The chairman is the Chairman of the Central Election Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR V.P. Orlov.

Presiding.

Dear comrades people's deputies of the USSR! It was a great honor for me. In accordance with the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I, as Chairman of the Central Election Commission, will have to open the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Allow me, first of all, on behalf of the Central Election Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR to cordially congratulate you on your election to the highest body of state power in our country, on the great trust that the Soviet people have placed in you, on the honorable and extremely responsible mission that is now entrusted to you.

The elections and preparations for them took place in conditions of widespread, unprecedented publicity and openness, and a rapid growth in the political activity of the working people. This was especially convincingly confirmed on Sunday, March 26, when more than 172 million Soviet people - almost 90 percent of all voters included in the lists - went to the polls to express all shades of public opinion to support perestroika.

The elections showed that perestroika had become a national cause. The Soviet people spoke out for its further deepening, for the fastest changes for the better in all

spheres of life. With their novelty and high interest of the masses, the elections complemented and enriched the image of perestroika and became a step of fundamental importance in the development of democracy. They moved our society forward along the path outlined by the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU.

The elections confirmed that the people see in Lenin’s party a force capable of uniting Soviet society, ensuring its consolidation, and finding effective ways to solve pressing problems and overcome difficulties. We have never had a more powerful, nationwide referendum in favor of the Communist Party and its course for renewal.

Today we can say that the elections that took place were a major contribution to the practical implementation of the reform of the political system and the establishment of democracy. They brought Soviet democracy to a qualitatively new level and will go down in the history of our socialist state as one of the most important milestones in the development of all social life. During the election campaign, the Soviet people acquired unique political experience. At a new, extremely responsible and difficult stage of the democratic development of our country, candidates for deputies were nominated from below. Thousands of candidates took part in the election campaign, and elections were carried out on an alternative basis. Millions of voters have only just now truly felt that their voice means a lot in resolving major government issues and in the socio-political development of the country.

The current election campaign has presented a far from clear picture. It reflected the diversity of positions, points of view, and opinions that exist in our society. It became a kind of testing ground where new provisions of the USSR Constitution were put into effect for the first time, and a fundamentally new Election Law was tested. In general, it made it possible to hold elections on a truly democratic basis and to obtain new electoral practices. At the same time, at pre-election meetings, in labor collectives, and in the media, wishes were expressed about the need to adjust certain norms and procedures established by the Law.

All of them deserve attention and require analysis. It is important, taking into account the experience gained, to make the necessary changes to the election legislation so that it more fully meets the interests of developing socialist democracy and strengthening our statehood. All proposals on these issues received by the Central Election Commission will be transferred to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Today, 2,155 people's deputies of the USSR out of 2,249 elected are present at the Congress. Detailed data on the election results and the composition of deputies will be reported by the Credentials Commission, which will be elected by the Congress and to which the Central Election Commission will transfer all the documentation necessary to verify the powers of the deputies.

It should be said that in this hall today there are workers, collective farmers, production commanders, scientists, cultural figures, military personnel - people of different professions, different generations, representatives of the people with great political and intellectual potential.

The composition of the deputies reflects the multinational character of our country. Among them are representatives of 65 nations and nationalities.

The current deputy corps will have to solve problems of national importance. These tasks are assigned by our Constitution, first of all, to the Congress of People's Deputies, which, being the highest body of state power, is competent to consider any issue within the jurisdiction of the USSR, determines the main line of activity of the Supreme Council and all other state bodies.

Today the attention and thoughts of all working people are directed to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR; much is expected from it. First of all, it is an answer to people’s questions related to the further course of perestroika. Along with their parliamentary mandate, voters gave you, comrade deputies, their faith in a better life, in a prosperous and powerful Soviet socialist state.

Let me express confidence that the Congress of People's Deputies will justify the aspirations of the people, that each deputy will contribute his share of experience, intelligence and labor to the joint efforts aimed at achieving new stages of socio-economic and spiritual progress for our society.

Comrades! In accordance with Article 110 of the USSR Constitution, I declare the first meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics open.

(Fruits).

On the podium is People's Deputy of the USSR V.F. Tolpezhnikov, head of the office of the 1st Riga City Clinical Emergency Hospital named after N. Burdenko (Proletarian National-Territorial Electoral District, Latvian SSR).

Comrades! Before we begin our meeting, I ask you to honor the memory of those killed in Tbilisi. (Everyone stands up. A minute of silence). Thank you.

I am making a parliamentary request: on behalf of my constituents, I demand that it be publicly reported now, at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, who gave the order to beat peaceful demonstrators in the city of Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 and to use toxic substances against them, and also to report the name of these toxic substances. (Applause).

Chairman. Comrades! Many deputies made proposals for the election of the Presidium of our Congress. These proposals were supported by a meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR.

The floor for the proposal on behalf of the meeting of representatives of the Presidium of the Congress is given to Deputy Lukin.

Lukin V.P., gas cutter at the Kolomna Diesel Locomotive Plant named after V.V. Kuibyshev (Moscow rural national-territorial electoral district, RSFSR).

Dear comrades! As is known, the organization of preparations for the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is entrusted to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This work has been done.

A meeting of representatives of groups of deputies makes a proposal to elect to the Presidium of the Congress of People's Deputies the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. (Applause). And the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov. (Applause).

A proposal is also made to elect Comrade Vladimir Pavlovich Orlov to the Presidium of the Congress as Chairman of the Central Election Commission. (Applause). In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, he opened the first meeting of the Congress.

At a meeting of groups of deputies, it was decided to delegate one representative from each union republic to the Presidium of the Congress. The meetings of deputies of the republics proposed the following comrades to the Presidium of the Congress: Azizbekova Pusta Azizaga kyzy - director of the Museum of History of Azerbaijan; Aitmatov Chingiz - Chairman of the Board of the Writers' Union of the Kirghiz SSR, Editor-in-Chief of the magazine "Foreign Literature"; Ambartsumyan Viktor Amazaspovich - President of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR; Brazauskas Algrdas-Mikolas Kaze - First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania; Vorotnikov Vitaly Ivanovich - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR; Gorbunov Anatoly Valeryanovich - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR; Ishanov Hekim - chief engineer of the Turkmenneft production association, Turkmen SSR; Kozhakhmetov Ibraimzhan - chairman of the collective farm named after Kirov, Panfilov district, Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakh SSR; Kiseleva Valentina Adamovna - operator of the Grodno production association "Khimvolokno" named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR, Belarusian SSR; Kurashvili Zeinab Givievna - seamstress-machine operator of the Tbilisi Knitting Production Association "Gldani", Georgian SSR; Lippmaa Endel Teodorovich - Director of the Institute of Chemical and Biological Physics of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR; Mukhabatova Soniabibi Khushvakhtovna - foreman of the farm of the Khaeti-Nav state farm in the Garm region, Tajik SSR; Nishanov Rafik Nishanovich - first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan; Paton Boris Evgenievich - President of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR; Svetlana Anatolyevna Rotar is a master of machine milking at the Moldova collective farm, Dondyushensky district, Moldavian SSR.

Thus, a total of eighteen comrades are proposed to be elected to the Presidium of the Congress.

Presiding. Allow me to put the proposals submitted to a vote.

Those who are in favor of electing the proposed composition of the Presidium, please raise your certificates. Please omit it. Against? Abstained? The Presidium of the Congress has been elected. Almost unanimously.

We ask the elected deputies to take seats on the Presidium of the Congress. (Applause).

M. S. Gorbachev presides.

Presiding. Let me, on behalf of the Presidium of the Congress, thank you for your trust. (a fruits and changes). We will try to work in full contact - I am sure that all members of the Presidium will support me in this - with the Congress in order to successfully guide this ship towards its intended goals.

We need to approve the agenda and order of work of the Congress. I would like to inform the People's Deputies of the USSR, the Congress, that yesterday, under your authority, representatives of groups of People's Deputies of the USSR, 446 people, met. We sat for nine hours and discussed these issues most thoroughly in order to prepare proposals for you on them.

The floor on behalf of the meeting of representatives on the agenda and order of work of the Congress is given to Deputy Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev N. A., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR (Alma-Ata - Ili territorial constituency, Alma-Ata region).

Dear comrades people's deputies! Yesterday, at a meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, the issue of the agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was comprehensively discussed.

Various points of view on this issue were expressed at the meeting. As a result of a thorough discussion, proposals were developed to include the following issues on the agenda of the Congress:

1. Election of the Credentials Committee of the Congress.

2. Election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

3. Election of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

4. Election of the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

5. On the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. Speaker - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

6. Program of future activities of the USSR Government. Speaker - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

7. Approval of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

8. Election of the Constitutional Supervision Committee of the USSR.

9. Approval of the Chairman of the People's Control Committee of the USSR, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Prosecutor General of the USSR, Chief State Arbitrator of the USSR.

10. Miscellaneous.

On behalf of the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, I make a proposal to approve this agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. As for the order of work of the Congress, it is proposed to consider issues in the order in which they are included in the agenda.

Chairman. So, there is a proposal from a meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR.

Please - Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov. (Fruits).

Sakharov A.D., academician, chief researcher at the P. N. Lebedev Physical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. (From the USSR Academy of Sciences).

Dear deputies, I want to speak in defense of two fundamental provisions that became the basis of the draft agenda, compiled by a group of Moscow deputies as a result of long work. This project was also supported by a number of deputies from other regions of the country.

We proceed from the fact that this Congress is a historical event in the biography of our country. The voters, the people, elected us and sent us to this Congress so that we would take responsibility for the fate of the country, for the problems that it faces now, for the prospects for its development. Therefore, our Congress cannot begin with elections. This will turn it into an electoral convention. Our Congress cannot give legislative power to one fifth of its members. The fact that rotation is provided for does not change anything, especially since in a hurry, obviously, the rotation is drawn up in such a way that only 36 percent - I am basing this on the Constitution - only 36 percent of deputies have a chance to be part of the Supreme Council.

This is the basis for the first fundamental thesis of the provision contained in the draft presented by the Moscow group.

I propose to accept as one of the first items on the agenda of the Congress the decree of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. We are experiencing a revolution, perestroika is a revolution, and the word “maternity leave” is the most appropriate in this case. The exclusive right of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR is the adoption of laws of the USSR, the appointment of senior officials of the USSR, including the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Chairman of the People's Control Committee of the USSR, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Prosecutor General of the USSR, and the Chief State Arbitrator of the USSR. In accordance with this, changes must be made to those articles of the USSR Constitution that relate to the rights of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. These are, in particular, articles 108 and 111.

The second fundamental question that faces us is the question of whether we can, whether we have the right to elect the head of state - the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR before discussion, before discussion on the entire range of political issues that determine the fate of our country, which we obliged to consider. There is always an order: first the discussion, the candidates presenting their platforms, and then the elections. We will disgrace ourselves in front of all our people - this is my deep conviction - if we act otherwise. We cannot do this. (Applause).

In my speeches, I have repeatedly expressed support for the candidacy of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. (Applause). I still adhere to this position now, since I do not see another person who could lead our country. But I don't see that at the moment. My support is conditional. I believe that a discussion is necessary, a report from the candidates is necessary, because we must keep in mind the alternative principle of all elections at this Congress, including the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I say the word “candidates,” although I think it is quite possible that there will be no other candidates. And if they are, then we will speak in the plural. Candidates must present their political platform. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who was the founder of perestroika, whose name is associated with the beginning of the process of perestroika and the leadership of the country for four years, must say about what happened in our country over these four years. He must talk about both achievements and mistakes, and talk about it self-critically. And our position will also depend on this. The most important thing he must say is what he and the other candidates are going to do in the near future in order to overcome the extremely difficult situation that has developed in our country, what they will do in the future... (Noise in the hall).

Presiding. Let's agree that if someone wants to speak out as a matter of discussion, then up to 5 minutes maximum. Finish up, Andrey Dmitrievich.

Sakharov A. D. I'll finish now. I will not list all the issues that I consider necessary to discuss. They are contained in our project. I hope the deputies are familiar with this project. But, in closing, I hope that the Congress will prove worthy of the great mission that faces it, that it will democratically approach the tasks facing it.

Chairman. Just a minute, comrades! I think we are already at the final stage. We discussed the issues on the agenda with quite great desire and concern. And these questions have basically emerged. But, I think, we will not deprive the comrades who spoke out at previous stages of the opportunity to convey their point of view to the Congress. And it’s up to the Congress to make a decision. Our main proposal was made on behalf of all delegations, so I ask, comrades, to speak briefly.

Please, Comrade Popov.

Popov G. X., editor-in-chief of the journal “Economy Issues”, Moscow. (From the Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies of the USSR).

Comrades! Yesterday, in a completely democratic atmosphere, at a meeting of representatives of groups of deputies, the agenda was adopted, which was reported here today. We participated in the discussion, we were all given the opportunity to speak. There was a vote; 15 percent of the participants in the meeting of representatives spoke in favor of the proposal we made. But, as Mikhail Sergeevich correctly said, democracy is democracy - we have the opportunity to appeal to the Congress.

The essence of the problem lies essentially in one agenda item. To be precise, it is whether to hold discussions, debates and reports before the elections of the Supreme Council or after the elections of the Supreme Council. There was a proposal that Andrei Dmitrievich spoke about. There was a second proposal, which was voted on yesterday: that Mikhail Sergeevich’s report be heard as the third item on the agenda, after his election.

Where does the current idea come from that elections by the Congress of the Supreme Council should take place immediately? It starts from two assumptions. Both of these assumptions are not someone’s invention, ill will, desire to launch a voting machine, etc. They are dictated by the logic of our Constitution, and it is quite understandable that the comrades made these proposals. According to the Constitution of the USSR, we really must wait until the Supreme Council appoints the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Prosecutor General, elects the Chairman of the People's Control Committee, then we must receive these nominations and we must vote. In this case, the logic proposed by the agenda is natural. But we believe that there is a need for an amendment to the Constitution, which Andrei Dmitrievich spoke about, that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the People's Control Committee, the Prosecutor General, the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Chief State Arbitrator should be elected or appointed here at the Congress, in order to enhance the role of the Congress as the highest body of state power in the country. If this amendment is adopted, there will be no need to pre-elect the Supreme Council in order to give it the opportunity to work and nominate candidates.

The second assumption that forms the basis of the agenda. The point is that the election of deputies to the Supreme Council essentially does not require debate about their points of view, position, etc. Essentially, we are being asked to move away from such principles of democracy as real secret voting, choice among alternative candidates. We are asked to vote for a list of candidates in which the number of applicants corresponds to the number of allocated places. Why did this idea come about? Again, not because someone wants to violate democracy. There is logic here, and again this is the logic of our Constitution. It states that the Council of the Union should be formed taking into account the regional principle. And from here all the consequences arose: since it is a regional principle, then, consequently, quotas. The quotas natural for the Council of Nationalities were extended to the Council of the Union, and as a result, quite naturally, each region strives to realize its quota. A situation arises that requires attention. After all, today each region has different deputies. I don’t know the situation in many places, but, for example, the Moscow region is quite familiar to me.

In the Moscow region, such a well-known figure in our perestroika as Nikolai Travkin won the elections. In the list of representatives from the Moscow region, I do not see him as a candidate for the Supreme Council. I, for example, believe that for our perestroika his participation in the Supreme Council is necessary.

Therefore, we are asked to simply take as a basis what each region offers. It seems to me that we all ended up in this room only because there were new elections, elections with alternative candidates, elections with programs, and so on. The principle of alternativeness must be extended to the elections of the Supreme Council. If this principle is accepted, the principle of alternativeness, then everything falls into place, then it is possible to actually hear the report and arrange a debate as the third item on the agenda.

Our delegation sat for a very long time yesterday, late into the night, and by a majority vote, with three abstentions and two against, decided to address the Congress with a proposal. We are submitting a full list of candidates, significantly exceeding the number of seats that have been allocated to us. We ask all of you to follow our example and defend the new democracy. (Applause).

Chairman. The floor is given to People's Deputy Meshalkin.

Meshalkin E.N., Director of the Research Institute of Pathology and Blood Circulation of the Ministry of Health of the RSFSR, Novosibirsk. (From the Peace Movement, united by the Soviet Peace Committee, together with the United Nations Association in the USSR).

Dear comrade deputies! This is the first time I have to speak before such a responsible and huge forum. Forgive me if I'm a little worried, but it seems to me that if we are going to approve the agenda today, of course there must be a reason for it. But there must also be a completely responsible formulation of the question. The agenda proposed here was approved by the majority of delegations yesterday. The key point on this agenda is the question of whether to immediately elect the Chairman of the Supreme Council or listen to him first. It seems to me that in order to listen to the future Chairman of the Supreme Council, it is necessary first of all to vest him with powers. Because we need not only a statement of today’s affairs, but also an analysis of what can be done, supported by the supreme authority, that is, the Supreme Council, with which, of course, the Chairman will discuss his report. This is absolutely necessary, because you and I cannot just listen to empty promises, we need to know what will be backed up by action. (Applause).

Representatives of a group of deputies from Moscow, in particular Academician Sakharov, confirmed that they do not see an alternative to the figure of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. When we talk about a candidate for the post of Chairman or President, what determines his figure is not what he says now, but his deeds preceding these elections. Don’t we know the previous cases with which the candidate for the post of Chairman characterized himself at least during the period of four years of activity? After all, no one forces the President of the United States of America to speak in front of a microphone or in front of the Senate with promises immediately before his election. There is a long four- to six-month election campaign in which the future president's affairs and his promises are outlined. And therefore, I believe that from the position, so to speak, of ensuring that we receive a truly businesslike report, a real analysis of what needs to be done to implement and complete perestroika in our country, we must first vest the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council with the powers of the Chairman of the Supreme Council, and then listen to this report. This is my point of view. This is the first. (Applause).

I also believe that it is necessary to listen to this report after the elections to the Supreme Council. No one is stopping you from introducing alternative candidates to the discussion of candidates for the Supreme Council - this is the second issue on the agenda, but not the first, and there is no need to bring it up now. I believe that our first meeting of the Congress should now be limited to the approval of the agenda. And for each item on the agenda, when it comes time to consider it, the debates that I just talked about should be organized. I urge you to vote for the agenda that was approved yesterday by the majority - not 85 percent, as Comrade Popov says, but more than 85 percent. The vote was essentially unanimous. Representatives of the delegations approved this agenda. Thank you. (Applause).

Chairman. Comrades, shall we continue the debate? Or have two points of view been formed, and we can discuss them and decide which one we will adhere to?

Who is in favor of ending the exchange of views here? One minute. I will read out the note: “In pursuance of the orders of my voters to hold any elections at the Congress, it is mandatory on a competitive basis and on the basis of Articles 48 and 120 of the Constitution of the USSR, I nominate my candidacy for election to the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I am ready to present my program. Obolensky Alexander Mitrofanovich, people's deputy from the Leningrad rural national-territorial district of the RSFSR."

Deputy (did not introduce himself).

There is an alternative proposal. I agree that we need to elect Mikhail Sergeevich as the first Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, because we know him. We know him by his deeds, by his daily hard work. I deeply agree with this. But I do not agree to elect the Supreme Council immediately, because it will include many people whom we do not know. We are now returning to common sense in our lives. We cannot elect mostly unknown people who are changing before our eyes.

I want to see how they will show themselves here, what their position is, their citizenship, their courage, and only after that, after listening to them, looking at them, will I vote for them.

I make an alternative proposal. The first to elect the Chairman of the Supreme Council. I agree with the arguments that have been made here. But I propose that the election of the Supreme Council itself be held after the discussion.

