Socio-economic causes of low birth rates. The consequences of low fertility and the search for a solution to the problem. Why should we practice birth control at all?
demographic birth rate death population
Since the change in the mortality rate in Russia was the most dramatic and has been widely studied, there are several different hypotheses on this subject:
Here is a list of the most popular ones:
1. Alcohol consumption
2. Environmental issues
3. Poverty and poor nutrition
4. The collapse of the health care system
5. Reaction to strong changes in social conditions, stress
6. Compensation after a period of low mortality in the second half of the eighties
Let's consider some of them. Studies have shown that the health care system plays a fairly important role, but still not a decisive one. This is explained by the fact that most causes of death in our time are determined not by the quality of the health care system, but by self-preserving behavior.
Environmental problems can be eliminated immediately - the decline in production has only caused an improvement in the environmental situation.
Alcohol consumption can play a rather important role, since the percentage of deaths from alcohol poisoning, as well as its use, have increased during the reforms. But drunkenness cannot be considered as a cause - it is only a consequence of other factors, mostly spiritual.
Also, the increase in mortality may be due to the compensation effect after the anti-alcohol campaign - that is, those who should have died from alcohol poisoning in the second half of the eighties began to die only now, after the abolition of anti-alcohol measures of that time.
The dominant point of view is that one of the main causes of our troubles is the worsening of the economic situation: in order for the nation to recover, it is necessary to raise the standard of living. However, after analyzing the dynamics of mortality over 25 years (since the mid-1970s), one can find that none of the economic indicators explains its trajectory.
A study conducted in the mid-90s in Russia showed that from a medical point of view, people began to lead a healthier lifestyle, while mortality only increased.
In his book "The Demographic Catastrophe in Russia: Causes, Mechanism, Ways to Overcome", Doctor of Medical Sciences I. Gundarov presented the results of research into the causes of the increase in mortality in Russia.
Reasons for the fall in the birth rate
As it was written above, considering the birth rate in Russia, one can trace not one, but two problems. The first is a gradual decline in the birth rate throughout the period under review. The second is a sharp decline in the birth rate, which began in 1987 and continues to this day.
It is extremely important to note that graph 1 exactly repeats the graph of the third and fourth phases of the demographic transition in its pessimistic second version.
According to the theory of demographic transition, all countries and peoples go through the same stages in their demographic history, each of which corresponds to a certain type of population reproduction.
If we consider the processes taking place in Russia today from the point of view of the theory of demographic transition, then we can assume that today's depopulation is not caused by some external circumstances - for example, reforms, but is a natural process taking place not only in Russia, but also in many other developed countries.
If we compare the birth rate schedule in Russia with the demographic transition schedule, then phase III began at the end of the 19th century, and phase IV - in 1987. Thus, the theory of demographic transition explains both of the above problems.
And although this theory does not say what follows the fourth phase, we can assume two options for the further development of events - either the situation stabilizes after a while (still at an insufficient level), or, more likely, it will worsen further.
Politicians, ordinary people, and even many researchers are of the opinion that any woman has a natural desire to have many children, and only the absence of conditions prevents her from fulfilling this desire, and if only the necessary conditions are created, the birth rate will immediately increase. This position is known as the "interference paradigm". Research shows that this approach is completely wrong. The real reason for the low birth rate is not that certain factors prevent a woman from having many children. The 1994 micro-census contained a question about the desired number of children in ideal conditions, and this number is 1.9 children, which is not enough even for a simple reproduction of the population. That is, even if all interfering factors are eliminated and ideal conditions for the birth of children are provided, the problem of low fertility will not be solved. Consequently, the main reason for the decline in the birth rate should be sought not in some external factors, such as prosperity or confidence in the future, but in culture and public consciousness.
It is widely believed in society that the fall in the level of income of the population as a result of the reforms is the main reason for the fall in the birth rate, and it is believed that the economic factor is of decisive importance. Unfortunately, this opinion is shared even in the highest circles of power. However, the results of studies conducted both in Russia and in a number of European capitals showed an inverse relationship between the birth rate and the level of well-being. That is, in poor families, the birth rate was higher than in rich ones. Moreover, studies have shown that not only the actual, but also the planned number of children in poor families was higher. From this we can conclude that it was not the fall in the level of income that caused the birth rate crisis in Russia.
