da with the preservation of Russian national features-ben-no-stay (greater than in Za-pa-de, the role go-su-dar-st-va, some-paradise ve-la to for-si-leu by-ro-kra-tii and weak-bo-development of public ini-tsia-ti -you), in the con-sta-ta-tion of the fact that the os-no-howl from-no-she-niya go-su-dar-st-va to the general-st-vu was pa-ter -on-lizm. According to Westerners, the Russian state-su-dar-st-vo in the form of sa-mo-der-zha-via you-ra-zha-lo is all-general in-te-re-sy, and in this way, names, but it is under the influence of public opinion, the development of enlightenment and science, but it should have become ini -tsia-to-rum and gar-ran-tom whether-to-vi-da-tion co-words-no-go an-ta-go-niz-ma in Russia and under-go-tov-ki on -ro-da (“not-raz-viv-shey-sya part of che-lo-ve-che-st-va”) to political freedoms-bo-ladies. This allows many modern studies-to-va-te-lyam op-re-de-lyat Westerners as li-be-ral-but-con-ser-va-tiv-noe ideological flow.

In the 1840s, the pa-fos you-stu-p-le-niy of the Westerners was on-the-right-len to ut-ver-wait-ing the pre-sun-walk-st-va Za-pa-da, in 1850- th years, they, like s-vya-no-fi-ly, co-medium-to-that-chi-were on thoughts-le-ni-yah about ways and ways to raz-re -she-niya of problems, hundred-yav-shih before Ros-si-her. At the end of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which was not successful for Russia, some Westerners on-pi-sa-whether better-chiv-shie shi-ro-kuyu from-news-for-pis-ki, in some-ryh con-sta-ti-ro-va-li on-ripening in Russia crisis, oh-va-tiv-shiy all one hundred -ro-ny of life-no common-st-va, and pre-la-ha-whether the plan is not-about-ho-di-my pre-ob-ra-zo-va-ny for you-ho-yes out of him. In the first of such for-pi-juice (1855) B.N. Chi-che-rin sub-subjected to the cri-ti-ke external-li-ti-ku with the end-chav-she-go-xia of Emperor Ni-ko-lai I (ko-to-paradise, according to me-niyu Chi-che-ri-na, but-si-la ex-Pan-Sio-ni-st-sky ha-rak-ter and brought-ve-la to war-not), in a close mutually -mo-connection of military non-successes with "internal-ren-him not-dev-swarm-st-vom of go-su-dar-st-va." K.D. Ka-ve-lin in his-her-pis-ke, also on-pi-san-noy in 1855, saw the main pri-chi-well from-hundred-lo-sti of the country in the cr - in the st-n-nom pra-ve, ot-marked his pa-lip-noe effect on the moral-st-ven-noe state of society and co -qi-al-nuyu stability, on-stay-shaft on not-about-ho-di-mo-sti os-in-bo-g-de-niya kre-st-yang with the earth and for “rising-on-gra-zh-de-nie vlad-del-tsam” (this principle formed the basis of the kre-st-yan-sky reform of 1861).

Due to the fact that the main goal of the Westerners is from-me-on the cre-on-st-no-go right-wa - would-la real-li-zo-va-on the right-vi-tel-st- Vom, circles of Westerners dispersed in the early 1860s, one-on-one Westerners (K.D. Ka-ve-lin, B.N. Chi-che- rin) continue to play a prominent role in public life. Ter-min "Westerners" in a degree-pen-but lost-ra-til concreteness, it began to be used with-me-ni-tel-but to li-be-ral-but on-stro-en-noy part-ty in-tel-li-gen-tion.

In the 40s of the 19th century, a special direction arose in Russian philosophical thought, which was called "Westerners", "Westerners", "Europeans". It arose in the course of a controversy with the "Slavophiles". In contrast to the Slavophiles, the "Westerners" did not defend the idea of ​​the originality and exclusivity of the historical role and fate of Russia in world history, but the idea of ​​Russia being woven into a single evolutionary world process. And the development of Western Europe and America is a progressive expression of world history. Therefore, Russia should objectively “follow” the Western path of development, and not isolate itself from it and not oppose it. The "Western" path of development was characterized by the development of capitalism, the establishment of the free development of the individual, the creation of civil society and opposition to all kinds of despotism, the progressive development of science. Freedom is understood as a necessary attribute of historical development. Representatives of "Westernism" believed that economic, political, social, industrial and technical transformations naturally await Russia, which should be promoted, not hindered. The spirit of the socio-economic transformation of Russia took possession of the minds of people, and the essence of this transformation had to be comprehended philosophically.

The “Westerners” considered the existence of serfdom and the absence of political and social freedoms of the individual to be the main obstacle to the progressive development of Russia. In this, the representatives of the "Westerners" did not differ. But they differed over the ways and means of transforming Russia and the future of Russia. As a more or less unified direction, "Westernism" survived until the end of the 60s of the XIX century. The largest representatives of the "Westerners" were A.I. Herzen, T.N. Granovsky, N.I. Ogarev, K.D. Kavelin and other philosophers and publicists. The ideas of "Westernism" were supported by V.G. Belinsky, I.S. Turgenev, P.V. Annenkov, I.I. Panaev. But the largest figure in the philosophical thought of Russia of this period was Alexander Ivanovich Herzen (1812–1870).