Presiding. So, who is in favor of stopping the exchange of views on this issue? Please vote. Please omit it. Who's against it? So. For now, I ask those who are against to put down their IDs. We need to develop a counting mechanism. A proposal is made: to entrust the counting of votes in open voting to a group of people's Deputies consisting of the following: the leader of the group is Deputy Kostenko, Chairman of the Orenburg Regional Executive Committee. His assistants: Academician Platonov - President of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Sokolov - Senior Researcher at the Voronezh Research and Production Association "Electronics". It is expected that the group will also include the following deputies: Amangeldinova - secondary school teacher, Pavlodar; Widiker - director of the Suvorovsky state farm, Kazakhstan; Akhunov - deputy director of school No. 4, Uzbek SSR; Baranov - Chairman of the trade union committee of the Leningrad production association "Izhora Plant"; Andreev - chief engineer of the Moscow State Design and Survey Institute "Mosgiprotrans"; Yaroshenko - Deputy General Director of the Scientific and Production Association for Tractor Manufacturing, Moscow; Babich - Chairman of the Kyiv City Committee of the Trade Union of Agricultural Workers; Bichkauskas - investigator for particularly important cases of the Prosecutor's Office of the Lithuanian SSR; Giro - commander of the Tu-154 ship, Tajikistan; Ibragimov - driller of the Marine Drilling Directorate "Oil Rocks", Azerbaijan SSR; Margvelashvili - senior lecturer at Tbilisi State University; Bursky - Chairman of the Brest Regional Executive Committee; Reshetnikov - deputy shop manager of the Kaluga Engine Production Association; Nazarov - first secretary of the Russko-Polyansky district party committee of the Omsk region; Erokhin - deputy commander of a military unit, Kiev Military District; Shlyakota - director of the Vetsumi state farm, Latvian SSR; Aasmäe - head of the sector of the design bureau, Estonian SSR; Belyaev is the dean of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.

These are the comrades proposed by the representatives of the delegations. Are there any challenges to these comrades? No.

Who do you suggest? Come out here and speak.

Belyaev V.N. (Kantemirovsky territorial electoral district, Moscow). Two comrades fell ill, two of our sectors are not covered. At that meeting, two comrades were included in the reserve. I would ask the chairman of the counting group to report these names so that they can be approved by the Congress.

Presiding. Fine. So, name these two names. Who can report? Comrade Kosteniuk. Please report two comrades.

Kosteniuk A. G. Mikhail Sergeevich, comrade deputies! We have a reserve, this is Comrade Karasev...

Presiding. Where?

Kosteniuk A. G. Head of the department of the Kramatorsk Industrial Institute of the Ukrainian SSR. And comrade Belenkov Yuri Nikitich - director of the All-Union Cardiology Research Center of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.

Presiding. Comrades, is a replacement acceptable?

Clear. Decided.

Boldyrev Yu. Yu., senior engineer of the Central Research Institute of Ship Electrical Engineering and Technology, Leningrad (Moscow territorial electoral district, Leningrad).

I have a proposal for the voting mechanism. The fact is that not all deputies will be able to speak during the Congress. Voters must have the right to evaluate how their representatives performed at this Congress. Voters should have the right to know how their deputies voted on certain issues, except personal ones. Therefore, I make a proposal: organize a fixed vote on all issues except personal ones. I think all technical issues can be resolved. (Applause).

Chairman. I think that this proposal is one of the attempts to drag us into something that the Congress should not be drawn into. (Applause).

But since such an offer has been received, I must decide on this one way or another. So, the first proposal that was submitted to the Presidium. Anyone in favor of this voting mechanism, please raise your certificates. Please omit it. Against? Thirty-one deputies are against. Abstaining? Twenty people abstained. Issue resolved.

So, there is a counting commission, I ask my comrades to get to work now, and I will probably start again with the one who is in favor of approving the agenda that Comrade Nazarbayev introduced on behalf of the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies of the USSR in the form it is , and at the same time he outlined the order of discussion of issues (in the order in which they go), I ask the deputies to raise their certificates. Please omit it. Who's against it? Count it, comrades. Who, comrades, abstained on this issue?

Presiding. The issue is resolved. (Applause).

This determines the fate of other proposals. The Congress cannot work on two agendas at once.

Don't worry, I know what to do. Who is in favor of limiting it to this? Consider the issue on the agenda resolved and thereby not begin to consider other alternative proposals. I ask the deputies to vote. Please omit it. Are there any against? A clear minority. In this case, no counting is required. This is in the context of the question and does not have such significance. Absolute majority.

Decided. The agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR has been approved.

Now about the order of our work. Deputy Nazarbayev, on behalf of the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, made a proposal to consider issues in the sequence in which they are included in the agenda. I included this in the first voting item, we voted.

But then we talk about the Regulations. As you know, the Constitution provides for the adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which should determine in detail the entire procedure for the activities of the highest authorities. Naturally, we now do not have such Regulations. We have to adopt it, and, apparently, the Congress at the appropriate moment must make a decision and instruct the Supreme Council to develop a draft of these Regulations and submit it for approval at the next Congress, that is, the autumn Congress.

Apparently this is what we will do. Before the adoption of permanent Rules of Procedure, it would be advisable to adopt a temporary document defining the procedure for the work of the Congress. This task is solved by the Temporary Regulations for the meetings of the Congress, the draft of which you have. It includes all the norms of the USSR Constitution on the work of the Congress, as well as the rules arising from them. The temporary regulations were considered by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and yesterday at a meeting of group representatives we discussed it, quite intensively, by the way, and many interesting additions were made. In my opinion, there were no objections; everyone unanimously approved it. Therefore, here is our project, you have it. I can put it to a vote if the deputies agree with the proposals that the meeting of group representatives made in this regard.

Take the floor and introduce yourself immediately, please.

Antanavichyus K. A., head of department of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR, Vilnius (Vilnius - October national-territorial constituency, Lithuanian SSR).

The Regulations we received today did not include any of the amendments that were proposed yesterday. For example, an amendment was adopted under Article 19 stating that a statement, declaration, or appeal submitted to the Congress by at least twenty deputies shall be distributed by the Congress as official documents of the Congress.

Further, an amendment was made to Article 15 stating that when deciding on the termination of debate, deputies elected from a union republic have the right to insist on the continuation of debate on issues relating to the republics, if such a proposal is supported by at least two-thirds of deputies elected from of this republic.

And there were other proposals, but we did not make them. This means that I think that their authors will also speak out.

Chairman. Firstly, I see that Article 15 says: “The cessation of debate is made by decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of people's deputies. When deciding on the termination of debate, deputies elected from a union republic have the right to insist on giving the floor to one of the deputies from this republic, if such a proposal is supported by at least two-thirds of the deputies elected from this republic.”

Antanavicius K. A. Then the question arises: why did representatives of the groups gather yesterday? We agreed yesterday that not just one deputy is given the floor, but that the debate continues at the request of at least two-thirds of the republic’s deputies. This is the essence of the change: not to one deputy, but the debate continues and continues, as you said yesterday, until the second vote.

Chairman. Okay, that's a clarification. Vote? I think, comrades, this is all acceptable. The mechanism is well thought out: the Congress can always intervene in this process; if delays begin, speculation begins on this legal norm, he can stop the debate by voting again.

Now regarding your second proposal. I believe that we agreed on everything then, I remember it, just like you. We voted that all these documents are distributed not by the delegations themselves, but through the Presidium of the Supreme Council. I think we need to include this, confirm what we agreed on at the meeting.

They probably worked at night, you know, until dawn, and something slipped through. Please, Comrade Landsbergis.

Landsbergis V.V., Professor of the State Conservatory of the Lithuanian SSR, Vilnius (Panevezys city national-territorial constituency, Lithuanian SSR).

I asked for the floor a little earlier, but now I would like to draw your attention, dear deputies, to the fact that the voting method that is adopted here and was already in effect yesterday may be considered incorrect. In cases where there are alternative proposals, it would be more correct to vote like this: first, who is for the first proposal, and then, who is for the second proposal. And not the way we do it. I suggest you think about this. And besides, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Academician Sakharov made two proposals on the agenda. And his first proposal - about the decree of the Congress - is still silent.

Presiding. Let's consider! As for the issue of the agenda, it has been resolved. We have already decided. Collectively, the Congress decided. I don't think we'll go back to this. Let's move on.

Regarding the question raised by Academician Sakharov regarding the decree, let's instruct the Presidium to consider this proposal. This does not contradict the agenda. This already applies to the hierarchy of the highest authorities, and the Congress has more control over it than the Supreme Council. And it can determine more accurately. This topic was the most important yesterday, and by the way, we came up with a very interesting proposal. I mean that we will apparently propose (but this will come later) to hold two congresses a year. And not as planned - so that the Supreme Council would basically become a working body, albeit a solid, high body, with greater rights, but still mainly work for the Congress. And so that the basic laws, except those that do not require a decision from the Congress (we will outline this), are ultimately adopted by the Congress. (Applause).

We agreed that the deputies who do not get into the Supreme Council would not have the feeling that they were invited once a year, or even twice, and then stew there, on the spot, in their own juices. No. We thought about it. It should be all in one package. For now, it was considered as an idea, only tentatively. I felt from talking with many deputies that many, if not all, are concerned about the fate of the people's deputy. And we agreed that, firstly, the commissions will include, say, 50 percent of the members of the Supreme Council and 50 percent of other people's deputies. Thus, this will immediately expand the opportunities for deputies to participate in the work of commissions.

We also agreed that the Supreme Council, conducting its current work in the chambers and in commissions, will send the people’s deputies both the work schedule and the schedule of commission meetings. Therefore, all deputies will know the issues that are being discussed, and each deputy, when he needs and considers it possible to participate in the discussion and express his point of view on a particular issue, will come and participate in the work of a particular commission or in a meeting of the chamber . Moreover, we agreed that this should be decided at this Congress. In addition, there will be a new status for the People's Deputy of the USSR, which should raise the authority of the deputy corps in comparison with the position in which it is placed by the current status. We will work on this and decide at the autumn Congress.

Thus, comrades, through the implementation of these ideas, and as they are developed, I think others will appear, we will reach the point that the people’s deputy, within the framework of his term of office, will effectively participate in all the work. And you and I will give all the necessary instructions on these issues.

Therefore, let's instruct the Presidium to decide on Academician Sakharov's proposal and submit its thoughts on this matter. Fine? I don't think it requires a vote, just agreement. Fine.

One of the deputies came up to me and said: “Mikhail Sergeevich, it is wrong that you are leading the Congress. Because it should be led by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission.” Is someone not happy with my, perhaps, undemocratic nature? I don't know. We, comrades, discussed this issue, and it was recognized that the working Presidium of the Congress should include representatives from both the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, who was entrusted with opening the Congress, and from the republics, so that there would be representatives, so that it would be a working, a full-blooded, representative democratic body that could meet, discuss how the Congress is going, develop some ideas, and if something arises, report to you, etc. All deputies, when discussing in deputy groups and at meetings of representatives, with this agreed, and such a proposal was made. Probably they want to “overthrow” the chairman or something, but don’t worry: we agreed that all members of the Presidium will take turns leading the meetings of the Congress.

Levashev A.V., assistant of the department of political economy of the Leningrad Technological Institute named after Lensovet (Kolpinsky territorial electoral district, Leningrad).

Comrade deputies! The fact is that, according to Article 110 of the Constitution, the first meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies after the elections is chaired by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission. If this is not so, then it turns out that all decisions, votes and acts taken now have no legal force. We need to reopen the Congress. This is a very serious matter. Thank you for your attention.

Chairman. I think that the Congress, at the preparatory stage, developed proposals and democratically resolved the issue of the Presidium. And thus today the Congress constituted everything as it is. Shall we proceed from this? Does anyone have any doubts about this? No. Fine.

We started discussing the Regulations. Please. Introduce yourself.

Plotnieks A. A., Professor of the Latvian State University named after P. Stuchka, Riga (Jelgava national-territorial electoral district, Latvian SSR).

Dear comrades people's deputies! The question of the Regulations, temporary or permanent, may seem at first glance to be purely technical. But I was eager to get to this podium because I consider it an issue of paramount importance. By developing or finalizing one or another version of the Regulations, we are laying the foundations for the more or less successful activities of our Congress.

In this regard, I begin with a final conclusion. I would propose to form a commission from the people's deputies of the USSR, who now, within a couple of days, would finalize these Temporary Regulations, and the Congress would approve it, since our legal status, the forms of our activities should be in force immediately after the Congress closes . The possibility of their use will depend on what this document will be. In this regard, there is also the following.

We are currently at the second stage of reform of the political system. This stage assumes that we will rebuild the federation taking into account the real sovereignty of the union republics. This, in turn, means that very intensive legislative activity will be needed. The Temporary Regulations talk about this. It talks about who exercises the right of legislative initiative, how to pass laws, and so on. But a number of questions remain open. In particular, the question remains open about what laws the Congress will adopt and what laws the Supreme Council will adopt. The Constitution does not give us an answer to this question. If you compare the powers of the Congress and the Supreme Council, they partially overlap. This means that we must stipulate in the Regulations one way or another what laws we will consider. And, perhaps, provide for some possibility of convening not an extraordinary, but a regular Congress, which would engage in legislative activity.

Further, in this regard, I would suggest that we think about this: maybe it makes sense for the laws adopted by the Supreme Council to be approved at the next Congress. This would be democratic and would not require much time, but at least the people, in the person of people’s deputies, would give the go-ahead to the work that the Supreme Council did over a certain period.

The question of regulation of the legislative activities of the Congress. Also a very interesting question. Let’s say, from the Rules of Procedure we do not receive an answer to questions about what is the time frame for the development of projects in standing commissions and committees, what is the procedure for introducing amendments to them, what is the participation of deputies - both elected to the Supreme Council and non-elected - in the activities of these permanent commissions. This is extremely important; it is a legislative technique. And whether we will be able to give technically more or less perfect laws depends on how accurately we are able to develop these rules. Mikhail Sergeevich has already said that it is still desirable to involve people’s deputies who are not elected to the Supreme Council in the work of standing commissions. This is not in the Regulations. It seems to me that this should definitely be written down so that in cases where special knowledge is needed, we can come and speak, because it will not be possible to speak at the Congress. And everyone wants to make their own contribution to rule-making activities.

And finally, it seems to me that today’s experience already shows that organizational forms are needed. They are also included in the document, but they are still few. Imagine a huge group of people, how can they organize? Apparently, we need to organize ourselves among the union republics. And, apparently, the deputies of the union republic should already appear in some kind of association in the Regulations: let it be a group, let it be a delegation, as we want, it is necessary to clearly record how their work is organized.

Then there will be no inconsistency, there will be more organization, there will be more efficiency. Thank you for your attention. (Applause).

Chairman. Can I express my opinion about this, I think, very informative speech? We - this is apparently the fate of the first Congress - are faced with the fact that we need Regulations, we must develop them. But until we have developed and approved the Regulations, we must live and work. There is a transitional stage for this - the Temporary Regulations. So it was proposed so that we could work, move, and resolve issues. But, as I have already said, we must develop Regulations; they will become the subject of deep discussion at the Congress. This is the first thing.

Secondly. Many questions that Comrade Deputy correctly raised deserve general attention. I think the Rules will change especially seriously given the fact that the delegates support the idea of ​​​​the need to return again and more clearly define the hierarchy of relations between the Congress and the Supreme Council. Hence the participation of deputies in various forms of work, including commissions and committees. All this will need to be implemented in the Regulations. If we stand on the basis of reality, the actual state is this: in order for the Congress to work and resolve issues, we now must support and agree with the Temporary Regulations. All other issues mentioned in the speech should be linked to the permanent Regulations. True, some of them, for example, on the participation of deputies in the work of standing committees, regardless of whether they are members of the Supreme Council or not, are reflected in the document, but that is not the point. All other issues will be resolved as part of the discussion of the issue of two congresses (we have one planned so far), as part of clarifying the mutual competence of the Congress and the Supreme Council. Moreover, it will probably become clear that not every law requires, for example, ratification. There are laws that require that the Supreme Council simply meet and decide the issue. There are laws affecting the fate of the state; they will require ratification by the Congress. We need to work on this. All this will then be reflected in the permanent Regulations, which we will submit for approval at the next Congress. I think we need to move in this direction.

How are you, comrades? Right?

Please. Comrade Stankevich.

Stankevich S. B., senior researcher at the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow (Cheremushkinsky territorial electoral district, Moscow).

I would like to propose an amendment to Article 18 of the Temporary Regulations. I agree that a more serious revision of the Regulations can wait. It is necessary to create a special commission that will seriously deal with this. But the proposal that I am submitting for your consideration, it seems to me, makes sense to be included in the Temporary Regulations of the Congress.

We are talking about Article 18, which defines the voting procedure. The fact is that there is no provision for roll-call voting. During the election campaign, from communicating with voters in Moscow and other cities, it became absolutely clear to me that the overwhelming majority of voters want to know how their representatives vote at the Congress. In addition, thanks to anonymous voting, deputies now have a fairly convenient opportunity to reject serious proposals, serious bills, the adoption of which voters are waiting for, and then not bear any responsibility to them. I would like to avoid this convenient possibility of anonymous voting. I understand perfectly well that since we have technical difficulties and we currently cannot afford such a luxury as an electronic voting system, in this situation we are forced to look for other solutions.

Let's say that most voting will be done simply by show of hands. Let's go for this archaic. But for the most fundamental proposals and bills, at the request of, say, at least 100 deputies, we can agree to such a luxury as a roll-call vote. Therefore, the essence of the proposal is as follows: to supplement Article 18 of the Temporary Regulations with the provision that, at the request of at least 100 deputies of the Congress, voting can be carried out by name. (Applause).

Chairman. Let me express my opinion and seek advice in this regard. I think that Stankevich’s proposal generally deserves attention. Let's remember: on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, for example, there was a roll-call vote. This means that such questions may continue to arise when there is a need for a roll call vote. But, in my opinion, it is impossible to agree that a roll-call vote can be held at the request of 100 deputies. This must be decided by the Congress. The congress must determine the form of voting, not 100 deputies. I propose to formulate the proposal as follows: by decision of the Congress, a roll-call vote can be held. In my opinion, this is a very important and serious addition.

Kosteniuk A. G. I report: for - 431.

Those who are in favor of the second sentence: “The Congress may hold a roll-call vote on its decision,” please raise your hands. Please omit it. Is it necessary to count in this case?

Presiding. But only if everyone agrees, then we won’t. Overwhelming majority. Nobody insists on counting? Nobody.

Then the issue is resolved. Your proposal, Comrade Stankevich, is accepted with amendments.

Now, comrades, I want to announce the request of Gorinov and Karpochev, deputies from the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. They write: “Attempts by some deputies to divert the Congress to discuss procedural issues are a very harmful thing. This does not create authority for our Congress before voters, even those voters who elected comrades Sakharov, Boldyrev and others. The people are waiting for how the Congress will resolve the fundamental issues of life, so it is necessary to turn to the Congress, whether to give the floor three or four times to those who are actively bringing disorganization into the work of the Congress.” (Applause).

For my part, I would comment on this: many significant questions were raised here. Therefore, I consider everything that has been done so far in these hour and a half to be significant. We have approved the agenda. We have approved the Regulations, and all our activities should be based on this. And finally, we exchanged views on issues that are already emerging. I mean the considerations of Academician Sakharov. We need to think about having the Presidium prepare, based on the participation of deputies, proposals that fall within the competence of the Congress and the competence of the Supreme Council on the functioning of our entire complex representative mechanism. Therefore, everything that has been discussed here can hardly be attributed only to negative work. Basically, it is still positive, but the warnings of the deputies, their wishes, I think, are appropriate and democratic. They exercised their right to make such comments.

Please. Introduce yourself.

