M.: Academy, 1996 - 496 p.

The book is based on the textbook “General Psychology,” which was reprinted many times from 1970 to 1986 and translated into German, Finnish, Danish, Chinese, Spanish and many other languages. The textbook has been radically revised and supplemented with new materials that meet the modern level of development of psychological science.

Despite all the content and completeness, the textbook retains the features of propaedeutics in relation to subsequent basic and practice-oriented academic disciplines. In fact, each chapter of this book is the basis of a corresponding textbook for a specific psychological discipline. For example, the chapters “Communication” and “Personality” are a kind of preamble for the course (program and textbook) “Social Psychology”. Chapters devoted to cognitive processes: “Memory”, “Perception”, “Thinking”, “Imagination” are introduced into the course “Educational Psychology” or “Psychology of Learning”.

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CONTENT
Part I. SUBJECT AND HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
Chapter 1. Historical path of development of psychology (M.G, Yaroshevsky).................. S
1. Ancient psychology.................................................. ........................... 6
2. Psychological thought of the New Age.................................................... 18
3. The origins of psychology as a science................................................... ......... 28
4. Development of experimental and differential psychology.... 38
5. Main psychological schools.................................................... ....... 44
6. Evolution of schools and directions................................................. ............. 57
Chapter 2. Modern psychology. Its subject and place in the system of sciences (A.V. Petrovsky). 70
1. Subject of psychology......................................................... ........................... 70
2. Psychology and natural science.................................................. ................ 73
3. Psychology and scientific and technological progress.................................................... 76
4. Psychology and pedagogy................................................... ........................ 77
5. The place of psychology in the system of sciences.................................................... .......... 80
6. Structure of modern psychology.................................................. ...... 80
7. The concept of general psychology................................................... ................ 85
Chapter 3. Methods of psychology (LA. Karpenko)............................................ ............... 88
1. Subjective method.................................................... ........................... 88
2. Objective method.................................................... ........................... 91
3. Objective research methods................................................................. ...... 92
4. Experimental method......................................................... ........................... 96
5. Measurements in psychology.................................................... ........................ 100
6. Survey method......................................................... ........................................... 106
7. Projective methods.................................................. ........................... 111
8. Method of reflected subjectivity.................................................... .......... 112
9. Organization of a specific psychological study............ 113
Part II. PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND STATES
Chapter 4. Sensations (T.P. Zinchenko)..................................................... ........................... 117
1. The concept of sensation.................................................... ................................... 117
2. General patterns of sensations.................................................... ........ 126
Chapter 5. Perception (V.L. Zinchenko, T.P. Zinchenko).................................. .......... 137
1. Characteristics of perception and its features.................................... 137
2. Perception as action................................................... ........................ 146
3. Perception of space................................................... ........................... 149
4. Perception of time and motion................................................. .......... 159
Chapter 6. Memory (G.K. Sereda).................................................... ........................................ 164
1. General concept of memory................................................... ........................... 164
2. Types of memory........................................................ ........................................... 172
3. General characteristics of memory processes.................................................... 177
4. Memorization................................................... ........................................... 179
5. Playback................................................... ................................... 187
6. Forgetting and storing.................................................... ........................... 190
7. Individual differences in memory.................................................... ........ 194
Chapter 7. Thinking (A.V. Brushlinsky).................................................... ........................ 196
1. General characteristics of thinking................................................... ......... 196
2- Thinking and problem solving.................................................... .................... 209
3. Types of thinking............................................................. .................................... 217
Chapter 8. Imagination (A.V. Petrovsky).................................................... .................... 222
1. The concept of imagination, its main types and processes.................... 222
2. Physiological foundations of imagination processes.................................... 230
3. The role of fantasy in children’s play and adults’ creativity.................................. 233
Chapter 9. Feelings (AL Petrovsky)................................................... ............................ 239
1. Definition of feelings and their physiological basis.................................... 239
2. Forms of experiencing feelings................................................... ................... 243
3. Feelings and personality................................................. ................................... 252
Part III. INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Chapter 10. Activity (L.I. Petrovsky, V.L. Petrovsky).................................259
1. Internal organization of human activity.................................................259
2. External organization of activity................................................... .......267
3. Painful actions.................................................. ................................276
Chapter 11. Communication (L.V. Petrovsky).................................................... ........................280
1. The concept of communication.................................................... ...............................280
2. Communication as the exchange of information................................................... .........283
3. Communication as interpersonal interaction.................................................292
4. Communication as people’s understanding of each other.................................................. 301
Chapter 12. Groups (L.V. Petrovsky).................................................... ...............................310
1. Groups and their classification................................................... ...............310
2. The highest form of group development.................................................. ............312
3. Differentiation between groups of different levels of development...................................320
4. Integration of groups of different levels of development....................................331
5. Student groups: psychological features of the work of a teacher (MAO. Kondraty:i).337
6. Structure of relationships in the family.................................................. .....350
Chapter 13. Consciousness (B.S. Mukhina, L.V. PstroiskiP)................................................. ....362
1. Development of the psyche in phylogenesis.................................................... .............362
2. The emergence of consciousness.................................................... ...........................366
3. The structure of consciousness and the unconscious in the human psyche........................372
Chapter 14. Personality (L.V. Petrovsky).................................................... ...........................385
1. The concept of personality in psychology.................................................... .........385
2. Personality structure.................................................... ...............................390
3. Basic theories of personality in foreign psychology...................................397
4. Personality orientation............................................................. .................... 401
5. Personal self-awareness................................................................. ........................ 407
6. Personal development.................................................. ................................... 417
Part IV. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A PERSON
Chapter 15. Temperament (N.S. Leites)................................................. ............................... 432
1. General concept of temperament.................................................... ............... 432
2. The role of temperament in work and educational activities.....,............ 442
3. Temperament and parenting problems.................................................. ... 447
Chapter 16. Character (A.V. Petrovsky)................................................. ........................... 451
1. The concept of character................................................... ................................ 451
2. Character structure.................................................... ........................... 452
3. Nature and manifestations of character................................................. .......... 458
Chapter 17. Abilities (A.V. Petrovsky^...................................... .................... 468
1. The concept of abilities................................................... ........................... 468
2. Structure of abilities.................................................... ........................... 474
3. Talent, its origin and structure.................................................... .. 476
4. Natural prerequisites for abilities and talent.................................... 480
5. Formation of abilities................................................... ................ 486
Application. Glossary of terms................................................... ........................... 489
Recommended reading................................................... ............... 491

Abstract - History of Psychology (Abstract)

Spurs for the exam in the history of psychology (Crib sheet)

Test - Brief history of psychology (Laboratory work)

Cheat Sheet on Experimental Psychology (Crib Sheet)

n1.doc

Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G.

HISTORY AND THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

Volume 2

Publishing house "Phoenix"

Rostov-on-Don

Artist O. Babkin

Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G.

And 84 History and theory of psychology.  Rostov-on-Don:

Publishing house "Phoenix", 1996. Volume 2. - 416 p.

AND 4704010000 _ without announcement BBK 65.5

Petrovsky A.V.

ISBN 5-85880-159-5 Yaroshevsky M.G.,

© Phoenix, 1996.

PART FOUR
PSYCHOPHYSICAL AND

PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL

PROBLEMS

Chapter 10
PSYCHOPHYSICAL PROBLEM

Monism, dualism and pluralism
In countless attempts to determine the nature of mental phenomena, an understanding of its relationships with other phenomena of existence has always been assumed, in an explicit or implicit form.

The question of the place of the psyche in the material world was variously resolved by adherents of the philosophy of monism (the unity of the world order), dualism (coming from two fundamentally different principles) and pluralism (believing that there are many such principles).

Accordingly, we are already familiar with the first natural scientific views on the soul (psyche) as one of the particular transformations of a single natural element. These were the first views of the ancient Greek philosophers, who represented this element in the form of air, fire, and a flow of atoms.

Also, attempts arose to consider the units of the world not to be material, sensually visible elements, but numbers, the relationships of which form the harmony of the cosmos. This was the teaching of Pythagoras (VI century BC). It should be taken into account that a single substance, which serves as the basis of all things (including the soul), was thought of as living, animate (see above - hylozoism), and for Pythagoras and his school number was not at all an extra-sensory abstraction. The cosmos he formed was seen as a geometric-acoustic unity. For the Pythagoreans, the harmony of the spheres meant their sound.

All this indicates that the monism of the ancients had a sensual coloring and sensual tonality. It was in a sensual, and not an abstract, image that the idea of ​​the inseparability of the mental and physical was affirmed.

As for dualism, it received its most dramatic, classical expression from Plato. In his polemical dialogues, he expanded everything that was possible: the ideal and the material, the felt and the conceivable, the body and the soul. But the historical meaning of Plato’s teaching, its influence on the philosophical and psychological science of the West, right up to the modern era, does not lie in the opposition of the sensory world to the visible, the senses to the mind. Plato discovered the problem of the ideal. It was proven that the mind has very special, specific objects. Mental activity lies in joining them.

Because of this, the mental, having acquired the sign of ideality, turned out to be sharply separated from the material. Prerequisites arose for the opposition of ideal images of things to the things themselves, of spirit and matter. Plato exaggerated one of the features of human consciousness. But only then did she become noticeable.

Finally, something should be said about pluralism.

Just as monistic and dualistic ways of understanding the relationship of the psyche to the external material world had already developed in ancient times, the idea of ​​pluralism arose. The term itself appeared much later. It was proposed in the 18th century by the philosopher X. Wolf (teacher of M.V. Lomonosov) to contrast monism. But already the ancient Greeks were looking for several “roots” of being instead of one. In particular, four elements were distinguished: earth, air, fire, water.

In modern times, in the teachings of personalism, which accepts each person as the only one in the Universe (W. James and others), the ideas of pluralism have become dominant. They split existence into many worlds and, in essence, remove from the agenda the question of the relationship between mental and extra-psychic (material) phenomena. Consciousness thereby turns into an isolated “island of the spirit.”

The real value of the psyche in a single chain of being is not only the subject of philosophical discussions. The relationship between what is given to consciousness in the form of images (or experiences) and what happens in the external physical world is inevitably presented in the practice of scientific research.
Soul as a way of assimilation
The first experience of a monistic understanding of the relationship of mental phenomena to the external world belongs to Aristotle. For previous teachings, there was no psychophysical problem here at all (since the soul was represented either as consisting of the same physical components as the surrounding world, or it, as was the case in Plato’s school, was opposed to it as a heterogeneous principle).

Aristotle, asserting the inseparability of soul and body, understood the latter as a biological body, from which all other natural bodies are qualitatively different. Nevertheless, it depends on them and interacts with them both at the ontological level (since life activity is impossible without the assimilation of matter) and at the epistemological level (since the soul carries knowledge about the external objects surrounding it).

The solution found by Aristotle in his quest to end Plato's dualism was truly innovative. It was based on a biological approach. Let us recall that Aristotle thought of the soul not as a single entity, but as formed by a hierarchy of functions: plant, animal (in today’s language, sensorimotor) and rational. The basis for explaining higher functions was the most elementary one, namely plant ones. He considered it in the fairly obvious context of the interaction of the organism with the environment.

Without the physical environment and its substances, the work of the “plant soul” is impossible. It absorbs external elements during nutrition (metabolism). However, an external physical process in itself cannot be the cause of the activity of this plant (vegetative) soul if the structure of the organism, which perceives the physical impact, were not disposed to this. Previous researchers considered fire to be the cause of life. But it is capable of growing and expanding. As for organized bodies, for their size and growth “there is a limit and a law.” Nutrition occurs due to external matter, but it is absorbed by a living body differently from an inorganic one, namely due to the “mechanics” of expedient distribution.

In other words, the soul is a way of assimilating the external and becoming familiar with it, specific to a living organization.

Aristotle applied the same model for solving the question of the relationship between the physical environment and an organism with a soul to explain the ability to sense. Here, too, an external physical object is assimilated by the organism according to the organization of the living body. A physical object is outside of it, but thanks to the activity of the soul it enters the body, imprinting in a special way not its substance, but its form. Which is what sensation is.

The main difficulties that Aristotle encountered while following this strategy arose during the transition from the sensorimotor (animal) soul to the rational one. Her work had to be explained by the same factors that would allow her to apply techniques to innovatively deal with the mysteries of nutrition and sensation.

Two factors were implied - an object external to the soul and a bodily organization adequate to it. However, objects “assimilated” by the rational part of the soul are characterized by a special nature. Unlike objects that act on the senses, they are devoid of substance. These are general concepts, categories, mental constructs. If the corporeality of the sense organ is self-evident, then nothing is known about the corporeal organ of knowledge of extrasensory ideas.

Aristotle sought to understand the activity of the rational soul not as a unique, incomparable phenomenon, but as akin to the general activity of the living, its special case. He believed that the principle of the transition of possibility into reality, that is, the activation of the internal potencies of the soul, has the same force both for the mind, which comprehends the general forms of things, and for the metabolism in plants or the sensation of the physical properties of an object by the sense organ.

But the absence of material objects adequate to the activity of the mind prompted him to admit the existence of ideas (general concepts) similar to those spoken about by his teacher Plato. Thus, he, following Plato, moving to the position of dualism, cut short the deterministic solution to the psychophysical problem at the level of the animal soul with its ability to possess sensory images.

Beyond this ability, the internal connections of mental functions with the physical world were severed.
Transformation of Aristotle's teachings into Thomism
Aristotle's doctrine of the soul solved biological and natural science problems. In the Middle Ages, it was rewritten into another language that suited the interests of Catholicism and was consonant with this religion.

The most popular copyist was Thomas Aquinas, whose books were canonized by the church under the name of Thomism. A typical feature of medieval ideology, reflecting the social structure of feudal society, was hierarchism: the younger exists for the benefit of the elder, the lower - for the sake of the higher, and only in this sense is the world expedient. Thomas extended the hierarchical template to the description of mental life, the various forms of which were placed in a stepped series - he is lower to higher. Every phenomenon has its place.

The souls are located in a stepped row - plant, animal, rational (human). Within the soul itself, abilities and their products (sensation, idea, concept) are hierarchically located.

The idea of ​​“gradation” of forms meant for Aristotle the principle of development and originality of the structure of living bodies, which differ in levels of organization. In Thomism, the parts of the soul acted as its immanent forces, the order of which was determined not by natural laws, but by the degree of closeness to the Almighty. The lower part of the soul is turned to the mortal world and gives imperfect knowledge, the higher provides communication with the Lord and, by his grace, allows us to comprehend the order of phenomena.

In Aristotle, as we noted, the actualization of ability (activity) presupposes an object corresponding to it. In the case of a plant soul, this object is an assimilated substance; in the case of an animal soul, it is a sensation (as the form of an object affecting the sense organ); in the case of a rational soul, it is a concept (as an intellectual form).

This Aristotelian position is transformed by Thomas into the doctrine of intentional acts of the soul. In intention as an internal, mental action, content always “coexists” - the object to which it is directed. (The object was understood as a sensory or mental image.)

There was a rational aspect to the concept of intention. Consciousness is not a “stage” or “space” filled with “elements.” It is active and initially objective. Therefore, the concept of intention did not disappear along with Thomism, but moved into the new empirical psychology when the functional direction opposed Wundt’s school.

An important role in strengthening the concept of intention was played by the Austrian philosopher F. Brentano, who at the end of the 19th century came up with his own plan, different from Wundt’s, for transforming psychology into an independent science, the subject of which is not studied by any other science (see above).

As a Catholic priest, Brentano studied the psychological works of Aristotle and Thomas. However, Aristotle considered the soul to be a form of the body - and in relation to its plant and sensory functions - associated with the physical world (bodies of external nature). The intention of consciousness and the object that coexists with it have acquired the character of spiritual entities. Thus, the psychophysical problem was “closed.”
Turning to Optics
The psychophysical problem acquired new content in the context of the successes of natural science in the field of optics, which combined experiment with mathematics. This branch of physics was successfully developed in the Middle Ages by both Arabic-speaking and Latin-speaking researchers. Within the boundaries of the religious worldview, they, having made the mental phenomenon (visual image) dependent on the laws objectively operating in the external world, returned to the psychophysical problem removed from the agenda by Thomism.

Along with the works of Ibn al-Haytham, the doctrine of “perspective” of Roger Bacon (c. 1214 - 1294) played an important role in strengthening this trend.

Optics switched thought from a biological orientation to a physical and mathematical one. The use of diagrams and concepts of optics to explain how an image is constructed in the eye (that is, a mental phenomenon arising in a bodily organ) made physiological and mental facts dependent on the general laws of the physical world. These laws - in contrast to the Neoplatonic speculation about the heavenly light, the radiation (emanation) of which the human soul was considered to be - were empirically tested (in particular through the use of various lenses) and received mathematical expression.

The interpretation of a living body (at least one of its organs) as a medium where physical and mathematical laws operate was a fundamentally new line of thought, which ancient science did not know. Regardless of the degree and nature of the awareness of its novelty and importance by the medieval naturalists themselves, an irreversible change occurred in the structure of scientific and psychological thinking, the starting point of which was the understanding of the sensory act (visual sensation) as a physical effect, built according to the laws of optics. Although only a certain range of phenomena related to the function of one of the organs was meant, an intellectual revolution objectively began, which subsequently captured the entire sphere of mental activity, up to and including its highest manifestations.

Of course, finding out the paths of movement of light rays in the eye, the features of binocular vision, etc. is very important in order to explain the mechanism of the appearance of a visual image. But what are the grounds for seeing this as something more than elucidating the physical prerequisites for one of the varieties of reception?

Whether Ibn al-Haytham, Roger Bacon, and others claimed more, or whether their intention was a general reconstruction of the original principles for the explanation of mental processes, they laid the foundation for such a reconstruction. Relying on optics, they overcame the teleological method of explanation. The movement of a light beam in a physical environment depends on the properties of this environment, and is not directed in advance by a given goal, as was assumed in relation to movements occurring in the body.

The work of the eye was considered a model of expediency. Let us remember that Aristotle saw in this work a typical expression of the essence of the living body as matter organized and controlled by the soul: “If the eye were a deceitful creature, its soul would be sight”. Vision, which became dependent on the laws of optics, ceased to be the “soul of the eye” (in the Aristotelian interpretation). It was included in a new causal series and was subject to physical rather than immanent-biological necessity.

Mathematical structures and algorithms have long been used as an expression of the principle of necessity 1 .

But in themselves they are insufficient for a deterministic explanation of nature, as evidenced by the history of the Pythagoreans and Neo-Pythagoreans, Platonists and Neoplatonists, schools in which the deification of number and geometric form coexisted with outright mysticism. The picture changed radically when mathematical necessity became an expression of the natural course of things in the physical world, accessible to observation, measurement, and empirical study, both direct and using additional means (which took on the meaning of experimental instruments - for example, optical glasses).

Optics was the area where mathematics and experience were combined. The combination of mathematics and experiment, leading to major achievements in the knowledge of the physical world, at the same time transformed the structure of thinking. The new way of thinking in natural science changed the nature of the interpretation of mental phenomena. It was initially established on a small “patch”, which was the area of ​​visual sensations.

But, once established, this method, as more perfect, more adequate to the nature of phenomena, could no longer disappear.
Mechanics and changing concepts of soul and body
The image of nature as a grandiose mechanism that arose in the era of the scientific revolution of the 17th century and the transformation of the concept of the soul (which was considered the driving principle of life) into the concept of consciousness as the subject’s direct knowledge of his thoughts, desires, etc. decisively changed the general interpretation of the psychophysical problem.

It is necessary to emphasize here that the thinkers of this period really considered the problem in question as a relationship between mental and physical processes in order to explain the place of the psyche (consciousness, thinking) in the universe, in nature as a whole. Only one thinker, namely Descartes, did not limit himself to analyzing the relationships between consciousness and physical nature, but tried to combine a psychophysical problem with a psychophysiological one, with an explanation of the changes that physical processes undergo in the body, subject to the laws of mechanics, giving rise to “passions of the soul.”

However, for this, Descartes had to leave the realm of purely physical phenomena and project the image of a machine (i.e., a device where the laws of mechanics operate in accordance with a design created by man).