The formation of his philosophical views was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel, especially his doctrine of dialectics, the materialistic philosophy of L. Feuerbach. He calls Hegel's dialectical method nothing more than "the algebra of revolution" and tries to apply Hegel's dialectic, especially his doctrine of the unity of opposites, to the development of nature, man, society and human history. In the philosophy of L. Feuerbach, he finds the fundamental ideas for the formation of his own views on the nature of man, the nature and essence of consciousness, knowledge, arising from the natural nature of man. In his philosophical views, he evolves from Hegel's idealism to materialism, going beyond the ideas of L. Feuerbach's anthropological materialism.

Already in his first works "On the Place of Man in Nature" (1833), "Amateurism in Science" (1842-43), but especially in "Letters on the Study of Nature", he takes the position of materialism. He recognizes the objective existence of nature (matter), which exists before man, outside of man and independently of him: “Outside of man there is an infinitely diverse set of particulars, vaguely intertwined with each other; ... they were when he (the person - G.Ch.) was not; … they are without end, without limits; they constantly and everywhere arise, appear, disappear,” he notes in his Letters on the Study of Nature. Due to the fact that in nature there is a "cycle" of phenomena and processes, it retains itself both as a unity and as a variety. That is, he recognizes the development of nature as a universal system, which can only be known by man, his spirit.

Based on this, A.I. Herzen distinguishes philosophical knowledge of nature from natural science. Philosophy seeks to reveal the universal universal laws of the existence of nature, and more broadly - the world as a whole, while natural science studies private, separate aspects of natural phenomena. Therefore, philosophy gravitates towards theoretical knowledge, and natural science towards empirical knowledge. “They (natural scientists - G.Ch.) would like to be completely empirical”, “which is impossible for a thinking being”. He notes that the subject of philosophy is the knowledge of the universal (that is, the universal laws of the existence of the world) the achievement of true knowledge about it. Revealing this one truth “occupied all philosophies at all times”, and all existing philosophical systems complemented each other, since any philosophical system cannot provide exhaustive knowledge about the essence of the world's existence. He sees the vocation of philosophy in "to develop the eternal from the temporal, the absolute from the relative."

From the materialistic positions of A.I. Herzen analyzes the problem of the unity of thinking and being, the relationship between being and thinking, about the nature and essence of human cognition and thinking.

He recognizes that being precedes thinking and consciousness, it is objective. Man does not bring laws from his consciousness into the existence of nature, the world and history. They are inherent in life itself. At the same time, the laws of the existence of the world are reproduced in the consciousness and thinking of man. Therefore, thinking and being have identity, unity. The unity of being and thinking manifests itself especially clearly at the primitive stages of human history, when man has not yet “disintegrated with nature”, directly feeling both his unity with nature and the unity of his thinking and being. But as a person develops the ability to abstract thinking, the unity of being and thinking becomes less obvious, but does not disappear at all.

In his philosophical reflections A.I. Herzen devotes a large place to the problem of the origin, essence and nature of human consciousness and thinking. He believes that consciousness and the need for knowledge in a person appears after he (man) has lost unity with nature. And consciousness and knowledge are the second way of “assimilating and conquering appearance”, the objective world that exists outside of a person. Consciousness and knowledge are actually the theoretical assimilation of the objective world.

Herzen specifically emphasizes that consciousness and cognition are a manifestation of the generic quality of a person, and not just a manifestation of the personal "I". Only realizing “the highest unity of the genus (the human race - G.Ch.) with oneself”, a person acquires the ability for theoretical knowledge and thinking, “which returns a person from antinomy to harmony”, gaining a new unity of the objective and subjective.

A necessary condition for the formation of proper human thinking A.I. Herzen considers the word, language, the development of which leads to the ability of a person to generalize, abstractly, universally consider the existence of the world. Only in this case, the development of the world opens before a person not as a set and heap of single, random phenomena, but as a natural process of the development of the world as a system. Therefore, the “object of knowledge” and cognition appears to be generalized. The contradiction between empirical and theoretical knowledge is overcome. Empirical knowledge, being primary, is, as it were, in a transformed form included in theoretical knowledge, losing its immediacy and independence. Following Hegel, considering the dialectic of the empirical and the theoretical in knowledge, Herzen sees the synthesis of the empirical and the theoretical not in their simple addition, but in the transformation of the first into the second due to the mediating role of abstract thinking. Thus, knowledge proceeds from the individual to the general, from form to content, from the external to the internal, increasingly approaching the true knowledge of the essence of the existence of the world as a universe. Therefore, he is inclined to believe that “there is no philosophical system that would start with pure falsehood or absurdity; the beginning of each is the actual moment of truth, the absolute truth itself, but conditioned, limited by a one-sided definition that does not exhaust it. Therefore, A.I. Herzen believes that the entire process of cognition and development, including philosophy, is a process of overcoming the one-sidedness of truth, not lies. “That is why every moment of the development of science, passing as one-sided and temporary, will certainly leave an eternal legacy.” This is the position of A.I. Herzen has not lost its significance even now.

A.I. Herzen also develops his own, close to the dialectical materialist, understanding of the development of history, the essence of the historical process. Let us note the main features of his philosophy of history.

He notes that the development of history is based on the struggle of opposites. “At all times of the long life of mankind, two opposite movements are noticeable; the development of one causes the emergence of another, at the same time the struggle and destruction of the first. The source of this struggle is the contradiction between the individual, striving for monopoly, and the mass, which seeks "to take the fruit of their labor, to dissolve them in itself." They mutually exclude and complement each other at the same time. And "this polarity is one of the phenomena of the life development of mankind, a phenomenon like a pulse, with the difference that with each beat of the pulse, humanity takes a step forward." He emphasizes that this struggle proceeds in its own way in different epochs and in different countries, but it is a real source of universal development.