Boyare Yu. R., associate professor of the Latvian State University named after P. Stuchka, Riga (Dobele national-territorial electoral district, Latvian SSR).

I have no doubt that the Regulations presented by the Presidium can be accepted as a basis, and I would gladly vote for it. But, apparently, in addition, we still need to accept some small amendments so that we can move forward with a clear conscience. For some republics and delegations they seem to be of significant importance. Moreover, what I will talk about now, we basically (Mikhail Sergeevich, I believe you won’t let me lie) talked about it yesterday and somehow agreed on it. I have this proposal. Relatively small delegations, in particular the Baltic republics, are worried that in the main political debates, in this very large mass of our generally constructive comrades who all want to speak, they may not get the floor at all. That's why we had a proposal yesterday... No, comrades, this is serious. I have no criticism, just a small request. Still, we need to vote so that every delegation, every republic receives at least a guaranteed minimum of speeches - three speeches at the main political debates.

Presiding. Right.

Boyar Yu. R. It is very important.

Presiding. This issue - I confirm that the deputy is right - was discussed at a meeting of representatives, we agreed, and let's write it down - to instruct the Presidium of the Congress to collectively determine the list of speakers so that the interests of all republics, territories and regions are taken into account. I put the republics first, we are the Union. And, probably, to some extent they should take into account that there are different representatives. Therefore, if you do not object, we can propose the following formulation: instruct the Presidium to monitor the speeches so that at least a minimum of participants is provided - representatives of all republics, territories, regions and relevant groups.

Boyar Yu. R. My next proposal, comrades. Yesterday we more or less agreed - this proposal was made by a number of comrades from the Russian Federation, from the city of Moscow - that after all we, that is, the delegations themselves, need to nominate our representatives to the Supreme Council. This should be written down in the Regulations. Because we think, and we discussed for a very long time, the whole day in our group (back in Riga), who and how to nominate, taking into account the business, personal qualities and even capabilities of each. Professor Plotnieks, who spoke before me, excuse me, he also has an important point. He has a small child at home and a mother who needs supervision. We take this into account in our group. But the rest of the comrades cannot know this, so we have a very clear proposal. We are putting forward our list and will stand for it. Then we will change. Why on earth would I interfere in the affairs of the Russian Federation, determine who will represent the Russian Federation? I would even consider it immodest. This is our second proposal, on which we agreed yesterday.

Presiding. Yes, this has nothing to do with the Regulations, but it has to do with the voting procedure.

Boyar Yu. R. The following is suggested by Professor Plotnieks. We are, first and foremost, legislators and determine the policy of our state. Therefore, one of the most important tasks of our Congress is to compile a main list of priority laws. Apparently we need to vote for this. During the Congress, this work must be done, an appropriate commission must be created that would deal with these laws and proposals for bills. This work, as they say at international meetings, is significant and important.

Presiding. So, in the first part, there is a proposal to give the Presidium instructions to monitor and regulate speeches so that the representation of the republics, at least regions, relevant groups, and public organizations in the debates is ensured.

As for the second group of questions. Let's instruct the Presidium to organize the study of these issues and present considerations on this matter for their subsequent consideration - they are of a very important nature.

Boyar Yu. R. Yes, and according to the laws. Comrades! Mikhail Sergeevich made a very important remark that the law is different. But regarding the so-called “functional” laws, I still have a proposal: to vote on all laws, that is, all laws are adopted by the Congress or approved by the Congress, and in the intervals between the next Congresses and sessions, which, as we decide, will be once or two per year, the law adopted by the Supreme Council is in force. But if the Congress does not approve the law, then it does not take effect. This is the next sentence.

Presiding. I think this echoes what I was saying. All these issues must be resolved in the main Regulations, where we will divide hierarchies, rights, relationships, and there we will determine to what extent and which laws will be decided finally in the Supreme Council, which ones - at the Congress or require information or approval of the Congress. That is, there we will dot all the i's. Because these are big legal issues of fundamental importance.

Boyar Yu. R. A small amendment that we agreed on yesterday. I think we have definitely decided on this. I mean amendments to the Regulations. Look at paragraph 19, the very last paragraph, at the very bottom of the page. We agreed that people's deputies will have the right to take part not only in the work of chambers, but also commissions and committees with the right of advisory vote. I propose to write this down; it is essential and important for the status of a people’s deputy.

Presiding. Okay, let's write it down. Moreover, during the preliminary study we proceeded from the fact that we were talking about commissions.

Presiding. The point is that the commissions will include approximately 50 percent of the members of the Supreme Council, 50 percent of people's deputies - non-members. In commissions - with a casting vote, and in the bodies of the Supreme Council - with an advisory vote.

Boyar Yu. R. The very last thing, comrades. Apparently, we are all very concerned about somehow moving forward all the time and not getting stuck in very complex issues and discussions that we cannot resolve in such a large mass. Therefore, I have extremely serious doubts about whether we should vote by name. If we had electronics, as is the case at some international meetings, this would go quickly. And if this mass votes by name now, one question will take us a whole day. I really doubt: should we do this?

Presiding. For the information of the deputies, I would like to say that such instructions have been given and a project is being drawn up so that each deputy’s workplace is prepared accordingly. The project is being worked on. And the matter will be resolved.

Comrades, shall we end the discussion?

It's a big question. Yesterday we discussed it carefully at a meeting of representatives, very carefully. 446 people sitting here can confirm. And today's discussion confirms that this is a really big issue. And I think we must act based on the Constitution, according to which the Congress elects the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council is elected, and not formed in the same way as it was formed in practice when there were congresses of Soviets. Then the lower level of the Soviets delegated its deputy to the highest, and thus the process of forming congresses of Soviets began. In this case, proposals come from local delegations, but the decision is made - by voting - by the Congress itself.

There are questions here that need to be thought about. The question of combining the right of the Congress to determine and make a final decision on the composition of the Supreme Council, taking into account the opinions of the republics, still requires clarification at subsequent stages. I think we exchanged opinions, all these nuances will be taken into account.

Sebentsov A. E., head of department of the Moscow floodlight plant (Perovsky territorial electoral district, Moscow).

Comrades! I have a proposal regarding Article 20 of the Temporary Regulations, which also applies to the procedure for conducting our Congress. Article 20 provides that meetings of the Congress are held openly and representatives of state and other organizations, as well as other persons, are invited to them. I would like to propose the following addition to this article: invited persons do not have the right to interfere in the work of the Congress, expressing their opinion through shouts, applause and other means.

Presiding. I think this wish should be expressed from the Congress to all those invited today and for the future. All our deputies are sitting in the stalls, and there is no one here except them.

Sebentsov A. E. Yes, but we already heard shouts from the balcony. And one more question. I would like to exercise my right of legislative initiative and propose a draft Law on the status of the People's Deputy of the USSR so that this draft will be duplicated and distributed to all deputies present at the Congress.

Chairman. Comrades! Now we give half a minute to speak.

Kurochka G.M., Chairman of the permanent session of the Supreme Court of the Komi ASSR, Vorkuta (Vorkuta national-territorial electoral district, Komi ASSR).

I suggest placing microphones between the rows, otherwise it’s inconvenient to work, that’s it; and the second sentence: at the very beginning I submitted a note to the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, for some reason there was no answer, although it contained issues that concern many deputies. All.

Chairman. Fine. Please, Comrade Adamovich. Now everyone, comrades, come forward.

Adamovich A.M., Director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Cinematography, Moscow. (From the Union of Cinematographers of the USSR).

We sit for two hours, with millions of people watching us for two hours. And so our people think: “Okay, what if we want to support the Congress, express our opinion on the issues that are raised at it?” And let's imagine - people will now come out to somehow express their opinions. What will greet them? Will they really be met by the Decree on demonstrations and rallies that was adopted? Don't we need to cancel this Decree both during the Congress and during the elections so that the people can actively participate in our work? (Applause).

Deputy (did not introduce himself).

Amendment to Article 20. We have already spoken here on this article, but we noted the last part, which is not very significant. At the beginning of the wording of this paragraph it says: “Representatives of government organizations, etc. are invited to the meeting.” Why are they “invited”? We are building a rule-of-law state; the term “invited” is not a legal formulation at all and essentially legalizes the discretion of the organizers of a particular congress. It is necessary to provide the wording: “representatives of government organizations, labor collectives, the press, television, and the media have the right to be present.” Otherwise, we will not fulfill the instructions of the 19th Party Conference on the development of glasnost and the resolution on glasnost.

Presiding. First. Let's decide. I think that we will return to the topic that Comrade Adamovich raised. This is certain. As for the proposal to make a decision right now, to suspend the Decree on demonstrations and rallies, I think we cannot follow this path at all. The next step is to pause something else. Then we’ll say: let’s suspend the Constitution, and so passions will flare up.

I think that the order that exists today - even with all the shortcomings that the deputies will probably talk about - makes it possible to hold rallies in favor and not in favor, but in connection with the Congress. And therefore, it is unnecessary to raise the question now that everything needs to be cancelled, stopped. I would not resolve this issue in such dramatic tones.

And when we come to these issues, I think we will discuss them. Do you insist that this issue be voted on?

In my opinion, what exists provides an opportunity for discussion. “By the way, on the eve of the Congress you were at a rally in two or three places, and everything was fine. So I don’t know what we’re talking about.

There is a note here: “Is there a live broadcast of the meeting now?” It's coming. Everyone sees. The whole country sees, and the whole world sees.

Is continuity of the television broadcast of the Congress guaranteed? Guaranteed.

Saunin A. N., associate professor of the department of the Makeevka Institute of Civil Engineering, Donetsk (Makeevka territorial constituency, Donetsk region).

The first thing I would like to say is that I have the feeling that some of our deputies are rushing to catch a train that is about to depart; their proposals are taking them away from the agenda, from the problems that we are discussing.

Second. Regarding the Regulations. We want to create a rule-of-law state, which means we want to live according to laws and regulations, and the haste to adopt the Regulations and other documents adopted here may lead to us returning to them again - to their imperfections, to the shortcomings - what we had and before. I think the democratic process is difficult. We need to be patient, thoughtful, listen carefully to the pros and cons and make a decision.

According to the Regulations. The first article of the Temporary Regulations states that the Congress is held once a year. It seems that Mikhail Sergeevich said that we should hold congresses twice a year. This means that it must be written down in the Regulations - twice a year.

Further. I don’t like Article 19 - its last lines, where we, people’s deputies, authorized equal representatives of the people, are divided into deputies with the right of a decisive vote and with the right of an advisory vote. And I believe that this is connected with what Mikhail Sergeevich spoke about - this is a change in the status of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its transformation from a body of state power into a body of the Congress of People's Deputies. I propose to remove this item.

Presiding. Fine. But I come back again to what we were talking about. Until we made changes to the Constitution, and it says: once a year. We cannot adopt Regulations that would be contrary to the Constitution. Yesterday at a meeting of representatives, everyone agreed that this topic is the topic of the Congress and the Supreme Council: the timing, frequency, regularity of congresses - we all must work on and make appropriate changes to the Constitution and include them in the new Rules of Procedure. So let's do it, comrades. In the meantime, let’s resolve the issue of the Temporary Regulations. So that they can act.

Lubenchenko K.D., Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov (Ramensky territorial electoral district, Moscow region).

Comrades, we all call for political culture. Unfortunately, we are not showing it very much now, but there is a live broadcast. It seems to me that if we are talking about the Regulations, then this is such an extremely complex document that we must develop very carefully and over the course of many months. We won't accept it now.

But we, in addition to this, also want to include in the Regulations a whole range of substantive issues, specific norms, and each of us wants to express a whole host of thoughts. And this sea will simply overwhelm us. One issue is currently being considered: the issue of the Temporary Regulations. But the Congress has such high legal force that, in general, the Temporary Regulations are not a hindrance for it. And in the course of considering certain issues, we can immediately make changes to it if something bothers us. If we now devote time to including all these issues in the Regulations, then nothing will happen. Therefore, it seems to me that it is now necessary to raise the question of an editorial commission that would immediately deal with these problems, summing up all the comments that are being made, so that we each do not go to the podium and speak.

And one last thing. A remark was made to us here that the first meeting of the Congress after the elections is chaired by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, and then by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But in order not to violate the Constitution, it seems to me that we must confirm by a vote of the Congress the right to conduct it, which was entrusted to Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev by the Presidium. Thus, the issue of violation of the Constitution will be procedurally removed.

Presiding. But it’s as if this issue has been resolved and legitimized. What, do you want to vote? Let's then secure everything by voting so that I am not a usurper. Please. Against? No. Have you reached unanimity, comrades? Abstaining? Five abstained. Decided.

Let me conclude this discussion on the Rules of Procedure and rely on the proposal of the last deputy. To pose the question in such a way as to approve the Temporary Regulations with those additions that we have already decided on here in each specific case. And, naturally, to instruct the Presidium to make a proposal for a commission so that it can already begin work on summarizing all proposals on the Regulations and so that this work can already move forward. And edit these Regulations taking into account the comments.

Those who are in favor of adopting the Temporary Regulations with the additions that we have adopted, please raise your certificates. Please omit it.

Who's against it, comrades? I don’t see, but do the counters see? No. Who abstains? There are abstainers. Do the math. Have your comrades counted who abstained?

Kosteniuk A. G. 17 people abstained.

Presiding. We adopted the regulations with 17 abstentions.

Now, comrades, in accordance with the Constitution, we need to form a Credentials Commission of the Congress to verify the powers of the elected deputies. You have proposals on its composition in your hands. They are introduced both by groups of people's deputies and by the meeting of their representatives. They have been agreed upon, but nevertheless the Congress may have some questions or other proposals. Any comments on the personnel? Please... Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov has the floor.

Sakharov A. D. I believe that the position of chairman of the Credentials Commission is an extremely important position. It should be discussed personally, and not as a general list. My suggestion is that this position should be filled by a professional lawyer due to the nature of this work.

Chairman. So, a question about the chairman. The proposed deputy is Gidaspov Boris Veniaminovich - General Director of the scientific and production association "GIPH", Chairman of the Board of the intersectoral state association "Tekhnokhim", Leningrad. I want to say that this candidacy was put forward directly at the meeting of representatives. This was a unanimous opinion, including, in my opinion, Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov speaking out for this. Perhaps it makes sense to discuss his proposal, since we are talking about the figure of the chairman. By the way, there are lawyers on the commission’s list. I think this is not the case when a lawyer should necessarily be the chairman. Deputy Stankevich has the floor.

Stankevich S. B. I make the following proposal: give the commission itself the opportunity to elect a chairman, and vote only for its composition. Let her figure out who will be the chairman, who will be his deputies, and who will be the secretary. Thank you.

Presiding. This topic was discussed at a meeting of representatives, and the following proposal was put forward. But everyone considered that this was the prerogative of the Congress, and not the commission itself.

Comrades Leningraders, what can you say about Comrade Gidaspov?

Revnivtsev V.I., General Director of the intersectoral scientific and technical complex “Mekhanobr”, Leningrad. (From the All-Union Society of Inventors and Innovators). It seems to me that the main qualities for the chairman of the Credentials Committee should be decency and honesty. From the Leningrad delegation, since we discussed this issue, I will say that Comrade Gidaspov has these properties. But there is a lawyer there, and I think compliance with the legal form will be ensured in the commission. (Applause).

Presiding. Fine. Does anyone question what has been said?

Presiding. Comrade Gidaspov, please come up to the podium and tell us a little about yourself.

Gidaspov B.V. (Petrograd territorial electoral district, Leningrad).

Comrades! I’m really not a lawyer, I have a technical education. True, I attended two or three meetings and realized that now such education is almost in the red. I graduated from the Polytechnic Institute, taught at universities for a long time, and worked my way up to head of the department. Now he is a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, director of a large institute and chairman of an intersectoral association and concern created in Leningrad for the first time.

Gidaspov B.V. My attitude towards the elections is correct and normal. We believe that the way we conducted the elections, we got these results. (Applause).

Presiding. Fine. Still have questions? Comrade Aidak, please.

Aidak A.P., chairman of the collective farm "Leninskaya Iskra" of the Yadrinsky district of the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Yadrinsky national-territorial electoral district, Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic).

Of course, my performance is not entirely appropriate, but what can you do? The day before yesterday, on the initiative of the peasant commission, the Committee for the Rescue of the Volga and a group of collective farm chairmen, a meeting of collective farm chairmen and state farm directors was held. We are very grateful to Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Egor Kuzmich Ligachev for finding more than two hours to meet and discuss with us all the burning problems of the village.

Yesterday, collective farm chairmen and state farm directors met again. The country's leadership gave us the go-ahead to bring our pains to this Congress. A group of collective farm chairmen (about 70 people) decided that this appeal should be discussed not only with collective farm chairmen and state farm directors, but with all agrarian deputies...

Presiding. Comrade Aidak, are you a member of the Credentials Commission?

Aidak A.P. No. I ask everyone involved in agricultural production to stay in the room during the break to discuss this appeal. Thank you.

Presiding. Comrades, if there are no other comments or considerations regarding the Credentials Commission, then I could put its composition to a vote.

If anyone is in favor of the proposed composition of the Credentials Committee, please raise your certificates. Please omit it. Who's against it? Two. Who abstained? Three abstained.

The Credentials Committee was elected with two against and three abstentions. Now we need to give the floor to the Chairman of the Credentials Committee for a message.

Gidaspov B.V. I ask the members of the Credentials Commission to go after the adjournment to the Faceted Chamber, where the meeting will be held.

In order to preserve the political foundations of the state, it was decided to change the structure of power and return it to “Leninist ideals.” In June-July 1988, a decision was made to create a two-tier system of power:

1) Congress of People's Deputies of 2250 people;

2) elected by the Congress and renewed every year by 1/5 of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (554 people). (

1st People's Congress dep. USSR– May-June 1989 (Elected President of the USSR Supreme Council – M.S. Gorbachev; President of the Council of Min. – N.I. Ryzhkov; for the first time, the official opposition of “interregionalists” arose, for the first time daily broadcast of all meetings).

2 People's Congress dep. USSR– November 1989 (political propaganda decisions: there was an open skirmish between Ak. Sakharov and M.S. Gorbachev, the 1939 pact with Germany was condemned, the XIII Five-Year Plan plan was discussed but never adopted, the entry of troops into Afghanistan was condemned) .

3rd Extraordinary Congress of the People. dep. USSR– March 1990 (abandoned Article 6 of the Constitution, elected M.S. Gobachev as the first President of the USSR, refused to recognize Lithuania’s secession from the USSR).

4 People's Congress dep. USSR– December 1990. At the congress, the question of M.S. Gorbachev’s resignation was raised for the first time. It is noteworthy that this question was formulated by a representative of the CPSU. However, soon the Supreme Council granted M.S. Gorbachev emergency powers.

The last Congress of the CPSU - XXVIII, July 1990. At the congress, Yeltsin, Popov, and Sobchak left the party. By the end of 1990, the CPSU had shrunk by a third. The number of party members dropped to 15 million. M.S. Gorbachev proposed creating a Union of Northern States.

Parade of sovereignties.

The process of collapse of the USSR began with the beginning of the process of collapse of the CPSU. In 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party left the CPSU. During these same years, from May 1988 to January 1991, declarations of independence or sovereignty were adopted in all union and autonomous republics. But the Baltics went further. On March 11, 1990, Lithuania adopted the Act on the Restoration of State Independence. Soon, on June 12, 1990, at the First Congress of the People. dep. The RSFSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Baltic republics. Soon, four days later, the same Declaration was adopted by Ukraine. In October 1990, Yeltsin announced the non-subordination of the RSFSR to the allied authorities and the beginning of his own course of reforms. This decision was enshrined in law.