Meanwhile, the economic factor should not be discounted at all, since it undoubtedly has a certain significance. It is known that economic measures - raising benefits, etc. - can raise the birth rate, but, unfortunately, only to the level of the desired number of children in a family, which, for example, today in Russia is 1.9 children per family, that is, below the level of simple reproduction of the population. Therefore, the question is to raise the level of the desired number of children in the family, and here economic measures are powerless.
On the basis of numerous studies of reproductive behavior in Russia and abroad, data have been obtained that allow us to believe with great confidence that it is cultural factors that play a decisive role in reducing the birth rate.
Types of population reproduction, or phases of demographic transition, are strictly dependent on the mode of production in society. Phases I and II correspond to the agrarian mode of production, phase III to the industrial one, and phase IV to the post-industrial one.
This is easy to explain - in an agrarian society, children were necessary for survival, as they were workers, helpers, defenders. The well-being of the family directly depended on the number of children. Moreover, the death rate in the agrarian era was very high, and where the death rate is high, the birth rate is usually high.
In the industrial era, the family ceases to be a production unit, children are no longer necessary for survival, but for procreation and satisfaction of the emotional needs of parents. Therefore, the desired number of children in the industrial era is 1-3 children per family, and this number gradually decreases, at first remaining sufficient for simple reproduction of the population, and even a small increase in it.
But then, as civilization develops, mass families with few children become more and more widespread. This is primarily due to the fact that the entire way of life of a person in our era is associated with extra-family activities, and the role of the family in the life of an individual is gradually decreasing, which will be discussed in the next section.
There are various forms of family. The family was originally represented by an extended form, and this form has been most common for thousands of years. An extended family consists of several nuclear families, and a nuclear family is a family consisting of only parents and their children.
But with the advent of industrialization and urbanization, there is a shift from the "traditional" family to the "modern" family, from the extended family to the nuclear family. Such a transition negatively affects the birth rate, since the traditional family is characterized by large families, early and long marriage and childbearing, a ban on abortion and divorce.
Initially, the institutions of education, health care, economics, and others were within the family, but, with the process of industrialization, these institutions began to gradually leave the family, became extra-family.
A. Antonov and S. Sorokin in the book "The Fate of the Family in Russia of the 21st Century" name the following differences between the industrial family and the agrarian one:
1. The collapse of the family economy, the separation of home and work, out-of-family employment of parents in the system of hired labor with individual wages, the disappearance of joint activities of parents and children everywhere except for families of farmers, the transition to family-domestic self-service, family-centrism is replaced by egocentrism, the well-being of the family begins to take shape from the successes of individual family members.
2. In urban families, which make up the majority, the connection with the land is broken, the essence of the family home is dramatically transformed, the functions of consumption, hygiene and the implementation of physiological processes predominate, psychological fusion with the microenvironment is replaced by delimitation, the emphasis is on separation from neighbors, on ethnic alienation, etc.
3. In the industrial family, kinship is separated from the economic affairs of the family, the maximization of individual benefits and economic efficiency outweigh the value of kinship ties.
4. The replacement of a centralized family-kinship system of an extended type by decentralized nuclear families weakened intergenerational ties and the authority of elders, as well as the prescriptions of parents and kinship regarding the choice of a spouse, taking into account the property status (“open” system of marriage choice while maintaining material interests and the right to inherit), the transition from the prohibition of divorces to their admission, but within the framework of complicated procedures, mainly at the initiative of the husband.
5. The destruction of the system of high birth rates in connection with successes in controlling mortality and the removal of the taboo on the prevention and termination of pregnancy, the elimination of the need for the full use of the reproductive period and hence, the weakening of the norms of lifelong and early marriage, lifelong childbearing and marriage, the softening of the norms of sexual behavior outside of marriage and before marriage.
The individualistic values of modern capitalism went against the collectivist, family values, and the institution of the family began to gradually die out.
This section analyzes demographic patterns and discusses how to solve the demographic problem.
Myths about the causes of low fertility
The reasons for the low birth rate are often seen in the "low standard of living", "destruction of family values", "lack of spirituality", etc. As a positive example, Muslim countries are sometimes cited, where "the birth rate is growing." In fact, all of this is false.
As statistics show, a low standard of living has nothing to do with a decrease in the birth rate. On the contrary, poor countries tend to have higher birth rates than rich ones. In the same way, within the same society, the birth rate among rich citizens in most countries is lower than among the poor. Provision of housing conditions, as statistics show, also does not affect the birth rate.