A person, an individual, according to Herzen, is a participant and creator of his own history and the history of mankind as a whole, after he left the animal world. He creates history as a social, public, and not a biological being. The attribute of a person's existence as a social, social being is the "freedom of the person", understood by him as a comprehensive manifestation of talents, his mind and his consciousness. Freedom itself is a manifestation of his consciousness and reason. A person is free to the extent that he realizes himself as a social being. “It (face, person) is the first element, a cell of the social fabric.” Consequently, the motive of history is the struggle for the freedom of the individual, against violent external influence on it.

By freedom, he means "ownership of oneself." An indispensable condition for human freedom, according to Herzen, is the recognition of "personal autonomy", personal independence. “The social idea, the moral idea exists only under the condition of personal autonomy” (emphasis added by me – G.Ch.). At the same time, the freedom of the individual reaches its authenticity only when it becomes a necessity not only for the individual himself, but also for all others. By freedom, Herzen also means any elimination of social oppression, material exploitation of a person, when he (a person) becomes only an object and subject of someone else's will. He concludes "that history is nothing but the development of freedom in necessity". He is close to the conclusion: the freedom of the individual is an indispensable condition for the freedom of all. And only in this case freedom fully becomes a necessity.

Herzen defends the idea that both the essence of man and the content of freedom depend on the social environment in which, by necessity, they exist. Therefore, freedom is always concrete, historical both in its content and in its manifestation. From this he concludes that originality is an indispensable attribute of historical freedom. Consequently, the historical movement towards freedom as a necessity is a complex and contradictory process in which the dialectics of the conscious and the spontaneous are closely intertwined. He emphasizes: "the more consciousness, the more originality (originality - G.Ch.), the less consciousness, the closer the connection with the environment, the more the environment absorbs the face." He astutely notes that "there are epochs when a person is free in a common cause." Then “the activity towards which every energetic nature aspires coincides with the aspiration of the society in which it lives. At such times - also quite rare - everyone rushes into the cycle of events, lives in it, suffers, enjoys, perishes. Such epochs appear as epochs of social revolutions. Therefore, the story itself is tragic.

At the same time, he deeply philosophically remarks: “People cannot be liberated in the external life more than they are liberated from within. Strange as it may seem, experience shows that it is easier for peoples to endure the forcible burden of slavery than the blow of excessive freedom. Because freedom is, first of all, an attribute of the inner, spiritual life of a person.

Philosophically comprehending the prospects for the development of human history, the internal motive of which, in his opinion, is the achievement of individual freedom, the liberation of man from social oppression and the establishment of social justice, he is convinced of the justice of the ideas of socialism, the implementation of which will lead to the creation of a just society without oppression of man. The era of bourgeois revolutions in the 19th century, which he witnessed, were, in his opinion, a natural stage in the movement towards socialism. He believes that Russia is also moving along this path. But disappointed in the results of the bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe, he comes to the conclusion that for Russia the most organic transition to socialism is through the Russian peasant community. And the social force capable of solving this historical task is the peasant. “The man of the future in Russia is a man,” emphasizes A.I. Herzen. Why, then, does he see in the Russian community the basis for establishing socialism in Russia? Firstly, because the Russian peasant is instinctively inclined towards communist morality, which denies not only the injustice of the landlords and the landowners' power, but injustice, inequality as such. Secondly, the Russian community has historically justified the strength of its internal structure. “The community saved the Russian people from the Mongol barbarism… She…” withstood the intervention of the authorities; she successfully lived to see the development of socialism in Europe. Thirdly, since the creator of history is the people, and the majority of the people in Russia are the peasantry, the communal consciousness and psychology of the people most fully correspond to the assertion of the principles of socialism in the organization of public life. In his opinion, the historical mission of Russia is expressed in the fact that it is able to establish socialism, which is an expression of the demand of world history itself. Ideas and philosophy of A.I. Herzen influenced the formation in Russia of such a political movement in the 19th century as Narodnaya Volya. At the same time, A.I. Herzen persistently warned in his last work - the letter "To an old comrade" (1869), addressed to Bakunin M.A., theorist of anarchism, against violence and terror as tools of social transformation and the establishment of freedom and socialism. Since “it is impossible to take underdevelopment by force”, and “terror destroys prejudices as little as conquest destroys nationalities”. Because they (violence and terror) only drive social diseases inside, without creating anything in return. He is a supporter of the evolutionary development of history, since evolution is the most natural expression of the natural development of world history.

The representative of the liberal trend in “Westernism” was the Russian historian and philosopher, a prominent jurist Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin (1818–1885). For Western liberals, the general principle is the recognition of human freedom and its realization as a universal driving force of historical development. From these positions, he demanded the abolition of serfdom as the main obstacle to the socio-economic progress of Russian society, preventing Russia from naturally joining in a single universal process of civilized development. He considered the release of peasants with land for ransom a necessary condition for the formation of a conservative "muzhik estate", endowed with the right of private property, as the social force that would ensure the socio-economic progress of Russia. He believed that the patriarchal foundations of economic relations and the exclusivity of the national characteristics of Russia (for example, the religiosity of the Russian people) had exhausted themselves. Therefore, the historical prospects for the development of Russia are connected with the convergence of the development of Western Europe on the basis of the recognition of liberal freedoms of the individual and new social groups and classes emerging in Russia of that period. At the same time, he was a supporter of a compromise between the need for liberal socio-economic reforms and the preservation of autocracy based on liberal laws.