Soon, similar Declarations were adopted in the autonomous republics of the RSFSR (Yakutia, TASSR, Chechnya, Bashkiria).

Novo-Ogarevsky process.

On June 24, a draft of a new union treaty was published. However, the Baltic republics refused to discuss it. The western regions of Ukraine and Moldova expressed a negative attitude towards the agreement. Similar sentiments reign in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.

On March 17, at a referendum on the existence of the USSR, support was expressed for the union state (76%). On April 24, a preliminary agreement “9+1” was signed in Novo-Ogaryovo. The signing of the new union treaty was scheduled for August 21. The new state was to become a confederation. Gorbachev was to become the new President, Nazarbayev was to become Prime Minister.

On the eve of the signing of the agreement, M.S. Gorbachev went on state vacation. Foros dacha in Crimea.

Collapse of the USSR.

State Emergency Committee.

On August 19, 1991, at 6 o’clock in the morning, the creation of the State Emergency Committee was announced. Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev announced the temporary assumption of the functions of head of state. This was explained by the illness of M.S. Gorbachev.

The Commission included Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, min. Defense Marshal of the USSR D.T. Yazov, Chairman KGB V.A. Kryuchkov, min. ext. cases B.K. Pugo and others. The circumstances of the creation of the State Emergency Committee are poorly understood. Probably, all parties to this process were interested in this, both those who joined the Commission and those who were temporarily removed from power. The actions of the Commission were in accordance with the plan approved by M.S. Gorbachev back in the spring of 1991. At a meeting in Foros between the members of the Commission and the President of the USSR, Gorbachev did not oppose the measures of the State Emergency Committee, did not remove them from power and even shook their hands.

The members of the Commission motivated their actions by the inconsistency of the future treaty with the norms of the USSR Constitution, the danger of disrupting the events planned for August 21 (Ukraine, for example, hesitated), and the desire to prevent the collapse of the USSR. However, the Commission's actions were poorly coordinated. Troops were brought into Moscow, but they were not given clear orders, the reason for their presence was not explained, and they were not given ammunition. At the same time, the Armed Forces of the RSFSR began to reassign the army, but no one opposed this. The senior command staff and commanders of military units began to change their oath, recognizing B.N. Yeltsin as commander in chief. The supplies and activities of the government of the RSFSR continued. The commission mobilized the army, but did not dare to introduce into Moscow units loyal to the oath and formations based on military schools that supported the State Emergency Committee. Mass rallies began in Moscow and Leningrad. Barricades were spontaneously built. Free food, alcohol, and water were brought into improvised gathering places for opposition youth and townspeople.

On August 20, B.N. Yeltsin issued a Decree banning the activities of the CPSU. The Plenum scheduled for August 20-21 never took place.

By August 21, the opposition took the initiative into their own hands. On the night of 21–22, the President of the USSR returned to Moscow. On August 23, at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, M.S. Gorbachev confirmed the legality of all the Decrees of B.N. Yeltsin.

By August 26, all members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested and the party buildings were taken away. Mirshal Akhromeev, manager. Affairs of the Central Committee of the CPSU Kruchin, min. ext. Del Pugo committed suicide. Yazov refused pardon and sought a trial. The court recognized the actions of the members of the State Emergency Committee as legal, and justified the actions of the members of the State Emergency Committee.

On September 2, M.S. Gorbachev announced the preparation of a new union treaty designed to create a Union of Sovereign States on a confederal basis. On these same days, the last Congress of the People took place. deputies of the USSR. A program for a new state system for the transition period was adopted and the State Council was created.

The first decision of the State. The Council recognized the independence of the Baltic republics. In August-September, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Turkmenistan declared independence. And on November 25, members of the State Council refused to sign the agreement written with their participation.

On December 1, Ukraine declared its complete independence, and 2 days later it was recognized by the RSFSR as an independent state. And already on December 8, in conditions of secrecy at the Belovezhskaya Pushcha dacha, the collapse of the USSR was recognized and an agreement on the creation of the CIS was signed. Within a few days, despite the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, the decisions of the Belovezhskaya Agreement were ratified by the Supreme Council of the republics. For some time Nazarbayev spoke out against the collapse of the USSR. On December 25, M.S. Gorbachev announced his resignation as President of the USSR. B.N. Yeltsin terminated the powers of deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, and the Russian flag was raised over the Kremlin.

The collapse of the Soviet system occurred later, in 1993, during the confrontation between the President of Russia and the Armed Forces of the RSFSR. The court found B.N. Yeltsin's actions illegal. However, the President won the political confrontation. The new constitution of the RSFSR created new authorities, completely eliminating the Soviet form of democracy.

Foreign policy of the USSR in the mid-60s - early 90s of the XX century.

Social countries Commonwealth.

After the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchov, the new government began a course to eliminate the problems that arose during the previous period of government. It was necessary to normalize relations with Romania and China, restore relations with the United States and with the countries of the “third world”. It was necessary to cope with the threat of the collapse of the socialist camp.

The most important events of this period were

1) entry of ATS troops into Czechoslavakia (1968);

2) military clash with China on the island. Damansky (1969);

3) participation in military conflicts in Vietnam (60s), India, the Middle East, Lebanon and Syria (70s), Egypt (1948-1949, 60s);

4) participation in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1973-1975);

5) expansion of the CMEA at the expense of Vietnam and Cuba, agreements were concluded with Yugoslavia, Finland, Iran, Mexico, Nicaragua

6) signing of the ABM treaties, SALT 1 and SALT 2 (1972) with the United States;

7) participation in Polish politics. the crisis of the first half of the 80s (general V. Jaruzelski);

The first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened in Moscow on May 25, 1989. The Congress immediately did not go as its organizers had expected. Chairman of the Central Election Commission V.P. did not have time.

Orlov finished his speech when, without asking anyone, in front of the amazed audience and the shocked country, the previously unknown Riga doctor V.F. flew onto the podium. Tolpezhnikov and invited the delegates to honor the memory of those killed during the dispersal of the demonstration in Tbilisi. As soon as the pre-prepared lists of participants in the presidium of the congress and proposals for the agenda were announced, a man whose name was known throughout the country appeared on the podium: Academician A.D. Sakharov. He was known for decades as a dissident exiled to Gorky, as the creator of the hydrogen bomb, and stripped of three Hero of Socialist Labor stars for his human rights activities. Some people knew, but the vast majority saw and heard him for the first time. What he said seemed all the more important.

And Sakharov said the following: “I propose to accept as one of the first items on the agenda the decree of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. We are going through a revolution, perestroika is a revolution, and the word “maternity leave” is the most appropriate in this case. The exclusive right of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR is the adoption of laws of the USSR, the appointment of senior officials... In accordance with this, changes must be made to those articles of the Constitution of the USSR that relate to the rights of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR... The second fundamental question that faces us is - this is a question of whether we can, whether we have the right to elect the head of state - the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR before discussion, before discussion on the entire range of issues that determine the fate of our country...”

Sakharov stated that he supported Gorbachev’s candidacy for this post, but this support was, in his words, “conditional in nature.” He insisted on alternatives when electing the chairman of the Supreme Council, on the mandatory discussion of the candidates’ political program1.

His speech was not that of an experienced speaker. He did not have a “commander’s voice” or effectively constructed phrases. There was something else - amazing courage and responsibility, exceeding political calculations. He addressed not only the congress, but also the country. She recognized him and remembered him.

The country also heard the voices of deputies from the Baltic republics. Their speeches concerned, at first glance, issues of technical parliamentary procedures. Among them is the right of deputies from the republics to seek discussion of an issue at a meeting of the congress, if this proposal is supported by up to two-thirds of the republican deputies, the immediate adoption of the rules of the congress, and only after this discussion of other issues. They were also supported by some Russian deputies. And when Gorbachev, who presided over the congress, read out a note that “the attempts of some deputies to divert the congress to discuss procedural issues are a very harmful thing,” then for those who followed the progress of the meeting, it became clear: procedural issues are an important matter, this is what distinguishes a parliamentary meeting (although at first they were afraid to use the word “parliament”) from a party congress, where everything is agreed upon in advance, decided, and the delegates can only vote unanimously.

Already on the first day of the congress, urgent national problems emerged.

Deputies from Georgia insisted on an investigation into the events in Tbilisi, deputies from Armenia and Azerbaijan made mutual accusations about the events in Sumgait and Karabakh; Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Alksnis accused the leadership of the Latvian SSR of discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in the republic; deputy P.P. Falk spoke about the need to restore German autonomy (the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was liquidated during the war).

The clear and undisputed favorite for the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was Gorbachev. Remarks addressed to him concerned the advisability of combining the posts of General Secretary and Chairman of the Supreme Council, asked for an explanation about the construction of his dacha in Crimea, and gave “instructions” for the future.

B.N. was nominated twice. Yeltsin for this post: for the first time it was proposed by V.A. Biryukov, the second - G.E. Burbulis, both from the Sverdlovsk region. Yeltsin refused to put forward his candidacy. Some intrigue in

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Verbatim report. M., 1989. T. 1. P. 9-11.

The course of the congress was brought about by the self-nomination of A.M. Obolensky, an engineer from Apatity. But he was not even included in the voting list. According to the voting results, Gorbachev received an absolute majority. “For” - 2123 votes, “against” - 87.

The live television broadcast of all meetings made the congress especially poignant. Within a few days, previously little-known people, elected as deputies, became famous throughout the country; they were recognized not only by their faces, but also by their voices. Television killed the “sacred secret” of power. There is an opportunity to compare, evaluate, agree or disagree. The broadcast of the congress meetings became a powerful, unprecedented catalyst for political sentiment.

For the first time, the Congress of People's Deputies provided an all-Union platform for the expression of various views and positions. During the days of the congress, the republics in fact became what they were only formally according to the Constitution - subjects of the USSR. The problems that worried the population of each of them were openly named. The delegations of the Baltic republics insisted on an investigation into the circumstances of the conclusion and assessment of the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, on the introduction of republican self-financing, and proposed a draft law on the economic independence of the republics. The Ukrainian and Belarusian delegations had their own special opinion when developing the USSR budget, taking into account the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Uzbek delegates protested against the activities of Gdlyan’s investigative group.

During the elections of deputies to the USSR Supreme Council - a permanent body of power - an inevitable split occurred. The carefully prepared staff of candidates for the Supreme Council did not include people who became opposition leaders. This gave rise to Yu.N. Afanasyev to blame both the deputies of the congress and the presiding officer M.S. Gorbachev that the Supreme Council is being formed as a “Stalin-Brezhnev” one, and call the delegates to the congress an “aggressively obedient majority”1.

Yeltsin was not elected either. The RSFSR had seats in the Council of Nationalities. According to the voting results, Yeltsin received more than half of the votes, but ended up 12th. Unexpectedly, deputy from Omsk A. Kazannik, elected to the Supreme Council, asked to recuse himself on the condition that Yeltsin would take his place. This was a unique precedent. The rules of the congress did not stipulate that self-recusal could be subject to any conditions. Self-recusal could be accepted by the congress, but without any conditions. Sobchak cleared the general confusion. From his discussions about world legal practice and various options for resolving the current legal incident, it followed that it was necessary to satisfy Kazannik’s self-recusal so that his place would be taken by the one who received the following number of votes2. This procedure was approved by the congress. So Yeltsin became a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

At the congress, Yeltsin was the center of attention of journalists, but did not rush to the podium. He performed only twice, and not nearly as boldly as A. Sakharov, A. Sobchak, G. Popov or S. Stankevich. 1

Right there. pp. 223-224.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Verbatim report. M., 1989.

On the last day of work G.H. Popov announced the creation of an “interregional deputy group” (IDG), which, in essence, became the political opposition within the Congress of People’s Deputies. At the origins of the MDG was the club of Moscow deputies. The statement on the formation of the MDG at the congress was signed by 157 deputies1. Then their number grew.

During the election campaign, Yeltsin stayed away from the democratic movement of the Moscow intelligentsia. Criticizing the progress of perestroika, he tried not to over-exaggerate, did not lash out at authorities, and constantly emphasized that his election program did not contradict the party’s, that he supported the party’s strategic course, differing only on issues of tactics.

The vagueness of Yeltsin's political views was noted by both his opponents and supporters. V. Fedorov (Sakhalinsky)2, commenting on Yeltsin’s October 19, 1989 interview with Rodina magazine, wrote: “...a study of Yeltsin’s program and subsequent speeches does not leave the impression of the presence of a holistic concept of the overall development of the Soviet state.” “Boris Nikolayevich has more than once demonstrated the courage of his thinking; for the benefit of democracy, he violated many taboos that we received with our mother’s milk. And yet his political credo is not entirely clear to this day. What we hear from his lips is rather fragmentary and not interconnected, rather than simply left unsaid.”3

For the democrats, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister Yeltsin remained a stranger, a representative of the party elite, albeit disgraced. We will give only two opinions about him, dating back to April 1989. Sergei Mitrofanov: “But what is Yeltsin fighting against the apparatus for? What if he is just fighting for a new apparatus, trying to save what can still be saved, and is not really a subversive of the foundations, but a representative of a new generation of leaders who have realized that they are cutting the branch on which they sit?

Pavel Felgenhauer: “The Yeltsin phenomenon has no analogues in the history of modern Russia. The trusted party functionary returns to the center of political life not through apparatus intrigues, but relying on the clearly expressed will of the people, acquiring the features of an epic hero before our eyes. The liberal-radical opposition is hopelessly divided. It is not possible to unite on any ideological platform, but you can unite around a charismatic personality. Everyone can unite around Yeltsin.”4

Yeltsin's first speech at the MDG meeting was not successful. He was accused of speaking like a regional committee secretary. Many MDG organizers had doubts whether to invite Yeltsin. Despite all his conflicts with the party nomenklatura, he did not go beyond the rules of the game dictated by the System.

Logunov V. Interregional deputy group: a year in opposition // People's Deputy. 1990, no. 12. P.21.

V. Fedorov-Sakhalinsky - in 1990, chairman of the Sakhalin Regional Executive Committee, after the elections he was invited to the highest advisory and coordinating council of the Presidium of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR, then transformed into the presidential council.

Homeland. 1990. No. 1. Quoted from: Fedorov (Sakhalinsky) V. Yeltsin. Feature article. - M., 1995. P.14,18-19’

Referendum. Journal of Independent Opinions 1987-1990. Selected materials. M., 1990. S. 166-167.

G. Shakhnazarov recalled his conversation with G. Popov about Yeltsin. When asked what the democrats found in Yeltsin, Popov replied: “People like it... He’s brave, he’s the coolest at cutting down the system.” Shakhnazarov: “But the intellectual potential is not very great.” Popov: “And he doesn’t really need to assert himself, that’s our concern.” Shakhnazarov: “Gavriil Kharitonovich, what if he, as they say, decides to go his own way?” Popov: “Eh, darling, in this case we’ll just throw him off, and that’s all.”1. He turned out to be more insightful

A. Sakharov, who is credited with saying: “We all have our own business to switch to - science, teaching, art. Yeltsin has nothing but a political future. He will go with us to the end." As noted by S.S. Alekseev, Yeltsin was assigned a certain role - not a spiritual associate, but a striking force, a leader2.

Be that as it may, Yeltsin not only became a member of the MDG, but was also elected one of its five co-chairs. Yu.N. also became co-chairs. Afanasyev, V.A. Palm, G.H. Popov and A.D. Sakharov. The fundamental provisions of the MDG platform were: recognition of private property, including land; decentralization of power; economic independence of the republics, increasing their sovereignty3.

In the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Committee on Construction and Architecture, and therefore the only member of the MDG to join the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This committee, formed on a sectoral basis, was created at the suggestion of Gorbachev specifically for Yeltsin. Other committees and commissions of the Supreme Council should be formed according to problems. There were great difficulties in organizing the work of the Committee. All executive bodies for capital construction management in the country were liquidated; as a result of the reorganization, the USSR State Construction Committee no longer had administrative functions. The committee was overwhelmed with paperwork, there were not enough staff and funds.

Now Yeltsin’s office was located in the Moscow Hotel, where luxury rooms were reserved for the work of Supreme Council committees. According to Olbik’s recollections, in his office there were two small T-shaped tables, three chairs with green velvet upholstery, two identical armchairs, a small coffee table, light curtains on the doors, a parquet floor that was polished to a shine, and one ordinary telephone. On the table, the journalist noticed the book “Gorbachev’s Russia and American Foreign Policy” by Severin Bialer and Michael Mendenbaum, Progress Publishing House. On the shelf there are several books, including “The Architecture of Soviet Georgia”, a book about Gorbachev in English, “Bulletin of the USSR Parliamentary Group”, the catalog “New Books Abroad”, etc. Next to the office there was a fairly large reception room where they worked assistants L. Sukhanov and A. Korzhakov4.

Shakhnazarov G. The price of freedom. M., 1993, p. 157.

Alekseev, S.S. Gorbachev and Yeltsin: Celebration and drama // Izv. Ural. state un-ta. - Ekaterinburg, 2003. No. 25. P.92.

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 9. D. 12. See also: Power and opposition. Russian political process XX

centuries. M., 1995. P. 309.

Alexander Olbik. Baltic vector of Boris Yeltsin, http://bookz.ru/authors/ol_bik- а1ек5апс1г/ебн/1-ebn.html

Eliseeva Natalya Viktorovna,
Professor of the Russian State University, head of the educational and scientific center "New Russia. History of Post-Soviet Russia"

Aggravation of interethnic relations

At the beginning of his reign, M. S. Gorbachev did not understand what a threat interethnic tensions and conflicts posed to the USSR. He naively believed that the national question had been resolved in the USSR. Reality refuted his ideas.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh led to pogroms of Armenian families in Sumgait, Azerbaijan, in March 1988. In turn, thousands of Azerbaijanis were forced to flee Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. At the beginning of 1989, the allied authorities introduced direct union rule in Karabakh, hoping to thus resolve the problem, but at the end of the year they returned Nagorno-Karabakh to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. The Supreme Council of Armenia in response to this adopted a resolution on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war between the military formations of Azerbaijan and Karabakh, with the active support of the latter by Armenia. On September 24, 1989, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a law on the sovereignty of the republic. In January 1990, pogroms against Armenians began in Baku. The response was the introduction of troops, which resulted in casualties among the population.

In Georgia, they remembered the overthrow of the Menshevik Social Democratic government of independent Georgia by the Red Army in 1922. In May-June 1989, pogroms took place in Fergana against the houses of Meskhetian Turks who had been evicted there back in 1944. The army leadership did not want to take on the role of whipping boy and did not intervene until they received direct instructions. As a result, thousands of citizens became victims of violence. These events gave rise to an increasingly critical attitude of the local population towards the allied government. By the fall of 1989, there was a rise in the national movement in Ukraine. The First Congress of the Russian Rukh movement, which advocated the independence of Ukraine, was held.

Under the influence of economic turmoil in the republics, social tension increased. Dissatisfaction with the policies of the union center turned many informal political associations from supporters into opponents of “perestroika” and forced them to take anti-union positions. The leaders of the national fronts clearly formulated the economic and national problems of their republics, won the sympathy of the population and quickly became influential political forces in the republics.

Demands to restore the state sovereignty of the national republics have gained increasing popularity. In the Baltics, the basis for these demands was the non-recognition of the 1939 Treaty between the USSR and Nazi Germany, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which allowed the USSR to occupy the Baltic republics. In November 1988, the National Front of Estonia came out with demands for recognition of sovereignty, political independence and changes in property relations in the republic. Similar processes of growth of national self-awareness, search for national identity and articulation of national interests took place in Lithuania, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine. A wave of rallies erupted in the capitals of the republics. A mass demonstration in Chisinau resulted in riots.