All talk about poverty as a reason for not wanting to have children has a purely psychological background. It is uncomfortable for a person to admit (including to himself) that he does not want to have children out of selfish motives - therefore, arguments about material distress are used. For example, one of the Orthodox charitable foundations offered substantial material support to poor families in which a woman decided to have an abortion (in order to dissuade them from this step). The vast majority of women refused.
The reasons for the decline in the birth rate do indeed have a material basis, but it is not at all a matter of poverty (see the next subparagraph).
The “crisis of the family” is also not the reason for the decline in the birth rate. As you know, the traditional types of family relations have undergone the greatest changes in the Scandinavian countries, where at present about 50% of children are born out of wedlock. Nevertheless, the birth rate in the Scandinavian countries is not lower than the average European level and significantly higher than in Japan, where family relations have undergone only a slight transformation. For example, Iceland is one of the few developed countries where the birth rate ensures the reproduction of generations (above two children per woman), but almost two thirds of children are born out of wedlock.
With the "decline of spirituality" - a similar situation. For example, the birth rate in such "highly spiritual" countries as Iran and Tunisia has fallen below the level of simple reproduction of generations. In Iran, the birth rate is now lower than in "spiritual" America and the same as in "anti-family" France (see statistics). Even 30 years ago, high birth rates in the southern countries of Europe were associated with higher religiosity. Now, the birth rate in these countries has fallen below the average European level. Similarly, a sharp decline in the birth rate is now taking place in Latin America, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco - countries that are very religious.
Inter-religious differences also do not play a decisive role. In India, the Muslim part of the population has a higher birth rate than the Hindu, but special studies have shown that Muslim and Hindu families of equal social status and material security have an equal birth rate (i.e., religiosity in itself does not force more children, but only hinders social adaptation, which leads to poverty and higher birth rates). The persistence of a high birth rate in Pakistan is not the result of religious attitudes, but only the result of a lag in development - more than half of the population of this country is illiterate.
Religious and cultural factors can delay the development of society, and therefore delay the demographic transition. We have to pay for this by lagging behind more developed countries and economic dependence on them. But if development does occur, then the birth rate falls regardless of religious beliefs.
In all Muslim countries that have reached a certain level of development, the birth rate drops sharply. For example, if in 1965 in Tunisia there were on average 7 children per woman, then in 1995 there were 3, and today - 1.75. Similar processes are underway in Russia - in Dagestan, the birth rate has fallen from 5.5 in 1960 to to 2.05 now. A very high birth rate persists among the indigenous population of Saudi Arabia, but in the real economy, mainly visitors work there. Indigenous Saudis maintain their traditional and "large" way of life solely at the expense of oil revenues.
The only thing that determines the birth rate is the degree of development of the country. Those countries where the majority of the population earns a living outside of agriculture (moreover, it works intensively, and does not live off oil), inevitably reduce the birth rate. Low birth rates are observed in all countries where the industrial and post-industrial type of economy dominates.
The Real Causes of Low Fertility
In a traditional agrarian society, children were seen primarily as additional labor on the farm. Therefore, having children made economic sense, since people worked from early childhood. In conditions of subsistence farming, it was possible, as a rule, to increase the total income of the family in only one way - by creating new workers by having children. It was the material benefit of having a large number of children that was the main reason for the high birth rate in a traditional society. Plus, the extended family, as an economic unit, was more resilient during periods of famine and other disasters (not uncommon in a traditional society). In addition, a large number of children is a guarantee of procreation in conditions of relatively high infant mortality. Urbanization and industrial-type labor destroy this type of behavior and lead to a decrease in the birth rate, and the more generations lived in the city after migration from the countryside, the lower the birth rate.
In a developed industrial society, children must study for a long time in order to obtain a qualification that meets modern requirements. This leads to their exclusion from economic life. Children from assistants turn into a burden for adults. Parents are forced to spend their time and financial resources to achieve a high educational level for their children. They prefer to raise only one or two "high-quality" children, because a large number of children in the family, as a rule, negatively affects their educational level and future career. In addition, a long period of training contributes to an increase in the average age of a woman giving birth to her first child (from 16 to 25 years and older). In an agrarian society, children, working together with their parents, acquired the necessary labor skills in a natural way.