Other major thinkers of the era presented the relationship between the bodily and the spiritual (mental) on a “cosmic scale”, without offering productive ideas about the unique characteristics of the living body (as a device producing the psyche) in contrast to the inorganic one. Therefore, in their teachings, the psychophysical problem was not distinguished from the psychophysiological one.
Psychophysical interaction hypothesis
Having attributed the soul and body to fundamentally different areas of existence, Descartes tried to explain their empirically obvious connection through the interaction hypothesis. To explain the possibility of interaction between these two substances, Descartes suggested that the body has an organ that ensures this interaction, namely the so-called pineal gland (epiphysis), which serves as an intermediary between the body and consciousness (see above). This gland, according to Descartes, perceiving the movement of “animal spirits”, in turn is capable, thanks to vibration (caused by the action of the soul), of influencing their purely mechanical flow. Descartes admitted that, without creating new movements, the soul can change their direction, just as a rider is able to change the behavior of the horse he controls. After Leibniz established that in all bodies in dynamic interaction, not only the quantity (force), but also the direction of movement remains unchanged, Descartes’ argument about the ability of the soul to spontaneously change the direction of movement turned out to be incompatible with physical knowledge.

The reality of interaction between soul and body was rejected by Spinoza, occasionalists, and Leibniz, who were brought up on Cartesian teaching. Spinoza comes to materialist monism. Leibniz - to idealistic pluralism.
Innovative version of Spinoza
Recognizing the attributive (and not substantial) difference between thinking and extension and, at the same time, their inseparability, Spinoza postulated: “Neither the body can determine the soul to thinking, nor the soul can determine the body either to movement, or to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else?)” 2 .

The belief that the body moves or is at rest under the influence of the soul arose, according to Spinoza, due to ignorance of what it is capable of as such, by virtue of the laws of nature alone, considered exclusively as corporeal. This revealed one of the epistemological sources of belief in the ability of the soul to arbitrarily control the behavior of the body, namely, ignorance of the true capabilities of the bodily structure in itself.

"When people say, Spinoza continues, that this or that action of the body originates from the soul, which has power over the body, they do not know what they are saying, and only in beautiful words they admit that the true reason for this action is unknown to them and they are not at all surprised by it.” 3 .

This attack on “fine words” replacing the study of real causes was of historical significance. She directed the search for the actual determinants of human behavior, the place of which in traditional explanations was occupied by the soul (consciousness, thought) as the primary source.

Emphasizing the role of causal factors inherent in the activity of the body in itself, Spinoza at the same time rejected that view of the determination of mental processes, which later received the name epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that mental phenomena are ghostly reflections of bodily ones. After all, the mental as thinking is, according to Spinoza, the same attribute of material substance as its extension. Therefore, considering that the soul does not determine the body to think, Spinoza also argued that the body cannot determine the soul to think.

What motivated this conclusion? According to Spinoza, it follows from the theorem: “Every attribute of one substance must be represented through itself” 4 .

And what is true in relation to attributes is also true in relation to modes, i.e. the entire diversity of the individual, which corresponds to one or another attribute: the modes of one do not contain the modes of another.

The soul as a thinking thing and the body as the same thing, but considered in the attribute of extension, cannot determine each other (interact) not because of their separate existence, but because of their inclusion in the same order of nature.

Both soul and body are determined by the same reasons. How can they exert a causal influence on each other?

The question of Spinozist interpretation of the psychophysical problem requires special analysis. Erroneous, in our opinion, is the view of those historians who, rightly rejecting the version of Spinoza as a supporter (and even the founder) of psychophysical parallelism, present him as a supporter of psychophysical interaction.

In fact, Spinoza put forward an extremely deep idea, which remained largely ununderstood not only by him, but also by our contemporaries, that there is only one “causal chain”, one pattern and necessity, one and the same “order” for things (including such thing, like a body), and for ideas. Difficulties arise when the Spinozist interpretation of the psychophysical problem (the question of the relationship between the mental and nature, the physical world as a whole) is translated into the language of a psychophysiological problem (the question of the relationship between mental processes and physiological, nervous ones). It is then that the search for correlations between the individual soul and the individual body begins, outside the general, universal pattern, to which both are inevitably subordinated, included in the same causal chain.

The famous 7th theorem of the 2nd part of “Ethics” “The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things” meant that the connections in thinking and space are identical in their objective causal basis. Accordingly, in the scholium to this theorem, Spinoza states: “Whether we represent nature under the attribute of space, or under the attribute of thinking, or under any other attribute, in all cases we will find the same order, in other words, the same connection of causes, i.e. the same things follow each other" 5 .
Psychophysical parallelism
The occasionalist Melebranche (1638 - 1715), a follower of Descartes, adhered to a philosophical orientation opposite to the Spinozist one. He taught that the correspondence between the physical and mental, ascertained by experience, is created by divine power. The soul and body are completely independent entities from each other, so their interaction is impossible. When a certain state arises in one of them, the deity produces a corresponding state in the other.

Occasionalism (and not Spinoza) was the true founder of psychophysical parallelism. It is this concept that Leibniz accepts and further develops, who, however, rejected the assumption of the continuous participation of the deity in every psychophysical act. Divine wisdom manifested itself, in his opinion, in pre-established harmony. Both entities - soul and body - carry out their operations independently and automatically due to their internal structure, but since they are put into action with the greatest precision, one gets the impression of dependence of one on the other. The doctrine of pre-established harmony made the study of the bodily determination of the psyche meaningless. It simply denied it. "There is no proportionality, Leibniz stated categorically, between an incorporeal substance and one or another modification of matter" 6 .

The nihilistic attitude towards the view of the body as a substrate of mental manifestations had a heavy impact on the concepts of German psychologists who trace their ancestry to Leibniz (Herbart, Wundt and others).

Hartley: the single beginning of the physical,

physiological and mental
The psychophysical problem became psychophysiological in the 18th century with Hartley (in the materialistic version) and in H. Wolf (in the idealistic version). The dependence of the psyche on the universal forces and laws of nature was replaced by its dependence on processes in the body, in the nervous substrate.

Both philosophers approved the so-called psychophysiological parallelism. But the difference in their approaches concerned not only a general philosophical orientation.

Hartley, despite the fantastic nature of his views on the substrate of mental phenomena (as mentioned above, he described nervous processes in terms of vibrations), tried to bring the physical, physiological and mental under a common denominator. He emphasized that he came to his understanding of man under the influence of Newton’s works “Optics” and “Principles” (“Mathematical principles of natural philosophy”).

The important role of the study of light rays has already been noted in repeated attempts to explain various subjective phenomena by the physical laws of their propagation and refraction. Hartley's advantage over his predecessors is that he chose a single principle, gleaned from exact science, to explain processes in the physical world (oscillations of the ether) as a source of processes in the nervous system, parallel to which there are changes in the mental sphere (in the form of associations along adjacency).

If Newton’s physics remained unshakable until the end of the 19th century, then Hartley’s “vibratory physiology”, on which he relied in his doctrine of associations, was fantastic, having no basis in real knowledge about the nervous system. Therefore, one of his faithful followers, D. Priestley, proposed to accept and further develop Hartley’s doctrine of associations, discarding the hypothesis of nervous vibrations. Thus, this teaching was deprived of bodily correlations, both physiological and mental.

Proponents of associative psychology (J. Mill and others) began to interpret consciousness as a “machine” operating according to its own autonomous laws.
Advances in physics and the doctrine of parallelism
The first half of the 19th century was marked by major advances in physics, among which the discovery of the law of conservation of energy and its transformation from one form to another stands out. The new, “energetic” picture of the world made it possible to deal a crushing blow to vitalism, which endowed the living body with a special vital force.

In physiology, a physicochemical school emerged, which determined the rapid progress of this science. The body (including the human) was interpreted as a physico-chemical, energy machine. He naturally fit into the new picture of the universe. However, the question of the place of the psyche and consciousness in this picture remained open.

For most researchers of psychic phenomena, psychophysical parallelism seemed an acceptable version.

The circulation of various forms of energy in nature and the body remained “on the other side” of consciousness, the phenomena of which were considered as irreducible to physicochemical molecular processes and irreducible from them. There are two series between which there is a parallelism relationship. To admit that mental processes can influence physical ones means to deviate from one of the fundamental laws of nature.

In this scientific and ideological atmosphere, supporters of subsuming mental processes under the laws of the movement of molecules, chemical reactions, etc. appeared. This approach (its supporters were called vulgar materialists) deprived the study of the psyche of claims to study reality that is important for life. It came to be called epiphenomenalism - the concept according to which the psyche is an “excess product” of the work of the “machine” of the brain (see above).

Meanwhile, events occurred in natural science that proved the meaninglessness of such a view (incompatible with everyday consciousness, which testifies to the real impact of mental phenomena on human behavior).

Biology adopted Darwin's doctrine of the origin of species, from which it was clear that natural selection mercilessly destroys “surplus products.” At the same time, the same teaching encouraged us to interpret the environment (nature) surrounding the organism in completely new terms - not physical and chemical, but biological, according to which the environment acts not in the form of molecules, but as a force that regulates the course of life processes, including mental.

The question of psychophysical correlations turned into a question of psychobiological ones.
Psychophysics
At the same time, in physiological laboratories, where the objects were the functions of the sense organs, the logic of the research itself encouraged us to recognize these functions as having an independent meaning, to see in them the action of special laws that did not coincide with physicochemical or biological ones.

The transition to experimental study of the sense organs was due to the discovery of differences between sensory and motor nerves. This discovery gave natural scientific strength to the idea that a subjective sensory image arises as a product of irritation of a certain nervous substrate. The substrate itself was thought of - in accordance with the achieved level of information about the nervous system - in morphological terms, and this, as we have seen, contributed to the emergence of physiological idealism, which denied the possibility of any other real, material basis for sensations other than the properties of nervous tissue. The dependence of sensations on external stimuli and their relationships has lost its decisive significance in this concept. Since, however, this dependence really exists, it inevitably had to come to the fore with the progress of experimental research.

Its natural character was one of the first to be discovered by the German physiologist and anatomist Weber (see above), who established that in this area of ​​phenomena exact knowledge is achievable - not only deduced from experience and verified by it, but also allowing mathematical expression.

As already mentioned, at one time Herbart’s attempt to subsume the natural course of mental life under mathematical formulas failed. This attempt failed because of the fictitious nature of the calculation material itself, and not because of the weakness of the mathematical apparatus. Weber, who experimentally studied skin and muscle sensitivity, managed to discover a certain, mathematically formulated relationship between physical stimuli and sensory reactions.

Note that the principle of “specific energy” made no sense in any statement about the natural relations of sensations to external stimuli (since, according to this principle, these stimuli do not perform any function other than actualizing the sensory quality inherent in the nerve).

Weber, unlike I. Müller and other physiologists who attached primary importance to the dependence of sensations on neuroanatomical elements and their structural relationships, made the dependence of tactile and muscle sensations on external stimuli the object of research.

By checking how pressure sensations varied when the intensity of stimuli changed, he established a fundamental fact: differentiation does not depend on the absolute difference between values, but on the ratio of a given weight to the original one.

Weber applied a similar technique to sensations of other modalities - muscular (when weighing objects with the hand), visual (when determining the length of lines), etc. And everywhere a similar result was obtained, which led to the concept of a “barely noticeable difference” (between the previous and subsequent sensory effect) as a constant value for each modality. The "barely noticeable difference" in the increase (or decrease) of each kind of sensation is something constant. But in order for this difference to be felt, the increase in irritation must, in turn, reach a certain magnitude, the greater, the stronger the existing irritation to which it is added.

The significance of the established rule, which Fechner later called Weber's law (an additional stimulus must be in a constant relation to the given one for each modality in order for a barely noticeable difference in sensations to arise), was enormous. It not only showed the orderly nature of the dependence of sensations on external influences, but also contained (implicitly) a methodologically important conclusion for the future of psychology about the subordination of number and measure of the entire field of mental phenomena to their conditioning by physical ones.

Weber's first work on the natural relationship between the intensity of stimulation and the dynamics of sensations was published in 1834. But then she did not attract attention. And, of course, not because it was written in Latin. After all, Weber’s subsequent publications, in particular his excellent (already in German) review article for the four-volume “Physiological Dictionary” by Rud. Wagner, where previous experiments on determining thresholds were reproduced, also did not draw attention to the idea of ​​a mathematical relationship between sensations and stimuli.

At that time, Weber's experiments were highly regarded by physiologists not because of the discovery of this relationship, but because of the establishment of an experimental approach to skin sensitivity, in particular, the study of its thresholds, which vary in value on different parts of the body surface. Weber explains this difference by the degree of saturation of the corresponding area with innervated fibers.

Weber's hypothesis about the “circles of sensations” (the surface of the body was represented as divided into circles, each of which was equipped with one nerve fiber; and it was assumed that the system of peripheral circles corresponded to their cerebral projection) 7 acquired exceptional popularity in those years. Is it because it was in tune with the then dominant “anatomical approach”?

Meanwhile, the new line in the study of the psyche outlined by Weber: the calculation of the quantitative relationship between sensory and physical phenomena remained inconspicuous until Fechner singled it out and turned it into the starting point of psychophysics.

The motives that led Fechner to a new field were significantly different from those of the natural-scientific materialist Weber. Fechner recalled that on a September morning in 1850, thinking about how to refute the materialistic worldview that prevailed among physiologists, he came to the conclusion that if the Universe - from planets to molecules - had two sides - the “light” or spiritual, and the “shadow” ”, or material, then there must be a functional relationship between them, expressible in mathematical equations. If Fechner had been only a religious man and a metaphysical dreamer, his plan would have remained in the collection of philosophical curiosities. But at one time he occupied the department of physics and studied the psychophysiology of vision. To substantiate his mystical-philosophical construction, he chose experimental and quantitative methods. Fechner's formulas could not help but make a deep impression on his contemporaries.

Fechner was inspired by philosophical motives: to prove, in contrast to the materialists, that mental phenomena are real and their real magnitudes can be determined with the same accuracy as the magnitudes of physical phenomena.

The methods of barely noticeable differences, average errors, and constant irritations developed by Fechner entered experimental psychology and at first determined one of its main directions. Fechner's Elements of Psychophysics, published in 1860, had a profound impact on all subsequent work in the field of measurement and calculation of mental phenomena - right up to the present day. After Fechner, the legitimacy and fruitfulness of using mathematical techniques for processing experimental data in psychology became obvious. Psychology began to speak in mathematical language - first about sensations, then about reaction time, associations and other factors of mental activity.

The general formula derived by Fechner, according to which the intensity of sensation is proportional to the logarithm of the intensity of the stimulus, became a model for the introduction of strict mathematical measures into psychology. Later it was discovered that this formula cannot claim universality. Experience has shown the limits of its applicability. It turned out, in particular, that its use is limited to stimuli of medium intensity and, moreover, it is not valid for all modalities of sensations.

Discussions flared up about the meaning of this formula, about its real foundations. Wundt gave it a purely psychological, and Ebbinghaus a purely physiological meaning. But regardless of possible interpretations, Fechner’s formula (and the experimental-mathematical approach to the phenomena of mental life it suggested) became one of the cornerstones of the new psychology.

The direction, the founder of which was Weber, and the theorist and renowned leader was Fechner, developed outside the general mainstream of the physiology of the sense organs, although at first glance it seemed to belong precisely to this branch of physiological science. This is explained by the fact that the patterns discovered by Weber and Fechner actually covered the relationship between mental and physical (and not physiological) phenomena. Although an attempt was made to derive these patterns from the properties of the neuro-brain apparatus, it was of a purely hypothetical, speculative nature and testified not so much to real, meaningful knowledge, but to the need for it.

Fechner himself divided psychophysics into external and internal, understanding the first as a natural correspondence between the physical and the mental, and the second as between the mental and the physiological. However, the secondary dependence (internal psychophysics) remained in the context of the interpretation of the law he established, beyond the limits of experimental and mathematical justification.

We see, therefore, that a unique direction in the study of the activity of the senses, known under the name of psychophysics and which became one of the foundations and components of psychology, which was emerging as an independent science, represented an area different from physiology. The object of study of psychophysics was the system of relations between psychological facts and external stimuli accessible to experimental control, variation, measurement and calculation. In this way, psychophysics was fundamentally different from the psychophysiology of the sense organs, although Weber obtained the original psychophysical formula by experimenting with cutaneous and muscle reception. In psychophysics, the activity of the nervous system was implied, but not studied. Knowledge about this activity was not part of the original concepts. Correlations of mental phenomena with external, physical, and not with internal, physiological agents turned out to be, given the then existing level of knowledge about the bodily substrate, the most accessible sphere of experimental development of facts and their mathematical generalization.
Psychophysical monism
Difficulties in understanding the relationship between physical nature and consciousness, a really urgent need to overcome dualism in the interpretation of these relationships, led at the turn of the 19th to 20th centuries to concepts whose motto was psychophysical monism.

The main idea was to imagine the things of nature and the phenomena of consciousness as “woven” from the same material. This idea was presented in various versions by Z. Mach, R. Avenarius, and W. James.

“Neutral” material for the distinction between physical and mental is, according to Mach, sensory experience, i.e. sensations. Considering them from one angle of view, we create a concept of the physical world (nature, matter), while from another angle of view they “turn into” phenomena of consciousness. It all depends on the context in which the same components of experience are included.

According to Avenarius, in a single experience there are different series. We take one series to be independent (for example, natural phenomena), while we consider the other to be dependent on the first (the phenomenon of consciousness).

By attributing a psyche to the brain, we commit an unacceptable “introjection,” namely, we put into the nerve cells something that is not there. It is absurd to look for images and thoughts in the skull. They are outside of it.

The prerequisite for such a view was the identification of the image of a thing with itself. If you do not distinguish them, then, indeed, it becomes mysterious how all the wealth of the knowable world can be contained in one and a half kilograms of brain mass.

In this concept, the psyche was disconnected from two most important realities, without correlation with which it becomes a mirage - both from the external world and from its bodily substrate. The futility of such a solution to the psychophysical (and psychophysiological) problem has been proven by the subsequent development of scientific thought.
Sechenov and Pavlov: physical stimulus as a signal
The transition from a physical interpretation of the relationship between an organism and the environment to a biological one gave rise to a new picture not only of the organism, the life of which (including its mental forms) was now thought of in its inseparable and selective connections with the environment, but also of the environment itself. The influence of the environment on a living body was not thought of as mechanical shocks or as a transition from one type of energy to another. The external stimulus acquired new essential characteristics, determined by the body's need to adapt to it.

This received its most typical expression in the emergence of the concept of stimulus-signal. Thus, the place of the previous physical and energy determinants was taken by signal ones. The pioneer of including the category of signal as its regulator in the general scheme of behavior was I.M. Sechenov (see above).

A physical stimulus, acting on the body, retains its external physical characteristics, but when it is received by a special bodily organ, it acquires a special form. In Sechenov's language - a form of feeling. This made it possible to interpret the signal as an intermediary between the environment and the organism orienting itself in it.

The interpretation of an external stimulus as a signal was further developed in the works of I.P. Pavlov on higher nervous activity. He introduced the concept of a signaling system, which allows the body to distinguish between environmental stimuli and, in response to them, acquire new forms of behavior.

The signaling system is not a purely physical (energy) quantity, but it cannot be attributed to the purely mental sphere, if we understand by it the phenomena of consciousness. At the same time, the signaling system has a mental correlate in the form of sensations and perceptions.
Vernadsky: the noosphere as a special shell of the planet
A new direction in understanding the relationship between the psyche and the outside world was outlined by V.I. Vernadsky.

Vernadsky's most important contribution to world science was his doctrine of the biosphere as a special shell of the Earth, in which the activity of living matter included in this shell is a geochemical factor on a planetary scale. Let us note that Vernadsky, having abandoned the term “life,” spoke specifically about living matter. By substance it was customary to understand atoms, molecules and what is built from them. But before Vernadsky, matter was thought of as abiotic or, if we accept his favorite term, as inert, devoid of characteristics that distinguish living beings.

Rejecting previous views on the relationship between the organism and the environment, Vernadsky wrote: “There is no inert, indifferent, unrelated environment for living matter, which was logically taken into account in all our ideas about the organism and the environment: the organism  Wednesday; and there is no such opposition: the organism  nature, in which what happens in nature may not be reflected in the body, is an inextricable whole: living matter= biosphere" 8 .