The result of political changes in the mood of the population of the republics was a tightening of the position of their leadership in relations with the union center. The top of the national nomenclature hoped that these movements would clear the way for them to power in the already independent republics. History has confirmed such expectations. In Georgia, the group of President Z. Gamsarkhudia was soon replaced by the clan of E. Shevardnadze; in Azerbaijan, President A. Elchibey, the leader of the National Front, was replaced by former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee G. Aliyev. In all the republics of Central Asia, power remained in the hands of former party functionaries of the Communist Party. For most of the Russian party bureaucracy, the growth of national movements was unacceptable.

In response to interethnic conflicts and the strengthening of national movements, the union leadership either did not react or used force. Troops of the Transcaucasian Military District dispersed a peaceful rally in Tbilisi using sapper shovels and tear gas. There were casualties. The order to use troops to disperse the demonstration was given by local party authorities, but the anger of the population was directed against Moscow. M. S. Gorbachev understood that the use of force would not only undermine his popularity, but would also leave the USSR without Western loans. Massive repression would only hasten the country's bankruptcy. But understanding this did not solve the question: how to preserve the USSR?

The growth of opposition sentiments in Russia

In Russia, there was also a radicalization of the mood of the masses. In July 1989, the Leningrad Popular Front was created in Leningrad. A little later, the Moscow Association of Voters was established in Moscow. In the Communist Party, the “Democratic Platform in the CPSU” faction arose spontaneously. These informal associations published their own newspapers.

For the first time, signs of social trouble resulted in strikes. In March 1989, a strike of Vorkuta miners began. Miners of Kuzbass, Donbass, Vorkuta and Karaganda created strike committees, established the Union of Donbass Strike Committees and demanded that the authorities solve long-standing problems.

On the eve of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, major cities were engulfed in rallies. Thus, in Moscow on May 5, 1989, about 150 thousand people gathered for a rally of the democratic opposition at the Luzhniki Stadium. During the congress on May 27, a grand rally took place in Leningrad.

Social tension also increased in connection with the massive withdrawal of Soviet troops. On February 15, 1989, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was completed; in the spring, the withdrawal of 50 thousand Soviet soldiers from the GDR and Czechoslovakia began, and later from Mongolia. In June, the Central Asian Military District was abolished. Thousands of military personnel returned to a country where there was no housing or jobs for them.

Defeat of the party nomenklatura in the elections

The elections to the First Congress of People's Deputies became a completely new phenomenon for the Soviet people. Gone are the uncontested “elections without choice,” when voters were offered one candidate approved by the CPSU. Alternativeism has activated various political forces - from democrats to chauvinists from the Memory society. A real political struggle began in the USSR. In the regions, opposition candidates' access to newspapers and television was limited, but they actively used rallies and meetings with voters. The population showed great interest in their programs, people passed leaflets from hand to hand. This “samizdat” successfully competed with the official media.

The election law provided for a list of people's deputies from the CPSU according to a quota of 100 people. They were selected at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in March 1989. The list included almost the entire composition of the top party leadership. Although it was also attended by representatives of the creative intelligentsia - writers D. A. Granin, V. I. Belov, Ch. Aitmatov, lawyer D. Kudryavtsev, academician L. I. Abalkin, film director T. E. Abuladze, actor M. A. Ulyanov, as well as famous workers, builders, and agricultural workers, the list was popularly called the “Red Hundred”.

After the elections, it turned out that members of the CPSU made up 85% of the deputies. Using a quota from the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev managed to carry out his list, including both reformers and conservatives. And yet it was a defeat for the party-state, its loss of power. Many high-ranking party members, 32 first secretaries of regional party committees out of 160, did not get elected. Moreover, not a single party or Soviet leader, not a single member of the regional committee bureau, or even a military district commander was elected in Leningrad and the region. In Moscow, party workers were also largely defeated, but about 90% of Muscovites voted for B.N. Yeltsin. The elections in many large industrial and scientific centers of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, the south and east of Ukraine, as well as in the Baltic states, Armenia and Georgia turned out to be disastrous for the party apparatus. The elections were relatively successful for the party in the regions of the Central Black Earth and North Caucasus regions, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Approximately a quarter of all deputies elected in districts were critical of the CPSU. Many such deputies came from public organizations. Well-known scientists, writers, and lawyers were elected to the First Congress of People's Deputies: A. D. Sakharov, R. Z. Sagdeev, N. P. Shmelev, S. S. Averintsev, P. G. Bunich, Yu. N. Afanasyev, Yu. F. Karyakin, V. L. Ginzburg, G. Kh. Popov, A. A. Sobchak, Yu. Yu. Boldyrev and others.

The paradox was that, although the elections were organized and controlled by the CPSU, they were won by many figures who were more radical than Gorbachev and his political competitors. Before the elections, only informal instruments of political struggle were available to them. Having become deputies with rights secured by law, they acquired a high legal status and broad opportunities. The new political system made it possible to form a different political elite, which opposed itself to the party apparatus.

At the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the concerns of the party leaders were fully expressed. All the bitterness of defeat in the elections, the desire to blame the economic crisis of the socialist system on the “corrupting” role of the media, spilled out onto M. S. Gorbachev. This was essentially the first massive offensive of conservative forces in the party apparatus against Gorbachev, against “perestroika.” Despite this, he managed to remove 74 members and 24 candidate members from the CPSU Central Committee.

I Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR

The congress lasted from May 25 to June 9, 1989. And for all 16 days, passions raged under the arches of the Kremlin Palace, unprecedented before by Soviet citizens. The whole country, without stopping, followed the live (for the first time!) broadcast of the congress on television.

Already from the first minutes of the congress, the prepared script was violated. Deputy from Riga V.F. Tolpezhnikov unexpectedly rose to the podium and proposed to honor the memory of those killed in Tbilisi. The hall stood up. A.D. Sakharov demanded that the agenda be changed, making the first issue the adoption of a decree on the exclusive right of the congress to appoint senior officials of the USSR. It would seem that procedural issues were moving into the political plane. The question of the possibility of combining the posts of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR came to the fore. It was decided in favor of Gorbachev: he remained General Secretary and was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council.

The deputies were divided into two camps. The majority, consisting of the party nomenklatura, which Yu. N. Afanasyev aptly called the “aggressive-obedient majority,” supported Gorbachev, although with reservations. Democrats noted the failure of economic reforms and pointed to the destructiveness of the administrative-command system of management. They put forward the slogan of repealing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which determined the leading role of the CPSU in the political system of the USSR. This was a fundamental question: if for Gorbachev and his supporters the reform of the political system seemed complete, then the opposition demanded the creation of conditions for a multi-party system.

The congress not only failed to consolidate society around the “perestroika” leadership of the CPSU, but, on the contrary, divided it into supporters and opponents of the Communist Party. He publicly raised the question of the illegality of its monopoly on governing the country and questioned the reality of the country's federal structure under such management. Of great importance for the further development of events was the fact that Russian democrats supported deputies from the Baltic states on the issue of economic independence of their republics.

In the report “On the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR,” M. S. Gorbachev, already as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, emphasized that the time of party dictatorship had passed, and a new political regime was being established in the country. Gorbachev defined the program of further actions as follows: to promote a “full-blooded market” in economics, to implement the slogan “Power to the Soviets!” in politics, to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons in foreign policy and to negotiate in order to achieve a balance of interests in international affairs.

The long separation from Lenin resulted in Gorbachev defining his ideological position as centrist. In ideological terms, this meant a rejection of the class perception of the world, a command-administrative economy and recognition of the rule of law, which was alien to the practice of the past 70 years. In political terms, this was expressed in maneuvering between extremes: half-hearted economic reforms, a “balanced” personnel policy, hopes for reformability of the CPSU, reconciliation of the right and left, etc.

The ideology of the democrats reflected a view of Soviet history as one of continuous violence and irrational fanaticism. Criticism of the policies of past years raised the question of power itself, which was voiced at the congress in the draft Decree on Power proposed by Academician A.D. Sakharov. It followed from the Decree that the CPSU needed to “resign.” This idea, publicly voiced at a meeting of the legitimate representative body of government, united the democratic opposition, which formulated the economic perspective as “a society with an efficient economy in market conditions.”

After the congress, the political process began to develop according to a confrontational scenario. A struggle developed between radical democrats and Gorbachev supporters for support from the population. The Democrats formed the Interregional Deputy Group of People's Deputies of the USSR (MDG), which included about 300 people, and the Coordination Council of more than 20 people, elected its five co-chairs - B. N. Yeltsin, Yu. N. Afanasyev, G. Kh. Popov , A. D. Sakharova and V. A. Palma.

In September 1989, the MDG formulated its political program. The key demand was the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. After the sudden death of A.D. Sakharov on December 14, 1989, B.N. Yeltsin became the leader of the MDG. The Democrats had a reputation as opponents of partycrats, to whom the Democrats themselves included not only party conservatives, but also party reformers led by M. S. Gorbachev.

To generally accepted rules of law

The US administration developed a new strategy for relations with the USSR - “National Security Analysis-33”, which was presented to President George W. Bush in March 1989. The document stated that Gorbachev’s reforms “lead to a change in the Soviet social system in the direction of Western liberal democracy.” During 1989, US Secretary of State J. Baker met several times with M. S. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze. In June, George W. Bush visited Poland and Hungary. Meetings with their leaders and the opposition convinced him that in the countries of Eastern Europe, with the weakening of dependence on the USSR, a “collapse of socialism” was taking place.

The growing economic crisis in the USSR forced M. S. Gorbachev to speed up rapprochement with Western countries. Their governments set a condition: if you want to get loans, respect human rights, especially freedom of speech, assembly, and political associations. But for the CPSU (party-state), whose policy was based on maintaining a monopoly on power at any cost, including repression against dissidents, this meant a greater likelihood of leaving the political scene. Nevertheless, in January 1989, the Soviet Union signed the Vienna Declaration of the CSCE, according to which it was obliged to bring its legislation into line with generally accepted legal norms in world practice. For the first time, the USSR agreed with the priority of international law over national legislation.

In April 1989, Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which provided for punishment for political dissent, was repealed. Humanitarian and human rights topics were the subject of discussion at the Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991) CSCE meetings. Soviet legislation was brought into conformity with international conventions and treaties.

The decision to transfer USSR legislation to international legal standards had far-reaching consequences for relations with socialist countries and between union republics. The activity of nationalist forces until 1989 was restrained by the threat of application of the relevant articles of the Criminal Code. After the signing of the Vienna Declaration, the nationalist opposition received a legal basis for legalization. And centrifugal tendencies intensified in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

In March, the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral reduction in defense spending and a reduction in the armed forces. During 1989-1991, it was planned to reduce the size of the army by 500 thousand people, defense spending - by more than 14%. These actions in the West were perceived as forced, associated with a deep economic crisis, and only increased doubts about the solvency of the USSR. Difficulties arose in obtaining commercial loans.

In June 1989, M. S. Gorbachev visited Germany. The joint statement signed following the meeting defined the role of both countries in building a new Europe. Mutually beneficial and equal cooperation was envisaged. This turn in relations put on the agenda the extremely painful issue of the unification of Germany for the USSR. Unification was not an exclusively intra-German problem; the countries that won World War II were also involved in it: the USSR, the USA, England and France. A disunited Germany provided a balance between two socio-political systems.

The GDR, like most socialist countries, was experiencing serious economic difficulties and was in need of reforms aimed at democratizing the economic and political system. But the country's leadership, led by E. Honecker, had a negative attitude towards the reforms carried out in the USSR. The opposition consolidated on the slogan of unification with Germany, on the desire of the citizens of East Germany to achieve a high standard of living for the residents of West Germany. M. S. Gorbachev's foreign policy, oriented toward the democratization of international relations, objectively contributed to these aspirations. Negotiations on German reunification were difficult. Having recognized the right of the German people to unify, Soviet diplomacy intended to extend the process over time and, as one of the conditions, put forward the requirement that a united Germany not join NATO. On November 9, 1989, a symbolic event occurred - the Berlin Wall collapsed, although negotiations on the terms of unification continued until October 1990.

The federal states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia began to disintegrate. The communist leaders of Serbia, led by S. Milosevic, decided to play the card of Great Serbian chauvinism to retain power and unleashed a fratricidal war in Yugoslavia.

On the initiative of George W. Bush, on December 2-3, 1989, he met with M. S. Gorbachev on the island of Malta on board the Soviet motor ship Maxim Gorky. Both leaders issued a statement declaring the end of the Cold War. This meeting is usually assessed as a victory of “new political thinking” over the “Cold War” thinking that dominated the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Over time, the Western world began to interpret changes in relations with the USSR as a victory in the Cold War.

The Soviet government, forced to ask the West for economic assistance and politically motivated loans, could not resort to the use of force to maintain vassal regimes in power in Eastern Europe. During talks in Malta, Gorbachev informally assured Bush that the USSR would not use military force in Eastern Europe. By 1989, when the political elites of these countries realized the realities, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was only a matter of time. In Poland, negotiations have begun with the Solidarity trade union on holding free elections. The ruling party suffered a crushing defeat in these elections. In Romania, even the use of weapons by security forces did not save the regime; President N. Ceausescu was executed.

Prospects have opened for revising the foreign policy course in relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, the leadership of Vietnam was asked to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, which contributed to the improvement of relations between the USSR and China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed, and the situation in the Indochina region improved. This created the preconditions for the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting. The official visit of the Soviet delegation led by M. S. Gorbachev on May 15-18, 1989 was the first visit of the head of the USSR to the PRC in the previous 30 years. This visit marked the beginning of the normalization of relations between states. As a result of the second visit of the Soviet leadership to China in May 1991, a Soviet-Chinese border agreement was signed.

However, not everyone then or later considered the USSR’s foreign policy in 1990-1991 successful. Some viewed it as a national disaster. The “concessions” that M. S. Gorbachev made to the West, in accordance with his ideal of “new political thinking,” but rather under the pressure of the economic crisis in the USSR, increasingly frightened supporters of the “socialist choice.” Accustomed to militant anti-imperialist rhetoric, the party nomenklatura, part of the generals, officers, and intellectuals considered such a desire to establish cooperation with developed countries as a “surrender of ground,” a betrayal of national interests, or, more mildly, as unjustified concessions.

Gradual reforms on the road to collapse

By March 1989, the price of oil had dropped to $40-50 per ton from $125 in 1985 and largely determined the economic situation in the USSR and its inability to maintain food imports in the same volumes. Unforeseen expenses associated with natural and social disasters also had an impact. Thus, in the summer of 1988, the largest earthquake occurred in Armenia. The cities of Spitak, Leninakan and Kirovakan were completely destroyed. More than 24 thousand people died, direct material damage was estimated at 10 billion rubles (at 1988 prices), and taking into account the costs of restoring the destruction, this amount should at least be doubled.

In 1989, official statistics recognized a decline in industrial production. The current economic policy could not ensure stabilization. The economic reform program of 1987 was buried, control over the money supply and monetary income of the population was lost. Despite the crisis and the fall in production, the growth rate of the population's cash income in 1989 was 1.4 times higher than the growth rate of the population's expenses for purchasing goods and paying for services.

The “cash overhang” of money unsecured by goods grew rapidly. In 1989, additional money was issued twice as much as in the previous year - 18.3 billion rubles. The huge additional money supply in conditions of general shortage could not be spent on the purchase of food and goods and took the form of forced savings. Although with such a rapid increase in income, labor productivity did not grow at all, people perceived salary increases as honestly earned money.

In 1989, the deficit amounted to 92 billion rubles, or 10% of the gross national product. To cover it, the government used loans from the State Bank of the USSR, a “printing press” and loans abroad. Recognizing the country's financial situation as critical, the USSR leadership announced plans to reduce military spending. In March 1989, a resolution was adopted to reduce union budget expenditures in 1990 by 29.3 billion rubles and increase revenues by 33.7 billion. This meant that, under the pressure of the crisis, M. S. Gorbachev nevertheless decided to enter into conflict with the party and economic elite. But, as further developments showed, the measures taken were not enough to stop the impending disaster.

It was obvious that in order to reduce the budget deficit and reduce the rate of growth of the money supply, at a minimum, it was necessary to sharply increase retail prices. But in conditions of social tension and political destabilization, the country's top leadership considered this too dangerous and unacceptable and gave priority to political rather than economic reforms. This reorientation occurred when it became clear to the majority of the population that the economic achievements of “perestroika” turned out to be minimal. The people lived even worse than in previous years.

Nomenklatura privatization and primary accumulation of capital were gaining momentum. Based on the Law “On Cooperation,” more than 1,000 commercial banks were established within a short period of time, for which banking legislation had not even been developed. State specialized banks (Promstroybank, Agroprombank, etc.) were transformed into commercial ones.

The legalization of cooperative and then small private production took place in conditions of disordered relations between the state and non-state sectors of the economy. The founders of many commercial banks were large state-owned enterprises. These banks, like cooperatives under state-owned enterprises, were often used to semi-legally pump public funds into private entrepreneurship. During nomenklatura privatization, the property of state-owned enterprises was simply recorded as a contribution to certain joint-stock companies controlled by private individuals - yesterday's party officials. Introduced in accordance with the Law “On State Enterprise (Association),” the state order, according to Prime Minister N. I. Ryzhkov, “turned out to be farmed out to ministries and departments and was turned by them into a new package of traditional methods of targeted directive planning.”

Despite the rapid deterioration of the economic situation, the authorities delayed the transition to the market. The approach of gradual, evolutionary reform of the economic system prevailed in the government. In the summer of 1989, academician L. I. Abalkin, a supporter of this approach, was appointed deputy prime minister. He formed the State Commission on Economic Reform, which included academicians A. G. Aganbegyan and S. S. Shatalin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. A. Martynov, management specialists professors R. N. Evstigneev, G. A. Yeghiazaryan, B. Z. Milner.

The commission declared a desire for diversity of forms of ownership, their equality, and the transformation of the market into a tool for coordinating commodity producers. But at the same time she tried to maintain bureaucratic state regulation of the economy. Disputes were held, laws were developed and adopted, written in Soviet traditions, that is, laws of indirect action, with many references to the by-laws that were still being planned. The effect of such “reform” activity without price liberalization and financial stabilization was zero.

The budget deficit forced a reduction in budget funding. The lack of currency led to a sharp decrease in food imports - the cities were threatened with famine. Money turned into cut paper. Barter prevailed in relations between enterprises, which objectively led to a reduction in production. The issue of money to cover the budget deficit spurred a shortage of goods in stores and an increase in prices on collective farm markets. Their prices exceeded state retail prices by 3-4 times. But the State Commission was still inclined to a smooth, “evolutionary” version of economic reforms.

Split in the party

In the fall of 1989, political destabilization entered a new phase. The Communist Party actually split not only along ideological trends - into Stalinists, Leninists, Marxists and reformists, but also along national-republican lines. It was no longer the same party-state that was in power in 1985. After the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, the composition of district and city committees changed three times, Soviet bodies were almost completely renewed, and after the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee, the composition of the first secretaries of the republics and regional committees also changed. A rapid advance to the top of the second and third echelons of the nomenklatura began. The displacement of the older generation of party officials was accompanied by a general weakening of the party's role in society.

In September 1989, the Russian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee was formed, the chairman of which was M. S. Gorbachev. At the September 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the leader of the Communist Party of Lithuania A. Brazauskas publicly announced that the Lithuanian communists support the demand for Lithuania’s secession from the USSR. In early December, the Supreme Councils of the Baltic republics abolished Article 6 of the USSR Constitution on their territory and recognized the illegality of the forced annexation of these republics to the USSR in 1940. A mass withdrawal of republican communists from the CPSU began, and republican party organizations were divided into two: the CPSU and the Communist Party of a particular republic.