Almost all countries with a high educational level have low birth rates. And vice versa, the leaders in terms of fertility have an illiterate population (in the Arab countries, 38% of the population over 15 years old is illiterate, in the countries of "black" Africa - 35%).
The pension system also contributes to a decrease in the birth rate, because. people cease to be interested in having a large number of offspring to help in old age.
An important (but not decisive) role was played by the spread of available contraceptives.
Summarizing the above, it can be argued that the main reasons for the decline in fertility are economic. In a traditional agrarian society, having children was beneficial, but not in a modern industrial and post-industrial society. Of course, there is a certain cultural inertia, "the habit of having many children," but it only lasts for one generation.
Cultural factors can slow down the development of the country, maintaining a high proportion of the illiterate rural population with many children (this is precisely the reason for the large number of children in traditional cultures, and not their supposedly “high spirituality”). However, if development does occur, then a decrease in the birth rate becomes inevitable and it occurs even in those countries that are traditionally considered large families, for example, in Islamic countries and in Latin America.
This pattern is called the demographic transition. The number of countries with insufficient birth rates to fully replace generations rose from 13 in 1970 to 66 in 2002. The total population of these countries has reached 46% of humanity. (see also )
Is it possible to increase the birth rate?
In world practice, there was not a single example of a successful state policy that would lead to a long-term increase in the birth rate. A high birth rate is closely connected with the traditional way of life (elements of which are a low level of education and lack of rights for women). One of the few examples of a significant increase in the birth rate is the growth of this indicator in Chechnya in the early 2000s (that is, when a generation without a normal school education entered childbearing age in this region). But it is unlikely that such a method - through the degradation of society - seems acceptable. It was possible to slow down (but not stop) the decline in the birth rate in Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi society is very specific: the Saudis are not used to work (in the industrial sector, foreign workers are predominantly employed there), over a quarter of university graduates have "specialties" in theological disciplines, women are still completely powerless. Those. society has preserved itself in a traditional state thanks to oil revenues (however, despite the income, living standards have fallen significantly over the past 20 years).
The experience of the Scandinavian countries, France and Canada has shown that huge social payments are needed to increase the birth rate. As a result, for some time the birth rate can be increased by 0.4–0.6 children per woman. However, after a few years, the birth rate drops to its previous level or even to a lower level. For example, in Sweden, the birth rate was raised from 1.6 children per woman to 2.1, but then this figure fell to 1.5 (now it has risen to 1.7). Studies have shown that stimulating the birth rate with the help of benefits has practically no effect on the desired final number of children (i.e., on the family model), it can only shift the birth of children to an earlier age of a woman.
The reason for this is that, firstly, the child is more expensive than the social benefits offered, secondly, after giving birth, the woman loses in her own earnings (not to mention the blow to her career), thirdly, caring for a small child is more difficult work than working "from 9 to 18". Therefore, in order to really affect the birth rate, it is necessary to pay such social benefits that significantly exceed the average salary in the country. But not a single state budget can withstand this.
Therefore, social assistance for children can only be considered in the humanitarian aspect. As a measure of stimulating the birth rate, it is absolutely useless. Moreover, it can even bring harm, because. the birth rate is actually stimulated in the most marginal part of the population (for example, alcoholics), for whom money is more important than the future of children. In France, such stimulation led to a birth boom among the Arabs (and only among the unadapted and incompetent part of the Arab population). According to Vladimir Mukomel, a leading researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Both foreign and Soviet experience demonstrates that attempts to financially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginalized groups of the population, or from representatives of ethnic groups prone to having many children.”
To increase the birth rate, much more powerful material incentives are needed than social benefits. Moreover, such stimulation should act on the whole of society, and not only on the poorest part of it. One of the few measures that can provide this is the differentiation of taxation. For example, the introduction of very high taxes on the income of the childless and "one-child" and low - on everyone else. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that a simple tax on childlessness is ineffective (the proportion of the childless was approximately the same throughout the 20th century, and the highest percentage of childless women in Russia was observed in Stalin's time; the causes of childlessness lie outside of material factors). It should also be taken into account that tax benefits should be expressed as a share of an individual's income, and not as fixed amounts (tax deductions). Tax deductions in their economic essence differ little from benefits and have shown their inefficiency. One option for a "demographic" tax system is discussed in the Family section.