In conclusion, we note that the struggle between "Slavophiles" and "Westernizers" in Russian philosophical and political thought in Russia in the 19th century was a reflection of the inconsistency of public life. The essence of which was that the archaic forms of organizing social life, deprived of a historical perspective, were still quite strong, and the social forces, the formation of new forms of philosophical thought that met the needs of Russia's progress, were still rather weak and inaccessible to the masses.

Bibliography

World of Philosophy: Reading Book: At 2 pm - M .: IPL, 1991.

For the preparation of this work, materials from the site http://www.filosof-chel.narod.ru/ were used.

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In the 40-50s. 19th century two directions appeared in Russian society and philosophical thought - the Slavophiles, who began to talk about the "special path of Russia" and the "Westerners", who insisted on the need for Russia to follow the path of Western civilization, especially in the field of social structure, civil life, culture.

For the first time, the word "Slavophile" was used in an ironic sense to denote a certain social type by the poet Konstantin Batyushkov. The term "Westernism" was first encountered in Russian culture in the 1940s. XIX century, in particular, in the "Memoirs" of Ivan Panaev. It began to be used frequently after Aksakov's break with Belinsky in 1840.

Archimandrite Gabriel (Vasily Voskresensky) stood at the origins of Slavophilism. His Russian Philosophy, published in Kazan in 1840, became a kind of barometer of the emerging Slavophilism.

The views of the Slavophils were formed in ideological disputes, which escalated after the publication of Chaadaev's Philosophical Letter. The Slavophils came out with the justification of the original path of the historical development of Russia, fundamentally different from the path of Western Europe. The identity of Russia, according to the Slavophiles, is in the absence of class struggle in its history, in the Russian land community and artels, in Orthodoxy as the only true Christianity.

The main role in the development of the views of the Slavophiles was played by writers, poets and scientists Khomyakov, Kirievsky, Aksakov, Samarin. Prominent Slavophiles were Koshelev, Valuev, Chizhov, Belyaev, Hilferding, Lamansky, Cherkassky. The writers Dal, Ostrovsky, Grigoriev, Tyutchev, and Yazykov were close to the Slavophiles in their social ideological positions. Historians and linguists Buslaev, Bodyansky, Grigorovich paid great tribute to the views of the Slavophils.

The focus of the Slavophiles in the 1840s. there was Moscow, the literary salons of the Elagins, Sverbeevs, Pavlovs, where the Slavophiles communicated and argued with the Westerners. The works of the Slavophiles were subjected to censorship, some of the Slavophiles were under police surveillance, and were arrested. Due to censorship obstacles, the Slavophiles did not have a permanent printed organ for a long time, they were published mainly in the Moskvityanin magazine. After some softening of censorship in the late 1850s. they published the magazine "Russian conversation", "Rural improvement" and the newspapers "Molva" and "Sail".

On the question of the path of Russia's historical development, the Slavophiles, in contrast to the Westernizers, opposed Russia's assimilation of the forms of Western European political life. At the same time, they considered it necessary to develop trade and industry, stock and banking, the construction of railways and the use of machinery in agriculture. The Slavophils advocated the abolition of serfdom "from above" with the provision of land allotments to peasant communities.

The philosophical views of the Slavophiles were developed mainly by Khomyakov, Kireevsky, and later by Samarin and represented a kind of religious and philosophical doctrine. The true faith, which came to Rus' from the Eastern Church, determines, according to the Slavophiles, a special historical mission for the Russian people. The beginning of "sobornost" (free community), which characterizes the life of the Eastern Church, was seen by the Slavophiles in Russian society. Orthodoxy and the tradition of the communal way of life formed the deep foundations of the Russian soul.

Idealizing patriarchy and the principles of traditionalism, the Slavophiles understood the people in the spirit of conservative romanticism. At the same time, the Slavophiles called on the intelligentsia to get closer to the people, to study their life and way of life, culture and language.
The ideas of the Slavophiles were refracted in a peculiar way in the religious and philosophical concepts of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Soloviev, Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Karsavin, Florensky, and others).

Westerners - the direction of Russian anti-feudal social thought of the 40s of the XIX century, opposing the Slavophiles. The initial organizational base of the Westerners was the Moscow Literary Salons. Ideological disputes in Moscow salons are depicted by Herzen in Past and Thoughts. The Moscow circle of Westernizers included Herzen, Granovsky, Ogarev, Botkin, Ketcher, Korsh, Kavelin, and others. Belinsky, who lived in St. Petersburg, had a close relationship with the circle, and Turgenev also belonged to the Westernizers.

The common features of the ideology of the Westerners include the rejection of the feudal-serf order in the economy, politics and culture; demand for socio-economic reforms on the Western model. Representatives of the Westerners considered it possible to establish a bourgeois-democratic system by peaceful means - through education and propaganda to form public opinion and force the monarchy to bourgeois reforms; they highly appreciated the transformations of Peter I.

The Westerners advocated overcoming the social and economic backwardness of Russia not on the basis of the development of original elements of culture (as the Slavophils suggested), but due to the experience of Europe that had gone ahead. They focused not on the differences between Russia and the West, but on the common ground in their historical and cultural destiny.

In the mid 1840s. a fundamental split occurred among the Westerners - after the dispute between Herzen and Granovsky, the Westerners split into a liberal (Annenkov, Granovsky, Kavelin, etc.) and a revolutionary-democratic wing (Herzen, Ogarev, Belinsky). The disagreements concerned the attitude to religion (Granovsky and Korsh defended the dogma of the immortality of the soul, the Democrats and Botkin spoke from the positions of atheism and materialism) and the question of the methods of reform and post-reform development of Russia (the Democrats put forward the ideas of revolutionary struggle and building socialism). These disagreements were transferred to the sphere of aesthetics and philosophy.