II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR

The congress took place from December 12 to December 24, 1989. Deputies from the Baltic states, with the support of Russian democrats, initiated a discussion and assessment of the previously secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939 Treaty between the USSR and Germany). The Congress not only condemned this pact, but also recognized its legal inconsistency, which provided legal justification for the withdrawal of the Baltic republics from the Union. In fact, the problem of separatism was legalized as a natural component of the general democratic process of “perestroika.”

In terms of the intensity of passions and the rally activity of the deputies, this congress was similar to the First. In connection with the upcoming elections of people's deputies in the republics and regions, the deputies adopted the Law “On amendments and additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR on issues of the electoral system” dated December 20, 1989 No. 963-I. Barriers to candidates in the form of “meetings of public representatives” organized by district party committees were removed from the electoral legislation.

At the congress, the report of the parliamentary commission to study the causes of the tragedy in Tbilisi was heatedly discussed, when troops of the Transcaucasian Military District dispersed a peaceful rally in Tbilisi. 19 people were killed, over 250 were injured of varying degrees of severity. The commission was headed by A. A. Sobchak. The tension in the hall reached its climax during the speech of military prosecutor A.F. Katusev, who completely absolved the army of blame for its actions. Georgian deputies shouted “shame!” left the hall, followed by deputies from the Baltic states and the MDG. Gorbachev called on the deputies to return to the hall, promising to speak immediately after the break in the spirit of reconciliation and respect for the feelings of the Georgian people. During the break, additions were made to the draft resolution, which directly condemned the use of violence against demonstrators.

The Democrats set the tone at the convention. Ideas were voiced about abandoning the leading role of the CPSU and dismantling the unitary state of the USSR. And in this context - about the transition to a competitive market and private ownership of the means of production. But these proposals found no place in the report of Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov. Nevertheless, the majority of deputies voted for confidence in the government.

Following the results of the congress, an extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held on December 25-26, 1989, at which M. S. Gorbachev called Lithuania an integral part of the USSR and promised that there would be no second Tbilisi. He said that he did not intend to ban the Lithuanian People's Front "Sąjūdis" and expel the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania A. Brazauskas from the party. But the real situation at the Plenum indicated that the Secretary General was losing power. Senior party functionaries shouted rude remarks from the seats and “slammed” the speeches of his supporters. A conservative wave was growing in the CPSU Central Committee.

Foreign policy

A symbolic event occurred on November 9, 1989 - the Berlin Wall collapsed, although negotiations on the terms of unification continued until October 1990.

In February 1990, M. S. Gorbachev, at a meeting in Moscow with German Chancellor He. Kohl, proposed to “take the unification of Germany into his own hands.” Discussions about the right of a united Germany to enter into military alliances are a thing of the past. The Soviet leadership recognized this right with all the ensuing other rights and obligations. This concession was made in connection with the rapid deterioration of the socio-economic and political situation of the USSR and the dire need for loans for the purchase of food. Germany fulfilled its obligations and provided the USSR and then Russia with a total of almost 100 billion marks in loans, or more than half of the total amount of foreign aid. A movement began among the German population to provide humanitarian and food aid to Soviet people. A group of presidents of the largest German banks came to Moscow with specific proposals and projects.

During M. S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States at the end of May - beginning of June 1990, the issue of reducing offensive weapons was discussed. As a result of the visit, a protocol was signed to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, an Agreement on the Destruction and Cessation of the Production of Chemical Weapons, as well as a trade agreement that abolished discriminatory measures against the USSR. But restrictions on the supply of high-tech goods and computers remained.

In the fall of 1990, a meeting of representatives of 22 NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) took place in Paris, who signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), in particular, on equalizing the total number of weapons on the part of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. The agreement entered into force on July 17, 1992. The enormous conventional superiority that the Soviet Union enjoyed in Europe was eliminated.

In 1990, on the initiative of M. S. Gorbachev, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed, proclaiming an era of democracy, peace and unity on the continent. This document declared the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the “Declaration of the 22” was approved - a joint statement by the NATO and Warsaw countries, which stated that the states of both military blocs do not consider each other as hypothetical opponents.

Crisis of CMEA and Warsaw

By 1990, CMEA countries accounted for 80% of Soviet imports. In the GDR, the Soviet Union purchased carriages, in Hungary - Ikarus buses, in Czechoslovakia - Skoda cars, in Bulgaria - wine and cigarettes. Clothing and footwear were purchased in huge quantities. And the USSR exported oil to fraternal countries, and at very preferential prices, despite the multiple rise in prices on the world market, other raw materials and some types of equipment.

By 1989-1990, political elites had established themselves in the countries of Eastern Europe, viewing dependence on the USSR as the cause of the degradation of the political and economic institutions of their countries. They defiantly severed cultural ties, and progress began in economic relations within the CMEA. Ministers and politicians explained the difficulties experienced by their countries by the low quality of imported products or by the fact that it was impossible to use the CMEA currency (transferable ruble) outside this union. Soon, muted discontent gave way to an open clash of interests. Refusal of subjectivity in setting prices for export-import supplies required settlements between the CMEA countries in convertible currencies. This procedure, at the proposal of the USSR, was introduced on January 1, 1991. None of the countries had convertible currency, which led to a severance of economic ties between them. CMEA collapsed, joint projects were abandoned.

The Warsaw Pact Organization has also lost its meaning. In June 1990, Hungary announced its withdrawal from it, followed by the rest of the countries of the military alliance. A year later, an official statement was published in Budapest about the cessation of the activities of all political and then military structures of the Department of Internal Affairs and the abolition of CMEA. Thus, the military and economic organizations of the former socialist countries ceased to exist. Not only economic but also cultural cooperation has decreased.

It is unfair to blame M. S. Gorbachev for inaction at a time when ties with Eastern European countries were being broken. The revision of the historical path of the USSR in the twentieth century, the rejection of communist mythology and the need for Western loans did not allow the leader of Soviet reformers to resort to political or military pressure on former allies. He tried to build new, equal relationships with his neighbors. In an effort to prevent alienation in Soviet-Polish relations, in the spring of 1990 Moscow officially recognized the responsibility of the Stalinist leadership for the execution of captured Polish officers in Katyn in 1940. Documents relating to the events of those years were transferred to Poland. However, this recognition was not enough for reconciliation; the attitude of many Poles towards the USSR remained negative.

On the way to Russian sovereignty

By 1990, in Russian political movements of various orientations, the demand for Russian sovereignty was becoming increasingly popular. Society consolidated around this slogan for several reasons. Firstly, due to mass dissatisfaction with the falling standard of living in conditions of a permanent socio-economic crisis. People saw that the Union authorities were not solving the country's economic problems, and hoped that the Russian authorities, having rejected the conservative majority of the Union Congress of People's Deputies, would be able to carry out the overdue market reforms. Secondly, the Russian party nomenklatura sought to gain power no less than that received by the nomenklatura of other union republics. Thirdly, the complaints of Russians against the policies of the center in connection with the growth of anti-Russian sentiment in the union republics also had an impact.

In order to “cut the ground” from under the feet of Russian democrats, the question of Russia’s economic sovereignty was raised at the very first meeting of the newly created Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR, chaired by M. S. Gorbachev on January 15, 1990. It is important that the question of Russian sovereignty was raised by the leaders of the CPSU themselves. Later he was called “heretic” and the blame for “sovereignization” was placed on political opponents of the CPSU Central Committee.

The legal basis for the sovereignty of Russia was made up of changes to the Constitution of the RSFSR, introduced during the reform of the political system. According to the decisions of the XIX All-Union Party Conference, held on October 27, 1989, the Supreme Council introduced 25 amendments to the Constitution of the RSFSR. The highest body of state power in the RSFSR became the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, which was given the right to change the Constitution and determine the domestic and foreign policy of the RSFSR in accordance with the policies of the USSR. The Congress elected by secret ballot from among its members the Supreme Council - a permanent legislative, administrative and control body of state power of the RSFSR. The latter consisted of two chambers: the Council of the Republic and the Council of Nationalities. The Chairman of the Supreme Council was the highest official of the RSFSR, elected by the congress by secret ballot from among its members for a period of 5 years. The amendments did not stipulate the division of powers between the RSFSR and the USSR. This situation laid a time bomb under the relationship between the Union center and the RSFSR.

The election campaign for the election of people's deputies of the RSFSR has begun. In the context of a growing financial crisis and increased social tension, the main theme and subject of political confrontation between the Union and Russian authorities became the question of the depth and direction of economic reforms. The Union leadership sought an evolutionary transformation of the administrative-command system into a market one. This policy led to the destruction and theft of state assets that had become “nobody’s”, essentially covered up nomenklatura privatization, did not give hope for a rapid transformation of the economic system and doomed the population to years of hardship.

However, by that time it had already become clear that it was impossible to combine directive planning and the market. If during directive planning it is important for directors of enterprises to fulfill the plan issued from above, no matter how absurd it may be, then in market conditions their goal is to make a profit and win a place in the market. These goals of economic entities were incompatible.

Gorbachev and his entourage continued to talk about market socialism and were looking for ways to build it, although the experience of other countries spoke of the unrealizability of this idea. Neither Yugoslavia nor Hungary, which tried to build market socialism, managed to eliminate the main reason for the inefficiency of the socialist economy - the ineffectiveness of public investment. If in the USSR the official did not care where and with what return “nobody’s” state investments were invested, then in the “self-governing” Yugoslav state enterprises another obstacle arose to the growth of labor efficiency. It was difficult to pass through the bodies of workers' self-government decisions on investing profits in production. The workers needed money for a better life today, they did not want to wait for the new equipment to pay off, they demanded an increase in wages, bringing the cost of production almost to the selling price. In such conditions, investments were kept to a minimum.

In Western countries, similar problems caused by the reluctance of workers - co-owners of enterprises - to invest income in the development of enterprises were observed in production cooperatives and in enterprises purchased from their owners by their employees.

A logical conclusion suggested itself: state ownership, even in market conditions, turns out to be a brake on the economic development of the country, and therefore on increasing the living standards of the population. Without the legitimation of large private ownership of the means of production, effective investment cannot be expected. Realizing this, Russian democrats set as their goal the return of Russia to a competitive market, to the division of power and property. This implied a rejection of socialism in any form: from Stalin’s Gulag, from Brezhnev’s stagnant one, from Yugoslav market one.

During the election campaign, a negative public opinion was formed in society about the results of “perestroika” in general and personally about M. S. Gorbachev. On the contrary, the speeches of B. N. Yeltsin and other democratic leaders contributed to the growth of public support for the demands of radical reforms and the rejection of socialist myths. Populist slogans also played a role: abolish privileges, transfer state-owned dachas and mansions to children, etc.

According to the electoral law in force at that time, elections were held according to a majoritarian system. Each candidate fought for votes independently; support from public organizations was minimal. However, the focus of the candidate's speeches allowed voters to understand which camp he belonged to. However, there were also attempts to consolidate the political forces participating in the elections. In January 1990, the pre-election bloc of informal organizations “Democratic Russia” was established.

B. N. Yeltsin conducted his election campaign in Sverdlovsk, where before “perestroika” he worked as the first secretary of the regional committee. He criticized the CPSU and Gorbachev specifically, supported the slogan of abolishing Article 6 of the Constitution, insisted on the adoption of laws on property and land, declared that Russia should become a presidential republic, and suggested that the communists, within the framework of a multi-party system, form an independent party focused on democratic socialism.

On February 4, 1990, a grand rally took place in Moscow. Its organizers called on Muscovites to support supporters of the democratic path of development in the elections. There was a demand to give the opposition the opportunity to influence politics, and there was criticism of Gorbachev. On February 25, new rallies were held demanding the removal of the CPSU from power.

Elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR took place on March 4. Among those elected, 86% were members of the CPSU, of which 20-25% supported the “Democratic Platform of the CPSU”; 12.6% are scientists, 5% are workers. There were many military men and journalists. The weekly Argumenty i Fakty alone received 10 parliamentary seats. And party and Soviet workers - 110 mandates. The democratic opposition did not win, but received at least a third of the votes. In the constituency where B.N. Yeltsin ran, 11 more candidates were registered. But he won by a huge margin and received more than 85% of the votes.

The opposition is organizing

By the summer of 1989, the conservative opposition announced the creation of the United Workers' Front (UTF), and in the summer of 1990 it established the Russian Communist Party (RCP). The slogan of Russian communists is “to stop the degeneration of perestroika in an anti-socialist and anti-people direction.” They declared the main enemy to be the Democrats, who “occupied a dominant position in the media” and “carried away some active citizens with false guidelines.” Russian orthodox communists rejected the concept of “universal values” proposed by Gorbachev and argued that proletarian values ​​are precisely universal values. The leading ideologists of the Russian communists were professor of political economy of the Higher Trade Union School A. A. Sergeev, G. I. Zyuganov, etc. K. Polozkov, elected first secretary of the RCP.

At the February 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, party conservatives accused M. S. Gorbachev of “creating a regime of unlimited freedom for the activities of anti-socialist and nationalist groups,” and with him A. N. Yakovlev and E. A. Shevardnadze - in the failure of all economic reforms, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the departure from communist ideology. At the March 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, E.K. Ligachev accused Gorbachev of weakening the party and that, by refusing to support communist parties in socialist countries, he contributed to the fall of socialist regimes. Ligachev categorically stated that “it is impossible to modernize socialism and treat the pain points of our economy using the methods of capitalist economy.”

National patriots, or statists, also acted on this flank. This opposition took shape in the “Union” association within the framework of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Its leaders were V.I. Alksnis, E.V. Kogan, Yu.I. Blokhin. The “Union” took an irreconcilable, aggressive position towards M. S. Gorbachev and demanded that he be removed from power.

In addition to the RCP and the Union, smaller conservative groups emerged in 1990: “Unity - for Leninism and Communist Ideals”, “Marxist Workers’ Party - Party of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and others.

Some representatives of the intelligentsia and the Writers' Union of the RSFSR, headed by Yu. V. Bondarev and A. A. Prokhanov, showed noticeable activity on the conservative flank. Their ideology intricately intertwined monarchical sentiments, interest and idealization of pre-revolutionary Russia with sympathy for the Stalinist regime.

On the reformist political flank, the election bloc “Democratic Russia” took shape in the All-Russian Movement with branches in all regions of Russia, with representative bodies and apparatus. This movement aimed to achieve Russian sovereignty and finally move to the market and legal private property. Many of the program goals of “Democratic Russia” repeated the demands put forward by the MDG.

The “Democratic Platform in the CPSU” formed its own elected bodies and began publishing a newspaper. The leadership of the CPSU did not consider the Democratic Platform as an ally, although its slogans for transforming the CPSU into a social democratic party resonated with many ordinary communists. M. S. Gorbachev banned Demplatform activists from membership in the CPSU.

Extraordinary III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR

M. S. Gorbachev understood that in the new conditions, the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR no longer guaranteed the preservation of his status. The idea arose to introduce the post of president, who could be elected at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. To introduce amendments to the Constitution, it was necessary to enlist the support of the Politburo and the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The promotion of the plan took place under the guise of a correction of political reform, the goal of which from now on was not to strengthen democracy, but to build a rule of law state.

The prevailing opinion among Gorbachev’s circle was that the union leadership “lacked power.” In many respects, this was the case, because under the conditions of the policy of separating the functions of the CPSU and the state, the influence of the party apparatus on what was happening in the country decreased. It seemed that the introduction of the post of President of the USSR would help curb the growth of social and interethnic conflicts. It is no coincidence that the establishment of this institution was accompanied by a discussion of the need to introduce a state of emergency or direct presidential rule in areas of instability.

On March 12, 1990, the Extraordinary III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR began its work. A report on the introduction of amendments and additions to the Constitution of the USSR and the establishment of the post of President of the USSR was made by the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. I. Lukyanov. He presented the presidency as a new frontier of “perestroika,” a continuation of the redistribution of state and party power.

The political intrigue of the congress was that the election of M. S. Gorbachev to this post was held with the support of the Interregional Deputy Group, Gorbachev’s political opponent. Such a temporary union was needed both by Gorbachev, whom conservatives opposed, and by democrats, who were counting on his support for the demand for the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution. As a result, after manipulating the regulations, the Secretary General gained a sufficient number of votes and was elected President of the USSR. At the same time, changes were made to Article 6 of the Constitution, which meant that the CPSU was deprived of its monopoly on power. From now on, other political parties could participate in governing the country.

Gorbachev believed that he had strengthened his position, but subsequent events showed that this was not the case. The republics also began to introduce presidential positions, which negated the idea of ​​strengthening central power. On March 30, 1990, two weeks after Gorbachev’s election, at a meeting of the Federation Council it became known that the post of president had been introduced in Uzbekistan. To Gorbachev’s perplexed question: “How did this happen? The president in Uzbekistan is elected without advice, consultations, without consultation,” came the calm answer of the Uzbek leader I. Karimov: “That’s what the people wanted.” Karimov was supported by N. Nazarbayev: “Yes, and in Kazakhstan, too, people ask, why don’t we have a president?” . As a result, the regional elites received an additional powerful tool in the struggle for the sovereignty of the republics.

In order to still maintain the influence of the center, the Union leaders tried to strengthen the vertical of presidential power and change the nature of the federal structure of the Union. Many decisions of the USSR President also concerned further liberalization. Thus, in August 1990, by a special decree, the victims of political repressions of the 1920-1930s were rehabilitated, Soviet citizenship was returned to those deprived of it in 1966-1968, including the writer A. I. Solzhenitsyn.

I Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR

On May 16, 1990, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR began its work. The division of deputies took place along the line “reformers - conservatives”. The core of the reformers were Democratic Russia and its allies. The reformers represented a wide range of political forces - from radical democrats to high-ranking representatives of the nomenklatura, who saw in B. N. Yeltsin an authoritarian leader capable of establishing order in the country.

The culmination of the congress was the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. B. N. Yeltsin had the greatest chance of being elected. M. S. Gorbachev openly opposed his candidacy, proposing an alternative - the party orthodox I. K. Polozkov. On May 30, the third round of voting ended with Yeltsin's victory. In many ways, this predetermined the path of Russia.

The republic was declared a federation: it included autonomous republics - national-state entities, autonomous regions and districts. The congress formed a bicameral Supreme Council of the RSFSR and a Constitutional Commission.

At the congress, the “Declaration on the Sovereignty of Russia” was adopted on June 12, 1990. It proclaimed the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR throughout the entire territory of the republic and provided for the suspension of regulations of the USSR that conflicted with the laws of the RSFSR. By adopting this norm, the congress began a “war of laws.”

Both democrats and members of communist factions advocated Russian sovereignty. The democrats were driven to this by the realization that under the Union government it would not be possible to carry out consistent economic and political reforms. And this happened not only because Gorbachev relied at the congresses on the “aggressively obedient majority” from the Central Asian republics, but also because it was objectively beneficial for Central Asia to retain Russia as its donor.

Under the slogan of sovereignty, the Russian party nomenklatura fought with the allied one for property. This is what pushed her to vote for the sovereignty of the RSFSR, and then for laws that removed Russia from the jurisdiction of the USSR and made it possible to establish control over union property. For Russian politicians of any orientation, the task of transformation has turned from a purely economic one into a political one, and the demand for sovereignty has turned into the right to independently carry out radical market reforms.

In general, the congress reflected the increased radicalism in the mood of Russians. He instructed the Supreme Council to develop and submit to the next congress a draft concept of economic reforms. During the congress, the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR gathered for the first session, the agenda of which opened with the question of the formation of the Russian government. It was clear to the new Russian elite that we were talking about creating a team capable of implementing Russia's transition to market relations. As a result of long negotiations and voting, I. S. Silaev was appointed chairman of the government, G. A. Yavlinsky was appointed first deputy prime minister, and B. G. Fedorov was appointed minister of finance.