In other words, the entire tax burden in the context of individuals should fall on the “childless” and “one-child”. “If you don’t want to support your children, you will feed strangers.” This approach has an important advantage - it encourages childbearing only for those who pay taxes. Those. the most law-abiding and responsible part of society, not involved in the shadow economy and criminal activities. People should understand that the absence of a family with two children cuts off their ability to receive high legal incomes in the future.
Such a tax reform has not yet been carried out on a large scale in any country in the world. However, Modern society must reproduce itself, so strong measures are needed. So the demographic problem may well be solved, it is only necessary to show political will.
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It's no secret that demographic level in our country today leaves much to be desired. One of the reasons for this is the decline in marital fertility. Fertility is declining in the countries of the south and east of Europe; in many states, the birth rate began to decline equally long ago and intensively both in rural areas and in cities; in some countries, the process of industrial development has significantly outstripped
a decline in marital fertility, and in others, an intensive decline in fertility preceded active industrialization. Demographers usually cite the following factors as explanations for the decline in marital fertility.
1. Reduced mortality. When more children survive, fewer births are required to reach the desired family size.
2. Increased costs and reduced economic benefits associated with having children. In rural families, children help with the housework at an early age and help their parents in old age; in cities, children provide less assistance and require more expenses, especially after leaving school.
3. Increasing the role of women. Since the burden of pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing falls on the woman, the rise of her role contributes to the spread of birth control. The same factor can be attributed to the child-free movement, which advocates the rejection of the birth of children.
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Let's now look at the myths about the causes of fertility decline and point out the real reason for this phenomenon.
Myth one: Fertility decline is a natural phenomenon and should be accepted as the norm. A nuance is important here: yes, the phenomenon is natural for sociogenesis (more on that later), but it does not follow from this that it should be recognized as the norm. Here's "on the fingers": diseases are a natural phenomenon, aren't they? But this does not mean that they should be considered the norm - a completely healthy person should be the norm, even if he exists only in theory. Of course, modern postmodernism seeks to philosophically blur the concept of the norm, reaching the point “illness is just a different way of being” (J. Lacan), and liberal ideology demands that everything that does not bring direct physical harm to another individual be considered the norm, but let’s not be distracted.
The essence of the myth: all Europeans are like that - they don’t want to give birth, but are we slurping cabbage soup with bast shoes? There is nothing to worry about, we will die for the company!
From the fact that a decrease in the birth rate in modern society relative to the peasant one is natural, it does not follow in any way that a decrease in it below the level of reproduction should be considered the norm. Reducing is normal, but not that much! Once again I recommend Thilo Sarrazin's book "Germany: Self-Destruction".
Myth two- reduction of the issue to the economy: "if there is something to raise children - they will start it." The myth is easily refuted by the fact that in Europe, which was very prosperous in material terms, until recently, they did not want to give birth. Social payments are also not a solution to the problem, they do not increase the number of desired children in the family. There is a positive effect: women begin to give birth statistically a little earlier, but for this benefit should be large enough. The reason is simple: in any case, the maintenance of a child costs more than the amount of social benefits, and at the same time, after giving birth, a woman automatically lags behind in career growth and in most cases loses her qualifications, which affects her future earnings. Well, to be honest, caring for a baby, which is required around the clock, is much harder work than the usual work “from 9 to 18”, especially if not at work, but just in the office (just don’t fall into postmodernism like “both spouses should take maternity leave” - this will not solve problems with family finances, and a man is evolutionarily “not imprisoned” for caring for babies, his role comes later). In other words, in order for social benefits to be guaranteed to increase the birth rate, they must at least equal the average salary in the country, which no state budget can withstand.
In addition, the payment of cash benefits really stimulates the birth rate - but it is among the marginal part of the population, for which money is right now more important than the future of children. I will quote Vladimir Mukomel, a leading researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences: “Both foreign and Soviet experience demonstrates that attempts to financially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginalized groups of the population, or from representatives of ethnic groups prone to having many children.”
I note that against the background of this myth, there are sometimes calls for such a reduction in sociogenesis - they say, since the number of children decreases with an increase in the standard of living, then let's go back to the pampas! Only rural subsistence farming, only hardcore! Usually accompanied by immoderate religiosity. Due to the obvious insanity of the concept, we will not disassemble it: after all, if its propagandists are so against progress for humility, then why do they write such appeals on a computer on the Internet?