The philosophical researches of the Westerners were influenced by: in the early stages - Schiller, Hegel, Schelling; later Feuerbach, Comte and Saint-Simon.

In the post-reform period, under the conditions of capitalist development, Westernism as a special trend in social thought ceased to exist.

The views of Westerners were developed in Russian liberal thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

In modern Russia, the Westernizing idea is in deep crisis. Its symptoms are varied - from the marginalization of political parties, acting from the position of accelerated integration of Russia into the "Atlantic community" to Russia's steadily conflicting relations with the leading powers of the West. An even bigger symptom of this crisis is the negative results that westernized candidates get in the last four parliamentary and presidential elections - their results never cross the 5% barrier. Another interesting fact is that in the first half of the 1990s. the radical Westernizers were in fact the ruling party in Russia.

And yet the main symptom of the crisis is the ideological difficulties of radical Westernist movements and authors. All of them are in favor of carrying out some kind of “liberal reforms” in Russia, which should bring it closer to the West. This is immediately followed by a bewildered question: “Didn't Russia already carry out such reforms in the first half of the 1990s?”. The answer to this is difficult. If we admit that we did, then it is not clear why Russia has not yet become part of the West; if not carried out, then it is not clear which reforms should be considered “radical”. Let me remind you that the withdrawal of the USSR from Eastern Europe in 1990 was presented to Soviet society as a “return to Europe”, but since then Russia has not returned to Europe.

But in the Russian public consciousness, a stable opposition "liberals - patriots" is being strengthened. At first glance, she is amazing. After all, liberalism and patriotism are ideologies from two different political planes: domestic political and foreign policy. Liberals should, logically, be opposed by conservatives or socialists; patriots - cosmopolitans. But the "patriots-liberals" opposition betrays an important trend. In modern Russia, for some reason, it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to be a liberal and a patriot, while, for example, in the 19th century. it was considered the norm. The profound transformation of Russian Westernism, and with it the entire Russian public discourse, is evident.

The "West" That Wasn't

In the most general sense, "Westernism" means the idea of ​​catching up development. Russia, in the opinion of Westerners, should copy as much as possible the more advanced Western economy, political system, and culture. Different states could serve as the standard of modernization for domestic Westerners in different eras: the Commonwealth (XVI–XVII centuries), Holland (early XVIII century), France (XVIII century), Great Britain (XIX century), USA (XX century) . But the essence remained the same - Russia must catch up with these states, copy their institutions and cultures as much as possible, that is, break its traditional social structure.

Here you can see an interesting feature of Russian Westernizers - they were guided by a certain abstract "West", completely ignoring the specifics of individual European states. None of the Russian Westernizers left behind a fundamental work on the history or politics of any European country. The "West", as shown by the Soviet historian N. Eidelman, was seen by Russian Westerners as a kingdom of economic progress, constitutional and civil liberties, respect for the rights of the individual and small peoples, and broad local self-government. The "West" meant a certain set of values ​​associated with such archetypes as "personal freedom" and "linear progress" as opposed to "traditionalism".

The paradox of history was that not a single Western country of that time fit this description. In the Commonwealth and the Austrian Empire there was no less rigid serfdom than in Russia, and in Austria it was finally abolished only in 1850 - 11 years before its abolition in the Russian Empire. Prussia received an imposed constitution only after the revolution of 1848; Austria - in 1867, after being transformed into Austria-Hungary. In France, as a result of the French Revolution, the system of local self-government was completely destroyed and a rigid unitary structure based on a bureaucratic apparatus was established. In the USA, slavery was abolished in 1870, and the remnants of racial segregation were completely destroyed during the administration of R. Nixon (1969-1974). And most importantly, all Western constitutions of the XIX century. were of a qualifying nature, severely limiting the circle of voters. The concept of "universal suffrage" appeared in the West only after the First World War, and its implementation became possible half a century later.

Great Britain fit the standard of Russian Westernizers even less. The British political system never had a constitution in the sense that it existed in continental Europe - its analogue was a disparate set of documents, the main of which were the Bill of Rights (1689) and the Habeas Corpus Act (1800). .). Great Britain until the parliamentary reform of 1884 remained a hierarchical class-representative monarchy with an extremely narrow circle of voters. In Great Britain, the crown remained the head of not only the state, but also the church, and these functions were not formal. (Catholics, for example, did not receive their first civil rights until 1829.) Britain was an empire with a distinctly non-European identity. The British Empire did not formally emerge until 1876, when Queen Victoria (1837–1901) assumed the title of Empress of India. Russian Westerners laughed a lot at the Eurasians, forgetting that their standard - Great Britain - sought to create an Asian empire, forming the ideology of Indian "ariosophy".

Modern British researchers also question the myth of the incredible economic success of Great Britain in the 19th century. They point out that prior economists overestimated the extent of the United Kingdom's early industrialization. Great Britain became the “factory of the world” quite late (in the 1830s) and lost this status quite early (in the 1870s), i.e. in 40 years - a period less than the active life of one generation. Industrialists did not have serious political power in the country - the basis of the elite were large landowners, who in the second half of the 19th century. took control of the financial system. In the UK, there were several industrial centers like Lancashire or the London agglomeration, while the rest of the country lived in a pre-industrial way. This was especially pronounced in the west of the British Isles, where even at the end of the 19th century. feudal landownership prevailed.