For the success of the reforms, the most important condition was the removal of the Russian executive power from direct subordination to the allied authorities. On June 22, 1990, the congress adopted a resolution “On the delimitation of management functions of organizations on the territory of the RSFSR.” According to this resolution, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR was removed from the subordination of the USSR government. Direct control over organizations, enterprises and institutions on the territory of the RSFSR was retained by eight Union ministries, including the Ministry of Defense and the KGB. But at the same time it was stipulated that the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs would interact with the union Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in the future it was planned to create the KGB of the RSFSR. Autonomy was acquired by the State Bank of the RSFSR and Vnesheconombank, subordinate to the Supreme Council of the RSFSR.

The confrontation between the union government and the party apparatus of the CPSU, on the one hand, and the new government of Russia, on the other, was felt throughout the work of the congress. Gorbachev attended the meetings of the congress and spoke out against any sovereignty, realizing that this meant the beginning of the end of the USSR. The “Declaration of Russian Sovereignty” has become a political and legal instrument for distancing Russia from both the Union center and party dictatorship. This document began the decommunization of Russian authorities.

Last Congress of the CPSU

A week after the adoption of the “Declaration of the Sovereignty of Russia”, on June 19, 1990, the Conference of Communists of Russia opened. Gorbachev was not against the creation of the Communist Party of Russia, but proposed not to confuse the problems of the republic with the problems of the party as a whole. At the conference, Russian communists demanded the resignation of the entire Politburo and the dissolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

Two weeks later, the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU took place. It became an arena for the battle between reformist and orthodox movements in the party. The orthodox denounced M. S. Gorbachev and his supporters that the CPSU had lost its power monopoly. This explained economic problems and interethnic conflicts. B. N. Yeltsin proposed renaming the CPSU into the Party of Democratic Socialism and allowing freedom of factions in it. After his proposal was rejected, Yeltsin announced his resignation from the CPSU and left the meeting room. This was an open challenge to the union government and M.S. Gorbachev. The voting showed that a quarter of the congress delegates were against Gorbachev.

At this congress, politicians came together for the last time, who, by a whim of fate, found themselves first together, and then in different political columns - B. N. Yeltsin, M. S. Gorbachev and E. K. Ligachev. For Yeltsin, the rostrum of the congress became a springboard for the beginning of a new stage in his political biography. Ligachev suffered a humiliating defeat in this audience. Having put forward his candidacy for the post of Deputy Secretary General, he did not receive support even from that part of the hall that was opposed to Gorbachev. And Gorbachev himself lost his right and left wings and remained the general secretary of the essentially unchanged CPSU.

The resolution “Towards Humane Democratic Socialism” adopted by the congress recognized ideological pluralism, private property and the principle of separation of powers. But this was no longer a program of the Communist Party-state, but a declaration that was worth little. The CPSU was disintegrating, and a massive departure from its ranks began among those party members who were in it for career reasons.

For Gorbachev himself, the results of the last party congress were not relevant. As president of the USSR, he was no longer under the control of the party, the Politburo and the Central Committee. These structures turned out to be practically excluded from participation in decision-making. And the abolition of the nomenklatura appointment procedure, coupled with the deprivation of the CPSU of legal grounds for influencing personnel policy, freed the republican and local elites from party control. The state apparatus of the Soviet Union turned into a complex conglomerate of collaborating and opposing groups and clans.

Missed chance

By mid-1990, two centers of power had taken shape in the country: the Union one, headed by USSR President M. S. Gorbachev, and the Russian one, headed by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin. Economic problems were in the foreground. The Union Government adopted the document “Main Directions for Stabilizing the National Economy and the Transition to Market Relations,” known as the L. I. Abalkin Plan. The leadership of the RSFSR chose the “500 days” program of G. A. Yavlinsky.

Supporters of the union plan accused opponents of adventurism: they say, you cannot reform a giant country in 500 days. Yavlinsky's supporters reproached the Union government for its primitivism of views and reluctance to carry out reforms in general. In fact, the programs were essentially similar and sharply different from what had been done before. They were aimed at creating a market, and not at “restructuring” the planned economy. In 1990-1991, both the Union and Russian authorities recognized the need for private property, price liberalization, and did not rule out unemployment. The tempos inherent in them were different. Abalkin’s plan was based on a phased transition to the market and was designed for 5 years. And in the “500 days” program, such a period was just a populist slogan. Yavlinsky had the intention of achieving financial stability with a breakthrough, “shock therapy” - liberalizing prices, eliminating subsidies to enterprises and reducing military spending. Simultaneously with the transition to free prices, it was planned to carry out phased privatization.

M. S. Gorbachev understood that there was no alternative to the reforms declared by the “500 days” program. But, having considered the hardships that radical reform would bring, I was afraid of a social explosion. It should be taken into account that by that time his rating had fallen to extremely low. He decided to make one based on two programs. But compromise was impossible because they presented alternative methods of financial stabilization. The text of the “synthesized” program was more like a political economy textbook. Gorbachev's decision turned out to be wrong - he missed his chance.

The Russian leadership has announced its intention to implement the “500 days” program on a republican scale. But he failed, since it was simply impossible to achieve financial stabilization without control over the “printing press,” that is, the State Bank of the USSR. And it was still under the jurisdiction of the union center.

Union leadership - loss of control levers

In the second half of 1990, the union leadership continued to lose the levers of state administration, and from January 1991, when the Russian Law “On Property in the RSFSR” of December 24, 1990 No. 443-I came into force, and management in the sphere of production. Enterprises that came under Russian jurisdiction received tax benefits. An absurd situation arose when neighboring factories operated under different laws - Union and Russian.

The Union authorities did not want to lose the agricultural sector as well. In response to the proposal of the democratic opposition to give land to the peasants, at the October 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, a decision was made that stated that the Plenum was against “the transfer or sale of land into private ownership,” and the CPSU Central Committee, “supporting various forms of denationalization of enterprises,” spoke out “for the priority of collective forms of ownership.” M. S. Gorbachev did not accept this idea either: “I have always advocated and still advocate for the market. But, being for the market, however, I, for example, do not accept private ownership of land - no matter what you do with me. I don't accept it. Lease - at least for 100 years, even with the right to sell rental rights, with inheritance. Yes! But I don’t accept private property with the right to sell land. This, by the way, is a tradition of the rural community."

Union Treaty

The question of federal relations in the USSR also caused heated controversy. It became key in late Soviet history. Even at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the new Union Treaty was discussed as the crown of reform of the political system. Then work began on his projects. More than 200 experts from various specialties and representatives of over 40 political parties and movements were involved in it. The work was supervised by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Lukyanov.

In August-October 1990, meetings of expert groups of the union and autonomous republics were held. By November, the first version of the project was prepared and published in the media. But he did not satisfy the leadership of the republics. Russian politicians focused not on the Union of Sovereign Republics, but on the Union of Sovereign States, that is, on the transformation of the republics of the USSR into independent states.

In December 1990, B. N. Yeltsin tried to conclude a quadripartite agreement within the Union - with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Subsequently, Russia began to conclude bilateral agreements with the republics, which, in turn, entered into agreements with each other. Taken together, these treaties constituted a kind of “anti-union treaty.”

The political process of strengthening the republics led to a crisis of Soviet statehood. The Union government was unable to get out of this crisis on its own; it appealed to public opinion. The question of the fate of the Soviet Union was made dependent on the results of the referendum, which was scheduled for March 17, 1991 by the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The majority of Soviet citizens, not accustomed to objecting to their superiors, spoke out in favor of preserving the USSR. But it was not possible to save the Union. The interests of national republican elites got in the way.

On the eve of bankruptcy

At the end of 1989 - beginning of 1990, Soviet foreign trade organizations increasingly missed payment deadlines under contracts. Without debt repayment, counterparties refused to supply food, medicine, equipment, and demanded prepayment for new supplies, which further aggravated the currency crisis. By the fall of 1989, Western banks began to doubt the advisability of providing new loans to the USSR. They were worried not only about the rapid growth of debt, but also about political instability in the country. Added to low oil prices was a collapse in oil production - from 500 to 300 million tons.

The Soviet government, faced with the reluctance of commercial banks to provide loans, was forced to turn directly to Western governments for politically motivated loans.

Store shelves were completely empty, food shortages became total. The province has long been accustomed to cards. In December 1990, rationed distribution of some products was introduced in Moscow, which had previously been supplied according to different standards.

In December 1990, M. S. Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This provoked a surge of criticism of his policies among broad sections of the population. The gap between the president's triumphs abroad and the results of his reforms at home has become apparent. The USSR entered 1991 without a plan or budget. All 15 republics consistently moved towards their sovereignty. There was a demarcation of political forces, the forks in “market or plan”, “democracy or authoritarianism”, “one party-state or multi-party system”, “pluralism or a single ideology” were realized. M. S. Gorbachev, speaking from a position of centrism, sought to stand above the political fray. It was a dangerous choice. But the President of the USSR still headed the party-state apparatus and remained Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

For the first time, meetings of the highest authority were broadcast on radio and television. Millions of people did not look away from loudspeakers and screens.

Newspapers with materials from the congress were in great demand.

“These were great weeks in the history of the country,” wrote A.N. Yakovlev. - An exciting event that marked the practical beginning of parliamentarism in the USSR and in Russia. I think there is still no complete understanding of the significance of this fact.”

Characterizing the prospects that opened up for our country in this regard, M.S. Gorbachev writes: “I don’t remember who was the first to say this, but everyone supported it: from now on, congresses of people’s deputies, and not congresses of the CPSU, become the main political forums that determine the life of the country.” And further: “This was a sharp turn, a real change of milestones, which should be followed by a gradual replacement of the old institutions of power, and even its symbols.”

That is, the coat of arms, banner and anthem.

Article 110 of the USSR Constitution stated: “The first meeting of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR after the elections is chaired by the Chairman of the Central Election Commission for the election of People’s Deputies of the USSR, and then by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or his deputy.” However, apparently fearing surprises, as soon as the presidium of the congress was elected, M.S. Gorbachev took the presidency into his own hands. In this regard, all subsequent work of the congress essentially became illegal.

After the report of the credentials commission, people's deputies elected the chairman of the Supreme Council, who became M.S. Gorbachev, then the Supreme Council itself.

When electing members of the Supreme Council, all candidates proposed by the opposition were failed, including B.N. Yeltsin. Then the next day, deputy from Omsk A. Kazannik resigned. The vacant seat was taken by Boris Nikolaevich.

I remember well how the above-mentioned episode was shown on television and how touching it looked. Only later did it become known that this whole story was played out according to a pre-drawn scenario.

It turns out that after the congress rejected the candidacy of B.N. during the election of members of the Supreme Council. Yeltsin, G.Kh. Popov met with M.S. Gorbachev and raised the question of the need to correct what had happened. “Gorbachev understood,” notes Gavriil Kharitonovich, “that if the Supreme Council, where neither Sakharov, nor Afanasyev, nor me was elected, turns out to have no opposition deputies at all, then it will not be possible to make it a lever of pressure on the Central Committee, as Mikhail Sergeevich imagined.” . But he saw no way out of this situation.

“And if we find a way out ourselves,” I asked, “will you support us?” “Yes,” he replied. And he kept his word. What happens next is well known. Siberian deputy Alexey Kazannik, after my conversation with him, decided to refuse to work in the Supreme Council. Following him in terms of the number of votes received was Yeltsin. That's how he ended up in the Supreme Council. But then the “aggressively obedient majority,” having seen through our trick, became indignant and began to demand new elections. Gorbachev replied: they say, everything is according to the regulations. If someone refuses, then the next one passes after him.”

According to the testimony of former assistant B.N. Yeltsin L. Sukhanova, M.S. Gorbachev not only showed interest in Boris Nikolayevich getting into the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but also ensured that a Committee for Architecture and Construction was created specifically for him in the Supreme Council.

This suggests that B.N. Yeltsin was assigned the role of leader of the opposition in the first Soviet parliament, and Mikhail Sergeevich contributed in every possible way to this.

The most heated debate at the congress revolved around the report “On the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR,” which was delivered by M.S. Gorbachev. After a heated debate, the congress decided to “move to a new model of the economy,” which would be characterized by a complete refusal now not of the party, as was said before, but of the state “from the functions of direct intervention in the operational management of economic units.” Translated into ordinary language, this meant a transition to a market economy.

At the same time, the parliamentary opposition took shape. G.H. Popov sets out the circumstances of its appearance as follows: “According to the regulations, only territorial groups were allowed to be created at the congress, and they were led by regional committee secretaries who strictly controlled their delegation, suppressing any dissent.”

As a result, says Gavriil Kharitonovich, at the very beginning of the congress, “our Moscow group - it included Yeltsin, Sakharov, Afanasyev, Adamovich, myself, and other opposition deputies - always found ourselves in the minority.” “Sakharov and I spoke with Gorbachev. He said that he would try not to interfere with our work.”

“But the parliamentary majority still crushed us. That’s when I proposed creating an interregional group. They say that if territorial deputy communities are envisaged, then interregional ones should also be legalized. This was, it seems, the only way, without going beyond the congress regulations, to unite opposition deputies. That's what we did."

There are reasons to question this version. The fact is that the Congress opened on May 25, and a day later, on the 27th, Gavriil Kharitonovich came to the podium and made the following statement: “A group of regional Moscow deputies from scientific organizations and creative unions considers it necessary to leave the all-Moscow delegation. We propose to think about forming an interregional independent deputy group and invite all fellow deputies to join this group.”

This gives reason to assume that the creation of an “independent deputy group” began even before the opening of the congress.

According to G.Kh. Popov, at first there were 60 people in the Interregional Deputy Group, then 70, then 100, by the end of the congress there were “150 deputies”. According to D. Matlock, “by the summer” there was a consolidation of “more than three hundred deputies.” Soon their number approached 400. And the alliance with the Balts made it possible to increase the number of opposition members to 1/4 - the right to demand the convening of a congress.

The opposition openly raised its banner when Academician A.D. was given the floor. Sakharov. He proposed adopting a decree on power, which would proclaim the abolition of Article 6 on the leading role of the party and the transfer of real power in the country to Soviets at all levels. And although this is precisely what the political reform was aimed at, M.S. Gorbachev refused to put the proposal to a vote.

The reason for this, apparently, was that, according to his plan, the completion of the political reform should have been elections to local Soviets, which were first scheduled for the fall of 1989, then postponed to March 1990. Therefore, M.S. Gorbachev rejected A.D.’s proposal. Sakharov not on the merits, but for tactical reasons.

It is unlikely that Andrei Dmitrievich and his like-minded people then expected to receive the necessary support, but they hoped in this way not only to rally the opposition at the congress itself, but also to use the demand for the abolition of Article 6 to unite the opposition throughout the country.

Three more questions played an important role in uniting the opposition: a) about the Tbilisi events of 1989, b) about the secret protocol of 1939 and c) about the case of T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.I. Ivanova. Special parliamentary commissions were created on all these issues. The first was headed by A.A. Sobchak, the second - A.N. Yakovlev, the third - R.A. Medvedev.

The second question was of particular importance for the fate of the country, on the solution of which the fate of not only the Baltic states, but also the entire Soviet Union largely depended.

On May 11, the issue of the Baltic states was specifically brought up at a meeting of the Politburo. “The day before yesterday,” we read in A.S.’s diary. Chernyaeva, - the PB considered the situation in the Baltic states. Six members of the PB, after various commissions and expeditions, submitted a note - pogrom, panic: “everything is collapsing,” “power is going to the popular fronts.” In this spirit, the work was carried out on the three first secretaries: Vaino (meaning Vaino Välyas - A.O.), Brazauskas, Vargis. But they did not allow themselves to be eaten. They behaved with dignity."

Moreover, as is clear from the diary of V.I. Vorotnikova, A. Brazauzkas reported that the Lithuanian communists “demand independence and full economic accounting.”

How did M.S. behave in this situation? Gorbachev? “We trust the first secretaries,” he said. - Otherwise it can not be. It is impossible to “identify the popular fronts, which are followed by 90 percent of the people of the republics, with extremists... If a referendum is announced, not a single [republic], not even Lithuania, “will leave.” Involve the leaders of the “popular fronts” in state and government activities, put them in positions... think about how to actually transform the federation... meet them halfway as much as possible.”

In his speech, M.S. Gorbachev also formulated the maximum that in this case he was ready to go. “The interests of the Union, the Center,” he emphasized, “are not very great: the army, the state apparatus, science. The rest is the business of the republics."

The rest is land ownership, industry, agriculture, transport, domestic and foreign trade, customs, finance, money issue, police, state security, domestic and foreign policy, i.e. almost everything, including the army, the state apparatus, and science, since laws about them and money were supposed to become the prerogative of the republics.

Thus M.S. Gorbachev demonstrated that when he spoke of reforming the Soviet Union as a federation, he meant turning it into a confederation, if not a commonwealth.

And none of the Politburo members were alarmed by this. None of them reacted to such a revelation from the Secretary General.

Is it any wonder then that on May 18, the Supreme Council of Lithuania “adopted amendments to the Constitution, according to which the laws of the USSR are in force after their approval by the Supreme Council of the republic. A declaration on state sovereignty and a law on the foundations of economic independence were also adopted.” Somewhat later, on July 28, the Supreme Council of Latvia adopted a declaration of sovereignty.

On June 1, 1989, Estonian deputy academician E.T. Lippmaa proposed the creation of a Commission for the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. This proposal was approved by the congress. Moreover, at the suggestion of M.S. Gorbachev, A.N. was included in the commission. Yakovlev, who became its chairman.

Here, it should probably be noted that the International Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on International Policy, headed by him, discussed the issue of unleashing the Second World War, including the secret protocol on August 23, 1939, as early as March 28, 1989, i.e. a day after the elections of people's deputies took place. However, it was not possible to achieve a decision condemning this protocol.

But on May 18, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR adopted the Declaration “On the State Sovereignty of Lithuania,” which condemned the fact of the republic’s inclusion in 1940 into the USSR and addressed “the Congress of People’s Deputies and the government of the USSR with a demand to condemn secret deals between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany 1939 -1941, to declare them illegal and ineffective from the moment of their signing.” On the same day, May 18, a similar resolution regarding the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” was adopted by the Supreme Council of Estonia. Later Latvia joined them.

Consequently, the mentioned Estonian deputy acted in full accordance with the instructions of A.N. Yakovlev and decisions of the Supreme Councils of the Baltic republics. It is no coincidence that Alexander Nikolaevich was elected chairman of the congress commission on this issue.

The commission included Ch. Aitmatov, Alexy II, G. Arbatov, L. Harutyunyan, Y. Afanasyev, I. Drutse, A. Kazannik, V. Korotic, V. Shinkaruk. V.M. became the “working coordinator”. Falin.

On August 6, 1989, “Soviet Russia” published an article “August 39 - before and after,” which posed the questions: why was the question of the secret protocol raised and what would the recognition of its illegality mean, and gave the following answer to them: “ If we consider changes in the Soviet western State border after August 23, 1939 as a consequence of an illegal treaty, then the automatic result of abandoning the 1939 treaty should be the restoration of the Soviet western border at the time of August 23, 1939. This will mean the loss of Soviet sovereignty over the three Baltic republics, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, Northern Bukovina and Moldova, the northern part of the Leningrad region (Karelian Isthmus and the northern shore of Lake Ladoga) and part of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic."

Speaking at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR A.V. Gorbunov proposed making significant changes to the Constitution of the USSR: a) supplement it with a Union Treaty, which the union republics could sign, b) transfer to the union republics full power on their territory, c) assign to the union republics all property located on their territory.