This equal sign was of fundamental importance. At one time I.M. Sechenov, having adopted the credo of advanced biology of the mid-19th century, rejected the false concept of the organism, which isolates it from the environment, whereas the concept of an organism should also include the environment that composes it. Defending in 1860 the principle of the unity of the living body and the environment, Sechenov followed the program of the physico-chemical school, which, having crushed vitalism, taught that forces act in a living body that do not exist in inorganic nature.

"We all  children of the Sun", - said Helmholtz, emphasizing the dependence of any form of life on the source of its energy. Vernadsky, whose teaching represented a new round in the development of scientific thought, gave a different meaning to the principle of the unity of the organism and the environment. Vernadsky spoke not about a false understanding of the organism (like Helmholtz, Sechenov and others), but about a false understanding of the environment, thereby proving that the concept of the environment (biosphere) should also include the organisms that make it up. He wrote: “In the biogenic current of atoms and the energy associated with it, the planetary, cosmic significance of living matter is clearly manifested, for the biosphere is the only earthly shell into which cosmic energy, cosmic radiation and, above all, radiation from the Sun continuously penetrate.” 9 .

The biogenic flow of atoms to a large extent creates the biosphere, in which there is a continuous material and energy exchange between the inert natural bodies that form it and the living matter that populates it. Human activity generated by the brain as a transformed living substance dramatically increases the geological strength of the biosphere. Since this activity is regulated by thought, Vernadsky considered personal thought not only in its relation to the nervous substrate or the immediate external environment surrounding the organism (like naturalists of all previous centuries), but also as a planetary phenomenon. Paleontologically, with the advent of man, a new geological era begins. Vernadsky agrees (following some scientists) to call it psychozoic.

This was a fundamentally new, global approach to the human psyche, including it as a special force in the history of the globe, giving the history of our planet a completely new, special direction and rapid pace. In the development of the psyche, a factor was seen that limited the inert environment alien to living matter, exerting pressure on it, changing the distribution of chemical elements in it, etc. Just as the reproduction of organisms is manifested in the pressure of living matter in the biosphere, so the course of the geological manifestation of scientific thought puts pressure on the things it creates weapons against the inert, restraining environment of the biosphere, creating the noosphere, the kingdom of reason. It is obvious that for Vernadsky, the impact of thought, consciousness on the natural environment (outside of which this thought itself does not exist, because it, as a function of nervous tissue, is a component of the biosphere) cannot be other than mediated by tools created by culture, including means of communication.

The term “noosphere” (from the Greek “nous” - mind and “sphere” - ball) was introduced into the scientific language by the French mathematician and philosopher E. Leroy, who, together with another thinker Teilhard de Chardin, distinguished three stages of evolution: the lithosphere, the biosphere and noosphere. Vernadsky (who called himself a realist) gave this concept a materialistic meaning. Not limiting himself to the position expressed long before him and Teilhard de Chardin about a special geological “era of man,” he filled the concept of “noosphere” with new content, which he drew from two sources: the natural sciences (geology, paleontology, etc.) and the history of scientific thought .

Comparing the sequence of geological layers from the Archeozoic and the morphological structures of the life forms corresponding to them, Vernadsky points to the process of improvement of nervous tissue, in particular the brain. “Without the formation of the human brain there would be no scientific thought in the biosphere, and without scientific thought there would be no geological effect  biosphere restructuring  humanity" 10 .

Reflecting on the conclusions of anatomists about the absence of significant differences between the brains of humans and monkeys, Vernadsky noted: “This can hardly be interpreted otherwise than by the insensitivity and incompleteness of the methodology. For there can be no doubt about the existence of a sharp difference in the manifestations in the biosphere of the human mind and the mind of apes, closely related to geological effect and brain structure. Apparently, in the development of the human mind we see manifestations not of the gross anatomical, revealed in geological duration by changes in the skull, but of a more subtle change in the brain... which is associated with social life in its historical duration.” 11 .

The transition of the biosphere to the noosphere, while remaining a natural process, at the same time, according to Vernadsky, acquired a special historical character, different from the geological history of the planet.

By the beginning of the 20th century, it became obvious that scientific work could change the face of the Earth on a scale similar to great tectonic shifts. Having experienced an unprecedented explosion of creativity, scientific thought has revealed itself as a force of a geological nature, prepared by billions of years of the history of life in the biosphere. Taking the form, in the words of Vernadsky, of “universality”, embracing the entire biosphere, scientific thought creates a new stage in the organization of the biosphere.

Scientific thought is initially historical. And its history, according to Vernadsky, is not external and adjacent to the history of the planet. This is a geological force that changes it in the strictest sense. As Vernadsky wrote, the biosphere, created over geological time and established in its equilibrium, begins to change more and more deeply under the influence of the scientific thought of mankind. The newly created geological factor - scientific thought - changes the phenomena of life, geological processes, and the energy of the planet.

In the history of scientific knowledge, Vernadsky was especially interested in the question of the subject as the driving force of scientific creativity, about the importance of the individual and the level of society (political life) for the development of science, about the very methods of discovering scientific truths (it is especially interesting, he believed, to study those individuals who made discoveries long before they were truly recognized by science). "I think, - wrote Vernadsky, - By studying discoveries for the field of science made independently by different people, under different circumstances, it is possible to penetrate deeper into the laws of the development of consciousness in the world.” 12 . The concept of personality and its consciousness was comprehended by the scientist through the prism of his general approach to the universe and the place that man occupies in it. Reflecting on the development of consciousness and peace, in space, in the Universe, Vernadsky attributed this concept to the category of the same natural forces as life and all other forces acting on the planet. He hoped that by turning to historical relics in the form of those scientific discoveries that were made independently by different people in different historical conditions, it would be possible to verify whether the intimate and personal work of thought of specific individuals is carried out according to objective laws independent of this individual thought, which, like any laws of science, they are distinguished by repeatability and regularity.

The movement of scientific thought, according to Vernadsky, is subject to the same strict natural historical laws as the change of geological eras and the evolution of the animal world. The laws of the development of thought do not automatically determine the functioning of the brain as a living substance of the biosphere.

An organized corporation of scientists is not enough either. Special activity of the individual is required in the processes of transformation of the biosphere into the noosphere. It was this activity, the energy of the individual, that Vernadsky considered the most important factor in the transformative work taking place in the universe. He distinguished between unconscious forms of this work in the activities of successive generations and conscious forms, when from the centuries-old unconscious, collective and impersonal work of generations, adapted to the average level and understanding, “methods of discovering new scientific truths” are distinguished.

Vernadsky associated the acceleration of progress with the energy and activity of individuals who mastered these methods. With his “cosmic” way of understanding the universe, progress did not mean the development of knowledge in itself, but the development of the noosphere as a changed biosphere and thereby the entire planet as a systemic whole. Personal psychology turned out to be a kind of energetic principle, thanks to which the evolution of the Earth as a cosmic whole occurs.

The term “noosphere” meant a state of the biosphere - one of the shells of our planet - in which it acquires a new quality thanks to scientific work and the work organized through it. Upon closer examination, it becomes obvious that this sphere, according to Vernadsky’s ideas, was initially permeated with the personal and motivational activity of a person.

www.koob.ru

Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G.

Fundamentals of theoretical psychology.

(introductory chapter).

Part 1.
PROLEGOMENA
TO THEORETICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL

RESEARCH.

Part 2.
BASIC CATEGORIES

PSYCHOLOGY.

Part 3.
METAPSYCHOLOGICAL
Part 4.
EXPLANATORY

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Part 5.
KEY ISSUES
(instead of conclusion).
Literature.
From the authors
The book offers readers (senior-year students of pedagogical

calls and psychological faculties of universities, as well as graduate schools

there departments of psychology) a holistic and systematized consideration

the foundations of theoretical psychology as a special branch of science.

The textbook continues and develops the issues, containing

Psychology, 3rd ed., 1985; Yaroshevsky M.G. Psychology of the XX century

tiya, 2nd ed., 1974; Petrovsky A.V. Questions of history and theory of psycho-

logy. Selected works, 1984; Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G. Is-

theory of psychology, 1995; Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G. Story

and theory of psychology, in 2 volumes, 1996; Yaroshevsky M.G. Historical

skaya psychology of science, 1996).

The book covers: the subject of theoretical psychology, psychological

chological cognition as activity, historicism of theoretical

basic problems of psychology. In its essence, "Fundamentals of Theoretical

psychological psychology" is a textbook intended for completing

teaching a full course of psychology in higher educational institutions.

Introductory chapter "Theoretical psychology as a field of psychology"

chesical science" and chapters 9, 1 1, 14 were written by A.V. Petrovsky; chapter 10 -

V.A. Petrovsky; chapters 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17-

M.G. Yaroshevsky; final chapter "Categorical system -

core theoretical psychology" was written jointly by A.V. Petrovsky,

V.A. Petrovsky, M.G. Yaroshevsky.

The authors will gratefully accept comments and suggestions,

which will contribute to further scientific work in the field of technology

oretic psychology.
Prof. A.V. Petrovsky

Prof. M.G. Yaroshevsky

Theoretical psychology as a field of psychological science

(introductory chapter)

Subject Subject of theoretical psychology - self-referential

theoretical lecture of psychological science, identifying and using

psychology following its categorical structure (protopsy-
chemical, basic, metapsychological, extra-

nism, systematicity, development), key problems arising

on the historical path of development of psychology (psychophysical, psychological

hophysiological, psychognostic, etc.), as well as the psycho-

logical cognition as a special type of activity.

The term "theoretical psychology" is found in the works of many

scientific industry.
Elements of theoretical psychology included in the context as

general psychology and its applied branches are presented in

works of Russian and foreign scientists.
Many aspects concerning the nature and

structures of psychological cognition. Self-reflection of science of technology

suffered during crisis periods of its development. So, on one of the rub-

history, namely at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries,

Discussions arose about what method of education

psychology should be guided by acceptance - either by what is accepted

taken in the natural sciences, or what relates to culture. IN

Subsequently, issues related to

entire subject area of ​​psychology, in contrast to other sciences and specialties

digital methods for its study. The following were repeatedly touched upon:

topics such as the relationship between theory and empirics, the effectiveness of volume

explanatory principles used in the spectrum of psychological

problems, the significance and priority of these problems themselves, etc.

The most significant contribution to enriching scientific ideas about

the originality of psychological science itself, its composition and structure

contributed by Russian researchers of the Soviet period P.P. Blonsky,

L.S. Vygotsky, M.Ya. Basov, SL. Rubinstein, B.M. Teplov. However

its components have not yet been isolated from the contents of the

personal branches of psychology, where they existed with other mathematics

rial (concepts, methods of study, historical information -

mi, practical applications, etc.). So, S.L. Rubinstein in

in his major work “Fundamentals of General Psychology” gives a

elaboration of various solutions to the psychophysical problem and consideration of

Reveals the concept of psychophysiological parallelism, mutual

action, unity. But this range of questions does not appear as a precursor.

method of studying a special branch, different from general psychology, which

which is primarily addressed to the analysis of mental processes and

states. Theoretical psychology, therefore, did not act

for him (as well as for other scientists) as a special integral

no scientific discipline.

The peculiarity of the formation of theoretical psychology in

the present time is a contradiction between its already established

representation as an integral area, as a system of psychological

eliminate in this book. At the same time, if it were named

"Theoretical psychology", then this would imply completeness

the formation of the area designated in this way. In fact

However, we are dealing with the “openness” of this scientific field for

inclusion of many new links into it. In this regard, it is advisable

but to talk about “the foundations of theoretical psychology”, meaning

further development of the problem, ensuring the integrity

ity of the scientific field.
In the context of theoretical psychology, the problem of co-

the relationship between empirical knowledge and its theoretical generalization.

At the same time, the process of psychological cognition itself is considered

as a special type of activity. Hence, in particular, the following arises:

the problem of the relationship between objective research methods and

self-observation data (introspection). Arose repeatedly

the theoretically complex question of what actually

Introspection reveals whether the results of introspection can be

be considered on a par with what can be acquired through objective measures

todami (B.M. Teplov). Doesn't it turn out that, looking into the world?

By the way, a person is not dealing with the analysis of mental processes and co-

standings, but only with the outside world, which is reflected in them

and presented?
An important aspect of the branch of psychology under consideration is

improve its predictive capabilities. Theoretical knowledge is

is formed by a system of not only statements, but also predictions based on the field

water for the emergence of various phenomena, transitions from one

statements to another without direct appeal to the feeling

personal experience.

Separation of theoretical psychology into a special field of scientific research

knowledge is due to the fact that psychology is capable of its own

forces, relying on their own achievements and guided by their own

natural values, to comprehend the origins of one’s formation,

development prospects. We still remember those times when “methodology

solved everything,” although the processes of emergence and application of the method

ologies could have nothing to do with psychology, society. Many have up to

There is still a belief that the subject of psychology and its fundamental

areas of extrapsychological knowledge. A huge number of common

methodological developments devoted to the problems of financial

activity, consciousness, communication, personality, development, written fi-

losophists, but at the same time addressed specifically to psychologists. Afterbirth-

they were charged with a special vision of their tasks - in the spirit

quite appropriate at the end of the 19th century the question “Who and how developed

learn psychology?", that is, in search of those areas of scientific knowledge

science (philosophy, physiology, theology, sociology, etc.), which

Some would create psychological science. Of course, the search for psycho-

gey in itself of the sources of its growth, “branching”, flourishing

and the emergence of the sprouts of new theories would be absolutely unthinkable

outside the appeal of psychologists to special philosophical, cultural

rological, natural science and sociological works.

However, despite the importance of the support provided

psychology are non-psychological disciplines, they are not capable of

change the work of self-determination of psychological thought. Theo-

rhetic psychology responds to this challenge: it forms the

times yourself, peering into your past, present and future.
Theoretical psychology is not equal to the sum of psychological theories

riy. Like any whole, it represents something painful

neck than the collection of parts that form it. Various theories and con-

concepts within theoretical psychology conduct a dialogue with each other

home, are reflected in each other, discover in themselves the general and special

something that brings them together or alienates them. Thus, before us is the month-

then the “meetings” of these theories.
Until now, none of the general psychological theories could

declare itself as a theory truly general in relation to

approach to cumulative psychological knowledge and the conditions for its acquisition

retention. Theoretical psychology is initially focused on

building a similar system of scientific knowledge in the future. At that

time as material for the development of special psychological

History of psychology

gical science

and historicism theoretically

skoy psychology

theories and concepts are facts obtained empirically and

generalized in concepts (the first stage of psychological cognition

theory), the material of theoretical psychology is these very theories.

ories and concepts (second stage) that arise in specific

historical conditions.

Inextricably linked areas of psychology

scientific science - history of psychology and theory

rhetic psychology is nevertheless

differ significantly in the subject of research

dovaniya. The tasks of the historian of psychology

stand in tracing the development paths of research and their theoretical

formalization in connection with the vicissitudes of civil history and

in interaction with related areas of knowledge. Psychic historian

chology follows from one period of the development of science to another, from

characteristics of the views of one prominent scientist to the analysis of views

niya of the other. In contrast, theoretical psychology uses

the principle of historicism for the analytical consideration of the results

tata of the development of science at each of its (development) stages, due to the fact

then the components of modern theoretical

knowledge of the most significant characteristics and approaches. History

for these purposes, technical material is used to carry out technical

cultural barriers turned out to be very poorly represented in the world

psychological science. At the same time, those proposed for consideration

The basis of theoretical psychology could be built on

material obtained by analyzing American, French,

German or some other psychology. The legality of the trust

This view can be explained by the fact that in Russian

psychological psychology actually turned out to be reflected (with all the labor -

problems of their relay through the “Iron Curtain”) the main principles

boards of psychological thought represented in the world

science. This refers to the work of Russian psychologists

THEM. Sechenova, I.P. Pavlova, V.A. Wagner, S.L. Rubinstein,

L.S. Vygotsky. It is precisely the invariance of theoretical psycho-

gia makes it possible to consider it within the existing

and scientific schools and directions that have not lost their significance.

Therefore, there is no basis for characterizing theoretical psychology.

idea to use the name “history of psychology” and in the same

at least a “theory of psychology,” although both history and theories of psychology

are included in its composition.

Metaphysics In 1971 M.G. Yaroshevsky introduced

and psychology, in contrast to the traditional concept of general

general forms of being and knowledge, the concept of “categorical structure”

psychological science." This innovation was not the result

speculative constructions. Studying the history of psychology,

M.G Yaroshevsky turned to the analysis of the reasons for the collapse of some

psychological schools and movements. It turned out that their co-

the creators turned out to be focused on one relatively iso-

lated, obviously a priority for psychological researchers

gical phenomenon (for example, behaviorism based its

their views, behavior, action; Gestalt psychology - image

etc.). Thus, in the fabric of psychological reality they im-

supposedly one invariant “universal” was explicitly identified,

which became the basis for the construction of the corresponding theory

in all its branches. This made it possible, on the one hand, easier

build a logic for the development of the research system, the transition from one

them experimentally verified statements to others, confidently

but predictable. On the other hand, this narrowed the scope of application

tion of the original principles, since it was not based on foundations,

which were the starting point for other schools and directions. Introduction

tegorial system as the basis on which the basic

psychological concepts were of fundamental importance. Like

in all sciences, in psychology, categories were the most general

and fundamental definitions covering the most

social properties and relationships of the phenomena being studied. Apply

to the countless number of psychological concepts, highlighting

The identified and described basic categories were system-forming

mi, allowing us to build categories of a higher order -

"attitude", born, respectively, in Gestalt psychology,

psychoanalysis, behaviorism, interactionism, to “metapsychology”

nie", "value", "activity", "communication", etc. If the basic
"Yaroshevsky M.G. Psychology in the 20th century. M., 1971.

"The possibility of expanding the categorical

building psychology beyond the basic and metapsychological levels, which

allows us to judge the “protopsychological” preceding the basic level

Van in the final section of the book, where a general categorical

nal system of psychology, which includes 4 levels (24 psychological

Identification along with the “basic” metapsychological categories

ries and the corresponding ontological models allows re-

to move towards the most complete comprehension and explanation of the psychological

skaya reality. On this path, the opportunity opens up to consider

understand theoretical psychology as a scientific discipline that has

metaphysical character. Moreover, metaphysics is understood here

not in the traditional Marxist sense, which interpreted it as

the opposite of dialectic philosophical method (consideration

characteristic of the phenomenon in their immutability and independence from each other

ha, which denies internal contradictions as a source of development).

Meanwhile, this flat approach to understanding metaphysics, games

orienting its real meaning, rooted in the teachings of Ari-

Stotel, can and should be replaced by an appeal to the ideas of Russian-

th philosopher Vladimir Solovyov. From the point of view of V. Solovyov,

metaphysics is primarily the study of essences and phenomena,

naturally replacing each other, coinciding and not coinciding -

talking to each other. From the point of view of V. Solovyov, the opposite

the difference between essence and appearance does not stand up to criticism - does not

only epistemological, but also simply logical. These two concepts

have a correlative and formal meaning for him. Phenomenon

reveals, reveals its essence, and the essence reveals

appears, manifests itself in its appearance - and at the same time what is

essence in a certain respect or at a certain level of cognition

tion, there is only a phenomenon in a different relation or at a different stage -

no knowledge. Turning to psychology, V. Solovyov emphasized

(we use his typical phraseology below):<...>

action is the appearance or discovery of my hidden states

thoughts, feelings and wills that are not directly given

to the outside observer and in this sense represent for him a non-

which "unknowable essence">. However (according to V. Solovyov) she

is known precisely through its external appearance; but this psychological

a real essence, for example a certain act of will, is only a manifest

a general character or mental make-up, which in turn

is not the final essence, but only a manifestation of more

deep - soulful - being (intelligible character-

ra-according to I. Kant), which is indisputably indicated by the facts of morality

natural crises and rebirths. Thus, in the external

and in the inner world to carry out a certain and constant program

the difference between essence and appearance, and consequently between pre-

method of metaphysics and positive in science is completely impossible.

it is possible, and their unconditional opposition is a clear mistake.
The metaphysical views of Vladimir Solovyov are more important

neck value for understanding the explanatory principle of construction

mountains of a higher order. In the final section of the book

they are called extrapsychological.