The European countries themselves until the middle of the twentieth century. did not realize their commonality, but saw themselves as different worlds. The English culture of romanticism was born at the end of the 18th century. as a denial of the French Enlightenment. German conservative thought of the 19th century. (from I. Fichte to O. Spengler) was based on the idea of ​​the "German world" as a special civilization, radically different from the rest of the "West". 19th century German conservatives felt much closer to the Russian Empire than to "godless France". Ideas about Germany as a special, more spiritual civilization than the "West" were characteristic of German society until the middle of the 20th century. The idea of ​​the unity of "European civilization" began to appear only at the very end of the 19th century. - in the clash of European powers with the cultures of East Asia. The world wars of the first half of the 20th century, which began with a tough struggle between Great Britain and Germany, froze this process for half a century.

The imperative of European thought in the nineteenth century. there was a selection of three "historical races" - Anglo-Saxon, Romanesque and Germanic (Teutonic). Each of them was attributed special innate traits and properties of temperament. The history of France since the Restoration of the Bourbons was presented by French historians as a struggle between the "Roman" (Gauls) and the "Teutonic" (Franks) races. The rise of Germany in 1870 was perceived by her French contemporaries as the rise of the "Teutonic race" against the "Romance". By the beginning of the twentieth century. the ideology of cultural confrontation began to spread to British-German relations. The famous essay by O. Spengler "Prussianism and Socialism" (1919) postulated the presence in the West of two civilizations that are irreconcilably hostile to each other - Anglo-Saxon and German. The question of which "West" Russia was to become a part of remained unanswered at that time.

In this sense, Russian "Westernism" was not a real political ideology, but rather a protest attitude of the Russian intelligentsia. Several interesting examples can be given. “It can be said about us that we constitute, as it were, an exception among nations. We belong to those of them who, as it were, are not part of the human race, but exist only to teach a great lesson to the world, ”wrote P.Ya. in 1836. Chaadaev. As if at that time the Prussian barons or the industrialists of Manchester saw themselves as "an integral part of the human race"! By the way, an interesting question - what did both of them have in common? “In the end, the entire Russian intelligentsia - including the nationalist - came to terms with the secession of Poland. But she never realized the full depth of the historical sin committed - a whole century - over the soul of the Polish people, nor the naturalness of the indignation with which the West looked at Russian rule in Poland, ”wrote another Russian Westerner G. Fedotov 100 years later. It is curious that the author did not say, for example, about the "historical sin" of France in relation to Indochina. The “naturalness of indignation” among the countries that conquered, for example, Hindustan and tropical Africa, or divided Poland together with Russia, is also incomprehensible. (The last Polish state, the Republic of Krakow, was liquidated not by Russia, but by Austria in 1846.)

“Ivan IV did not understand that it was not enemies who had secretly conspired against him, but organizational confusion, chaos that the immature bureaucracy could not cope with; there was a shortage of qualified administrators,” wrote the ideologist of modern Russian Westernism A.S. Akhiezer. Meanwhile, it was at this time that France was engulfed in a half-century civil war between the Catholics and the Huguenots. Even a history lover at the level of A. Dumas’ novels will immediately say that chaos and confusion were by no means in the Moscow kingdom at that time, and the French did not even think about the current administration (even qualified, even unqualified) - the kings tried to storm the castles of recalcitrant seigneurs. Or maybe the Spanish administration of the Duke of Alba in the Netherlands was "qualified", which led to the revolt of the Dutch from the power of the Spanish crown? This is not just a rejection of historical facts. This is a worldview that compares Russia not with the real, but with an abstract ideal “West”, which did not exist in historical reality.

It seems that Russian "Westernism" initially had not international, but internal political roots. The Russian aristocracy admired the high legal security of the British aristocracy. The middle strata of the intelligentsia and the radicals saw in the European revolutions an example for the struggle against the political regime. It is no coincidence that Russian Westerners were so little interested in Germany, Austria and German culture - these countries did not fit into the scheme of their ideas about the West. The cult of the abstract West was developed, rather, to solve internal rather than external problems.

Window to Europe"

Russian "Westernism" was formed as an ideology in the world of "balance of power". One could admire the abstract "West", but Russia could not submit to it due to the absence of the "West" itself. At the level of concrete politics, the question immediately arose: what kind of “West” should Russia become? Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria or maybe the USA? Russia could not be together with all of them (as well as resist them all together), since the Western countries fought hard with each other. Until the end of World War II, the “Westernizer” was a supporter of the modernization of Russia along the lines of one or another European power, but he could well have advocated the strengthening of Russia.

Peter I (1689–1725) cut through a “window on Europe” at a time when it was divided into two blocs: 1) France, striving for hegemony, and its allies; 2) an anti-hegemonic bloc represented by England and Austria. Until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Russia was a stable (except for periods of individual fluctuations) member of the anti-hegemonic bloc against France. In the nineteenth century Russia was at first one of the five guarantor powers of the Vienna Order, and after the Crimean War - a partner of Prussia in its confrontation with France. In the twentieth century Russia entered as a partner of Great Britain and France against Germany. In the "West" they could talk about "Russian barbarism" as much as they wanted, but in practice the "Western powers" could not unite against Russia - their own internal contradictions were too great.