Essentially A.V. Gorbunov, on behalf of the Latvian delegation, raised the question of turning the USSR into a confederation. And although his proposal was not put to a vote, it did not raise any objections from the leadership of the CPSU and the USSR.

As Professor M.L. recalled. Bronstein, “at the first Congress of People’s Deputies” A.D. Sakharov made “a proposal to reform the Soviet Union on the model of the European Union,” i.e. essentially with the idea of ​​destroying the USSR. “Among the supporters of a phased... reform of the USSR according to a model close to the European Union,” was M.L. Bronstein.

Many consider the actions of A.D. Sakharov at the congress as the actions of an enthusiast - a loner. However, according to M.L. Bronstein, during the work of the congress A.D. Sakharov maintained relations with M.S. Gorbachev, and Viktor Palm, one of the founders of the Popular Front of Estonia, acted as a shuttle between them.

Thus, the First Congress of People's Deputies can be considered as a turning point in the history of our country, which became an important milestone towards the removal of the CPSU from power, the transition of the Soviet Union to a market economy and preparation for the destruction of the USSR.

The following decision of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was in full accordance with this: “Based on international norms and principles, including those contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Agreement and agreements at the Vienna meetings, bringing domestic legislation into conformity with it, the USSR will contribute to the creation of a global community of rule of law states."

Notes:

Medvedev V.A. Perestroika had its chance // Breakthrough to freedom. About perestroika twenty years later. Critical analysis. M, 2005. P. 67.

Gorbachev M.S. From a speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on March 11, 1985 // Collection. op. T. 2. M., 2008. P. 157.

Volkogonov D.A. Seven leaders. Gallery of leaders of the USSR. Book 2. Leonid Brezhnev. Yuri Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko. Mikhail Gorbachev. S. 1997. pp. 304–305.

Dobrynin A. Completely confidential. Ambassador to Washington under six US presidents (1962–1986) M., 1996. P. 607.

XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. February 23 - March 3, 1981 Verbatim report. T. 1. M., 1981. P. 40.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 2. P. 7.

Brzezinski 3. Large chessboard. M., 1998. pp. 13–20.

Dobrynin A. Completely confidential. P. 607.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 207.

Gaidar E.T. Death of the Empire. pp. 131–205; Ostrovsky A.V. Who installed Gorbachev? pp. 30–32, 37–41.

Chernyaev A.S. Six years with Gorbachev. P. 41.

Dobrynin A. Completely confidential. P. 607.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 2. P. 311.

Right there. P. 312.

“We had no time for Europe.” Alexander Yakovlev about the chaos in the foreign policy of the USSR in the mid-80s // Kommersant - power. 2005. No. 8. P. 45.

Christians F.V. Roads to Russia. Through the storms of time. M., 1990. P. 129.

International banks and insurance companies in the world of capital. Economic and statistical reference book. M., 1988. pp. 98–101.

Christians F.V. 1) Roads to Russia. Through the storms of time. P. 129; 2) You underestimate the time factor. The conversation was conducted by V. Zapevalov // Literary newspaper. 1990. June 13.

Christians F.V. Roads to Russia. Through the storms of time. P. 129.

From a conversation with the Chairman of the Board of Deutsche Bank W. Christians. April 18, 1985 // AGF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 4506. 2 l.

Christians F.V. You underestimate the time factor. The conversation was conducted by V. Zapevalov // Literary newspaper. 1990. June 13.

Medvedev V.T. The man behind. M., 1994. pp. 290–291.

Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. P. 165.

Gorbachev M.S. Reflections on the past and future. 2nd ed. M., 2002. P. 228.

Speech before members of the British Parliament on December 18, 1984 // Gorbachev M.S. Collection op. T. 2. P. 130.

Yakovlev A.N. Twilight. P. 413.

Ligachev E.K. Warning. pp. 117–118.

Right there. P. 122.

Shakhnazarov G.Kh. - Gorbachev M.S. September 1988 // AGF. F. 5. 0p. 1. D. 18165. L. 1.

Archives of the Kremlin and Old Square. P. 199. On February 2, similar information on the RSFSR was presented to the CPSU Central Committee by V.I. Vorotnikov // Ibid. P. 200.

Anniversary of Leonid Batkin // Radio Liberty. June 29, 2007 // http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/Transcript/400037.html# ixzz2KsXxAw00.

Transcript of conversation with Yu.A. Prokofiev at the Russian Central Institute of Arts and Sciences on October 30, 1996 // RGASPI. F. 660. Op. 6. D. 15. L. 216.

Right there. P. 100.

Sheinis V.L. The Rise and Fall of Parliament. T. 1. P. 120.

“The intelligentsia created a political club...” On the creation of the discussion club “Moscow Tribune” // Russian Thought. Paris, 1988. October 21.

Sheinis V.L. The Rise and Fall of Parliament. T. 1. P. 119.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 374; Kolesnikov A. The General Secretary’s condition is stable // Kommersant. 2001. August 17.

Three days. Conversation between Alexander Prokhanov and Valery Boldin // Tomorrow. 1999. No. 33. August 17, 1999.

Sukhanov L. Three years with Yeltsin. Notes of the first secretary. Riga, 1992. P. 49.

Sukhanov L. Three years with Yeltsin. P. 27.

Pavlov B.S. August from the inside. pp. 22, 25.

Yakovlev A.N. Twilight. P. 406.

A year after the resignation of B.N. Yeltsin gave an interview to BBC, CBS and ABC (Yeltsin B.N. Meeting at the Higher Komsomol School. November 12, 1988 // RGANI. F. 89. Op. 8. D. 29 L. 22).

How the policy of perestroika was “done.” P. 46.

Sukhanov L. Three years with Yeltsin. P. 59.

Pribylovsky V. Yeltsin Boris Nikolaevich // Antikompromat. Public Internet Library of V. Pribylovsky; XIX All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. June 28 - July 1, 1988. T. 2. P. 243.

Right there. pp. 55–62.

Yeltsin B.N. Confession on a given topic. M.: Ogonyok, 1990. pp. 87–93.

Matlock D. Death of an Empire. P. 105.

Olbik A.S. What's around the bend? Or 30 hours in the company of interesting interlocutors. Riga. 1990. pp. 116–135.

Social justice - the compass of perestroika // Soviet youth. Riga. 1988. August 4 (interview with B.N. Yeltsin, conversation conducted by A. Olbik).

Social justice - the compass of perestroika // Jurmala. 1988. August 4, (interview with B.N. Yeltsin, conversation conducted by A. Olbik).

Olbik A.S. Nostalgic chronicles. M., 2006. section - 4/ section - 4–12/6409 - Nostalgicheskie_hroniki_ sbornik_intervyu - 01bik_ Aleksandr. html).

Braithwaite R. Beyond the Moscow River. Upside down world. Per. from English M., 2004. P. 145.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 414.

For peace and progress (interview of G. Zhavoronkov with A.D. Sakharov) // Moscow News. No. 6. February 5th. pp. 8–9; See also: Sakharov A.D. About peace, perestroika and progress // Interlocutor. 1989. No. 8. S. 5.

Sakharov A.D. Anxiety and hope. M., 1991. P. 259.

For peace and progress (interview of G. Zhavoronkov with A.D. Sakharov) // Moscow News. No. 6. February 5th. pp. 8–9.

Ostrovsky A.V. Who installed Gorbachev? pp. 238–239.

Sakharov A.D. Anxiety and hope. P. 259.

Efremov G. We are people to each other. P. 169.

Peters J. The heart of Latvia is still alive // ​​Baltic path to freedom. P. 98.

Matlock D. Death of an Empire. P. 192.

Grigoryan R. Unknown pages of the “Singing Revolution” // Anatomy of Independence. P. 177.

Serkov A.I. Russian Freemasonry. 1731–2000. Encyclopedic Dictionary. M., 2001. S. 547, 1154–1156, 1165–1167, 1177–1178, 1205–1207.

Zemtsov I.G. People and masks. Book 1. P. 64.

Ostrovsky A.V. Solzhenitsyn: farewell to myth. pp. 551–552.

Soros about Soros. Staying ahead of change. George Soros with Byron Wien and Christina Coenen. Per. from English M., 1996. P. 133.

Kolesnikov A. Unknown Chubais. pp. 68–69.

Right there. P. 69.

According to R.B. Evdokimov, the criminal underground began to seek connections with the opposition movement and provide it with material support already in 1987 (Recorded conversation with R.B. Evdokimov. St. Petersburg. February 19, 2007 // Author’s archive). And in 1990, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, P. Lucinsky stated: “The shadow economy serves the entire opposition. He gives her money in bags. They openly give her printing tools, paper, etc.” (Meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. September 13, 1990 // RGANI. F. 89. Op. 42, d. 29. L. 23).

In the Central Election Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR // Izvestia. 1989. April 5.

Message from the Central Election Commission on the results of the elections of people's deputies of the USSR in 1989. April 4, 1989 // Izvestia. 1989. April 5.

Right there. See also: Spring 89. Geography and anatomy of parliamentary elections. M. 1990.

List of people's deputies of the USSR elected from territorial, national-territorial districts and from public organizations // Izvestia. 1989. April 5. pp. 2–12.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. pp. 426–430. In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. pp. 460–466.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 426.

Senin V.T. Confession of complicity. P. 205.

“I have walked the constitutional path to the end”: Mikhail Gorbachev about the events of five years ago and what followed them // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1996. December 25.

Shakhnazarov G.Kh. With and without leaders. P. 331.

In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee... P. 464.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 429.

See: Sobchak A.A. Tbilisi break, or Bloody Sunday 1989. M., 1993. Froyanov I.Ya. Diving into the abyss. St. Petersburg, 1996. pp. 251–278; Tbilisi, April 1989. Publication SV. Popova, Yu.V. Vasilyeva, A.D. Chernyaeva // Historical archive. 1993. No. 3. From 95–122.

Sobchak A.A. Tbilisi break. P. 101 (report by I.N. Rodionov).

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 517–518 (speech by T. V. Gamkrelidze).

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 524–526 (speech by I.N. Rodionov); Sobchak A. A. Tbilisi break. P. 102 (report by I.N. Rodionov).

Message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic // Dawn of the East. 1989. April 11; Sobchak A.A. Tbilisi break. P. 102 (report by I.N. Rodionov).

Right there. P. 103.

Right there. P. 97.

Right there. P. 106.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 540–545 (speech by D.I. Patiashivli).

Sobchak A.A. Tbilisi break. P. 102 (report by I.N. Rodionov).

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 526 (speech by I.N. Rodinov).

Bobkov F.D. KGB and power. P. 372.

Ligachev E.K. Warning. pp. 320–331.

Beshlos M., Talbott S. At the highest level. P. 62.

Gorbachev M.S. Reflections on the past and future. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 2002. P. 115.

Bobkov F.D. KGB and power. pp. 369–370.

Statement by the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Jumber Patiashvili. Bloody April Tbilisi. I want to tell you everything. Interview with journalists K. Abrahamyan and T. Boykov. February 28, 1992 // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). Essays. Documentation. Author - compiler G.P. Lezhava / ed. M.N. Guboglo. M., 1998. P. 154.

Statement by the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Jumber Patiashvili. Bloody April Tbilisi. I want to tell you everything. Interview with journalists K. Abrahamyan and T. Boykov. February 28, 1992 // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 155.

Conclusion of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to investigate the events that took place in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 // Historical archive. 1993. No. 3. P. 111. (Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 124).

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 518 (speech by T. V. Gamkrelidze).

Growth Yu. Tragic night in Tbilisi. Report by a Literaturnaya Gazeta observer who witnessed the events on the night of April 8-9 // Youth of Georgia. Tbilisi, 1989. April 13.

Zhavoronkov G., Mikeladze A., Imedashvili D. Untruth is always at our loss // Moscow News. 1989. No. 21. May 21st. P. 13.

Right there. 146–147.

Right there. P. 147.

Right there. P. 150.

Right there. P. 147.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 517–518 (speech by T.V. Gamkrelidze).

Information letter from the Prosecutor General of the USSR Trubin N.S. “On the results of investigations into the Tbilisi events of April 9, 1989.” // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 150.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 526 (speech by I.N. Rodionov).

Information letter from the Prosecutor General of the USSR Trubin N.S. “On the results of investigations into the Tbilisi events of April 9, 1989.” // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 146.

Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. T. 1. P. 527 (speech by I.N. Rodionov).

Information letter from the Prosecutor General of the USSR Trubin N.S. “On the results of investigations into the Tbilisi events of April 9, 1989.” // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). pp. 145, 150.

Right there. P. 150.

Romanov V., Uglanov A. Forty days later // Arguments and facts. 1989. No. 21. May 27 - June 2. P. 7.

Hart G. Russia is shaking the world. P. 240; Hosking D. History of the Soviet Union. 1917–1911. 2nd ed. P. 497.

Bobkov F.D. KGB and power. P. 373.

Information letter from the Prosecutor General of the USSR Trubin N.S. “On the results of investigations into the Tbilisi events of April 9, 1989 // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 148.

Right there. P. 149.

Right there. P. 148.

Conclusion of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to investigate the events that took place in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 // Historical archive. 1993. No. 3. P. 116.

Information letter from the Prosecutor General of the USSR Trubin N.S. “On the results of investigations into the Tbilisi events of April 9, 1989.” // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 148.

Right there. P. 149.

From the conclusion of the Commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the events in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989.” May 21, 1989 // Sobchak A.A. Tbilisi break... P. 201.

Statement by the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Jumber Patiashvili. Bloody April Tbilisi. I want to tell you everything. Interview with journalists K. Abrahamyan and T. Boykov. February 28, 1992 // Ethnopolitical situation in Georgia and the Abkhaz question (1987 - early 1992). P. 154.

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the convening of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR” // Izvestia. 1989. April 16.

This appeal was signed by A. Muzykantsky, L. Sukhanov and L. Shemaev. Recording of a conversation with A.N. Murashev. Moscow. July 1, 2008 // Author’s archive.

Right there. P. 160.

Murashev A. Interregional deputy group // Ogonyok. 1990. No. 32. P. 6.

Karyakin Yu.F. Conversion. From blindness to insight. M., 2007. P. 214.

Right there. P. 65.

Popov G.Kh. Again in opposition. P. 60.

From an interview with M.N. Poltoranina // Andriyanov V., Chernyak A. Lonely Tsar in the Kremlin. Book 1. M., 1999. pp. 249–250.

Murashev A. Interregional deputy group // Ogonyok. 1990. No. 32. P. 6.

Popov G.Kh. Again in opposition. P. 33.

Kraev V. 5th Column of the 5th Directorate // Duel. 2001. No. 11. S. 5.

Popov G.Kh. About the revolution of 1989–1991. P. 167.

Who's against it? // Light. 1989. No. 18. pp. 4–6 (conversation between V. Vyzhutovich and G.Kh. Popov). The issue went to press on April 11 (ibid., p. 2).

Chernyaev A.S. Joint outcome. P. 791.

In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. pp. 460–466.

Right there. P. 470.

Chernyaev A.S. Joint outcome. pp. 787–788; Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 2. P. 426.

In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. pp. 467–470.

Braithwaite R. Beyond the Moscow River. Upside down world. P. 138.

Chernyaev A.S. Joint outcome. P. 790.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 432. In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. P. 470.

Ibid; Gorbachev M.S. Life and Reforms. Book 1. pp. 431–432.

Chernyaev A.S. Joint outcome. P. 789.

Report of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on April 25, 1989 // Pravda. 1989. April 26.

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Audit Commission of the CPSU. B. d. // Truth. April 26, 1989.

Vorotnikov V.I. And it was like that. pp. 256–257.

From an interview with M.N. Poltoranina // Andriyanov V., Chernyak A. Lonely Tsar in the Kremlin. Book 1. P. 60.

Right there. P. 61.

Ligachev E.K. Warning. pp. 245–246.

Right there. pp. 248–249.

Romanov G.V. Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, General Prosecutor's Office of the USSR. May 18, 1989 // RGANI. F. 89. Op. 24. D. 23. L. 3.

Ligachev E.K. Warning. pp. 248–249.

Information message about the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee // Pravda. 1989. May 23; Vorotnikov V.I. And it was like that. P. 269. From the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, May 22, 1989 // In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. pp. 483–491.

May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (May 22, 1989). Verbatim report // RGANI. F. 2. Op. 5. D. 266. L. 19.

Sobchak A.A. Walking into power. 2nd ed. M., 1991. S. 31, 128–129.

Solovyov V.. Klepikova E. Boris Yeltsin. Political metamorphoses. M., 1992. P. 137.

Right there. P. 92.

Dulles A. CIA vs. KGB. The art of espionage. M., 2000. P. 303.

Sukhanov L. Three years with Yeltsin. P. 180.

Matlock D. Death of an Empire. P. 166.

Right there. P. 163.

Right there. P. 201.

Sukhanov L. Three years with Yeltsin. pp. 180–184.

Matlock D. Death of an Empire. P. 183.

Chernyaev A.S. Joint outcome. P. 795.

Memo by R. Bogdanov on US policy towards the USSR on May 5, 1989 // AGF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 7950. L. 2.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. P. 3; T. 3. pp. 206–232.

Yakovlev A.N. Twilight. P. 414.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 434.

Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR.” December 1, 1988 // Pravda. 1988. December 3.

Right there. pp. 56–109.

Right there. pp. 111–196, 201–222.

Right there. pp. 424–434.

Popov G.Kh. About the revolution of 1989–1991. pp. 179–180.

Sukhanov L. Three years with Yeltsin. P. 49.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 1. M, 1990. P. 435–471.

Right there. T. 3. pp. 408–429.

Vyzhutovich V. The first Soviet parliament became the gravedigger of communist omnipotence (interview with G.Kh. Popov) // Website of A.A. Sobchak (http://sobchak.org/rus/main.php3? fp=f02000000_ A000409).

Popov G.Kh. Again in opposition. P. 67.

Matlock D. Death of an Empire. P. 182.

Losev I. What is behind the word “democracy”? Polemical reflections after the conference of democratic movements and organizations // Leningradskaya Pravda. 1989. October 26.

Popov G.Kh. Again in opposition. P. 67.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 3. pp. 325–328.

“According to the plan, the Congress was supposed to make the Soviets a real power” (Chernyaev A.S. The logic of “perestroika”) // Free Thought. 2005. No. 4. P. 116.

Right there. T. 1. pp. 517–549. T. 2. pp. 241–247.

Right there. pp. 190–201.

Right there. T. 1. pp. 550–566.

Right there. T. 2. pp. 112–120 (Tbilisi events), 250–266 (Gdlyan-Ivanov case), 375–377 (1939 pact).

Sobchak A.A. Tbilisi break. pp. 24–26.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T 2. pp. 375–377. Yakovlev A.N. Pensieve of memory. P. 280.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 2. pp. 250–266.

In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee... P. 480–482.

Chernyaev A.S. Joint outcome. P. 794.

In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. P. 481.

Right there. pp. 200–201, 375–377.

From a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on International Politics on March 28, 1989. Looking into the past // News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 7. pp. 28–38.

Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR “On the state sovereignty of Lithuania” // Soviet Lithuania. 1989. May 19.

Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 516.

Information resolution on the eleventh session of the Supreme Council of the ESSR of the eleventh convocation // Soviet Estonia. 1989. May 19.

Yakovlev A.N. Twilight. P. 416.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 2. pp. 23–28.

Bronstein M. At the turn of eras. P. 53

Right there. P. 25.

Right there. pp. 90–91.

First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. May 25 - June 9. Verbatim report. T. 3, M., 1989. P. 421.