Metaphysics - in the understanding of Vladimir Solovyov - can become

subject of special attention when developing a system of theoretical

skoy psychology.
By identifying categorical

systems of psychology ^ the historian of psychology has the opportunity to go

as a developer of theoretical psychology.

Formulating as one of the principles of theoretical psychology

chology the principle of openness of the categorical system, research

whether they get the opportunity to expand basic categories due to

psychological understanding of other concepts appearing in

psychology, and thus new dyads can be built:

Shevsky when characterizing the categorical structure of psychology, in

this book is joined by two more - “experience” and “in-

division". Metapsychological development of these categories (based on

other, basic ones) can be found, respectively, in such

categories such as "feeling" and "I".

So, at the moment, the development of problems of theoretical psychology

chology, the possibility of an upward movement may be noted

specification of basic psychological categories in the direction

research on metapsychological categories of varying degrees of generalization

ness and specificity. The following series of hypotheticals emerges:

logical coo^vec^R^^and interbasic and metapsychological qualities

categories:

Image -> Consciousness

Motive -> Value

Experience -> Feeling

Action -> Activity

Attitude -> Communication

Individual -> I
* Together with V.A. Petrovsky.

16
The relationship between basic and metapsychological, defined below,

This metapsychological category reveals some basic

"system quality"). While in each of the basic categories

"unfolding" of these latent formations. Relationships between

wearing Leibnizian monads: each reflects each. If

try to metaphorically express the relationship between

but remember about the hologram: “part of the hologram (basic category-

ria) contains the whole (metapsychological category).

To be convinced of this, just look at any fragment of this

"holograms" from a certain angle of view.

Logically, each metapsychological category

ria is a subject-predicative construction, in which

In the second, the position of the subject is occupied by some basic category

there is no correlation between this basic category and other basic categories.

categories (“motive”, “action”, “attitude”, “experience”

appears as the development of the basic psychological category “image”,

form in the metapsychological category “activity”, etc. Ba-

turns into metapsychological, let’s denote it as “formalizing-

"("specifying"). The formal relationship between the ba-

are connected here by vertical lines, and the “designing” ones are connected by

clonal) (see p. 18).

From the above figure it is clear that in accordance with the principle

gy a number of basic psychological categories, as well as a number of metaps-

chological, open. Three versions can be offered, belt-

understanding this.
Metapsychological categories

^- "^"^. , ^ ^ ^"- "

^^ ^^" "^ , - " ^ ^"

~- "" "" ","*~, - "^"""^ "^ ^ ^""

""" - "-^"^"^ ""^""^^""

Basic psychological categories
Rice. 1. Basic (core) categories are connected

with metapsychological thick vertical lines,

and the decorative ones - thin slanted
1. Some psychological categories (both basic and me-

tapsychological) have not yet been studied, have not been identified as

chological concepts they appear as “work-

ing" concepts.
2. Some categories are born only today; like all,

arising “here and now”, they are still beyond

affairs of current self-reflection of science.
3. Some of the psychological categories will appear throughout

probabilities, in private psychological theories over time,

in order to someday become part of the categories of theoretical

skoy psychology.

The proposed method of ascent to metapsychological qualities

categories based on basic level categories further briefly

illustrated by the example of the correlation of some categories, in

already defined in psychology to one degree or another.

Image -> Consciousness. Is “consciousness” really a me-

tapsychological equivalent of the basic category “image”?

In recent literature, opinions have been expressed that exclude

who have a similar version. It is argued that consciousness is not like

believed, for example, A.N. Leontyev, “in its spontaneity...

the picture of the world that opens to the subject, in which he is included

himself, his actions and states,” and is not “an attitude to action

cohesion", but there is a "relationship in reality itself", "consistency

the totality of relations in a system of other relations”, “has no in-

dividual existence or individual representative

"In other words, consciousness is supposedly not an image - emphasis
18
transferred to the "attitude" category. A similar look to us

seems to follow from a limited understanding of the cat-

goria "image". The connection between the concept of “image” and having

centuries-old tradition in the history of philosophical and psychological

in Russian thought the concept of “idea”. An idea is an image (thought) in action,

a productive representation that forms its object. The idea is pre-

the opposition of the subjective and the objective is overcome. And therefore

It is quite reasonable to think that “ideas create the world.” Revealing in the image

that which characterizes it in terms of its effectiveness (and therefore

motives, relationships, experiences of the individual), we define it as

consciousness. So, consciousness is a holistic image of reality

(which in turn means the area of ​​human action), re-

representing the motives and attitudes of the individual and including

his self-experience, along with the experience of the outsideness of the world,

in which the subject exists. So, the logical core of the definition

"experience", "individual".

Motive -> Value. "Strength test" of the idea of ​​ascending

from abstract (basic) to concrete (metapsychological)

in accordance with this basic category (“semantic education”?

"significance"? "value orientations"? "value"?). However

with all the certainty that all these concepts are in

names with each other and at the same time correlate with the category “mo-

tive", they cannot - for various reasons - be considered metapsycho-

logical equivalent of the latter. One of the solutions to this problem is

of this person, we wonder about the hidden motives

his behavior, but the motive in itself is not yet a value. For example

measures, you can feel attracted to something or someone and

at the same time to be ashamed of this feeling. Are these motives

"values"? Yes, but only in the sense that these are “negative

values." This phrase must be recognized as a production

different from the original - "positive" - ​​interpretation of the category "valuable"

ity" (they talk about "material and spiritual, objective and subjective

technical, cognitive and moral values”, etc., etc.).

Thus, value is not just a motive, but a motive, a characteristic

occupied by a certain place in the system of self-relations of the subject.

The motive, considered as a value, appears in the consciousness of

division as an essential characteristic of its (individual’s) existence

niya in the world. We are faced with a similar understanding of value

both in everyday and scientific consciousness (“value” in ordinary

usage means “a phenomenon, an object that has something or

different meaning, important, significant in some respect";

philosophically, the normative-evaluative character is emphasized

character of "value"). What is valuable is that a person, according to Hegel,

recognizes as his own. However, before the motive appears before the individual,

house as a value, an assessment must be made, and sometimes re-

reassessment of the role that motive plays or can play in the process

processes of individual self-realization. In other words, in order to

if the motive were included by the individual in the image of himself and appeared as such

way, as a value, the individual must realize a certain

action (value self-determination). The result of this action

is not only the image of the motive, but also the experience of the soldered motive

the individual as an important and integral “part” of himself.

At the same time, value is what is valued in the eyes of a given individual.

can also be used by other people, that is, it has a motivating force for them.

loy. Through values, an individual personalizes (gains

its ideal representation and continuation of communication).

Motives-values, being hidden, are actively revealed

in communication, serving to “open up” those communicating to each other.

category of "relationships", considered not only in the internal,

but also on the external plane. So, value is a motive that

the process of self-determination is considered and experienced by the individual

view as its own inalienable “part”, which forms the basis

“self-presentation” (personalization) of the subject in communication.

Experience -> Feeling. The category "experience" (in a broad

sense of the word) can be considered as nuclear in the construction of me-

Bakh general psychology" distinguished between primary and specific "pe-

rezhivanie". In the first meaning (we consider it as a definition

dividing to establish one of the basic psychological

categories) “experience” is considered as an essential characteristic

mentality, the quality of “belonging” to the individual that

constitutes the “internal content” of his life; S.L. Rubinstein,

speaking about the primacy of such an experience, he distinguished it from the experience

vaniya "in a specific, emphasized sense of the word"; latest

have an eventful character, expressing “uniqueness” and “significance”

"responsibility" of something in the inner life of the individual. Such transitions

living, in our opinion, constitute what can be called

feeling. Special analysis of texts by S.L. Rubinstein could

show that the path of formation of event experience (“feelings”)

") is the path of mediation: the primary transformation that forms it

living appears in its conditioning from the outside

image, motive, action, relationship of the individual. Considering this

Thus, “experience” (in the broad sense) as a basic category

can be considered as a metapsychological category.

Action -> Activity. Metapsychological equivalent

This book develops the view that activity

represents a holistic internally differentiated (meaning

having an initially collective-distributive nature)

self-valuable action - such an action, source, goal, means and re-

the result of which lies in itself. Source

The name of the activity is the motives of the individual, its goal is the image

possible, as a prototype of what will happen, its means -

mi - actions towards intermediate goals and, finally, its

the result is the experience of the relationships that develop in the individual

with the world (in particular, relationships with other people).

Attitude -> Communication. The category "relationships" is a systemic

formative (nuclear) for the construction of a metapsychological

category "communication". "To communicate" means to relate to each other,

consolidating existing or forming new relationships. Consti-

the defining characteristic of relationships is the assumption

positions of another subject ("playing out" his role) and the ability

combine in thoughts and feelings your own vision of the situation and

another's point of view. This is possible through making certain

ny actions. The purpose of these actions is the production of common (something

"third" in relation to communicating). Among these actions

distinguished: communicative acts (exchange of information), acts

decentration (putting oneself in the place of another) and personalization

(achieving subjective reflection in another). Subjective level

the vein of reflection contains a holistic image-experience

another person, creating additional benefits for his partner

awakenings (motives).

Individual -> Self. In the logic of “ascent from the abstract to the concrete”

basic in the construction of the metapsychological category “I”.

The basis of such a view is formed by the idea of ​​self-identity of information.

division as an essential characteristic of his “I”. At the same time, it is preferable

It is assumed that the individual’s experience and perception of his self-

YYYY
identities form an internal and integral characteristic

tistics of his “I”: the individual strives to maintain his own

integrity, protect, and therefore realize

a special attitude towards oneself and another, carrying out certain actions

actions. In a word, “I” is the identity of the individual with himself, given

him in the image and experience of himself and forming the motive for his actions

and relationships.
Into the content of theoretical psychology

Key problems, along with the categorical system, include its

and explanatory basic explanatory principles: de-

principles of psychology, terminism, development, systematicity. Yavlya-

being general scientific in its significance,
they allow us to understand the nature and character of specific psychological

ical phenomena and patterns.

The principle of determinism reflects the natural dependence

the power of phenomena from the factors that generate them. This principle in psi-

chology allows us to identify the factors that determine the most important

characteristics of the human psyche, revealing their dependence on

giving birth conditions rooted in his being. In the appropriate

chapter of the book characterizes various types and forms of determinism

tions of psychological phenomena that explain their origin

and features.

The principle of development allows us to understand personality precisely

evolving, successively passing phases, periods, eras

and the era of formation of its essential characteristics. In this case, it is necessary

We must emphasize the organic relationship and interdependence

the power of explanatory principles adopted by theoretical psycho-

logic as determinants.

The principle of consistency is not a declaration, not a fashionable word -

use, as happened in Russian psychology in the 70s

80s. Consistency presupposes the presence of a system-forming

principle, which, for example, when applied in the psychology of development

development of personality, makes it possible to understand the characteristics of development

developing personality based on the use of the concept of active

mediation, acting as a system-forming principle.

Thus, the explanatory principles of psychology remain

in indissoluble unity, without which it is impossible to form

research on the methodology of scientific knowledge in psychology. Explainer-

The principles in psychology underlie the proposed

the final section of the book of the categorical system as the core of the

oretic psychology.
Key problems of theoretical psychology (psychophysical

skaya, psychophysiological, psychognostic, psychosocial,

psychopraxic) to the same extent as categories form

The row is open for possible further additions. Arose-

forming at virtually every stage of the historical path

of psychological knowledge, they have the greatest impact on

were dependent on the state of related sciences: philosophy (formerly

of all epistemology), hermeneutics, physiology, as well as social

no practice. For example, a psychophysiological problem varies

antakh its solution (psychophysical parallelism, interaction,

unity) bears the imprint of philosophical discussions between

supporters of the dualistic and monistic worldview and

success in developing a body of knowledge in the field of psychophysiology.

By emphasizing the key nature of these problems, we distinguish them from

countless number of particular issues and problems solved in different

personal areas and branches of psychology. Key issues in this

connections could rightfully be considered as “classical”, non-

have arisen variably over the course of two thousand years of history

theoretical as support for building the foundations of theoretical

psychological psychology and thereby constitutional

establishing it as a branch of psychology, nevertheless

do not exhaust its contents,
You can name specific problems, the solution of which leads to

to the creation of a system of theoretical psychology as a full-fledged

scientific industry. In the field of view there is a relationship between objects

and methods of psychological research, criterial assessment

about the validity of psychological concepts, identifying the place

psychology in the system of scientific knowledge, causes of occurrence,

the rise and fall of psychological schools, the relationship between scientific

psychological knowledge and esoteric teachings and much more.

In a number of cases, rich material has been accumulated to solve these problems.

tasks. It is enough to point to the work in the field of psychology of science.

However, the integration of the results of theoretical research, research

panels on various monographs, textbooks, manuals,

given in Russia and abroad, has not yet been implemented.

In this regard, the theoretical

grounds for the circulation of industries, scientific schools, various

currents of psychology to themselves, their own fundamental

niyam.
In its essence, theoretical psychology contrasts

part of practical psychology, nevertheless organically with it

connected. It allows you to separate what meets the requirements for

scientific validity from non-scientific speculative

tions. In Russian psychology of recent years, all this represents

is especially important.

Theoretical psychology should form a strict attitude

taking into account the use of explanatory principles presented by

contain in them basic, metapsychological and other categories, let-

solutions to key scientific problems. In order to go

from studying and considering the foundations of theoretical psychology to

structure of its system, it is necessary to identify the system-forming

principle. In the recent past, this issue would have been resolved with greater

"lightness". A similar principle would be declared to be philosophical

phy of Marxism-Leninism, although this would not advance the solution

Problems. The point, obviously, is not that he could not perform in this role.

drink, for example, historical materialism, which was once dominant

general ideology, but that the system-forming principle of the theoretical

psychological psychology cannot be completely and completely

extracted from other philosophical teachings. It must be found in

the very fabric of psychological knowledge, especially its self-consciousness

knowledge and self-realization. This is undoubtedly a task that

Theorists of psychology are called upon to decide.

Part 1.
PROLEGOMENA
TO THEORETICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL

RESEARCH.

Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G. Fundamentals of theoretical psychology. 1998.-528p. ISBN 5-86225-812-4 - M.: INFRA-M, In the multi-level system of psychological training developed by the authors of the book and the corresponding series of textbooks (Russian Federation Government Prize in the field of education 1997), theoretical psychology forms the upper level of this systems. Study guide A.V. Petrovsky and M.G. Yaroshevsky's "Fundamentals of Theoretical Psychology" characterizes its subject, categorical structure, explanatory principles and key problems. The textbook is intended for pedagogical universities and psychology departments of universities. The authors of the book are famous psychologists, academicians of the Russian Academy of Education, whose books have been published and republished not only in Russian, but also in many foreign languages. UDC 159.9 (075.8) BBK88 ISBN 5-86225-8I2-4 © Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G, 1998 Contents From the authors Theoretical psychology as a field of psychological science (introductory chapter) Subject of theoretical psychology History of psychological science and historicism of theoretical psychology Metaphysics and psychology Categorical structure of psychology Key problems and explanatory principles of psychology From the fundamentals to the system of theoretical psychology PART I. Prolegomena to theoretical psychological research Chapter 1. Psychological cognition as an activity Science is a special form of knowledge Theory and empirics From subject knowledge to activity Scientific activity in a system of three coordinates Social dimension Logic of the development of science Logic and psychology of scientific creativity Communication is the coordinate of science as an activity Schools in science Reasons for the collapse of scientific schools The emergence of new schools School as a direction in science Personality of a scientist Ideogenesis Categorical apperception Internal motivation Opponent circle Individual cognitive style Superconscious Chapter 2 Historicism of theoretical-psychological analysis The evolution of theories as a subject of special study The problem of analyzing psychological theories Prerequisites for changing learning theories Two paths in the science of behavior Behavioral sciences Cognitivism Historical vector PART II. Basic categories of psychology Chapter 3. Theoretical and categorical in the system of science Theory and its categorical basis The unity of the invariant and variant The system of categories and its individual blocks The origins of the crisis in psychology Categories of psychology and its problems Categories and specific scientific concepts Historicism of categorical analysis Chapter 4. Category of image Sensory and mental Primary and secondary qualities Image as a similarity to an object Image and association The problem of constructing an image Intention as the actualization of an image Concepts as names The problem of an image in the mechanistic picture of the world Influence of physiology Image and action Introspective interpretation of the image Integrity of the image Mental image and word Image and information Chapter 5. Category of action General concept of action Action of consciousness and action of the body Association as a mediating link Unconscious mental actions Muscle as an organ of cognitive action From sensorimotor action to intellectual Interiorization of actions Installation Chapter 6. Category of motive Localization of motive Affect and reason Problem of will Natural and moral Motive in the structure of personality Motive and field of behavior Dominant Overcoming the postulate about the balance of the organism with the environment Chapter 7. Category of attitude Diversity of types of relationships The role of relationships in psychology Attitude as a basic category Chapter 8. Category of experience Experience and personality development Experience and the subject of psychology Experience as a cultural phenomenon PART III. Metapsychological categories Chapter 9. Personality category Formation of the concept of “personality” in psychology “The existence of personality” as a psychological problem L.S. Vygotsky about personality “Dialogical” model of understanding personality: advantages and limitations The need to “be a person” The need for personalization and motives of an individual’s behavior Personality in communication and activity Personality mentality Personality theory from the standpoint of categorical analysis of psychology Postulates of personality theory Methodological foundations of personality theory Ontological model of personality Chapter 10. Category of activity Activity as the “substance” of activity Internal organization of activity External organization of activity Unity of external and internal organization of activity Self-movement of activity Chapter 11. Category of communication Communication as the exchange of information Communication as interpersonal interaction Communication as people’s understanding of each other “Significant other” in the system of interpersonal relationships Theory of role behavior Development of experimental social psychology The principle of activity-based mediation of relationships between people in a group Multi-level structure of interpersonal relationships Theory and empiricism in the psychology of interpersonal relationships Group cohesion and compatibility Cohesion from the position of the activity approach Levels of group compatibility Origin and psychological characteristics of leadership Classical theories of leadership Leadership from the position of theory activity mediation Theory of leader traits in a new light Leadership in the system of reference relations PART IV. Explanatory principles of psychology Chapter 12. The principle of determinism Pre-mechanical determinism Mechanical determinism Biological determinism Mental determinism Macrosocial determinism Microsocial determinism Chapter 13. The principle of systematicity Holism Elementarism Eclecticism Reductionism External methodologism The emergence of a systemic understanding of the psyche The machine as an image of systematicity The "organism - environment" system The emergence of the principle of systematicity in psychology Ring regulation of the work of the body system Mental regulation of behavior Systematicity in psychoanalysis Model of neuroses in school I.P. Pavlova Systematicity and expediency Systematicity and the problem of learning Gestaltism Sign system Development of the system Systematicity in the research of J. Piaget Systematic approach to activity The principle of systematicity and cybernetics Chapter 14. The principle of development Development of the psyche in phylogenesis The role of heredity and environment in mental development Development of the psyche and personality development. The problem of leading activity Historicism in the analysis of the problem of leading activity Social-psychological concept of personality development Model of personality development in a relatively stable environment Model of personality development. Age periodization PART V. Key problems of psychology Chapter 15. Psychophysical problem Monism, dualism and pluralism The soul as a way of assimilating the external Transformation of Aristotle's teachings into Thomism Appeal to optics Mechanics and changing concepts of soul and body Hypothesis of psychophysical interaction Innovative version of Spinoza Psychophysical parallelism Single principle of the physical , physiological and mental Advances in physics and the doctrine of parallelism Psychophysics Psychophysical monism Physical stimulus as a signal Noosphere as a special shell of the planet Chapter 16. Psychophysiological problem The concept of pneuma The doctrine of temperaments The brain or the heart - an organ of the soul? “General sensitivity” Mechanism of associations The significance of problems discovered during the period of antiquity Mechanism and a new explanation of the relationship between soul and body The concept of irritability The doctrine of nervous vibrations and the unconscious psyche The separation of the reflex and the principle of material conditioning of behavior Return to the reflex as an act of holistic behavior “Anatomical beginning” Transition to neurodynamics Signaling function Chapter 17. Psychognostic problem Contours of the problem Knowledge about the mental The categorical system is the core of theoretical psychology (instead of a conclusion) Literature From the authors The book is offered to readers (senior students of pedagogical universities and psychological departments of universities, as well as graduate students of psychology departments ) a holistic and systematized consideration of the foundations of theoretical psychology as a special branch of science. The textbook continues and develops the issues contained in the previous works of the authors (Yaroshevsky M. G. History of Psychology, 3rd ed., 1985; Yaroshevsky M.G. Psychology of the 20th century, 2nd ed., 1974; Petrovsky A.V. Questions of history and theory of psychology. Selected works, 1984; Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G. History of psychology, 1995; Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G. History and theory of psychology, in 2 volumes, 1996; Yaroshevsky M.G. Historical psychology of science, 1996). The book examines: the subject of theoretical psychology, psychological cognition as an activity, the historicism of theoretical analysis, the categorical system, explanatory principles and key problems of psychology. At its core, “Fundamentals of Theoretical Psychology” is a textbook intended for completing a full course in psychology in higher educational institutions. The introductory chapter “Theoretical psychology as a field of psychological science” and chapters 9, 11, 14 were written by A.V. Petrovsky; Chapter 10 - V.A. Petrovsky; chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 -M.G. Yaroshevsky; the final chapter “The categorical system is the core of theoretical psychology” was written jointly by A.V. Petrovsky, V.A. Petrovsky, M.G. Yaroshevsky. The authors will gratefully accept comments and suggestions that will contribute to further scientific work in the field of theoretical psychology. Prof. A.V. Petrovsky Prof. M.G. Yaroshevsky Theoretical psychology as a field of psychological science (introductory chapter) The subject of theoretical psychology The subject of theoretical psychology is self-reflection of psychological science, identifying and exploring its categorical structure (protopsychological, basic, metapsychological, extra-psychological categories), explanatory principles (determinism, systematicity, development), key problems arising in the historical path of development of psychology (psychophysical, psychophysiological, psychognostic, etc.), as well as psychological cognition itself as a special type of activity. The term “theoretical psychology” is found in the works of many authors, but it has not been used to formulate a special scientific field. Elements of theoretical psychology, included in the context of both general psychology and its applied branches, are presented in the works of Russian and foreign scientists. Many aspects concerning the nature and structure of psychological cognition were analyzed. The self-reflection of science intensified during crisis periods of its development. Thus, at one of the boundaries of history, namely at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries, discussions flared up about what method of concept formation psychology should be guided by - or what is accepted in the sciences of nature, or what relates to culture. Subsequently, issues related to the subject area of ​​psychology, in contrast to other sciences and specific methods of its study, were discussed from various positions. Topics such as the relationship between theory and empiricism, the effectiveness of explanatory principles used in the range of psychological problems, the significance and priority of these problems themselves, etc. were repeatedly touched upon. The most significant contribution to the enrichment of scientific ideas about the uniqueness of psychological science itself, its composition and buildings were introduced by Russian researchers of the Soviet period P.P. Blonsky, L.S. Vygotsky, M.Ya. Basov, S.L. Rubinstein, B.M. Teplov. However, its components have not yet been isolated from the content of various branches of psychology, where they existed with other material (concepts, methods of study, historical information, practical applications, etc.). So, S.L. Rubinstein, in his major work “Fundamentals of General Psychology,” gives an interpretation of various solutions to a psychophysical problem and examines the concept of psychophysiological parallelism, interaction, and unity. But this range of questions does not act as the subject of study of a special branch, different from general psychology, which is primarily addressed to the analysis of mental processes and states. Theoretical psychology, therefore, did not act for him (as for other scientists) as a special integral scientific discipline. A feature of the formation of theoretical psychology at the present time is the contradiction between its already established components (categories, principles, problems) and its non-representation as an integral field, as a system of psychological categories. The authors tried to eliminate the noted contradiction in this book. At the same time, if it were called “Theoretical Psychology,” this would presuppose the completeness of the formation of the field thus designated. In reality, we are dealing with the “openness” of this scientific field to include many new links. In this regard, it is advisable to talk about the “foundations of theoretical psychology”, meaning the further development of problems that ensure the integrity of the scientific field. In the context of theoretical psychology, the problem of the relationship between empirical knowledge and its theoretical generalization arises. At the same time, the process of psychological cognition itself is considered as a special type of activity. Hence, in particular, the problem of the relationship between objective research methods and introspection data also arises. The theoretically complex question has repeatedly arisen about what introspection actually provides, whether the results of introspection can be considered on a par with what can be obtained by objective methods (B.M. Teplov). Doesn’t it turn out that, looking into himself, a person deals not with the analysis of mental processes and states, but only with the external world, which is reflected and presented in them? An important aspect of the branch of psychology under consideration is its predictive capabilities. Theoretical knowledge is a system of not only statements, but also predictions regarding the occurrence of various phenomena, transitions from one statement to another without direct reference to sensory experience. The separation of theoretical psychology into a special sphere of scientific knowledge is due to the fact that psychology is capable, on its own, relying on its own achievements and guided by its own values, to comprehend the origins of its formation and development prospects. We still remember those times when “methodology decided everything,” although the processes of the emergence and application of methodology may have had nothing to do with psychology in society. Many still maintain the belief that the subject of psychology and its main categories can initially be taken from somewhere outside - from the field of extra-psychological knowledge. A huge number of widespread methodological developments devoted to problems of activity, consciousness, communication, personality, development, were written by philosophers, but at the same time addressed specifically to psychologists. The latter were charged with a special vision of their tasks - in the spirit of the quite appropriate question at the end of the 19th century, “Who should develop psychology and how?”, that is, in the search for those areas of scientific knowledge (philosophy, physiology, theology, sociology and etc.), which would create psychological science. Of course, psychology’s search within itself for the sources of its growth, “branching,” flourishing and emergence of the sprouts of new theories would be absolutely unthinkable without psychologists turning to special philosophical, cultural, natural science and sociological works. However, despite the importance of the support that non-psychological disciplines provide to psychology, they are unable to replace the work of self-determination of psychological thought. Theoretical psychology responds to this challenge: it forms an image of itself by looking at its past, present and future. Theoretical psychology is not equal to the sum of psychological theories. Like any whole, it is something more than the collection of its parts. Various theories and concepts within theoretical psychology conduct a dialogue with each other, are reflected in each other, discover in themselves what is common and special that brings them together or alienates them. Thus, before us is the place of “meeting” of these theories. Until now, none of the general psychological theories could declare itself as a theory that is truly general in relation to cumulative psychological knowledge and the conditions for its acquisition. Theoretical psychology is initially focused on building such a system of scientific knowledge in the future. While the material for the development of special psychological theories and concepts are facts obtained empirically and generalized in concepts (the first stage of psychological knowledge), the material of theoretical psychology is these theories and concepts themselves (the second stage), arising in specific historical conditions. The history of psychological science and the historicism of theoretical psychology Inextricably linked areas of psychological science - the history of psychology and theoretical psychology - nevertheless differ significantly in the subject of research. The tasks of a historian of psychology are to trace the development of research and its theoretical formulation in connection with the vicissitudes of civil history and in interaction with related fields of knowledge. The historian of psychology follows from one period of the development of science to another, from characterizing the views of one prominent scientist to analyzing the views of another. In contrast, theoretical psychology uses the principle of historicism to analytically consider the result of the development of science at each of its (development) stages, as a result of which the components of modern theoretical knowledge become clear in the most significant characteristics and approaches. For these purposes, historical material is used to carry out theoretical analysis. Therefore, the authors considered it appropriate to turn first of all to the activities of Russian psychologists, whose works, due to ideological obstacles, turned out to be very poorly represented in world psychological science. At the same time, the foundations of theoretical psychology proposed for consideration could be built on material obtained by analyzing American, French, German or some other psychology. The legitimacy of such a view can be explained by the fact that Russian psychology actually reflected (with all the difficulties of relaying them through the “Iron Curtain”) the main directions of psychological thought presented in world science. This refers to the work of Russian psychologists I.M. Sechenova, I.P. Pavlova, V.A. Wagner, S.L. Rubinshteina, L.S. Vygotsky. It is the invariance of theoretical psychology that makes it possible to consider it within currently existing scientific schools and directions that have not lost their significance. Therefore, to characterize theoretical psychology, there is no reason to use the name “history of psychology” and, to the same extent, “theory of psychology,” although both history and theories of psychology are included in its composition. Metaphysics and psychology In 1971, M.G. Yaroshevsky introduced, in contrast to the traditional concept of general philosophical categories covering all general forms of being and knowledge, the concept of the “categorical structure of psychological science.” This innovation was not the result of speculative constructions. While studying the history of psychology, M.G. Yaroshevsky turned to the analysis of the reasons for the collapse of some psychological schools and movements. At the same time, it turned out that their creators turned out to be focused on one relatively isolated, obviously priority psychological phenomenon for researchers (for example, behaviorism based its views on behavior, action; Gestalt psychology - image, etc. ). Thus, in the fabric of psychological reality, they implicitly identified one invariant “universal”, which became the basis for constructing the corresponding theory in all its branches. This made it possible, on the one hand, to more easily build the logic of development of the research system, the transition from some experimentally verified statements to others, confidently predicted. On the other hand, this narrowed the scope of application of the original principles, since it was not based on the foundations that were the starting points for other schools and directions. The introduction of the categorical system as the basis on which basic psychological concepts are developed was of fundamental importance. As in all sciences, in psychology the categories were the most general and fundamental definitions, covering the most essential properties and relationships of the phenomena being studied. In relation to countless psychological concepts, the identified and described basic categories were system-forming, allowing the construction of higher-order categories - metapsychological categories (according to A.V. Petrovsky). While the basic categories are: “image”, “motive”, “action”, “attitude”, born, respectively, in Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, interactionism, the “metapsychological categories” can be attributed, respectively, “consciousness”, “value”, “activity”, “communication”, etc. If basic categories are a kind of “molecules” of psychological knowledge, then metapsychological categories can be compared to “organisms”. Isolating, along with “basic” ones, metapsychological categories and the ontological models corresponding to them allows us to move on to the most complete comprehension and explanation of psychological reality. On this path, the opportunity opens up to consider theoretical psychology as a scientific discipline of a metaphysical nature. At the same time, metaphysics is not understood here in the traditional sense of Marxism, which interpreted it as a philosophical method opposite to dialectics (considering phenomena in their immutability and independence from each other, denying internal contradictions as a source of development). Meanwhile, this flat approach to understanding metaphysics, ignoring its real meaning, rooted in the teachings of Aristotle, can and should be replaced by an appeal to the ideas of the Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov. From the point of view of V. Solovyov, metaphysics is, first of all, the doctrine of entities and phenomena that naturally replace each other, coincide and do not coincide with each other. From the point of view of V. Solovyov, the opposition between essence and phenomenon does not stand up to criticism - not only epistemological, but also simply logical. These two concepts have a correlative and formal meaning for him. The phenomenon reveals, manifests its essence, and the essence is revealed, manifests itself in its phenomenon - and at the same time, what is an essence in a certain relation or at a certain level of cognition is only a phenomenon in another relation or at another level knowledge. Turning to psychology, V. Solovyov emphasized (we use his typical phraseology below): “... a word or action is a phenomenon or discovery of my hidden states of thought, feeling and will, which are not directly given to an outside observer and in this sense represent for him some “unknowable essence.” However (according to V. Solovyov) it is known precisely through its external appearance; but this psychological essence, for example, a certain act of will, is only a phenomenon of a general character or mental disposition, which in turn is not the final essence, but only a manifestation of a deeper - soulful - being (intelligible character - according to I. Kant), which is indisputably indicated by the facts of moral crises and degenerations. Thus, in both the external and internal world, it is completely impossible to draw a definite and constant boundary between essence and phenomenon, and, consequently, between the subject of metaphysics and the positive in science, and their unconditional opposition is a clear mistake. The metaphysical views of Vladimir Solovyov are of utmost importance for understanding the explanatory principle of constructing a categorical system in theoretical psychology. In meta-psychological categories, the essential characteristics of basic categories appear. At the same time, metapsychological categories themselves can act as entities for other categories of a higher order. In the final section of the book they are called extrapsychological. Metaphysics - in the understanding of Vladimir Solovyov - can become the subject of special attention when developing a system of theoretical psychology. The categorical structure of psychology By identifying the categorical structure, the historicism of psychological analysis gives the historian of psychology the opportunity to move to the position of a developer of theoretical psychology. By formulating the principle of openness of the categorical structure as one of the principles of theoretical psychology, researchers have the opportunity to expand basic categories through psychological understanding of other concepts appearing in psychology, and thus new dyads can be built: basic category - metapsychological category . So, for example, to the four basic categories first introduced by M.G. Yaroshevsky, when characterizing the categorical structure of psychology, in this book adds two more - “experience” and “individual”. The metapsychological development of these categories (based on other, basic ones) can be found, respectively, in categories such as “feeling” and “I”. So, at this moment in the development of problems of theoretical psychology, the possibility of an upward movement in the concretization of basic psychological categories in the direction of metapsychological categories of varying degrees of generality and specificity can be noted. The following series of hypothetical correspondences between basic and metapsychological categories emerges: Image -> Consciousness Motive -> Value Experience -> Feeling Action -> Activity Attitude -> Communication Individual -> Self The correlation of basic and metapsychological categories defined below can be conceptualized as follows: in each metapsychological category, a certain basic psychological category is revealed through its correlation with other basic categories (which makes it possible to identify the “systemic quality” contained in it). While in each of the basic categories, every other basic category exists hidden, “collapsed,” each metapsychological category represents an “unfoldment” of these latent formations. The relationship between the basic categories of psychology can be compared to the relationship between Leibnizian monads: each reflects each. If we try to metaphorically express the relationship between basic and metapsychological categories, then it would be appropriate to remember the hologram: “a part of the hologram (basic category) contains the whole (metapsychological category).” To be convinced of this, it is enough to look at any fragment of this “hologram” from a certain angle. Logically, each metapsychological category is a subject-predicative construction, in which the position of the subject is occupied by some basic category (one example: “image” as a basic category in the metapsychological category - “consciousness”), and in The predicate is the relationship of this basic category with other basic categories ("motive", "action", "attitude", "experience"). Thus, the metapsychological category “consciousness” is considered as a development of the basic psychological category “image”, and, for example, the basic category “action” takes on a specific form in the metapsychological category “activity”, etc. The basic category in the function of the logical subject of any metapsychological category we will call it “categorical core”; the categories through which this nuclear category turns into a metapsychological category will be designated as “formalizing” (“concretizing”). We depict the formal relationship between basic and metapsychological categories in Fig. 1 (with metapsychological categories, “nuclear” categories are connected here by vertical lines, and “formative” ones - by oblique lines) From the above figure it is clear that, in accordance with the principle of openness of the categorical system of theoretical psychology, a number of basic psychological categories, as well as a number metapsychological, open. Three versions can be proposed to explain this. Metapsychological categories Basic psychological categories Fig. 1. Basic (core) categories are associated with metapsychological thick vertical lines, and formative ones - with thin slanted ones. 1. Some psychological categories (both basic and metapsychological) have not yet been studied, have not been identified as categories of theoretical psychology, although in particular In psychological concepts they appear as “working” concepts. 2. Some categories are born only today; like everything that arises “here and now,” they are still outside the limits of the actual self-reflection of science. 3. Some of the psychological categories will appear, in all likelihood, in private psychological theories over time, in order to someday become part of the categories of theoretical psychology. The proposed method of ascending to metapsychological categories based on categories of the basic level is further briefly illustrated by the example of the correlation of some categories, to one degree or another, already defined in psychology. Image -> Consciousness. Is “consciousness” really the metapsychological equivalent of the basic category “image”? In recent literature, opinions have been expressed that exclude such a version. It is argued that consciousness is not, as A.N. believed, for example. Leontiev, “in its immediacy... the picture of the world that opens to the subject, in which he himself, his actions and states are included,” is not “an attitude to reality,” but is “an attitude in reality itself,” “with the totality of relations in a system of other relations”, “has no individual existence or individual representation”. In other words, consciousness is supposedly not an image - the emphasis is shifted to the category of “attitude”. Such a view, it seems to us, follows from a limited understanding of the category “image”. The connection between the concept of “image” and the concept of “idea”, which has a centuries-old tradition in the history of philosophical and psychological thought, has been missed. An idea is an image (thought) in action, a productive representation that forms its object. In the idea, the opposition of the subjective and the objective is overcome. And therefore it is quite reasonable to think that “ideas create the world.” By identifying in an image what characterizes it in terms of its effectiveness (and therefore, the motives, relationships, experiences of the individual), we define it as consciousness. So, consciousness is a holistic image of reality (which in turn means the area of ​​human action), realizing the motives and relationships of the individual and including his self-experience, along with the experience of the externality of the world in which the subject exists. So, the logical core of the definition of the category of “consciousness” here is the basic category “image”, and the formative categories are “action”, “motive”, “relationships”, “experience”, “individual”. Motive - "Value." The “strength test” of the idea of ​​​​ascending from abstract (basic) to concrete (metapsychological) categories can also be carried out using the example of the development of the category “motive”. In this case, a difficult question arises: which metapsychological category should be put in correspondence with this basic category (“semantic education”? "significance"? "value orientations"? "value"?). However, with all the doubt that all these concepts are in overlap with each other and at the same time correlate with the category “motive”, they cannot - for various reasons - be considered a metapsychological equivalent of the latter. One solution to this problem is to involve the “value” category. By asking what the values ​​of this person are, we are asking about the hidden motives of his behavior, but the motive itself is not yet a value. For example, you can feel attracted to something or someone and at the same time be ashamed of this feeling. Are these motivations “values”? Yes, but only in the sense that these are “negative values”. This phrase should be recognized as derived from the original - “positive” - interpretation of the category “value” (they talk about “material and spiritual, objective and subjective, cognitive and moral values”, etc., etc. .). Thus, value is not just a motive, but a motive characterized by a certain place in the system of self-relations of the subject. A motive, considered as a value, appears in the mind of an individual as an essential characteristic of his (the individual’s) existence in the world. We are faced with a similar understanding of value both in everyday and scientific consciousness (“value” in ordinary usage means “a phenomenon, an object that has one meaning or another, is important, significant in some respect”; in philosophical terms it emphasizes the normative evaluative character of “value”) - What is valuable is what a person, according to Hegel, recognizes as his own. However, before a motive appears to an individual as a value, an assessment must be made, and sometimes a revaluation of the role that the motive plays or can play in the individual’s self-realization processes. In other words, in order for a motive to be included by an individual in his self-image and thus act as a value, the individual must carry out a certain action (value self-determination). The result of this action is not only the image of the motive, but also the experience of this motive by the individual as an important and integral “part” of himself. At the same time, value is something that, in the eyes of a given individual, is also valued by other people, that is, it has a motivating force for them. Through values, the individual personalizes (gains his ideal representation and continuity in communication). Motives-values, being hidden, are actively revealed in communication, serving to “open up” those communicating with each other. Thus, the category of “value” is inseparable from the basic category of “relationships,” considered not only internally, but also externally. So, value is a motive that, in the process of self-determination, is considered and experienced by the individual as his own inalienable “part,” which forms the basis for the “self-presentation” (personalization) of the subject in communication. Experience - "Feeling." The category “experience” (in the broad sense of the word) can be considered as nuclear in the construction of the metapsychological category “feeling”. S.L. Rubinstein in “Fundamentals of General Psychology” distinguished between primary and specific “experience”. In the first meaning (we consider it as defining for the establishment of one of the basic psychological categories), “experience” is considered as an essential characteristic of the psyche, the quality of “belonging” to the individual of what constitutes the “internal content” of his life; S.L. Rubinstein, speaking about the primacy of such an experience, distinguished it from experiences “in a specific, emphasized sense of the word”; the latter have an eventful nature, expressing the “uniqueness” and “significance” of something in the inner life of the individual. Such experiences, in our opinion, constitute what can be called a feeling. Special analysis of texts by S.L. Rubinstein could show that the path of formation of an event experience (“feeling”) is a path of mediation: the primary experience that forms it appears in its conditioning on the part of the image, motive, action, and relationships of the individual. Thus, considering “experience” (in a broad sense) as a basic category of psychology, the category “feeling” - in the logic of ascension - can be considered as a metapsychological category. Action -» Activity. The metapsychological equivalent of the basic category “action” is the category “activity”. This book develops the view according to which activity is a holistic, internally differentiated (originally collective-distributive in nature) action in its own right - such an action, the source, goal, means and result of which lies within itself. The source of activity is the motives of the individual, its goal is the image of the possible, as a prototype of what will happen, its means are actions towards intermediate goals and, finally, its result is the experience of the relationship that the individual develops with the world (in particular , relationships with other people). Attitude -> Communication. The category “relationships” is system-forming (core) for the construction of the metapsychological category “communication”. “To communicate” means to relate to each other, consolidating existing relationships or forming new ones. The constitutive characteristic of relationships is the assumption of the position of another subject ("playing out" his role) and the ability to combine in thoughts and feelings one's own vision of the situation and the point of view of another. This is possible through the performance of certain actions. The purpose of these actions is the production of something common (something “third” in relation to those communicating). Among these actions are: communicative acts (exchange of information), acts of decentration (putting oneself in the place of another) and personalization (achieving subjective reflection in another). The subjective level of reflection contains a holistic image-experience of another person, which creates additional incentives (motives) for his partner. Individual - "I". In the logic of "ascending from the abstract to the concrete" the category "individual" can be considered as basic in the construction of the metapsychological category "I". The basis of such a view is formed by the idea of ​​the individual’s self-identity as an essential characteristic of his “I”. At the same time, it is assumed that the individual’s experience and perception of his self-identity form an internal and integral characteristic of his “I”: the individual strives to maintain his own integrity, to protect the “territory of the “I””, and therefore, realizes a special attitude towards yourself and others, carrying out certain actions. In a word, “I” is the individual’s identity with himself, given to him in the image and experience of himself and forming the motive of his actions and relationships. Key problems and explanatory principles of psychology The content of theoretical psychology, along with the categorical system, includes its basic explanatory principles: determinism, development, systematicity. Being general scientific in their significance, they allow us to understand the nature and character of specific psychological phenomena and patterns. The principle of determinism reflects the natural dependence of phenomena on the factors that generate them. This principle in psychology allows us to identify the factors that determine the most important characteristics of the human psyche, revealing their dependence on the generating conditions rooted in his existence. The corresponding chapter of the book characterizes various types and forms of determination of psychological phenomena, explaining their origin and characteristics. The principle of development allows us to understand personality precisely as a developing one, successively passing through phases, periods, eras and eras of the formation of its essential characteristics. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize the organic relationship and interdependence of the explanatory principles accepted by theoretical psychology as defining ones. The principle of systematicity is not a declaration, not a fashionable word of use, as was the case in Russian psychology in the 70-80s. Systematicity presupposes the presence of a system-forming principle, which, for example, when applied in the psychology of personality development, makes it possible to understand the characteristics of a developing personality based on the use of the concept of active mediation, which acts as a system-forming principle. Thus, the explanatory principles of psychology are in an indissoluble unity, without which the formation of a methodology of scientific knowledge in psychology is impossible. Explanatory principles in psychology underlie the categorical system proposed in the final section of the book as the core of theoretical psychology. The key problems of theoretical psychology (psychophysical, psychophysiological, psychognostic, psychosocial, psychopraxic), to the same extent as the categories, form a series open to possible further addition. Arising at virtually every stage of the historical path of formation of psychological knowledge, they turned out to be most dependent on the state of related sciences: philosophy (primarily epistemology), hermeneutics, physiology, as well as social practice. For example, the psychophysiological problem in its solution options (psychophysical parallelism, interaction, unity) bears the imprint of philosophical discussions between supporters of the dualistic and monistic worldview and successes in developing a body of knowledge in the field of psychophysiology. Emphasizing the key nature of these problems, we separate them from the countless number of private issues and problems solved in various fields and branches of psychology. The key problems in this regard could rightfully be considered “classical” ones that have arisen invariably throughout the two thousand year history of psychology. From the foundations to the system of theoretical psychology The categorical structure, explanatory principles and key problems, acting as supports for building the foundations of theoretical psychology and thereby constituting it as a branch of psychology, nevertheless do not exhaust its content. One can name specific problems, the solution of which leads to the creation of a system of theoretical psychology as a full-fledged scientific branch. The focus is on the relationship between the subject and methods of psychological research, the criterial assessment of the validity of psychological concepts, identifying the place of psychology in the system of scientific knowledge, the reasons for the emergence, flourishing and collapse of psychological schools, the relationship between scientific psychological knowledge and esoteric teachings, and much more. In a number of cases, rich material has been accumulated for solving these problems. It is enough to point to the work in the field of psychology of science. However, the integration of the results of theoretical research scattered across various monographs, textbooks, and manuals published in Russia and abroad has not yet been carried out. In this regard, to a large extent, the theoretical foundations for turning industries, scientific schools, and various currents of psychology to themselves, to their own foundations, have not developed. In its essence, theoretical psychology is opposed to practical psychology, nevertheless, it is organically connected with it. It allows you to separate what meets the requirements of scientific validity from speculation that is not related to science. In Russian psychology of recent years, all this seems especially important. Theoretical psychology must form a strict attitude towards the content of all branches of psychology, determining their place taking into account the use of explanatory principles, the representation of basic, metapsychological and other categories in them, and ways to solve key scientific problems. In order to move from studying and considering the foundations of theoretical psychology to building its system, it is necessary to identify the system-forming principle. In the recent past, this issue would have been resolved with greater “ease.” The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism would be declared to be a similar principle, although this would not advance the solution of the problem. The point, obviously, is not that, for example, historical materialism, the once dominant ideology, could not play this role, but that the system-forming principle of theoretical psychology generally cannot be completely and completely extracted from other philosophical teachings. It must be found in the very fabric of psychological knowledge, especially its self-awareness and self-realization. This, undoubtedly, is the task that psychological theorists are called upon to solve. Part I PROLEGOMENA TO THEORETICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH Chapter 1. Psychological cognition as an activity Science is a special form of knowledge One of the main directions of the work of the human spirit is the production of knowledge that has special value and power, namely scientific knowledge. Its objects also include psychic life forms. Ideas about them began to take shape since a person, in order to survive, oriented his behavior towards other people, conforming his own behavior to them. With the development of culture, everyday psychological experience was uniquely refracted in the creations of mythology (religion) and art. At a very high level of social organization, along with these creations, a different way of mental reconstruction of visible reality arises. Science appeared to them. Its advantages, which have changed the face of the planet, are determined by its intellectual apparatus, the most complex “optics” of which, which determines a special vision of the world, including the psychic, have been created and polished over centuries by many generations of seekers of the truth about the nature of things. Theory and empirics Scientific knowledge is usually divided into theoretical and empirical. The word "theory" is of Greek origin and means a systematically stated generalization that allows one to explain and predict phenomena. Generalization is correlated with the data of experience, or (again in Greek) empirics, that is, observations and experiments that require direct contact with the objects being studied. Thanks to the theory, what is visible with the “mental eyes” is capable of giving a true picture of reality, while the empirical evidence of the senses is illusory. This is illustrated by the ever instructive example of the Earth's rotation around the Sun. In his famous poem “Movement,” describing the dispute between the sophist Zeno, who denied movement, and the cynic Diogenes, A.S. Pushkin took the side of the first. There is no movement, said the bearded sage. The other fell silent and began to walk in front of him. He could not have objected more strongly; Everyone praised the intricate answer. But, gentlemen, this funny case Another example brings to mind: After all, every day the sun walks before us, However, stubborn Galileo is right. Zeno in his famous aporia “Stage” posed the problem of contradictions between the data of direct observation (the self-evident fact of movement) and the arising theoretical difficulty (before passing a stage - a measure of length - it is necessary to pass half of it, but before that - half of the half, etc. ...), that is, it is impossible to touch an infinite number of points in space in a finite time. Refuting this aporia silently (without even wanting to reason) with a simple movement, Diogenes ignored Zeno’s paradox in his logical solution. Pushkin, speaking on the side of Zeno, emphasized the great advantage of the theory with a reminder of the “stubborn Galileo,” thanks to which the real, true one was revealed behind the visible picture of the world. At the same time, this true picture, contrary to what sensory experience says, was created based on its testimony, since observations of the movements of the sun across the firmament were used. Here comes another decisive feature of scientific knowledge - its indirectness. It is built through the intellectual operations, structures and methods inherent in science. This fully applies to scientific ideas about the psyche. At first glance, the subject does not have such reliable information about anything as about the facts of his mental life. (After all, “another soul is darkness.”) Moreover, this opinion was also shared by some scientists who believed that psychology is distinguished from other disciplines by the subjective method, or introspection, a special “inner vision” that allows a person to isolate elements from which forms the structure of consciousness. However, the progress of psychology has shown that when this science deals with the phenomena of consciousness, reliable knowledge about them is achieved through an objective method. It is he who makes it possible to indirectly, indirectly transform the states experienced by an individual from subjective phenomena into facts of science. The evidence of introspection itself, or, in other words, a person’s self-reports about his sensations, experiences, etc., is “raw” material, which only through its processing by the apparatus of science becomes its empiricism. This is how a scientific fact differs from an everyday fact. The power of theoretical abstraction and generalizations of rationally comprehended empiricism reveals a natural causal relationship between phenomena. For the sciences of the physical world, this is obvious to everyone. Relying on the laws of this world they have studied allows them to anticipate future phenomena, for example, miraculous solar eclipses and the effects of human-controlled nuclear explosions. Of course, psychology is far from physics in its theoretical achievements and practice of changing life. Psychological phenomena immeasurably surpass physical ones in complexity and difficulty of cognition. The great physicist Einstein, getting acquainted with the experiments of the great psychologist Piaget, noticed that the study of physical problems is a child's game compared to the riddles of a child's game. Nevertheless, psychology now knows a lot about children's play as a special form of human behavior, different from the games of animals (in turn, a curious phenomenon). Studying it, she discovered a number of factors and mechanisms relating to the patterns of intellectual and moral development of the individual, the motives of her role reactions, the dynamics of social perception, etc. The simple, understandable word “game” is the tiny tip of a gigantic iceberg of mental life, associated with deep social processes, cultural history, and “radiations” of mysterious human nature. Various theories of the game have emerged, explaining its diverse manifestations through methods of scientific observation and experiment. Threads stretch from theory and empirics to practice, primarily pedagogical (but not only to it). From subject knowledge to activity Science is both knowledge and the activity of its production. Knowledge is assessed in its relation to the object. Activities - by contribution to the stock of knowledge. Here we have three variables: reality, its image and the mechanism of its generation. Reality is an object that, through activity (according to a research program), is transformed into an object of knowledge. The subject is captured in scientific texts. Accordingly, the language of these texts is objective. In psychology, he conveys information about mental reality using the means available to him (using his historically established “vocabulary”). It exists in itself, regardless of the degree and nature of its reconstruction in scientific theories and facts. However, it is only thanks to these theories and facts, conveyed in the subject language, that it reveals its secrets. The human mind unravels them not only due to its inherent research motivation (curiosity), but also based on the direct demands of social practice. This practice in its various forms (be it training, education, treatment, work organization, etc.) shows interest in science only insofar as it is capable of providing information about the mental organization of man and its laws that differs from everyday experience. development and change, methods for diagnosing individual differences between people, etc. Such information can be accepted by practitioners from scientists only if it is conveyed in the subject language. After all, it is precisely his terms that indicate the realities of mental life with which practice deals. But science, aimed at these realities, conveys, as we have already noted, the accumulated knowledge about them in its special theoretical and experimental forms. The distance from them to the practice that is eager to use them can be very great. Thus, in the last century, the pioneers of experimental analysis of mental phenomena E. Weber and G. Fechner, studying, regardless of any questions of practice, the relationship between facts of consciousness (sensations) and external stimuli, introduced the formula into scientific psychology , according to which the intensity of sensation is directly proportional to the logarithm of the strength of the stimulus. The formula was derived in laboratory experiments, capturing a general pattern, but, of course, no one at that time could foresee the significance of these conclusions for practice. Several decades passed, the Weber-Fechner law was presented in all textbooks. It was perceived as a kind of purely theoretical constant that proved that the table of logarithms is applicable to the activity of the human soul. In the modern situation, the relationship between the mental and the physical established by this law has become a widely used concept where it is necessary to accurately determine the sensitivity of the sensory system (sensory organ), its ability to distinguish signals. After all, not only the effectiveness of the body’s actions, but its very existence may depend on this. Another founder of modern psychology, G. Helmholtz, with his discoveries of the mechanism of constructing a visual image, created the theoretical and experimental trunk of many branches of practical work, in particular in the field of medicine. Many areas of practice (primarily related to the development of children's thinking) have been paved the way from the concepts of Vygotsky, Piaget and other researchers of intellectual structures. The authors of these concepts extracted the subject content of psychological knowledge by studying a person, his behavior and consciousness. But even in those cases where the object was the psyche of other living beings (the works of E. Thorndike, I.P. Pavlov, V. Koehler and others), the knowledge obtained in experiments on them was preceded by theoretical schemes, the testing of which for fidelity to psychic reality has enriched the subject of psychological science. It concerned factors of behavior modification, the acquisition of new forms of activity by the body. In the enriched subject “field” of science, shoots for practice quickly sprang up (designing training programs, etc.). In all these cases, whether we are talking about theory, experiment or practice, science appears in its objective dimension, the projection of which is the objective language. It is in its terms that the discrepancies between researchers, the value of their contribution, etc. are described. And this is natural, since, in relation to reality, they discuss questions about whether the theory is justified, whether the formula is accurate, whether the fact is reliable. There were significant differences, for example, between Sechenov and Wundt, Thorndike and Köhler, Vygotsky and Piaget, but in all situations their thoughts were directed towards a specific subject content. It is impossible to explain why they disagreed without first knowing what they disagreed about (although, as we will see, this is not enough to explain the meaning of the confrontations between the leaders of various schools and directions), in other words, which frag They turned the mental reality from an object of study into a subject of psychology. Wundt, for example, directed experimental work toward isolating the original “elements of consciousness,” which he understood as something directly experienced. Sechenov considered the subject content of psychology not “elements of consciousness,” but “elements of thought,” which meant combinations of various structures where mental images are associated with the motor activity of the body. Thorndike described behavior as a blind selection of reactions that accidentally turned out to be successful, while Köhler demonstrated the dependence of adaptive behavior on the body’s understanding of the semantic structure of the situation. Piaget studied the egocentric (not addressed to other people) speech of a child, seeing in it a reflection of “dreams and the logic of dreams,” and Vygotsky experimentally proved that this speech can perform the function of organizing the child’s actions in accordance with the “logic of reality.” Each of the researchers turned a certain layer of phenomena into a subject of scientific knowledge, including both a description of facts and their explanation. Both one and the other (both the empirical description and its theoretical explanation) represent an objective “field”. This includes, for example, phenomena such as the motor activity of the eye, running around the contours of objects, comparing them with each other and thereby performing a comparison operation (I.M. Sechenov), erratic movements of cats and lower species of monkeys in an experimental (problem) box, from which animals manage to escape only after many unsuccessful attempts (E. Thorndike), meaningful, purposeful reactions of higher species of monkeys capable of performing complex experimental tasks, for example, building a pyramid in order to reach a high-hanging bait (V. Kohler), oral reasoning of children alone (J. Piaget), an increase in the number of such reasoning in a child when he experiences difficulties in his activities (L.S. Vygotsky). These phenomena cannot be considered as “photographing” through the apparatus of science of individual episodes of the inexhaustible diversity of mental reality. They were a kind of models on which the mechanisms of human consciousness and behavior were explained - its regulation, motivation, learning, etc. The theories that interpret these phenomena (Sechenov’s reflex theory of the psyche, Thorndike’s theory of “trial, error and random success”, Kehler’s theory of “insight”, Piagev’s theory of children’s egocentrism overcome in the process of socialization of consciousness, Vygotsky’s theory of thinking and speech). These theories are distant from the activity that led to their construction, since they are intended to explain not this activity, but the connection of phenomena independent of it, the real, factual state of affairs. A scientific conclusion, a fact, a hypothesis are correlated with objective situations that exist independently of a person’s cognitive efforts, his intellectual equipment, and his methods of activity - theoretical and experimental. Meanwhile, objective and reliable results are achieved by subjects whose activities are full of biases and subjective preferences. Thus, an experiment, which is rightly seen as a powerful tool for understanding the nature of things, can be built on the basis of hypotheses that have transitory value. It is known, for example, that the introduction of experiment into psychology played a decisive role in its transformation in the image of the exact sciences. Meanwhile, none of the hypotheses that inspired the creators of experimental psychology - Weber, Fechner, Wundt - stood the test of time. From the interaction of unreliable components, reliable results like the Weber-Fechner law are born - the first true psychological law that received mathematical expression. Fechner proceeded from the fact that the material and spiritual represent the “dark” and “light” sides of the universe (including space), between which there must be a strict mathematical relationship. Weber erroneously believed that the different sensitivity of different parts of the skin surface is explained by its division into “circles”, each of which is equipped with one nerve ending. Wundt put forward a whole string of hypotheses that turned out to be false - starting from the assumption of the “primary elements” of consciousness and ending with the doctrine of apperception as a special mental force localized in the frontal lobes, which controls both internal and external behavior from the inside. Behind the knowledge that recreates an object adequately to the criteria of science, there is hidden a special form of activity of the subject (individual and collective). By turning to it, we find ourselves face to face with another reality. Not with mental life, comprehended by the means of science, but with the life of science itself, which has its own special “dimensions” and laws, to understand and explain which one must move from the subject language (in the indicated sense) to another language. Since science now appears to us not as a special form of knowledge, but as a special system of activity, let us call this language (as opposed to the subject language) activity-based. Before moving on to consider this system, we note that the term “activity” is used in various ideological and philosophical contexts. Therefore, a variety of views can be combined with it - from phenomenological and existentialist to behaviorist and informational “models of man.” When entering the field of psychology, special caution should be exercised regarding the term “activity.” Here it is customary to talk about activity as an instrumental interaction of an organism with the environment, and about the analytical-synthetic activity of thought, and about the activity of memory, and about the activity of a “small group”, etc. In scientific activity, since it is implemented specifically With individuals differing in motivation, cognitive style, character traits, etc., of course, there is a mental component. But it would be a deep mistake to reduce it to this component, to explain it in terms that psychology uses when speaking about activity. She talks about it, as is clear from what has been said, in objective language. Here a turn to another dimension is necessary. Let us explain with a simple analogy with the process of perception. Thanks to the actions of the eye and hand, the image of an external object is constructed. It is described in concepts adequate to it about shape, size, color, position in space, etc. But from these data relating to an external object, it is impossible to extract information about the structure and operation of the sense organs that provided information about it. Although, of course, without correlation with this information it is impossible to explain the anatomy and physiology of these organs. It is to the “anatomy” and “physiology” of the apparatus that constructs knowledge about the objective world (including such a subject as the psyche) that one should turn, moving from science as objective knowledge to science as activity. Scientific activity in the three-coordinate system All activity is subjective. At the same time, it is always regulated by a complex system of socio-cognitive requests, standards, norms, and ideals. Here one of the main conflicts of scientific creativity arises. On the one hand, only thanks to the intellectual and motivational energy of a man of science, unknown information about Nature is obtained, which has not yet entered one of the shells of this Nature (the noosphere). "Scientific thought in itself does not exist. It is created by a human living personality, it is its manifestation. In the world, only individuals who create and express scientific thought, manifest scientific creativity - spiritual energy, really exist. The weightless values ​​they created are scientific thought and scientific discovery - in the future they change the course of processes in the biosphere and the nature that surrounds us." On the other hand, the flight of creative thought is possible only in a social atmosphere and under the influence of the objective dynamics of ideas, which does not depend on individual will and personal talent. Therefore, a theoretical-psychological analysis of science as an activity (as opposed to a discussion of theories and empirical results, in which everything that gave rise to them is “extinguished”) always deals with the integration of three variables: social, cognitive and personal-psychological . Each of them separately has long been the subject of discussion in various attempts to describe and explain the uniqueness of scientific work. Accordingly, various aspects of this work were interpreted independently of each other in terms of such disciplines as sociology, logic and psychology. However, when included in a special system, which is science, these concepts acquire a different content. Historian M. Grmek delivered a “Word in Defense of the Liberation of the History of Scientific Discoveries and Myths.” Among these myths, he identified three: 1. The myth about the strictly logical nature of scientific reasoning. This myth is embodied in a concept that reduces scientific research to the practical application of the rules and categories of classical logic, whereas in reality it is impossible without a creative element that is elusive by these rules. 2. The myth of the strictly irrational origin of the discovery. He established himself in psychology in various “explanations” of the discovery by intuition or the genius of the researcher. 