Myth three: declaring migration a panacea for all ills. I will quote Igor Beloborodov, director of the Center for Demographic Research: “Replacing migration carries a whole range of social risks that are already being felt today... Let us list just a few of them: disruption of the ethno-demographic balance; interethnic conflicts; the growth of drug addiction; ethnic crime; deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation; the threat of losing strategic territories, etc.”
To be honest, I don't see the need to analyze this issue in detail; a violation of the ethno-demographic balance is enough. And if someone declares that there is nothing wrong with that - all people are equal, etc., then he should honestly, “on the forehead”, ask a question without arguing with the formal equality of rights, etc. different peoples: WHY are you promoting a position that inevitably violates the ethno-demographic balance of countries in the direction of reducing the relative number of representatives of the white race? On the example of the same Europe - everything is very clear.
Myth four: improving the quality of life is much more important than the quantitative growth of the population. The same attachment to money as in myth No. 2, but “from the other side”: they say, the quality of children depends only on the amount of money invested, you need to save! Once again I will quote I. Beloborodov: “It is often assumed that quality parameters can have a positive coloring only with a decrease in quantitative indicators. ... The main motive for reasoning about the priority of quality over quantity, as a rule, is the desire to expediently spend state and family funds.
And again: no one argues that the quality of life is an important parameter, but this does not mean that for this reason it is permissible to reduce the birth rate below the level of self-reproduction of the nation - obviously, right? Taking this opportunity, I note that, since fertility is important Total population, appropriate social guarantees are required for Total population, a guaranteed decent standard of living, and not abstract economic indicators such as GDP, and so on.
Fifth myth: family crisis. I clarify: the fact that the crisis of family relations takes place is a fact. And it negatively affects fertility (we will analyze in more detail in the next article). However, the myth lies precisely in what is declared paramount importance this factor. There is influence, but not critical: modern life allows you to raise children alone (which, of course, is bad - but possible), and even more so with the support of the family.
Usually this myth is pushed by the guardians of kondo-patriarchal values.
Perhaps the same myth (and the same category of its adherents) can indirectly include the “family planning” option: they say that sexual education is unacceptable, it corrupts children, teaches them to protect themselves instead of marrying virgins and giving birth, giving birth, giving birth. Here it is necessary to distinguish the need for adequate sexual information at school (and along with the ethics of intersexual and family relations, etc.), from what liberals understand by this: propaganda of the normality of homosexuality, etc., not to mention the approach to sex only as physiology - I think everyone is aware, and we will not be distracted. The difference is similar to the difference between the Soviet commission on juvenile affairs and modern juvenile justice.
Sixth myth- about the "decline of spirituality", i.e. earlier people were “highly spiritual” and gave birth, but now they have become materialistic and therefore do not want to give birth, but take care of themselves. Whether it’s a matter of ancient times, when children were born as if on a conveyor belt, half died in childhood, and whoever lived to forty years old is essentially an old man already, since the average life expectancy at the end of the 19th century in Russia was a little more than 30 years.
In this case, the standard posthocnonpropterhoc logical error is obvious: yes, a couple of centuries ago people were much more religious, but the high birth rate was also due to the lack of normal contraception, very early marriages, etc. Now you can compare the birth rate in very religious countries, and the birth rate in them will be quite clearly different: religious factors can delay, but not stop the development of society.
natural cause- this is peasantization, i.e. there is a process of reduction of the rural population in the cultivated area. I will quote A.N. Sevastyanov: “If at the beginning of the century the employed population of Russia consisted of 86% of peasants, 2.7% of the intelligentsia and 9% of workers, then by the 1990s. the share of workers in the RSFSR increased by almost 7 times, the intelligentsia - more than 10 times, and the peasantry, as already mentioned, fell by more than 7 times. It must be admitted that the communists brilliantly succeeded in the task that tsarism failed to cope with: the energy of depeasantization was taken under state control and spent, by and large, on useful, important, grandiose goals. And this is all for some seventy years - an unprecedented case in history that distinguishes us for the better from other peoples ”(note: the intelligentsia here means those engaged in mental work).
A high birth rate is observed in those countries where the majority of the population is rural. The transition to industrial production inevitably leads to a decrease in the birth rate. There are two main reasons, and they act not just simultaneously, but systemically.