The October Revolution of 1917 did not in the least exclude Russia from the system of intra-European relations. On the contrary, the USSR continued to make alliances with some European powers against others. First, in 1922, the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany against the powers of the Entente; then in 1935 - an alliance treaty with France against Germany. During the Second World War, the USSR again tried first to negotiate with Germany, then actually built a “new Entente” with Great Britain and the USA. Until the middle of the twentieth century. Russia could cut through a "window to Europe" because it had a systemic role in this community. The Western powers needed it as an ally - a critical mass in the struggle of some European powers against others.

The evolution of the views of the Russian Bolsheviks is also indicative. From the moment they came to power in 1917, they advocated a partnership with a supposedly revolutionary Germany against the Entente. However, already in the early 1930s. Soviet diplomacy begins to seek rapprochement with France in order to jointly contain Germany. And in 1942, Stalin unhesitatingly agreed with Roosevelt's concept of "four policemen", which provided for the creation of a post-war world order with the leading role of Great Britain, the USSR, the USA and China. The Soviet Union until the end of World War II remained the same participant in intra-Western alliances, like the Russian Empire.

Closing the "window to Europe"

Second half of the 1940s closed the possibility of the "Peter's paradigm" for the USSR. For the first time in history, the West has formed into a single system based on US leadership. The American "Marshall Plan" and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created on its basis created economic unity in the West. The creation of the NATO mechanism ensured not only a permanent US military presence in Europe, but also Washington's control over the power potential of European countries. The creation of the "Group of Seven" in 1975 made it possible for the West to create a mechanism for general political consultations on international problems. That same G-7-NATO mechanism emerged, which reinforces the adoption of political decisions by its participants by the presence of a common military mechanism under the control of the United States.

European integration itself was largely an American project. Its source was the "Marshall Plan" of 1947. The administration of H. Truman set clear conditions for European countries to receive financial assistance: the creation of the "European Economic Space" - the creation of the ECSC in 1951 was, in fact, the fulfillment by Europeans of American conditions. European integration implemented the American "double containment" formula of keeping Germany inside the Atlantic system and the USSR/Russia outside it. For the United States, it is not European integration that is dangerous, but its collapse, that is, a quarrel between NATO allies. It is no coincidence that almost all EU countries are simultaneously members of NATO, that is, their power potentials are under the control of the United States.

It would seem that the Russian Westernizers can triumph - that very united liberal "West" has arisen, which their predecessors dreamed of. But the fulfillment of desires brought, as usual, disappointment. In the united West, Russia did not have a systemic role. The USSR could no longer be an ally of some European countries in the fight against others - the European countries were members of a single military bloc. The USSR could not be the hegemon of this community either - this place was firmly occupied by the United States. The USSR could not be a power of "middle rank" - it had too large a territory, too powerful military and economic potential. The Americans did not want to see an alternative center of power within their system. And most importantly, the USSR has firmly taken the place of a “common enemy”, the presence of which ensures the unity of the West and its integration processes.

The turn was so profound that the Soviet intelligentsia did not immediately realize its depth. The communist ideology was considered the culprit of Russia's alienation from the West. At the same time, it remained unexplained why the Stalinist USSR, until the end of World War II, calmly entered into alliances with some Western countries against others. Even in the publications of dissidents (both non-systemic and systemic), the key question was not raised - why would the united "West" need a non-communist Russia? As a partner to solve global problems? But the West may well solve these problems at the expense of Russia itself. As a partner against India and China? But their military capabilities remain much weaker than the Russian and American ones. As a partner of the rising European Community against the US or vice versa? But none of the "crises of confidence" brought NATO to the brink of real disintegration. European countries did not question the need for an American presence in Europe, even during the period of détente. One can agree with the Russian political scientist V. Tsymbursky, who argued that after the Second World War, Russia became not only dangerous for the West (as it seemed to him in the past), but simply not needed as an intra-system element.

Another important point has also been overlooked. The creation of a single "West" was carried out by the United States through the crushing of all European empires and their territorial disintegration. "Common values" did nothing to stop the Americans from supporting, and often directing, the collapse of the British and French empires. American diplomacy still retains some of the restrictions on German sovereignty that were imposed on it after World War II. The most important of them are the ban on holding referendums on military-political issues, the ban on demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops from German territory, and restrictions on the development of the Bundeswehr. The military-industrial complexes of Germany and Japan were not only liquidated by the Americans after the Second World War, but have not been restored so far (even as part of the general confrontation between the USSR). It is possible to treat the actions of the Americans in different ways, but logic could suggest that an attempt to join this community would require Russia to territorially disintegrate and, at a minimum, unilateral disarmament.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not change the systemic role of the new Russia - having retained the Soviet nuclear potential, military-industrial complex, it remained the only country in the world capable of technically destroying the United States and waging war with them on the basis of conventional weapons. Neither China nor India has this ability to date. Russia is left with the only alternative to the American full spectrum of fundamental sciences, which allows it to maintain a power potential comparable to that of the United States. Despite all the overtures of Kozyrev's diplomacy, the basis of Russian-American relations in the first half of the 1990s was nuclear deterrence. Such a country, by definition, cannot be integrated into a single Western community based on American dominance. Its appearance there would create an alternative center of power for the United States, which would destroy the entire system of intra-Western relations.

For Russia, the moment of truth was the two crises of the late 1990s, connected with the expansion of NATO to the East (1997) and the NATO operation against Yugoslavia (1999). In the mid 1990s. in Moscow, for a while, there was confidence that partnership with France and/or Germany would make it possible to neutralize US hegemony in Europe. In practice, both Berlin and Paris backed Washington without paying much attention to Moscow's negative stance. Russian diplomacy then realized that neither Germany nor France would seriously quarrel with the United States for the sake of Russia. On the other hand, the Americans will willingly use them as a "good cop" to push through the common Western position in negotiations with Moscow.