3. The myth about the sociological factors of discovery. In this case, we mean the so-called externalism - a concept that ignores the own laws of the development of science and tries to establish a direct connection between the social situation of the scientist’s creativity and the results of his research. These myths have a common source: the “dissociation” of a single triad, formed by the three coordinates of acquiring knowledge, which have already been mentioned above. To overcome dissociation, it is necessary to recreate a holistic and comprehensive picture of the development of science as an activity that is adequate to reality. This, in turn, requires such a transformation of traditional ideas about various aspects of scientific creativity that will allow us to move towards the desired synthesis. There are vain hopes that it will be possible to explain how new knowledge is built in the creative laboratory of a scientist if this problem is solved by combining three directions long established by tradition. After all, each of them “broke through” its own track, polishing its apparatus of concepts and methods. Moreover, on completely different objects than the activities of a man of science. A different approach is initially needed here. Social dimension The social atmosphere in which a scientist works has several layers. The highest of them is the relationship between science and society in various historical eras. But science itself, as is known, represents a special subsystem in the sociocultural development of mankind. The uniqueness of this subsystem, within the boundaries of which people of science operate, in turn, has become the subject of sociological study. One of the leaders of this trend was the American sociologist Robert Merton, who identified a system of norms that unites those engaged in research work into a special community, different from other human institutions. (The system was called the ethos of science.) The object of analysis turned out to be a sociological “slice” of science. However, thereby, the hierarchy of value orientations of each individual person and, accordingly, the motives of his actions, experiences and other psychological determinants of creativity also appeared in a new light. The relationship between the individual and society, which sends its economic, political, ideological and other requests to science, acted as mediated by a special social structure - the “republic of scientists”, which is ruled by its own, unique norms. One of them requires producing knowledge that would certainly be recognized as different from the known stock of ideas about an object, that is, marked with the sign of novelty. The “prohibition of repetition” inevitably looms over the scientist. This is the social purpose of his work. Public interest is focused on the result, in which everything that gave rise to it is “extinguished.” However, with the high novelty of this result, the personality of the creator and much associated with it can arouse interest, even if it is not directly related to his contribution to the fund of knowledge. This is evidenced by the popularity of biographical portraits of people of science and even their autobiographical notes, which contain a lot of information about the conditions and originality of scientific activity and its psychological “reflections.” Among them are the motives that give the research search special energy and concentration on the problem being solved, in the name of which “you forget the whole world,” as well as such mental states as inspiration, insight, “flash of genius.” The discovery of something new in the nature of things is experienced by the individual as a value that surpasses any other. Hence the claim to authorship. Perhaps the first unique precedent is associated with a scientific discovery, which legend attributes to one of the ancient Greek sages, Thales, who predicted a solar eclipse. To the tyrant, who wished to reward him for his discovery, Thales replied: “It would be a sufficient reward for me if you did not take credit for yourself when you begin to pass on to others what you learned from me, but said that the author I am the one who discovers this discovery rather than anyone else." Fales placed the recognition that scientific truth was discovered by his own mind and that the memory of authorship should reach others above any material wealth. Already in this ancient episode one of the fundamental features of the psychology of a man of science was revealed . It refers to those aspects of a person’s behavior that are designated by the term “motivation.” In this case we are talking about exploratory behavior. Knowledge of something unknown to anyone before turns out to be the highest value and reward for a scientist, giving the greatest satisfaction. But it immediately becomes clear that this is not only a personal experience of success. It is important for him that the social world be notified of the result he has achieved, recognizing his priority, in other words, superiority over others, but not in economics, politics, sports, so to speak, earthly affairs, but in a special sphere, in the sphere of intellect , spiritual values. The great advantage of these values ​​is their attachment to that which is preserved regardless of individual existence, on which revealed truth does not depend. Thus, the personal thought that has cognized it is also marked with the sign of eternity. This episode reveals the uniqueness of the scientist’s psychology. Disputes about priority permeate the entire history of science. The individual-personal and social-spiritual are forever linked in the psychology of a scientist. This is how it was in ancient times. This is how things stand in modern science. The priority debate has various aspects. But the “case of Thales” reveals the face of science over which time has no power. The uniqueness of this “case” is that it highlights a special deep layer in the motives of creativity of a man of science. It embodies the claim to personal immortality, achieved through the contribution to the world of imperishable truths marked by his own name. This ancient episode illustrates the original sociality of the personal “parameter” of science as a system of activity. It touches on the issue of the perception of a scientific discovery in terms of the attitude of the social environment - macrosociety - towards it. But historical experience shows that the sociality of science as an activity appears not only when addressing the issue of the perception of knowledge, but also when addressing the issue of its production. If we turn again to ancient times, the collective factor of knowledge production even then received concentrated expression in the activities of research groups, which are usually called schools. Many psychological problems, as we will see, were discovered and developed precisely in these schools, which became centers not only of learning, but also of creativity. Scientific creativity and communication are inseparable; only the type of their integration has changed from one era to another. However, in all cases, communication was an integral coordinate of science as a form of activity. Socrates did not leave more than one line, but he created a “thought room” - a school of joint thinking, cultivating the art of maieutics (“vival art”) as a process of birth in a dialogue of distinct and clear knowledge. We never tire of being amazed at the richness of Aristotle’s ideas, forgetting that he collected and generalized what was created by many researchers who worked on his programs. Other forms of connection between cognition and communication were established in the Middle Ages, when public debates dominated according to strict ritual (its echoes are heard in the procedures for defending dissertations). They were replaced by a relaxed, friendly dialogue between people of science during the Renaissance. In modern times, with the revolution in natural science, the first informal associations of scientists arise, created in opposition to official university science. Finally, in the 19th century, the laboratory emerged as a center of research and the center of a scientific school. “Seismographs” of the history of science of modern times record “explosions” of scientific creativity in small, tightly knit groups of scientists. The energy of these groups gave birth to such directions that radically changed the general structure of scientific thinking, such as quantum mechanics, molecular biology, and cybernetics. A number of turning points in the progress of psychology were determined by the activities of scientific schools, the leaders of which were V. Wundt, I.P. Pavlov, 3. Freud, K. Levin, J. Piaget, L.S. Vygotsky and others. Discussions took place between the leaders themselves and their followers, which served as catalysts for scientific creativity and changed the face of psychological science. They performed a special function in the fate of science as a form of activity, representing its communicative “dimension”. This, like the personal “dimension,” is inseparable from the subject of communication - those problems, hypotheses, theoretical schemes and discoveries about which it arises and flares up. The subject of science, as already noted, is constructed through special intellectual actions and operations. They, like the norms of communication, are formed historically in the crucible of research practice and, like all other social norms, are set objectively; the individual subject “appropriates” them, immersing himself in this practice. The entire diversity of the subject content of science in the process of activity is structured in a certain way according to rules that are invariant and generally valid in relation to this content. These rules are considered to be mandatory for the formation of concepts, the transition from one thought to another, and the extraction of a generalizing conclusion. The science that studies these rules, forms and means of thought necessary for its effective work is called logic. Accordingly, the parameter of research work in which rational knowledge is presented should be called logical (as opposed to personal-psychological and social). However, logic embraces any methods of formalizing the creations of mental activity, no matter what objects it is directed at and no matter what ways it constructs them. In relation to science as an activity, its logical-cognitive aspect has its own special characteristics. They are determined by the nature of its subject, the construction of which requires its own categories and explanatory principles. Taking into account their historical nature, turning to science with the aim of analyzing it as a system of activity, we will call the third coordinate of this system - along with the social and personal - subject-logical. Logic of the development of science The term “logic,” as is known, has many meanings. But no matter how different views on the logical foundations of knowledge may differ, they invariably mean universal forms of thinking, as opposed to its substantive characteristics. As L.S. wrote Vygotsky, “there is a well-known organic growth of the logical structure (my italics - M.Ya.) of knowledge. External factors push psychology along the path of its development and cannot but undo its centuries-old work in it, nor jump forward a century.” Speaking about “organic growth,” Vygotsky, of course, did not mean a biological, but a historical type of development, but similar to biological in the sense that development occurs objectively, according to its own laws, when “the sequence of stages cannot be changed.” The subject-historical approach to intellectual structures is a direction of logical analysis, which should be distinguished from other directions also terminologically. Let us agree to call it the logic of the development of science, understanding by it (as in other logics) both the properties of knowledge themselves and their theoretical reconstruction, just as the term “grammar” means both the structure of language and the teaching about it. The main blocks of the research apparatus of psychology changed their composition and structure with each transition of scientific thought to a new level. In these transitions, the logic of the development of knowledge appears as a natural change in its phases. Once in the mainstream of one of them, the research mind moves along its inherent categorical contour with an inevitability similar to the fulfillment of the instructions of grammar or logic. This can be assessed as another vote in favor of giving the features of scientific research considered here the name of logic. At each stage, the only rational (logical) conclusions are those that correspond to the accepted determination scheme. For many generations before Descartes, only those reasonings about a living body were considered rational, in which it was believed that it is animate, and for many generations after Descartes, only those reasonings about mental operations, in which they were deduced from the properties of consciousness as an invisible internal agent (even if localized in the brain). For those who understand by logic only the universal characteristics of thinking, valid for any time and subject, the above will give reason to assume that here the content of thinking, which, unlike its forms, is really is changing, not only on the scale of eras, but also before our eyes. This forces us to recall that we are talking about a special logic, namely the logic of the development of science, which cannot be other than subject-historical, and therefore, firstly, meaningful, and secondly, dealing with successive intellectual " formations." This approach does not mean mixing formal aspects with substantive ones, but forces us to interpret the problem of forms and structures of scientific thinking from new positions. They must be extracted from the content as its invariants. Not a single one of Descartes’s particular (substantial) provisions concerning the activity of the brain has stood the test of time, but was even accepted by the naturalists of his era (neither the idea of ​​“animal spirits” as particles of a fire-like substance, but running along the “nerve tubes” and inflating the muscles, nor the idea of ​​the pineal gland as the point where corporeal and incorporeal substances “contact,” nor other considerations). But the basic deterministic idea of ​​the machine-like nature of the brain became the compass for researchers of the nervous system for centuries. Should this idea be considered the form or content of scientific thinking? It is formal in the sense of an invariant, in the sense of a “core” component of many research programs that filled it with various contents from Descartes to Pavlov. It is meaningful because it relates to a specific fragment of reality, which is of no interest for the formal-logical study of thinking. This idea is a meaningful form. The logic of the development of science has internal forms, that is, dynamic structures that are invariant with respect to the continuously changing content of knowledge. These forms are organizers and regulators of the work of thought. They determine the zone and direction of research in a reality inexhaustible for knowledge, including in the boundless sea of ​​psychic phenomena. They concentrate their search on certain fragments of this world, allowing them to be comprehended through an intellectual tool created by centuries of experience in communicating with reality. In the change of these forms, in their natural transformation, the logic of scientific knowledge is expressed - initially historical in nature. When studying this logic, as in any other study of real processes, we must deal with facts. But it is obvious that here we have facts of a completely different order than those discovered by observation of objectively meaningful reality, in particular mental reality. This reality is revealed when the study of objects itself becomes an object of study. This is “thinking about thinking,” reflection on processes through which only knowledge about processes becomes possible as a given, independent of any reflection. Knowledge about the methods of constructing knowledge, its sources and boundaries has occupied the philosophical mind since ancient times, which developed a system of ideas about the theoretical and empirical levels of comprehension of reality, about logic and intuition, hypothesis and methods of testing it (verification, falsification), a special language (dictionary and syntax) of science, etc. Of course, this level of organization of mental activity studied by philosophy, which seems less “tangible” compared to physical, biological and similar realities, is in no way inferior to them in terms of the degree of reality. Therefore, in relation to it, the question of facts is just as legitimate (in this case, the facts are theory, hypothesis, method, term of scientific language, etc.), as in relation to facts of the so-called positive fields of knowledge. However, don’t we then find ourselves in danger of retreating into “bad infinity”, and after constructing theoretical ideas about the nature of scientific knowledge, we must take up the theory concerning these ideas themselves, and this new “super-theory” in turn turn into a subject of reflective analysis of an even higher level, etc. To avoid this, we see no other possibility than to plunge into the depths of research practice, into the processes taking place in the world of history, where the origin and transformation of development of facts and theories, hypotheses and discoveries. The historical realities that have taken place (in the form of successive scientific events) are the texture that, being independent of the constructive abilities of the mind, alone can serve as a means of testing these abilities, the effectiveness and reliability of the theoretical constructs built thanks to them. It would be naive to believe that an appeal to the historical process itself can be without prerequisites, that there are facts of history that speak “for themselves,” regardless of the theoretical orientation of the subject of knowledge. Any specific fact is elevated to the level of a scientific fact in the strict sense of the word (and not just remains at the level of source material for it) only after it becomes an answer to a pre-set (theoretical) question. Any observations of the historical process (and therefore the evolution of scientific thought), like observations of the processes and phenomena of the rest of reality, are certainly regulated to varying degrees by a conscious conceptual scheme. The level and volume of reconstruction of historical reality and the possibility of its various interpretations depend on it. In this case, is there a reference point from which the theoretical study of established theories would acquire credibility? This point should be sought not outside the historical process, but within it itself. Before turning to it, it is necessary to identify the issues that actually governed the research work. In relation to psychological cognition, we are primarily faced with efforts to explain what is the place of mental (spiritual) phenomena in the material world, how they relate to processes in the body, how through them knowledge about surrounding things is acquired, what determines a person’s position among other people, etc. These questions were constantly asked not only out of universal human curiosity, but under the everyday dictates of practice - social, medical, pedagogical. By tracing the history of these questions and the countless attempts to answer them, we can extract something stably invariant from the whole variety of options. This provides the basis for “typologizing” questions, reducing them to several eternal ones, such as, for example, a psychophysical problem (what is the place of the psyche in the material world), a psychophysiological problem (how do somatic - nervous, humoral - processes and processes at the level of the unconscious and conscious psyche), psychognostic (from the Greek “gnosis” - knowledge), requiring to explain the nature and mechanism of the dependence of perceptions, ideas, intellectual images on the real ones reproduced in these mental products properties and relationships of things. To rationally interpret these relationships and dependencies, it is necessary to use certain explanatory principles. Among them, the core of scientific thinking stands out - the principle of determinism, that is, the dependence of any phenomenon on the factors that produce it. Determinism is not identical to causality, but includes it as a basic idea. It acquired various forms and, like other principles, went through a number of stages in its development, but invariably retained a priority position among all regulators of scientific knowledge. Other regulators include the principles of consistency and development. An explanation of a phenomenon based on the properties of a holistic, organic system, of which it serves as one of the components, characterizes the approach designated as systemic. When explaining a phenomenon based on the transformations it naturally undergoes, the principle of development serves as support. The application of these principles to problems allows one to accumulate meaningful solutions from the angles of view specified by these principles. So, if we dwell on the psychophysiological problem, then its solutions depended on how the nature of the causal relationships between soul and body, organism and consciousness was understood. The view of the body as a system changed - ideas about the mental functions of this system underwent transformations. The idea of ​​development was introduced, and the conclusion about the psyche as a product of the evolution of the animal world became generally accepted. The same picture is observed in the changes experienced by the development of the psychognostic problem. The idea of ​​the determinative dependence of the effects of external impulses on the devices that perceive them determined the interpretation of the mechanism of generation of mental products and their cognitive value. Viewing these products as elements or wholes was determined by whether they were thought of systemically. Since among these products there were phenomena of varying degrees of complexity (for example, sensations or intellectual constructs), the introduction of the principle of development was aimed at explaining the origin of one from the other. The role of explanatory principles is similar in other problematic situations, for example, when studying how mental processes (sensations, thoughts, emotions, drives) regulate an individual’s behavior in the external world and what influence this behavior itself, in turn, has on their dynamics. The dependence of the psyche on social patterns creates another problem - psychosocial (in turn, breaking down into questions related to the behavior of the individual in small groups and in relation to the immediate social environment, and questions related to the interaction of the individual with the historically developing world of culture). Of course, in relation to these topics, the success of their development depends on the composition of those explanatory principles with which the researcher operates - determinism, systematicity, development. In terms of constructing a real action, there are significant differences, for example, approaches that represent this action as a type of mechanical determination (as a reflex as an automatic coupling of centripetal and centrifugal semi-arcs), considering it an isolated unit that ignores the levels of its construction, and approaches according to which the mental regulation of action is built on feedback, involves considering it as a component of an integral structure and considers it to be rebuilt from one stage to another. Naturally, it is no less important what explanatory principles we adhere to in the psychosocial problem: do we consider the determination of human psychosocial relations to be qualitatively different from the social behavior of animals, do we consider the individual in an integral social community or do we consider this community is derived from the interests and motivations of the individual, do we take into account the dynamics and systemic organization of these communities in terms of their level of development, and not just systemic interaction. In the process of solving problems based on explanatory principles, knowledge about psychic reality is obtained that meets the criteria of scientificity. It takes on various forms: facts, hypotheses, theories, empirical generalizations, models, etc. We will designate this level of knowledge as theoretical-empirical. Reflection regarding this level is a constant activity of the researcher, testing hypotheses and facts by varying experiments, comparing some data with others, building theoretical and mathematical models, discussions and other forms of communication. Studying, for example, memory processes (conditions for successful memorization), mechanisms for developing a skill, the behavior of an operator in stressful situations, a child in games and the like, the psychologist does not think about the logic diagrams of the development of science, although in reality they are invisible rule his thoughts. And it would be strange if it were different, if instead of asking specific questions regarding observed phenomena, he began to think about what happens to his intellectual apparatus when perceiving and analyzing these phenomena. In this case, of course, their research would immediately be disrupted due to the switching of attention to a completely different subject than the one with which their professional interests and tasks are associated. Nevertheless, behind the movement of his thought, absorbed in a specific, special task, there is the work of a special intellectual apparatus, in the transformations of the structures of which the logic of the development of psychology is presented. Logic and psychology of scientific creativity Scientific knowledge, like any other knowledge, is represented through the work of thought. But this work itself, thanks to the searches of ancient philosophers, became a subject of knowledge. It was then that universal logical forms of thinking were discovered and studied as entities independent of content. Aristotle created syllogistics - a theory that clarifies the conditions under which a new statement necessarily follows from a series of statements. Since the production of new rational knowledge is the main goal of science, there has long been hope for the creation of logic that can provide any sane person with an intellectual “machine” that facilitates the work of obtaining new results. This hope inspired the great philosophers of the era of the scientific revolution of the 17th century, F. Bacon, R. Descartes, G. Leibniz. They were united by the desire to interpret logic as a compass that leads to the path of discoveries and inventions. For Bacon, this was induction. Its apologist in the 19th century was John Stuart Mill, whose book “Logic” was very popular among naturalists at that time. The value of inductive logic schemes was seen in their ability to predict the outcome of new experiments based on generalization of previous ones. Induction (from the Latin inductio - guidance) was considered a powerful tool of the triumphant natural sciences, which received the name inductive for this very reason. Soon, however, faith in induction began to fade. Those who made revolutionary changes in natural science did not work according to the instructions of Bacon and Mill, who recommended collecting particular data from experience so that they would lead to a generalizing pattern. After the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, the idea that induction serves as a tool of discovery is finally rejected. The decisive role is now given to the hypothetico-deductive method, according to which the scientist puts forward a hypothesis (no matter where it comes from) and derives from it provisions that can be controlled in an experiment. From this a conclusion was drawn regarding the tasks of logic: it should be concerned with testing theories from the point of view of their consistency, as well as whether they confirm. experience of their prediction. Philosophers once worked to turn this apparatus, in contrast to medieval scholasticism, which used the apparatus of logic to substantiate religious dogmas, into a system of instructions on how to discover the laws of nature. When it became obvious that such a plan was impossible, that the emergence of innovative ideas and, therefore, the progress of science was provided by some other thinking abilities, the version became stronger that these abilities were not related to logic. The task of the latter began to be seen not in ensuring the production of new knowledge, but in determining the scientific criteria for what had already been acquired. The logic of discovery was rejected. It was replaced by the logic of justification, the study of which became central to the movement known as “logical positivism.” The line of this direction was continued by the prominent modern philosopher K. Popper. One of his main books is called “The Logic of Scientific Discovery.” The title may be misleading if the reader expects to see in this book rules for the mind seeking new knowledge. The author himself points out that there is no such thing as a logical method of obtaining new ideas or as a logical reconstruction of this process, that every discovery contains an “irrational element” or “creative intuition.” The invention of a theory is like the birth of a musical theme. In both cases, logical analysis cannot explain anything. In relation to a theory, it can only be used for the purpose of testing it - confirming or refuting it. But the diagnosis is made in relation to a ready-made, already built theoretical structure, the origin of which logic does not undertake to judge. This is a matter for another discipline - empirical psychology. Reflecting on the development of consciousness in the world, in space, in the Universe, V.I. Vernadsky attributed this concept to the category of the same natural forces as life and all other forces acting on the planet. He hoped that by turning to historical relics in the form of scientific discoveries made independently by different people in different historical conditions, it would be possible to verify whether the intimate and personal work of the thoughts of specific individuals is carried out according to independent thoughts an objective law, which, like any laws of science, is distinguished by repeatability and regularity. The question of independent discoveries was raised several decades after Vernadsky in the sociology of science. Otborn and Thomas's "Are Discovery Inevitable: A Note on Social Evolution" lists about one hundred and fifty important scientific ideas put forward independently by various researchers. Another socio-. log - Robert Merton, having counted two hundred and sixty-four such cases, noted that Ogborn and Thomas's idea of ​​\u200b\u200bso-called "independent discoveries" is unoriginal, that a similar point of view was put forward long before them by a number of authors, a list of which he gives, therefore their conclusion about repeatability of innovations belongs to the category of “independent discoveries”. The list given by Merton does not include Vernadsky, who made a lot of efforts to, by comparing scientific results obtained independently of each other by scientists of different eras and cultures, to substantiate his thesis about the laws of the development of science, which act, like other natural laws, regardless of activity individual minds. Thus, at every step, the historian encounters innovative ideas and inventions that were forgotten, but subsequently re-created by minds who knew nothing about them in different countries and cultures, which excludes any possibility of borrowing. The study of this kind of phenomena forces us to “penetrate deeply into the study of the psychology of scientific research,” wrote Vernadsky. “It opens up for us, as it were, a laboratory of scientific thinking. It turns out that it is not by chance that this or that discovery is made, one way or another.” "Every device or machine is built. Every device and every generalization is a natural creation of the human mind." If the independence of the birth of the same scientific ideas in different, unrelated regions and communities was considered by Vernadsky to be an indisputable argument in favor of his thesis that the work of thought is carried out according to objective laws that produce their effects with regularity, the inherent ​relating to geological and biological processes, then facts that indisputably speak of premature discoveries (about persons, as Vernadsky said, who made discoveries before they were truly recognized by science), introduce into the analysis of the nature of scientific thought following the logical (concerning the laws cognition) two other parameters: personal and social. Personal - because the “prematureness of the discovery” indicated that it was the insight of an individual before being assimilated by the community. Social - since only as a result of such assimilation it becomes an “enzyme” of the evolution of the noosphere. Exploratory search belongs to the category of phenomena designated in psychology as “behavior aimed at solving a problem.” Some psychologists believed that the solution was achieved through “trial, error and accidental success”, others - by an instant restructuring of the “field of perception” (the so-called insight), others - by an unexpected guess in the form of an “aha experience” (who found the solution) exclaims: “Aha!”), the fourth - by the hidden work of the subconscious (especially in a dream), the fifth - by “lateral vision” (the ability to notice an important reality that eludes those who are focused on an object usually located in the center of everyone's attention), etc. d. The idea of ​​intuition as a special act emanating from the depths of the subject’s psyche became increasingly popular. This view was supported by the self-reports of scientists, containing evidence of unexpected breaks in the routine connection of ideas, of insights that give a new vision of the subject (starting from the famous exclamation “Eureka!” of Archimedes). Do such psychological data, however, indicate the genesis and organization of the discovery process? The logical approach has important advantages rooted in the universality of its postulates and conclusions, in their openness to rational study and verification. Psychology, having no reliable reference points regarding the course of the mental process leading to discovery, was stuck on ideas about intuition, or “insight.” The explanatory power of these ideas is negligible, since they do not outline any prospects for a causal explanation of the discovery, and thereby the facts of the emergence of new knowledge. If we accept the picture drawn by psychology of the events that occur in the “field” of consciousness or the “secrets” of the subconscious before the scientist notifies the world about his hypothesis or concept, then a paradox arises. This hypothesis or concept can only be accepted if it conforms to the canons of logic, that is, only if it stands the test of strict rational arguments. But it turns out to be “manufactured” by means that have nothing to do with logic: intuitive “insights”, “insights”, “aha-experiences”, etc. In other words, the rational arises as a result of the action of extra-rational forces. The main task of science is the discovery of determinants and laws. But it turns out that its people carry out their work without obeying the laws accessible to rational comprehension. This conclusion follows from the analysis of the situation we have considered concerning the relationship between logic and psychology, dissatisfaction with which is growing due not only to general philosophical considerations, but also to the urgent need to make scientific work, which has become a mass profession, more effective. It is necessary to reveal the deep subject-logical structures of scientific thinking and methods of their transformation that elude formal logic, which is neither subject-matter nor historical. At the same time, the nature of a scientific discovery will not reveal its secrets if we limit ourselves to its logical aspect, leaving without attention the other two - social and psychological, which in turn must be rethought as integral components of an integral system. Communication is the coordinate of science as an activity. The transition to explaining science as an activity requires looking at it not only from the point of view of the subject-logical nature of its cognitive structures. The fact is that they act in thinking only when they “serve” problematic situations that arise in the scientific community. The birth and change of ideas as a process, in the dynamics of which its own historiological pattern can be traced, occurs not in the sphere of “pure” thought, but in the socio-historical “field”. Its force lines determine the creativity of every researcher, no matter how original he may be. It is well known that scientists themselves, at least many of them, linked their own achievements with the successes of others. A genius like Newton called himself a dwarf who saw further than others because he stood on the shoulders of giants, in particular - and above all - Descartes. Descartes, in turn, could have referred to Galileo, Galileo to Kepler and Copernicus, etc. But such references do not reveal the social essence of scientific activity. They only emphasize the moment of continuity in the cumulation of knowledge thanks to the creativity of individual geniuses. They represent, as it were, separate pinnacles, acting as separate selected personalities of the highest rank (usually it is assumed that they have a special psychological profile), called upon to pass the historical baton to each other. Their isolation from the general socio-intellectual environment in which they developed and outside of which they could not have acquired the reputation of a genius is explained, in such a view, exclusively by their inherent individual and personal qualities. With this understanding, it is not the idea itself that the abilities for scientific creativity are distributed unevenly among individuals that is false. Another thing is false - the idea of ​​abilities as something that has no other basis than the mental sphere of the individual, closed in itself. As a subject of scientific activity, a person acquires characteristics that encourage him to be ranked as standing out from the general array of people engaged in science, due to the fact that he most effectively combines and concentrates what is scattered throughout the entire community of scientists . Where is the thunderstorm coming from, asked A.A. Potebnya, if there were no electric charges in the atmosphere? Speaking about the social conditioning of the life of science, several aspects should be distinguished. The features of social development in a particular era are refracted through the prism of the activities of the scientific community (a special society), which has its own norms and standards. In it, the cognitive is inseparable from the communicative, knowledge - from communication. When we are talking not only about a similar understanding of terms (without which the exchange of ideas is impossible), but about their transformation (for this is what is accomplished in scientific research as a form of creativity), communication performs a special function. It becomes creative. Communication between scientists is not limited to the simple exchange of information. Illustrating the important advantages of the exchange of ideas compared to the exchange of goods, Bernard Shaw wrote: “If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange them, then we remain with our own - each has an apple. But if each each of us has one idea and we pass them on to each other, then the situation changes, everyone immediately becomes richer, namely, the owner of two ideas." This clear picture of the benefits of intellectual communication does not take into account the main value of communication in science as a creative process in which a “third apple” appears when a “flash of genius” occurs when ideas collide. The process of cognition involves the transformation of meanings. If communication acts as an indispensable factor of knowledge, then the information that arises in scientific communication cannot be interpreted only as a product of the efforts of the individual mind. It is generated by the intersection of lines of thought coming from many sources. Speaking about the production of knowledge, we have so far placed the main emphasis on its categorical regulator