First, the economic reason. A traditional society implies an appropriate type of management: some kind of hydroponic farms or even just high-tech land cultivation - this is already an industrial way of farming, and it also has a high “entry barrier” both in terms of age and skills - a seven-year-old will not be able to work as a combine harvester. And in the traditional peasant life, he has long worked on the pickup, shepherd and so on. In such a household, the birth of children was economically profitable: they worked from early childhood. Industrial-type labor implies long education, etc., and children in the “family accounting” become an expense, not an income item. Compare the situations themselves “a five-year-old can already graze and feed poultry” (as an example) and “fully provide for a child at least up to 17 years old, and in most cases - seriously help at least until graduation” (and I am silent about the housing issue); clearly? The birth rate is causally correlated not with "spirituality", but with the norm of lack of education (however, "spirituality" and education have an inverse correlation). As soon as the people become educated, since labor requires education, the birth rate drops after a generation (the first retains the habit).
Secondly, the lack of industrial development always correlates with the lack of adequate medicine (and the corresponding norms adopted by the population), which also applies to contraception. It is important to understand that we are talking not only about technical capabilities, but also about the culture of use: Postinor, and even more so abortion, is, you know, not a method of contraception, as some actually practice. And the approach of “pulling abortion before the deadline” does not have a positive effect on reproductive function. And all this is also a matter of culture, the naturalness of application, a responsible approach to childbearing. In traditional cultures, the approach “once it flew in, then give birth” is common (and when the corresponding level collides with the moral norm “not necessarily”, then mutations of the behavior of the type “abortion as contraception” are obtained).
Both causes are interrelated and have a systemic impact. Some researchers focus on urbanization, but this factor is derivative.
So: a scientifically substantiated reason for the decline in the birth rate is depeasantization, the transition to an industrial society. This is a natural process of sociogenesis, but the decline in the birth rate below the level of reproduction is the suicide of the nation. The question arises: is it natural not just to reduce the birth rate in a civilized society, but just to this extent? We'll talk about this next time.
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According to Rosstat, the birth rate in Russia fell to ten year low. For the first time in recent years in The country experienced a natural population decline. RIA Novosti figured out why this happened and what to expect in coming years.
Back in 1990s
According to report Rosstat, in 2017 -m in Russia on light appeared 1.69 million children. It's on 203 thousand or on 10.7% lessthan a year earlier. According to this indicator, 2017 was the worst year for ten years - V last time fewer newborns in Russia was only 2007. The decline in the birth rate is observed in all regions of Russia except Chechnya. They gave birth actively, on 2016 level — 29 890 people. Max drop - V Nenets Autonomous Okrug (minus 16.5%), followed by — Chuvashia (minus 15%).
But there is also reasons for optimism. Mortality in Russia in also dropped markedly last year. year in 1.824 million people died in the country. It's on 63 thousand less than in 2016 — lowest inXXIcentury indicator. significantly reduced and infant mortality. In 2016 on 1000 births, 6 children died, in 2017 — 5,5.
However, all this is not helped to keep the natural population growth. fixed natural decline - minus 134.4 thousand people. In 2016, it was plus 5.4 thousand. But the total population of Russia still increased over migratory flow account. For a year in The country has added 200 thousand visitors. The main donor countries were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan And Ukraine.
Surprisingly, these results for no experts become. Scientific Supervisor of the Laboratory of Population Economics and demography of the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University Valery Elizarov says that demographic difficulties are inevitable as at least in next 15 years. He calls the socio-economic situation of the 1990s the main reason.
“The birth rate depends on number of young women in reproductive age. IN last year the 18th anniversary was reached by the smallest in Russian generation - born in 1999 throughout the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the zero years, the birth rate was extremely low. The increase began only after 2006. We had absolutely wild swings associated with socio-economic shocks. Second half of the 1980s - 1986-1987 - 2.5 million births! Then fall - To mid-1990s, there were 1.3-1.4 million births in year. Finally, 1.2 million 1999”, Elizarov notes.
The expert points out that now the age of childbearing is the generation of those who were born V period of demographic crisis. “Give birth children now most often 25-26 years old. Those who were born in 1992-1993 and at this time, a fall was already recorded. Now you yourself understand that this is not yet end", Elizarov says.
women men
Together with only the problems of the 1990s explain the situation exhausted. Yes, there are fewer women, but because and each individual woman gives birth less. The attitude of citizens towards building a family, priorities have shifted. According to data the same Rosstat, average age of a Russian mother - 26 years. It's on five years more than 1990s. During this time, the interval between appearances in family of the first and second child. In the 1990s it was three years on average A in 2017 - already 5.6 years. Thus, the birth of the second and subsequent children moved behind mother's 30th birthday.