NATO's Yugoslav operation did away with yet another stereotype. In the first half of the 1990s. The theory of democratic peace has gained popularity among Russian international affairs specialists. According to her, liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. Although 100 years ago a different view prevailed - the more democratic the regime, the more aggressive it is. But liberal democracies do not fight each other because they are driven into common military-political blocs under American leadership and project their natural aggressiveness onto the outside world. This system has an undisputed military leader who controls the power potentials of the other members of the bloc. For Russia, there is simply no systemic role left in this hierarchical system.

Reforms for the sake of weakness?

Apparently, here one should look for the roots of the Russian opposition "liberal - patriot". Modern Russian liberalism presupposes the subordination of Russia to the “liberal community”, which has its own leader and its own rules. Westerners of the past centuries could advocate the transfer of the French model to Russia without subordinating France, but the modern "liberal community" led by the United States is hierarchical and requires acceptance of its conditions as the basis for joining it. This option is possible only under the condition of serious infringement of Russian interests.

One can, of course, cite the example of France, which was almost the hegemon of the West in the 18th century. The Russian elite was culturally (and in many respects economically) dependent on Paris, although it continued to oppose French hegemony. However, France had intra-Western opponents - Great Britain and Austria - who fought against French hegemony. There was an alternative West to France. Today, the US has no real opponents within the Western world, and Russia has to deal with a single community based on common rules.

Among modern Russian liberals, it is popular to compare the experience of our country with the countries of Eastern Europe - the “successful experience” of European integration of the former (primarily Poland) and the “unfortunate experience” of Russia. However, it compares the incomparable. The small countries of Eastern Europe have small territories and do not have a power potential comparable even to the countries of Western Europe. In Brussels, they were seen as a natural sphere of influence for the EU. Needless to say, for a country with the largest territory in the world and a power potential comparable to the United States, such an option is impossible.

But these reflections lead to an interesting conclusion - only small countries can successfully integrate into the Western community. The experience of Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe shows that Russia's entry into the Euro-Atlantic is possible only if it meets four conditions:

• reduction of military potential to a level that is safe for the leader (USA);
• complete renunciation of any foreign policy activity on the territory of the former USSR;
• disaggregation of "natural monopolies";
• admission of Western institutions to relations between Moscow and Russian regions.

But the development of "European norms" in Russia will mean its gradual movement towards a confederation under external control. In the EU countries, a system of direct representation of regions at the level of European institutions has long been established. They allow Brussels to influence local authorities, restraining the interests of state elites in the interests of the "European bureaucracy". The Russian Federation includes many national-territorial entities. The development of local self-government based on the incorporation of "European norms" will mean a reduction in the powers of the federal center and, at the same time, the appearance of representation of national republics at the external, non-Russian level. An attempt at such EU intervention in the Chechen conflict has already been made after Russia's accession to the Council of Europe in 1996.

This is precisely the profound difference between modern Russian Westernism and Westernism of the past. The Westernism of Peter I and Catherine II suggested a geopolitical offensive by Russia. Modern Russian Westernism is the compression of its territorial space and the movement towards disintegration. Russia must submit to the norms of the external integrated “liberal community”, apparently losing its power potential and territorial integrity. Westerners of the past put forward the motto "Be patient to become great." Modern Westerners put forward another motto - "Be patient to become weak." However, the prospects for Russia's disarmament and territorial disintegration cannot be a popular ideology.

***

Russia's belonging to the West in the past was predetermined by the multipolar structure of the West itself. Its unification under the auspices of the United States deprived Russia of a systemic role within this community. Therefore, the "return of Russia to Europe" is possible only if the united West breaks up into a series of centers hostile to each other. Then Russia will again have a systemic role in the Western community. However, without fulfilling this condition, Russian Westernism still means Russia's subordination to the "liberal community", which requires her to take steps that are impossible and dangerous for her security.

1. For the best analysis of the archetypes of Russian Westerners, see Akhiezer A.S. Russia: Criticism of Historical Experience (Social and Cultural Dynamics of Russia). T. I - III. Moscow: Publishing House of the USSR Federal District, 1991.

2. Eidelman N.Ya. The moment of glory is coming ... The year is 1789. L.: Lenizdat, 1989.
3. The decreed constitution was granted by the Austrian emperor Ferdinand I in the spring of 1848. However, after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, Emperor Franz Joseph froze it by his decree of December 31, 1851. The constitution was restored only under the terms of the agreement of the Austrian court with the Hungarian aristocracy of March 15, 1867 when the Austrian Empire became a dual monarchy - Austria-Hungary. It is strange that, watching these events, Russian liberals considered autocratic rule to be a specifically Russian form of government.
4. Smith S. C. British Imperialism 1750–1970. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
5. Allenov S. G. “Conservative revolution” in Germany in the 1920s – early 1930s (Problems of interpretation) // Polis. 2003. No. 4. S. 94–107
6. Lebon, Gustav. Psychology of socialism. Complete and accurate trans. from fr. 5th ed. with portrait ed. and foreword. him to Russian. ed. / Gustav Le Bon. - 2nd ed. (9th thousand). - St. Petersburg: S. Budaevsky, 1908.
7. France withdrew in 1966 only from the military organization of NATO, and not from NATO as a whole.
8. Primakov E.M. Years in big politics. M.: Sovershenno sekretno, 1999. S. 263 - 302.