M. G. Yaroshesky - Ch. 2, 3, 4, 10; V. A. Petrovsky - Ch. 6; A.V.

Brushlipsky - Ch. 13

Part I INTRODUCTION TO

PSYCHOLOGY

Reviewers:

Doctor of Psychology, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education V. S. Mukhina;

Doctor of Psychology, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education V. V. Rubtsov

Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G.

P 30 Psychology: Textbook for higher students. ped. schools, institutions. -

2nd ed., stereotype. - M.: Publishing Center<Академия>;

High School, 200 i. - 512 s.

ISBN 5-7695-0465-Х (Publishing center<Академия>)

ISBN 5-06-004170-0 (Higher School)

This textbook is a continuation of the series of textbooks for

universities published under the editorship of A. V. Petrovsky -<Общая психология>

(1970, 1976, 1977, 1986) and<Введение в психологию> (1995, 1996, 1997),

awarded in 1997 by the Government of the Russian Federation in

field of education.

The book reveals the subject, methods, historical path of development

visual-psychological characteristics of personality.

UDC 159.9(075.8)

ISBN 5-7695-0465-Х

ISBN 5-06-004170-0

c Petrovsky A.V., Yaroshevsky M.G., 1998 c

Publishing center<Академия>, 1998

Chapter 1 SUBJECT AND

METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY

In the 20th century, the scientific foundations for the development were created

the most important problems of psychology. Currently psychology

defined its own special subject of study, its specific

objectives, own research methods; whole people are doing it

psychological institutes, laboratories, educational institutions

They train psychologists and publish special journals.

International psychological studies are systematically collected

congresses, psychologists unite into scientific associations and

society. The importance of psychology as one of the most important sciences about

man is now universally recognized.

SUBJECT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Each specific science differs from other sciences in particular

benefits of your subject. Thus, geology differs from geo-

desia in that, having the Earth as the subject of study, the first of

them studies its composition, structure and history, and the second - its dimensions

and shape. Clarification of the specific features of phenomena,

studied by psychology represents a significantly larger

difficulty. Understanding these phenomena largely depends on the

view held by people faced with

the need to comprehend psychological science.

The difficulty lies primarily in the fact that the phenomena studied

sought after by psychology, have long been distinguished by the human mind and

separated from other manifestations of life as special. IN

in fact, it is quite obvious that my perception of pi-

sewing machine is something completely special and different from

the typewriter itself, a real object that costs

on the table in front of me; my desire to go skiing is

something different compared to a real ski trip; my

the memory of the New Year's Eve is something different -

based on what really happened on New Year's Eve, and

etc. Thus, ideas about various

categories of phenomena that came to be called mental

(mental functions, properties, processes, state

niyami, etc.). Their special character was seen in belonging to

the inner world of a person, different from what

surrounds a person, and was attributed to the area of ​​mental life, pro-

contrasted with real events and facts. These phenomena

grouped under names<восприятие>, <память>,

<мышление>, <воля>, <чувства>etc., collectively forming

what is called the psyche, mental, inner world

a person, his mental life, etc. The psyche concludes

own internal picture of the world, inseparable from the human body

and represents the total result of the functional

ning of his body, primarily the central nervous

system, it provides the possibility of existence and

human development in the world.

Although people who directly observed other people in

everyday communication, dealt with various facts

behavior (actions, deeds, labor operations

etc.), however, the needs of practical interaction

forced them to distinguish hidden behind external behavior

mental processes. The action was always seen

intentions, motives that guided a person, behind

reaction to a particular event - character traits.

Therefore, long before mental processes, properties,

states became the subject of scientific analysis, accumulated

everyday psychological knowledge of people about each other. It

was fixed, passed on from generation to generation, in

language, folk art, and works of art. His

collected, for example, proverbs and sayings:<Лучше один раз

to see is to hear ten times> (about the advantages of spectator-

of perception and memorization before auditory);<Привычка -

second nature> (about the role of established habits that can

compete with innate forms of behavior), etc.

Everyday psychological information gleaned from the

social and personal experience, form pre-scientific psycho-

logical knowledge. They can be quite extensive,

can to a certain extent contribute to orientation in

behavior of surrounding people may be in certain

within the limits correct and corresponding to reality.

However, in general, such knowledge is not systematic,

depth, evidence and for this reason cannot become

a solid basis for serious work with people (teaching

cultural, therapeutic, organizational, etc.), requiring scientific

nykh, i.e. objective and reliable knowledge about the human psyche

century, allowing one to predict its behavior in certain

other expected circumstances.

What constitutes the subject of scientific study in psychology?

gee? These are, first of all, concrete facts of mental life,

characterized qualitatively and quantitatively. So, exploring

the process of a person’s perception of the objects around him,

psychology has established that the image of an object retains its relation

strong constancy even under changing perceptual conditions

yatiya. For example, the page on which these lines are printed is

will be perceived as white even in bright sunlight

light, and in semi-darkness, and under electric lighting, although

physical characteristics of rays cast by paper

with such different illumination, it will be different. In this

case we have a qualitative characteristic of the psycho-

gical fact. An example of a quantitative characteristic

psychological fact can be the speed of reaction

given person to the acting stimulus (if

the subject is offered, in response to the flash of a light bulb,

press the button as quickly as possible, then one has a reaction speed

maybe 200 milliseconds, and another - 150, i.e. know

significantly faster). Individual differences in speed

the reactions observed in the experiment are psychological

scientific facts established in scientific research

NI. They allow us to quantitatively characterize some

mental characteristics of various subjects.

However, scientific psychology cannot limit itself to describing

knowledge of a psychological fact, no matter how interesting it may be

was. Scientific knowledge necessarily requires a transition from

descriptions of phenomena to their explanation. The latter implies

discovery of the laws that govern these phenomena.

Therefore, the subject of study in psychology together with psycho-

Psychological laws become psychological facts. So,

the emergence of some psychological facts observed

is necessary whenever there are resources for this

appropriate conditions, i.e. naturally. Natural

character is, for example, the above fact regarding

physical constancy of perception, while constancy

possesses not only the perception of color, but also the perception of size

ranks and forms of the subject. Special studies have shown

whether that constancy of perception is not given to man initially,

from birth. It is formed gradually, according to strict laws

us. If there were no constancy of perception, a person would not

could navigate the external environment - at the slightest

changing its position relative to surrounding objects

there would be a radical change in the picture of the visible

world, objects would be perceived distorted.

How can one define the subject of psychology? Whatever

advanced in difficult ways over the centuries

psychological thought, mastering its subject, no matter how

knowledge about it changed and was enriched, no matter what the terminology

we have not designated it (soul, consciousness, psyche, activity

etc.), it is possible to identify features that characterize one’s own

is the subject of psychology, distinguishing it from other sciences.

The subject of psychology is the natural connections between subjects

ect with the natural and sociocultural world, captured in

system of sensory and mental images of this world, motivation

elements that motivate action, as well as in the actions themselves,

experiences of one’s relationship to other people and oneself, in

properties of the individual as the core of this system.

Its biologically determined components are also present in

animals (sensory images of the environment, motivation of behavior,

both instinctive and acquired in the process of

aptitude for it). However, the mental organization of man

qualitatively different from these biological forms. Co-

The socio-cultural way of life gives rise to consciousness in a person. IN

interpersonal contacts mediated by language and communication

joint activity, individual,<всматриваясь>in others

people, acquires the ability to know oneself as

subject of mental life, set goals in advance, pre-

his actions, to judge the inner plan of his

management Not all components of this plan are translated into English

consciousness. But they, forming the sphere of the unconscious, serve

subject of psychology, which reveals the nature of the corresponding

the expression of actual motives, drives, personal orientation

contradiction to her existing ideas about them. How to realize

conscious and unconscious mental acts are realized

through neurohumoral mechanisms, but do not occur

according to physiological, but according to the actual psychological laws

us. Historical experience says that knowledge about the subject

the field of psychology developed and expanded thanks to

connections of this science with other sciences - natural, social

nal, technical.

The theory occupies a special place among the branches of psychology.

tic psychology. The subject of theoretical psychology

principles, key problems solved throughout

historical path of development of psychological science.

PSYCHOLOGY

in the system of sciences

Modern psychology is at the intersection of a number of sciences. She

occupies an intermediate position between public

sciences, on the one hand, natural sciences, on the other,

technical - from the third. Its closeness to these sciences, even

the presence of industries developed jointly with

some of them, does not in any way deprive her

independence. In all its branches psychology

retains its subject of research, its theoretical

principles, their own ways of studying this subject. What

concerns the versatility of psychological problems, so

significant not only for psychology, but also for related

sciences, this is explained by the fact that the focus of psychologists

there always remains a person - the main character of the world

progress. All sciences and branches of knowledge have meaning and significance

only due to the fact that they serve man, arm him,

are created by him, arise and develop as human theory

and practice. All further development of psychological knowledge

is conceived as the maximum expansion of the connections between psychology and

related sciences while maintaining its independent

subject of research.

Psychology and

scientific-technical

The 20th century is characterized by exceptional

scale development of production, new types of technology,

technical progress in communications, widespread use

electronics, automation, development of new types of transport,

operating at supersonic speeds, etc. All this

makes enormous demands on the human psyche,

dealing with modern technology.

In industry, in transport, in military affairs, everything

taking into account the so-called psycho-

logical factor, i.e. possibilities contained in psi-

chemical cognitive processes - perception, memory,

thinking, in personality traits - character traits,

temperament, reaction speed, etc. So, in conditions of nervous

mental tension caused by the need

make responsible decisions in the shortest possible time

deadlines (situations largely typical for modern super-

sound aviation, for the work of dispatchers-operators of large

energy systems, etc.), turns out to be extremely significant

It is important to have certain personality traits that allow

carry out activities without any errors or disruptions. From-

the presence of these qualities leads to accidents.

The study of human psychological capabilities in connection with

requirements imposed on him by complex types of work

activities, characterizes the important role of modern

psychology. Engineering psychology dealing with solution

Problems<человек-машина>(issues of human interaction

century and technology), as well as the psychology of work in general, is closely

is in contact with many areas of technology.

The further development of psychology was significantly influenced by

has the computer revolution. A number of functions, including

unique property of human consciousness (functional

tions of accumulation and processing of information, management and

control) can now be performed by electronic devices.

The use of information-theoretic concepts and models

lei contributed to the introduction into psychology of new logical

mathematical methods. At the same time, individual studies

teliers, intoxicated by the successes of cybernetics, began to interpret the

catcher like a machine with program control. At that

At the same time, automation and cybernization have sharply increased

interest in learning and using effectively

functions that cannot be transferred to electronic devices

swarms, first of all - creative abilities.

For the future of humanity, for the individual and his psyche

building the significance of the computer revolution is enormous. But somehow

the personality of a person has not changed, no matter what miracles it has created

electronic information technology, it still

mental properties with all the signs will be inherent,

characteristic of the subject of psychology.

Scientific and technological progress, being

Psychology is a factor in the development of psychological science

and pedagogy and helping to free it from speculation

telial representations, currently

clearly revealed the closest connections between psycho

logy with pedagogy. This connection, of course, has always existed

which was realized by advanced psychologists and teachers. You

distinguished Russian teacher K.D. Ushinsky (1824-1870) underlined

nodded that in terms of its significance for pedagogy, psychology

ranks first among all sciences. To educate comprehensively

a person, noted K.D. Ushinsky, must be comprehensively studied.

Development of relationships between psychology and pedagogy, starting with

30s, acquires a dramatic character, causing

hampered by the gross interference of the party leadership in

scientific life. One of the pedagogical

gical scientific disciplines - pedology. Its defeat is

significantly slowed down the development of both psychology and pedagogy.

Pedology is a movement in psychology and pedagogy that arose

neck at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. as a result of the spread