Professor of the Department of Labor and social politicians Institute of Public Service and management (IGSU) RANEPA Alexander Shcherbakov points out that the cause should also be sought V low standard of living And striving for at the expense of work, own labor to improve the well-being of the family. In addition, at Russian women in in general, now much more career ambitions. “We have a paradoxical situation: about their gender purpose, women think only in second turn. They share more male look at lifewhere is the career at first place. And modern men are more and more like women. They often don't set themselves the task of financially providing for the family, Shcherbakov warns.
The authorities of the country understand that the situation is very serious, and take action. Yes, in November 2017 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced about the "reset" of the country's demographic policy. In December, the head of state signed law O monthly payments to families after the birth of the first child. On average, the amount 2018 will be, in depending on region, 10 523 rubles, V 2019 — 10 836 rubles, in 2020 — 11 143 rubles. Direct payment, The calculation takes into account the income of each family. Right to receiving money is provided to those who is the average income for family member is not exceeds one and a half times the subsistence minimum.
Besides, in December, the President signed a law on extension until the end of 2021 maternity capital programs. At the birth of the second third child, citizens of Russia are entitled to payment. Her size in 2017 — 453 026 rubles.
no sex want
The solution of economic issues, however, is not panacea. It is enough to look at global trends. According to the data UN, from 21 countries with the highest birth rates 19 are in Africa. All European states belong to countries with the lowest birth rate, although it is clear that the economic situation much better there than African continent.
Sexologist, head of the Sexual Health Center Anna Koteneva believes that the decline in fertility affects the specific modern morality. “Too much unnecessary information, too much fuss. Modern man lives in principle "here and now”, “after me even a flood”. Everyone wants to enjoy life, responsibility, in including for children are perceived as burden. Selfishness, individualism, independence, even infantilism rules“, she says.
Koteneva adds that current technologies seem to open up endless possibilities for communication, many moral prohibitions have been lifted. “But the current generation is not able to communicate often doesn't want it. The value of physical intimacy has declined. Used to be sex for young people was something forbidden, mysterious, desirable. It's available now, but got up in one row with other pleasures, entertainment, intimate relationships depreciated”, says the sexologist.
No matter how was, forecasts for the near future is not too optimistic. Rosstat warns: natural population decline is expected every year up to 2035, A the peak will be 2025-2028 years. This trend will be counterbalanced by migration growth, but population of Russia, demographers believe, in the specified period will still be reduced.
Demography: Russia is being let down by the "women's issue"
The Federal State Statistics Service of Russia published the Demographic forecast before 2035. By According to the forecast of Rosstat, it is expected that the population of Russia by 2036 will remain at 2017 level - 147 million people, plus or minus a few percent. At the same time, the share of the working-age population will remain almost constant. - 55-56%. Such data is not enough to number of working ages see internal changes. After all, if in within these 55–56%, there will be an increase in the number of the young part to age 40, and a decrease in the number of the older part of the working age, then a favorable demographic future for Russia lies ahead. AND quite different awaits us if, on the contrary, the young part will decrease.
Developing the Rosstat forecast, (what method - about see below), it is possible to determine the dynamics of the number of young ages up to 2040.
separate men and women on graphs do not make much sense, since recessions and rises in dynamics of the future number of 20-year-olds, 30-year-olds and 40 year olds almost double. A number of men and women in ages from 20 to 40 years differs only by a few percent.
What does this diagram make clear?
First. The number of 20-year-olds will increase to 2035 but slightly.
Second. Number of 30-year-olds in will begin to decline in the coming years. And in in the first half of 2020, the contraction will be very strong - about 10% annually.
Third. Number of 40-year-olds up to second half of 2020 will increase. But this increase will be small. A V 2030s will begin to decline, from about toy the same speed as the reduction of 30-year-olds in 2020 years.
So the total number of the young part of the working age on between 2018 and 2040 will decrease.
IN conclusion
IN In recent years, official publications have been full of peppy statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people.
IN In Russia, the Russian people make up about 80% of the total population. So the results of the spectral analysis of the Rosstat forecast can be extended to Russian people.
Like or dislike, but for peppy statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people - there is no reason.
